Smith v. Monti

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

MICHAEL SMITH, )

K57543, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

WARDEN MONTI, )

L. WALKER, ) Case No. 22-cv-435-DWD

H. WIGGS, )

B. ALLARD, )

SGT. DEAN, )

CONWAY, )

D. KNAUER, )

A. GALBRAITH, )

D. RIGHTNOWAR, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Michael Smith, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(IDOC) at Shawnee Correctional Center (Shawnee), brings this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights. (Doc.

17). This matter is now before the Court on Plaintiff’s second amended complaint. (Doc.

23). The Court concluded that Plaintiff’s original complaint (Doc. 1) and motion for

preliminary injunction (Doc. 3) were insufficient because the allegations were overly

broad, combined too many types of claims into a single lawsuit, and lacked detail about

the personal involvement of each defendant. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc.

17), was dismissed for the same reasons (Doc. 18).

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 23) is now before the Court for

preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is

required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a)-(b). Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a

defendant who by law is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally

construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

The Complaint

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is 87-pages in length, including exhibits,

but the factual allegations span only 13-pages. As with the First Amended Complaint,

Plaintiff does not provide a factual narrative that clearly incorporates allegations against

individual defendants. Instead, Plaintiff gives a 4-page summary of events with few

mentions of individual actors, and then he provides paragraphs of allegations against

defendants identified as “Defendant 1”, “Defendant 2,” and so on so forth. For example,

he alleges that

Defendant #2 – Warden of Programs, in violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment constitutional right, and Fourteenth Amendment

constitutional right, was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s living

conditions, while house in cell 1-B-73 and 3-A-74, that seriously deprived

Plaintiff of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. As a result,

Plaintiff has suffered mental and emotional trauma, and the Warden of

Programs did not address Defendant Conway’s assault on the Plaintiff.

(Doc. 23 at 20). Plaintiff included similar paragraphs for Defendants 1-9. Some

paragraphs are more detailed than others. For example, as to Defendant # 7 (Sgt. Dean),

Plaintiff wrote:

Defendant #7, Sgt. Dean, in violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

constitutional right and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right, failed

to abate harm and act on Plaintiff’s request for adequate medical treatment

following dining hall incident concerning Defendant Conway. Dean was

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s request for a make-up lunch meal, and

refused to provide the Plaintiff with disinfect[ant] to clean cell 3-A-74,

indigent/hygiene bag(s) to wash his hands and body regularly, upon

knowledge Plaintiff was in possession and complained about inadequate

and filthy bedding. Defendant #7, denied Plaintiff access to amenities and

basic quality of life essentials, as a ranking staff member with access to core

hygiene supplies, dating back week 1 of November through to November

17, 2021. As a result (Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement had not changed

from cell move 1-B-73 to 3-A-74), Plaintiff has suffered headaches and

sleepless nights, mental, physical, and emotional trauma.

(Doc. 23 at 23-24).

The primary focus of Plaintiff’s second amended complaint seems to be conditions

that he experienced in two different cells, although there are other allegations concerning

topics such as access to the courts or an officer’s careless behavior around the rash on

Plaintiff’s arm. As relief Plaintiff seeks compensation, a declaratory judgment, and

various forms of injunctive relief. (Doc. 23 at 7, 26).

Analysis

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to include “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Under

Rule 8(d), “each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” A generic assertion that

one or more defendants engaged in certain acts or constitutional violations is not

adequately specific. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009). The primary purpose

of these rules is fair notice. Because claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be based on a

defendant’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation, each individual

defendant plaintiff wishes to sue must be able to understand what he or she is alleged to

have done to violate plaintiff’s rights. See e.g., Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th

Cir. 1995) (“To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant

was personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.”) citing Sheik-Abdi

v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240, 1248 (7th Cir. 1994). “A complaint must contain enough details

to connect an individual defendant’s actions with a discrete harm. See e.g., Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Additionally, to state a

valid claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish not only that a state actor violated his

constitutional rights, but also that said violation caused the plaintiff an injury or damages.

Lord v. Beahm, 952 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 2020) (affirming summary judgment against an

inmate because he did not identify an injury beyond minor scratches).

1. Defendant Monti (Warden at Shawnee)

In the factual narrative, Plaintiff did not make any clear allegations that described

personal actions taken by Monti in violation of his rights. In the paragraphs at the end of

the complaint that were targeted at individual defendants, Plaintiff alleged that Monti

was deliberately indifferent to his conditions of confinement based on poor lighting,

‘unsanitary’ conditions, and lack of access to ‘adequate amenities and basic quality of life

essentials.’ (Doc. 23 at 18-19). Plaintiff alleges that as a result, he suffered a skin rash,

and mental and emotional trauma. He also alleges Monti committed deliberate

indifference or gross negligence by failing to supervise his subordinates who provided

inadequate conditions of confinement. Plaintiff’s allegations against Monti are

insufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment and § 1983 because § 1983

liability turns on the personal involvement of a defendant. It is not at all clear what

personal actions Monti took that harmed Plaintiff. Additionally, supervisors are

responsible for their own actions under § 1983, but they are not liable for the actions of

their subordinates. Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2018). The factual and

legal allegations provided against Monti are insufficient to state a claim based on his

personal involvement, so Plaintiff’s claim against Monti is dismissed for failure to state a

claim.

2. Defendant L. Walker or John/Jane Doe (Assistant Warden of Programs)

In the factual narrative of his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that on November 17,

2021, his conditions of confinement got worse, so he personally complained to Dean and

Walker about his issues, and he submitted a new grievance. (Doc. 23 at 16-17). In the

paragraphs after the complaint, Plaintiff generically alleges that Defendant Walker “was

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s living conditions[…] that seriously deprived Plaintiff

of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” (Doc. 23 at 20). These allegations

are insufficient to state a claim against Walker because Plaintiff does not indicate how

conditions ‘got worse,’ nor does he describe Walker’s personal involvement other than a

one-time verbal notification of problems on November 17. As a supervisor, the Assistant

Warden of Programs may not have a general responsibility for the actions of

subordinates, but Plaintiff’s allegation that he personally notified this Defendant of

problems could create an inference of personal involvement. Despite this potential

inference, it is impossible to discern from the complaint what the problematic conditions

were on November 17, or how the conditions had gotten ‘worse’ than they previously

were. By Plaintiff’s own account, he started in an ‘unsanitary’ and unsatisfactory cell on

October 12, 2021, but by October 29, 2021, he had been moved to a different cell. The only

specific issue that he lists with the new cell in the complaint is a pending work order for

the lights. He does not describe the problem with the lights in detail, nor does he indicate

if he specifically raised this problem with the cell to Walker. Given the sparsity of the

allegations about Walker’s personal involvement with the conditions of the cell, the

conditions claim against Walker is insufficient.

Plaintiff also suggests that he told Walker that Defendant Conway bumped into a

rash on his arm, but he does not detail what he asked Walker to do about the situation,

or how Walker responded. The mere mention that he told Walker about something is

insufficient to state a claim against Walker.

3. Defendant D. Rightnowar (Assistant Warden of Operations)

Plaintiff’s only mention of Rightnowar in the factual allegations is a conclusory

statement that Rightnowar “had knowledge of his complaints and grievance.” (Doc. 23

at 15). In the enumerated paragraphs, Plaintiff alleged that Rightnowar failed to provide

him “adequate shelter, food, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” (Doc. 23 at

21). Plaintiff’s allegations against Rightnowar are nothing more that legal conclusions,

without any detailed factual support to demonstrate Rightnowar’s personal involvement.

A supervisor’s mere role to oversee an aspect of prison operations does not immediately

make him liable for the actions of others. See e.g. Horshaw, 910 F.3d at 1029. Additionally,

a prison official who processed or reviewed an inmate grievance but did not participate

in the underlying conduct is not liable for the underlying conduct. See e.g. Owens v. Evans,

878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2017). The allegations presented are not sufficient to state a

claim against Defendant Rightnowar.

4. Defendant H. Wiggs (Business office administrator)

Plaintiff’s only factual allegations against Wiggs are generic allegations that Wiggs

was aware of grievances or complaints, and that Wiggs continued to fail to provide “core

hygiene items and necessities.” (Doc. 23 at 15, 17). In the enumerated paragraphs,

Plaintiff alleges that Wiggs refused to provide items like soap, shampoo, clean sheets,

lotion, detergent, etc.. (Doc. 23 at 21). In support of his complaint, Plaintiff submitted a

few slips that it appears he addressed to the ‘business office’ about his desire for

commissary or certain products. In response, the business office appears to have noted

that the requested items were out of stock, but that items had been re-ordered to satisfy

inmate orders. Plaintiff does not explain how Wiggs would have been aware of

grievances, and the grievances he submitted in support of the complaint do not appear

to be signed by Wiggs. Based on the available information and exhibits, Plaintiff’s claims

against Wiggs concerning hygiene items and necessities are insufficient.

To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that Wiggs restricted his access to commissary

items, the access to commissary privileges does not implicate the ‘minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities,’ so this hinderance does not amount to a constitutional harm.

See e.g., Smith v. Dodd, 2022 WL 2669160 (S.D. Ill. 2022) (there is no right to commissary

under federal law); Robinson v. Illinois State Correctional Center Stateville Warden, 890

F.Supp. 715, 718 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (finding that restrictions on commissary privileges did

not violate the constitution). By contrast, Wiggs might be held liable if he prevented

Plaintiff from all access to the minimal civilized measures of life, but Plaintiff’s allegations

are far too vague and conclusory to show that Wiggs personally implemented such a

restriction. Plaintiff alleged that the original hygiene items he was issued lacked “a face

towel, t-shirts, change of uniform, shower shoes, or cleaning materials for cell sanitation,”

but these items are not clearly essential. Although these items might be desirable, it is

not obvious they are necessary for a civilized life.1 Plaintiff’s claim against Wiggs is

insufficient.

5. Defendant Conway (Food services supervisor)

In the narrative of the complaint, Plaintiff alleged that “Defendant Conway

bumped into one of Plaintiff’s infected, irritated, rash areas, and denied him 1 of 3

mandatory prepared meals as a supervisor, through means of retaliation.” (Doc. 23 at

17). In the enumerated paragraphs, Plaintiff alleges that Conway intentionally bumped

into him, causing a blister or scab to bleed, and that Conway refused to file an incident

report or send him for medical care. (Doc. 23 at 22). After the incident, he claims Conway

contacted dining staff and caused Plaintiff to be denied a lunch meal, or a make-up meal.

These allegations do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

1 A commissary order slip Plaintiff submitted in support of his complaint expressed a desire for four bars of soap, and

two face towels. He then included requests for a significant number of food items, followed by detergent, sheets,

deodorant and toothpaste. The only item sought that he alleges he was originally missing from hygiene items was

face towels. (Doc. 23 at 80).

As to the allegation that Conway bumped into Plaintiff’s scab or blister and caused

it to bleed, plaintiff must allege both an objectively serious situation, and subjective

intent. Plaintiff alleges that Conway acted on purpose, but even if Conway acted

intentionally, Plaintiff has not described a harm of objectively serious proportions. Minor

scratches, bruises, or bleeding do not amount to a constitutional violation. See, Lord, 952

F.3d at 905 (affirming summary judgment against an inmate because he did not identify

an injury beyond minor scratches).

As to the allegation that Conway retaliated by denying Plaintiff a single meal or

make-up meal, this issue also does not rise to the level of a constitutional harm, nor does

it amount to retaliation. A missed meal does not violate the constitution and can be a

common part of ordinary life. See, Ybarra v. Neal, 2021 WL 5741328, *2 (N.D. Ind. 2021)

(missing a single meal does not amount to a constitutional violation). To show retaliation,

a plaintiff must identify protected speech, an action taken in response to that speech that

would chill a person of ordinary firmness, and a causal link. Plaintiff’s allegations do not

satisfy any of these components, so his claims against Conway are insufficient.

6. Defendant D. Knauer (Administrative Review Board)

Defendant Knauer is not mentioned in the factual narrative. In the enumerated

paragraphs, Plaintiff alleges that Knauer violated his rights by failing to respond to

correspondence to the Administrative Review Board (ARB) about his many concerns and

conditions of confinement. As the Court previously explained in regards to claims

against Knauer, “a state’s inmate grievance procedures do not give rise to a liberty

interest protected by the due process clause,” Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th

Cir. 1995), and the failure of prison officials to follow state created procedures does not

violate the Constitution, Maust v. Headley, 959 F.2d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 1992). Knauer’s only

apparent involvement in this case was her administrative processing of grievances. She

did not have any apparent involvement in the underlying conduct. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s claims against Knauer are insufficient.

7. Defendant Dean (sergeant)

In the factual narrative of his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that on November 17,

2021, his conditions of confinement got worse so he personally complained to Dean and

Walker about his issues, and he submitted a new grievance. (Doc. 23 at 16-17). In the

enumerated paragraphs, Plaintiff alleges that Dean should be held responsible for

basically everything he has discussed in his complaint in relation to his confinement, his

cell placement, his desire for hygiene materials, his desire for medical care after Conway

bumped into his arm, and his desire for a make-up meal after Conway denied a meal.

The problem with the allegations against Dean is that they are overly generic.

Plaintiff alleges at many different points of his pleadings that the conditions of his cell

were ‘unsanitary’ and that he wanted cleaning materials, but he never provides a clear

description of the problem. Although the physical condition of a dirty cell can amount to

a constitutional violation, not every dirty cell does amount to such a violation. Courts

take a holistic view of the alleged harmful conditions, both the type of conditions and the

duration factor into the existence of a constitutional violation. See e.g., Gray v. Hardy, 826

F.3d 1000, 1005-06 (7th Cir. 2016) (conditions that taken alone might not amount to a

constitutional violation, can add up to a violation if taken together they create an extreme

deprivation). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dean did not do enough about the

conditions of his cell from the first week of November thru November 17, 2021. This is a

short duration. It is also not clear during this timeframe what specific conditions were

serious or bothersome. Plaintiff’s complaint and allegations are too difficult to follow to

discern a sufficient claim against Dean based on the condition of the cell.

Additionally, not every medical ailment amounts to a constitutional violation.

Plaintiff alleges that a blister or scar on his arm bled when Conway bumped into him, but

minor skin irritations of this nature do not amount to a sufficiently serious condition. See

e.g. Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 722 (7th Cir. 2021). Therefore, it is not clear that Dean

should be held liable for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

8. Defendant B. Allard (clinical services supervisor)

Plaintiff alleged generically in the factual allegations that Allard was aware of the

conditions of his cell and his various needs, and in the enumerated paragraphs he

specifically claims that Allard was responsible for harms he described as the ‘counseling

staff supervisor.’ (Doc. 23 at 15, 24). These allegations are insufficient for reasons

described above. There is no concrete link between any discrete harmful condition of

Plaintiff’s cell, and Allard’s personal actions. Additionally, Allard’s role as a supervisor

is insufficient to establish any sort of liability under § 1983.

9. Defendant A. Galbraith (Librarian/paralegal)

In the factual narrative, Plaintiff alleges that Galbraith was aware of his complaints

about his initial cell—1-B-73. (Doc. 23 at 15). In the enumerated paragraphs, Plaintiff

alleges that Galbraith prevented him from access to the law library despite knowing

about the conditions of his cell, his lack of funds, and his pending court deadlines. (Doc.

23 at 24-25). He alleges that as a result of the denial (which was due in part to his visible

rash), he missed deadlines in a criminal case and a civil appeal. An access-to-the-courts

claim hinges on whether there was prejudice to a non-frivolous legal claim related to a

prisoner’s conviction, sentence, or conditions of confinement. Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d

965, 969 (7th Cir. 2006). To state a claim based on denial of access to the courts, an inmate

should ‘spell out’ the connection between the denial of access, and prejudice suffered to

the presentation of a non-frivolous legal claim. Id. The “predicate claim [must] be

described well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous’ test and to show that the ‘arguable

nature of the underlying claim is more than hope[.]” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403,

416 (2002). Although Plaintiff alleges that as a result of denial of access to the law library,

he missed deadlines in a criminal case, and a civil appeal, he does not provide

information about any potential prejudice suffered, or the nature of the underlying non-

frivolous claims that he was allegedly prevented from presenting in the impacted cases.

Without such information, Plaintiff’s access to the courts claim is insufficient as pled.

This determination is not a finding that Plaintiff did not suffer prejudice, or that he could

not perhaps present a viable claim. This is simply a determination that as pled the claim

is insufficient.

Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations against

all nine defendants are insufficient. This Order constitutes the third round of initial

review under §1915A that the Court has conducted on Plaintiff’s potential claims. (See

Docs. 11, 18). To date, Plaintiff struggles to make his claims clear and specific, and to

limit the claims he presents to a single transaction or event, or series of related

transactions or events, as is required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although

it is still conceivable that Plaintiff could present a viable claim or claims in a lawsuit (or

lawsuits) about the events he describes, the pleadings filed in this case are insufficient to

state a valid claim. Although, “[t]he usual standard in civil cases is to allow defective

pleadings to be corrected, especially in early stages,” Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898

F.3d 726, 738 (7th Cir. 2018), “courts have broad discretion to deny leave to amend

where…the amendment would be futile,” Hicks v. Aurora Loan Servs., 588 F.3d 420, 432

(7th Cir. 2009). Here, the Court finds that it would be futile to allow an amended pleading

in this case because Plaintiff has been given three opportunities to remedy defects with

his pleadings to no avail. The Court additionally notes that Plaintiff’s alleged claims

arose in 2021, so the dismissal of this case will not preclude future litigation efforts if

Plaintiff believes he can further narrow his claims to present them in a sufficient fashion.

Disposition

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice under

28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a viable claim against any of the nine named

defendants.

If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this Order, he must file a notice of appeal with this

Court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). If Plaintiff

chooses to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 filing fee irrespective of the outcome

of the appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d

724, 725-56 (7th Cir. 2008). Moreover, if the appeal is found to be nonmeritorious, Plaintiff

may incur a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A proper and timely motion filed

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal deadline.

Feb. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no later than 28 days after the

entry of judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be extended.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly and to CLOSE

this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 30, 2022 LD, i J

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge