Sprague v. Jeffreys

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CARL L SPRAGUE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 22-cv-424-NJR

)

)

ROB JEFFREYS, SARAH BROWN )

FOILES, HEATHER WRIGHT, )

RICHARD MORGANTHALER, JOHN )

BALDWIN, SALVADOR GODINEZ, )

and DELASH MUTT, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:

Plaintiff Carl L. Sprague, a civilly committed individual under the Sexually

Dangerous Persons Act (“SDPA”), 725 ILCS 205/0.01, et seq., who is currently committed

at Big Muddy River Correctional Center, brings this action for deprivations of his

constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also alleges violations of the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the Rehabilitation

Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 7949-94e. Sprague’s original Complaint (Doc. 1) was dismissed

for failure to state a claim (Doc. 8). In the Amended Complaint, Sprague alleges that the

current SDPA program at Big Muddy violates his constitutional rights.

This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Amended

Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to

screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law

is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The Amended Complaint

In his Amended Complaint, Sprague complains about every aspect of the Sexually

Dangerous Persons Program (the “SDPP”) at Big Muddy. Sprague has been a part of the

SDPP and in custody, on and off, since 1985 (Doc. 11, p. 2). Although he is supposed to

receive care and treatment for his mental illness and disorders, he alleges that the current

program at Big Muddy is ill-equipped to provide him the required care (Id.). In fact, he

alleges that he has never received the care and treatment he is supposed to receive since

his initial commitment in 1985 (Id.). Rather, he alleges, the program merely confined and

punished him for decades. Although he was conditionally released on several occasions,

he did not receive the continued care and treatment needed to maintain his release (Id. at

p. 5). Sprague alleges that he was on conditional release from 1995 to 2004 and 2011 to

2018 (Id.). He alleges his “guardians” during this time period, directors Salvador Godinez

and John Baldwin, failed to provide him with proper treatment for his condition (Id. at

pp. 6, 8). They also failed to provide him proper care prior to his release (Id. at p. 8).

Since his return to the SDPP in April 2018, Sprague alleges that he has not received

proper treatment because the program is in decline (Id. at p. 6). He currently only receives

one to one-and-a-half hours of group therapy per week or every other week. Many group

sessions are canceled and never rescheduled (Id.). Sprague does not receive any

additional hours of treatment or individual treatment (Id. at p. 11). He does not receive

any training; instead, he receives the occasional handout (Id.). The program has a limited

number of therapists and the current therapists, Shannon Newman and Heather Wright,

are on medical leave (Id. at p. 6). Thus, Sprague is denied treatment for his mental illness.

Sprague alleges that Rob Jeffreys, as director and head of the program, has failed to

provide him with a rapid avenue for release because of the limited resources currently at

Big Muddy (Id. at p. 9). Sarah Brown Foiles and Heather Wright were both over the

program at Big Muddy and failed to implement a program that provides proper care and

treatment for his mental illness (Id. at pp. 9-10).

Preliminary Dismissals

To the extent Sprague attempts to raise claims under the ADA and RA, as well as

a claim for medical malpractice, he fails to state a claim. He merely references these

statutes and potential claims without providing any factual allegations that support such

claims. Thus, those potential claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.

Further, to the extent that Sprague attempts to raise claims spanning the entire

length of his detainment, including violations of his constitutional rights which he alleges

occurred during his two periods of release, those claims are time barred. The statute of

limitations for Section 1983 claims is two years. Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 521–22 (7th

Cir. 2001). Thus, his allegations regarding care during his release from 2011 to 2018 are

clearly barred by the applicable statute of limitations. This includes his claims against

former Illinois Department of Corrections directors John Baldwin and Salvador Godinez

for the care they failed to provide during his most recent conditional release.

Sprague also fails to state a claim against Delash Mutt. Although identified in the

caption of his Amended Complaint, he fails to include any allegations against him.

Further, to the extent he alleges that Warden Morganthaler is liable as the supervisor of

the employees providing care to Sprague, he also fails to state a claim. Thus, Delash Mutt

and Warden Morganthaler are DISMISSED without prejudice.

Discussion

Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, the Court designates the

following count:

Count 1: Fourteenth Amendment claim against Rob Jeffreys, Sarah

Brown Foiles, and Heather Wright for failing to implement

an SDP program that provides adequate care for Sprague’s

mental illness and conditions.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is

mentioned in the Amended Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be

considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly

pleading standard.1

As a civil detainee, Sprague’s claims arise under the Fourteenth Amendment

which is subject to an objective unreasonableness standard. Miranda v. County of Lake, 900

F.3d 335, 352-54 (7th Cir. 2018); Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2019). At

this stage, the Court finds that Sprague states a valid Fourteenth Amendment claim

1 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face”).

regarding the treatment he has received in the SDPP at Big Muddy. Thus, Count 1 shall

proceed against Rob Jeffreys, Sarah Brown Foiles, and Heather Wright. The claim against

Rob Jeffreys will also proceed in his official capacity for purposes of implementing any

injunctive relief awarded to Sprague.

Pending Motions

As to Sprague’s motion for counsel (Doc. 12), he states that he is mentally ill,

suffers from other physical medical conditions, and needs counsel to help him pursue his

claims. Given the early stage of the litigation, however, it is difficult to accurately evaluate

the need for the assistance of counsel. See Kadamovas v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843, 845 (7th Cir.

2013) (“[U]ntil the defendants respond to the complaint, the plaintiff’s need for assistance

of counsel ... cannot be gauged.”).2 Further, counsel is not needed at this time because the

defendants have not yet been served and a scheduling order has not yet been entered.

Thus, Sprague’s motion for counsel is DENIED.

Disposition

For the reasons stated above, Count 1 shall proceed against Rob Jeffreys

(individual and official capacity), Sarah Brown Foiles, and Heather Wright. All other

claims and defendants are DISMISSED without prejudice.

The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants Rob Jeffreys, Sarah Brown Foiles,

and Heather Wright: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a

2 In evaluating the motion for counsel, the Court applies the factors discussed in Pruitt v. Mote,

503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007), and related authority.

Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to

mail these forms, a copy of the Amended Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order

to the defendants’ place of employment as identified by Sprague. If a defendant fails to

sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days

from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal

service on that defendant, and the Court will require that defendant to pay the full costs

of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided by Sprague,

the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending

the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the

address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained

in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Amended Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§1997e(g). Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond

to the issues stated in this Merit Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Sprague, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(f)(2)(A).

Finally, Sprague is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the

Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court

will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not

later than seven days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply

with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result

in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 9, 2022 Tq g

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

Chief U.S. District Judge

Notice to Plaintiff

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of

your lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your Amended Complaint. After service has

been achieved, the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to your

Amended Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to

receive the defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more.

When all the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order

containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is

advised to wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions,

to give the defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions

filed before defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as

premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time, unless

specifically directed to do so.