Opinion

Sloat v. Werlich

Court
District Court, S.D. Illinois
Filed
Dec 9, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 21.3%

one cellmate’s statement of ownership of property would not preclude other cellmate’s possession of the same property because two individuals may exercise joint possession

How later courts described this case

  • one cellmate’s statement of ownership of property would not preclude other cellmate’s possession of the same property because two individuals may exercise joint possession

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROBERT SLOAT, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 20-cv-200-SMY

)

ERIC WILLIAMS, )

Warden, FCI-Greenville, )

)

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YANDLE, District Judge:

Petitioner Robert Sloat, an inmate in the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), filed a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge the imposition of disciplinary sanctions

against him. Respondent filed a Response to the Petition (Doc. 16); Sloat filed a Reply (Doc. 18).

For the following reasons, the Petition will be DENIED.

Background

Sloat was convicted in the Southern District of Illinois for conspiracy to distribute and

intent to distribute more than 500 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing

methamphetamine, and was sentenced to 297 months consisting of 324 months minus 27 months

credit for time served in related state cases. See United States v. Sloat, Case No. 06-cr-40057-

JPG-9 (S.D. Ill.) (Doc. 269). Sloat’s projected release date is July 29, 2023.1

The disciplinary incident giving rise to this action occurred while Sloat was incarcerated

at the FCI-Greenville.2 According to the Incident Report (Doc. 16-2, pp. 64-65), on April 11,

1 According to public information on the BOP website, Sloat is currently scheduled for release on July 29, 2023.

Https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (Last visited July 13, 2022).

2 Sloat named the warden of that institution as the Respondent herein even though Sloat has since been transferred to

Leavenworth USP (Doc. 21). See al-Marri v. Rumsfeld, 360 F.3d 707, 712 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining that

2019, BOP Religious Services Assistant Carrie Sellers searched Cell 125 in Housing Unit B at

FCI-Greenville. Sloat and Inmate Michael Robinson were assigned to this cell. Sellers drafted

and signed a memorandum regarding the results of the search that stated as follows:

“On 4/11/2019, at approximately 10:30 AM, Religious Services Assistant Selers

conducted a cell search in Housing United 4B cell 125 belonging to Inmate

Robinson, Michael Reg. No. 31932-044 and Sloat, Robert Reg. No. 07294-025. I

recovered one (1) full piece of white lined notebook paper with faded blue lines on

one side; and the number 125 written 4 times attached to the handle of a small

broom in the common area of the cell.” (Doc. 16-2, p. 66).

The notebook paper was released to the Special Investigate Services (S.I.S.) Technician J.

Serio who tested the paper using a narcotic identification kit (NIK test) and completed the Incident

Report, charging Sloat with a violation of Prohibited Act 113 – possession of any narcotics, and

noting:

“On 4/11/2019, at approximately 10:30 AM, Religious Services Assistant C.

Sellers conducted a cell search in inmate cell 125. During the search (1) sheet of

white paper, soaked in an unidentified substance, was found rolled up and hidden

inside the handle of a dust pan located in the common area of cell 125. Cell 125

has (2) inmate occupants, Sloat, Robert, Reg. No. 07294-0125 and Robinson,

Michael, Reg. No. 31932-044. The paper, with the unidentified substance was

released to the SIS department.

I tested the sticker with NIK test kit A, resulting in a positive test for opium

alkaloids (purple color). I proceed to NIK test kit U, resulting in a negative test for

methamphetamine (burgundy color). I concluded with NIK test kit K, resulting in

a positive test for buprenorphine (purple color).” (Doc. 16-2, p. 64).

Lt. Ki. Dugdale gave Sloat a copy of the Incident Report on April 24, 2019 (Doc. 16-2, p. 65).

All incident reports are reviewed by a Unit Discipline Committee (“UDC”). 28 C.F.R.

§541.7. The UDC has several options when reviewing an incident report, including a referral of

the report to the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) for further review, based on the seriousness

of the prohibited act charged. Id. If the UDC refers the incident report to the DHO for further

jurisdiction over a habeas corpus petition is determined when the petition is filed even if an inmate is subsequently

transferred).

review, the UDC will advise the inmate of his rights at the upcoming DHO hearing, as set forth in

28 C.F.R. §541.8.

On April 25, 2019, the UDC provided Sloat with a Notice advising him that a hearing

would be scheduled before a DHO and outlining his rights with respect to the hearing (Doc. 16-2,

p. 74). Sloat signed acknowledgement of the Notice (/d.). He indicated that he did not wish to

have a staff representative or call any witnesses at the hearing (Doc. 16-2, p. 76).

On May 9, 2019, the hearing was convened by DHO Michael Puckett, but postponed due

to a discrepancy in the Incident Report as to whether Serio tested paper or a sticker for drugs. After

a request for clarification by DHO Puckett, Serio submitted an electronic statement stating that he

tested “white paper” (Doc. 16-2, p. 83).

The hearing was reconvened on May 24, 2019 (Doc. 1, pp. 10-12). Sloat raised several

objections and arguments during the hearing:

e That the item was not a sticker;

e That there was a discrepancy as to whether the paper was found on the broom handle

or hidden in a dustpan;

e That the item wasn’t his and was in his cell when he moved in; and,

e That he wanted lab results. (/d.).

DHO Puckett considered and rejected Sloat’s arguments in his report, finding:

e The item was clearly a piece of paper as reflected in Sellers’ memorandum, Serio’s

photographs, and Serio’s amended incident report;

e The item was clearly found in the common area of the cell;

e The item was found in a search of the cell and when an item is found in the cell’s

common areas, all inmates are held accountable; and,

e The staff conducted the NIK tests following proper procedures so that lab tests were

not necessary. (/d.).

He ultimately found Sloat guilty as charged and sanctioned him to 41 days of lost good time credit

(d.).

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Sloat filed a Regional Administrative Remedy Appeal, which was denied (Doc. 1, pp. 14-

15). He then filed a Central Office Administrative Remedy Appeal raising two arguments: that

he did not know the paper was contraband and that the BOP Program Statement 6060.08 does not

authorize the use of narcotic identification kit (NIK) testing as the basis for a disciplinary action.

(Id.). The Central Appeal was also denied (Doc. 1., p. 18).

Discussion

Sloat contends that there were “conflicting” and “misleading” statements and errors

throughout the disciplinary action including: “sticker” versus “paper”, “broom handle” versus

“dustpan”, and that the paper belonged to his cellmate and was not obviously contraband, and that

refusal to have the paper tested in an outside laboratory should be rejected under the Seventh

Circuit precedent.

BOP inmates may challenge the loss of good conduct credit through a petition for habeas

relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241. Jackson v. Carlson, 707 F.2d 943, 946 (7th Cir. 1983). While

inmates retain due process rights in connection with prison disciplinary proceedings, such

proceedings “are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant

in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Rather, the

following due process requirements apply to such proceedings: (1) receipt of written notice of the

charges in advance of the hearing; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision

maker; (3) the right to call witnesses and present evidence where the same will not be unduly

hazardous to safety or correctional goals; and, (4) a written statement as to the evidence relied on

and the reason for the decision. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-66; Henderson v. U.S. Parole Commission,

13 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994).

The findings of the disciplinary hearing officer must be supported by “some evidence in

the record.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); see also Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d

1395, 1402 (7th Cir. 1994). The Court does not reweigh the evidence or determine credibility.

Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 720 (7th Cir. 1996). Nor does the Court “assess the comparative

weight of evidence underlying the disciplinary board’s decision.” Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d

649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000). The “relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that

could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at

455-56 (emphasis in original)). As such, the Court can overturn the decision “only if no reasonable

adjudicator could have found [petitioner] guilty of the offense on the basis of the evidence

presented.” Henderson, 13 F.3d at 1077.

Before the Court can consider a claim for habeas relief, the petitioner must exhaust

administrative remedies. Jackson, 707 F.2d at 949; Clemente v. Allen, 120 F.3d 703, 705 (7th Cir.

1997). To satisfy this requirement, a legal contention or argument must be presented at each

administrative level. Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 982 (7th Cir. 2002) citing O’Sullivan v.

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999).

Sloat failed to fully exhaust his first three arguments through the final level of the

administrative appeal process. He raised his argument that the report referred to sticker, not paper,

on the Regional Administrative Remedy Appeal, but not on his Central Office Administrative

Remedy Appeal. Sloat did not contest the use of narcotic identification kit (NIK) testing as the

basis for a disciplinary action until the Central Office Administrative Remedy Appeal. He did not

raise the broom handle issue at any level of appeal. Accordingly, this Court will not consider these

arguments.

The only issue Sloat raised at each level of administrative review and appeal was that the

paper belonged to his cellmate and was not obviously contraband. Specifically, he argues that

upon moving into a new cell, he should be free from any contraband within that cell. But Sloat

was not “new” to cell 125 as he argues; he had been in cell 125 since December 20, 2018 (Doc.

16-3). Moreover, the DHO report notes:

“Although your cellmate testified that the drugs belonged to him, the drugs were

found in a common area of the cell. All inmates assigned to the cell are responsible

for ensuring their cell is free of contraband. When items are found in common

areas, all inmates are held accountable. Statement from other inmates are found

credible when there is corroborating evidence in conjunction with the admission.

In this case there is no corroborating evidence to support that the drugs are solely

your cellmates.” (Doc. 1, p. 11).

Multiple offenders may have control over a space and n be in possession of contraband.

See Arnold v. Sherrod, 2009 WL 1542794 (S.D. Ill. June 2, 2009) (“some evidence” existed to

support charge of possession of drugs found in inmate’s cell, even though inmate shared the cell

with two other inmates on basis that the inmate “had the responsibility to keep his cell area free of

contraband”); Giles v. Hanks, 72 F. App’x 432, 433-34 (7th Cir. 2003) (one cellmate’s statement

of ownership of property would not preclude other cellmate’s possession of the same property

because two individuals may exercise joint possession). As such, the DHO had “some evidence”

to support the charge for possession of drugs found in Sloat’s cell, and his finding in that regard

did not amount to a due process violation.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Sloat’s Petition for Habeas Relief under 28 U.S.C. §2241 (Doc.

1) is DENIED; this case is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter

judgment accordingly and to close the case.

If Sloat wishes to appeal the dismissal of this action, his notice of appeal must be filed with

this Court within 30 days after the entry of the judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). A proper

and timely motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day

appeal deadline. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no more than twenty-

eight (28) days after the entry of the judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be extended. Other

motions, including a Rule 60 motion for relief from a final judgment, do not toll the deadline for

an appeal.

A motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis (“IFP”) must set forth the issues Petitioner

plans to present on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Sloat does choose to appeal and is

allowed to proceed IFP, he will be liable for a portion of the $505.00 appellate filing fee (the

amount to be determined based on his prison trust fund account records for the past six months)

irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2);

Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7" Cir. 2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59

(7" Cir. 1999); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7" Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 9, 2022

STACIM.YANDLE ——™

United States District Judge

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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