Brown v. Illinois Department of Corrections

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

LEROICA BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 22-cv-00475-SPM

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS, WARDEN RON

VITALE, Individually, and in his

Official Capacity, WARDEN

SHARLETTE RODGERS,

Individually, and in his Official

Capacity, and SERGEANT

DWAYNE ELLIOTT, Individually,

and in his Official Capacity,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint filed

by defendants Illinois Department of Corrections, Warden Ron Vitale (“Vitale”), Warden

Sharlette Rodgers (“Rodgers”), and Sergeant Dwayne Elliott (“Elliott”) (collectively,

“defendants”). A supporting memorandum was filed contemporaneously with the motion

(Doc. 21). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted in part and denied in

part.

BACKGROUND

The facts alleged by Brown are accepted as true for purposes of defendants’

motion1. FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c); Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751-52 (7th Cir. 2011).

This Court will summarize what it deems necessary to address this motion.

1 The factual information was taken directly from the complaint (Doc.1) and will be cited accordingly.

Leroica Brown is a female who was hired by defendant Illinois Department of

Corrections (“IDOC”), the department of the Illinois state government that operates the

prison system, as a correctional officer in March 2018 (Doc. 18, ¶¶ 10, 25). Following

training, Brown began working at Southwestern Illinois Correctional Center

(“SWICC”), one of the IDOC facilities, in August 2018 as a probational correctional

officer (Id., ¶¶ 29, 35).

Brown attended Southwestern Illinois College in 2017 with defendant, Sergeant

Jeffrey Elliott (“Elliott”), who was employed by IDOC as a correctional officer at SWICC

until his promotion to Sergeant in late 2019 (Id., ¶¶ 20, 99). Defendant Ron Vitale

(“Vitale”), was employed by IDOC and served as the warden at SWICC until December

31, 2019 (Id., ¶ 13). Defendant Sharlette Rodgers (“Rodgers”) was employed by IDOC

and became warden at SWICC on January 1, 2020 (Id., ¶ 14). Vitale, Elliott, and

Rodgers all had supervisory authority over Brown at SWICC.

Elliott contacted plaintiff prior to her employment at SWICC and offered his

assistance in her obtaining a job (¶¶ 20-23). Throughout her training, Elliott sent vulgar

emails to Brown and left notes of her car (¶¶ 28-34). Once she began employment at

SWICC, Brown stopped responding and tried to avoid Elliott (¶ 36). In September 2018,

Brown first reported Elliott to a supervisor2 at SWICC and believes Vitale was made

aware of her complaints (Id., ¶¶ 46-58). Following her complaint, Brown remained

scheduled on the same shifts and in the same area as Elliott (Id., ¶ 54).

Brown filed an incident report in October 2018 against a superior, Sergeant

Nicholas Sroka (Id., ¶ 54). Brown referenced numerous incidents that occurred in

2 Brown claims she reported Elliott to Major Angela Harlan.

October 2018, including keys being thrown at her, an obscene hand gesture, phone

disconnections, as well as accusations that she was lying and bypassing the chain of

command (Id., ¶¶ 60-65).

In November 2018, Brown was transferred to the 3:00 – 11:00 p.m. shift (Id., ¶

66). On November 21, 2018, Brown injured her back and later submitted the workman’s

compensation paperwork to Major Ronald McDonald (Id., ¶¶ 67-73). Later that month,

Brown was disciplined for not providing a workman’s compensation report for her injury

(Id., ¶¶ 67-73).

On January 29, 2019, McDonald gave Brown a poor performance review and

requested to extend her probationary period (Id., ¶ 76). Brown filed a grievance

disputing the poor performance review and her probationary period was not extended

(Id., ¶ 77).

In March 2019, Brown learned she was pregnant and planned to begin her

maternity leave on October 23, 2019 (Id., ¶ 78). In April 2019, Brown advised Vitale and

her supervisors of her pregnancy, and requested to move to light duty in accordance

with an IDOC practice of reassigning pregnant officers to less dangerous and physically

demanding positions (Id., ¶¶ 80-82). In May 2019, Brown provided proof of pregnancy,

along with list of recommended restrictions to Vitale, Marshall, and the Union President

Shifferdecker (Id., ¶¶ 84, 85). Later in May 2019, Brown provided additional

documentation to support her request for a reasonable accommodation of a light duty

position (Id., ¶¶ 86, 87). Although Vitale approved Brown’s request for reasonable

accommodation, she was not notified until she followed up with him (Id., ¶ 88).

Notwithstanding the foregoing, IDOC did not provide her with the approved

accommodations (Id., ¶ 89).

In the summer of 2019, Brown began wearing scrub pants because she could no

longer fit into her uniform pants and the uniform department did not have pants that

could accommodate her pregnancy, but she was reprimanded for being out of uniform

(Id., ¶¶ 90, 91).

In October 2019, Brown received a phone call from Elliott that she reported to

her shift commander, Major Kevin McQuarrie (Id., ¶¶ 92, 93). Two days later, Brown

began her maternity leave early (Id., ¶ 94). After delivery but while still in the hospital,

Brown was notified by SWICC’s HR that she could not start her maternity leave early

without additional documentation (Id., ¶ 95). Brown’s mother left the paperwork at the

guardhouse at SWICC (Id.).

Brown complained to her union representative, the union vice president, and

Harlan about IDOC’s failure to accommodate her pregnancy, along with the abuse and

retaliation directed against her (Id., ¶ 96). While on maternity leave, Elliott was

promoted to Sergeant, making him a higher-ranking officer (Id., ¶ 99).

In January 2020, Brown returned to SWICC and was questioned by HR about not

providing paperwork for the first two days of her medical leave and threatened with

discipline (Id., ¶ 98). When she returned from maternity leave, her supervisor was Major

Cassandra Davis (Id., ¶ 103). Davis assigned Brown to work with Elliott (Id., ¶ 104).

On January 5, 2020, Brown advised Warden Rodgers of her prior complaints of

sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation (Id., ¶ 100). Brown was advised that

the complaints had been investigated and were unfounded (Id., ¶ 102). Brown also filed

a complaint that Davis continued to schedule her to work with Elliott (Id., ¶ 105).

On January 11, 2020, Brown was verbally counselled for being approximately

seven (7) minutes later to work (Id., ¶ 107). That same month Brown reported to Tamara

Brown with Affirmative Action that Davis continued to schedule her to work the same

shifts and areas as Elliott (Id., ¶ 115).

On February 8, 2020, Brown was notified that her shift was changing and that

she would not be getting her requested days off because someone with higher seniority

had requested them (Id., ¶ 116). However, someone on her shift had lower seniority and

protocol required that shift changes and days off affect employees with lower seniority

(Id., ¶ 117). Brown advised she needed the requested days to complete training and filed

a grievance (Id., ¶ 118, 119).

On February 9, 2020, Brown’s daughter was admonished when she called her

mother at work (Id., ¶ 124). On February 12, 2020, Brown had a family emergency, and

although she followed proper policies and protocol, she was disciplined (Id., ¶¶ 125, 126).

On February 17, 2020, Union President Sergeant Cynthia Fields asked plaintiff about

withdrawing her complaints (Id., ¶ 129). On February 23, 2020, Brown reported an

incident when a male co-worker exposed himself (Id., ¶ 130). That same month, Brown

provided Major McQuarrie with copies of her prior complaints and requested they be

given to Warden Rodgers (Id., ¶¶ 131, 132).

In March 2020, Brown began suffering panic attacks, which she attributes to the

ongoing issues at work (Id., ¶ 127). On March 2, 2020. Brown advised Union President

Sergeant Fields of her complaints (Id., ¶ 134). On March 13, 2020, Brown was diagnosed

with anxiety due to stress (Id., ¶ 128). Later that month, Brown notified IDOC that she

lost her childcare due to Covid-19 and requested time off (Id., ¶ 138).

In May 2020, Brown was advised that if she did not return to work, she would be

terminated by IDOC (Id., ¶ 139). On May 7, 2020, Brown resigned her employment,

effective June 1, 2020 (Id., ¶ 140).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 8, 2022, Brown filed this action (Doc. 1). On June 13, 2022, defendants

filed a motion to dismiss along with supporting memorandum of law (Docs. 15, 16). On

June 14, 2022, Brown was granted leave to amend her complaint (Doc. 17), and on June

27, 2022, the first amended complaint was filed (Doc. 18).

In the amended complaint, Brown generally alleged sexual harassment so

pervasive as to create a hostile work environment, retaliation in response to various

complaints of discrimination, and pregnancy discrimination, all of which ultimately

resulted in constructive discharge (Id.). Specifically, Brown asserted claims under Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq., the Pregnancy

Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k), et. seq., the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 Ill.

Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/1-101, et. seq., and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution

of the United States. Brown. The amended complaint was brought in the following nine

counts: (1) Equal protection against all defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Sex

discrimination against all defendants in violation of Title VII; (3) Pregnancy

discrimination against IDOC in violation of Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination

Act; (4) Retaliation against IDOC in violation of Title VII; (5) Sex discrimination against

all defendants in violation of the IHRA; (6) Pregnancy discrimination against

defendants Vitale, Rogers, and Elliott in violation of IHRA; (7) Retaliation against all

defendants in violation of IHRA; (8) Disability discrimination against all defendants in

violation of IHRA; and, (9) Violations of Americans with Disabilities Act against IDOC

(Id.). The amended complaint was very detailed and thorough, identifying numerous

incidents to support Brown’s claims (Id.).

On July 28, 2022, the pending motion to dismiss was filed pursuant to Rules 8,

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. 20). Within the

supporting memorandum of law, defendants raise several arguments to support their

motion (Doc. 21). First, defendants argue that Count I, which is brought under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, should be dismissed because neither the IDOC nor the defendants (Vitale,

Rodgers, and Elliot) in their official capacities are “persons” subject to suit under Section

1983. (Id.) Second, defendants contend that Brown’s IHRA claims brought in Counts V,

VI, VII, and VIII are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Id.) Third, defendants assert

that the complaint should be dismissed because it violates Rule 8’s “short and plain

statement” requirement. (Id.).

On August 29, 2022, Brown filed her response to defendants’ motion to dismiss

and rebutted each of the arguments (Doc. 23). In her response, Brown claimed to have

alleged sufficient facts to plausibly support her claims and emphasized that this case

was at the pleading stage (Id.). With respect to the specific arguments raised by

defendants, Brown countered that her § 1983 Equal Protection claim against IDOC was

not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, that Counts V through VIII alleging violations

of the IHRA were not barred by sovereign immunity, and that the amended complaint

complies with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Id.)

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must comply with Rule

8(a) by providing “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A motion to dismiss should be granted if the

plaintiff fails to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The

factual allegations in a complaint must “raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56; see also Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400,

404 (7th Cir.2010) (“[P]laintiff must give enough details about the subject-matter of the

case to present a story that holds together.”). For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the

court takes all facts alleged in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences

from those facts in the plaintiff's favor, although conclusory allegations that merely

recite the elements of a claim are not entitled to this presumption of truth. Virnich v.

Vorwald, 664 F.3d 206, 212 (7th Cir.2011).

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the court must dismiss a complaint if it lacks subject-

matter jurisdiction over a case. To survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the

plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has jurisdiction over its claims.

United Phosphorous, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir.2003) (en

banc ). The court takes the allegations in the complaint as true, viewing all facts and

any reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Scott Air

Force Base Props. v. Cnty. of St. Clair, Ill., 548 F.3d 516, 519 (7th Cir.2008). The

standard for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss differs from that governing a Rule

12(b)(6) motion only in that the court “ ‘may properly look beyond the jurisdictional

allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the

issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists.’ ” Apex Digital, Inc.

v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 444 (7th Cir.2009) (quoting Even v. Astrue, 536

F.3d 651, 656–57 (7th Cir.2008) (additional citations omitted)).

ARGUMENT

I. Count I

A. Law

Defendants claim that Count I of the first amended complaint, i.e. Brown’s §1983

Equal Protection claim, is barred by the Eleventh Amendment (Doc. 21). In general, a

state is immune from suits brought by individuals in federal court. Ameritech Corp. v.

McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 585 (7t Cir. 2002). Section 1983 is entitled, “Civil action for

deprivation of rights”, and states in pertinent part,

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress …”. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In other words, Section 1983 authorizes suits against a “person” who acts under

color of state law and deprives another person of his or her rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

B. Analysis

In the case caption, Brown names IDOC along with SWICC staff, Elliott, Vitale,

and Rodgers, both individually and in their official capacities, as parties (Doc. 18). She

also identifies Count I of the Amended Complaint as being brought pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983; Equal Protection Against all Defendants (Doc. 18, p. 17). In the conclusion

to the amended complaint, Brown seeks monetary relief and injunctive relief in the form

of reinstatement (Id., ¶250).

The Supreme Court has held that neither a state, its agencies nor its officials are

suable “persons” within the meaning of section 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (see also Lapides v. Board of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617

(2002); Carroll v. DeTella, 255 F.3d 470, 471 (7th Cir.2001). Consequently, neither

IDOC nor Vitale, Rodgers and Elliott in their official capacities, are “persons” subject to

suit for monetary damages under Section 1983. Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 613

(7th Cir. 2012). Furthermore, a state agency such as IDOC cannot be sued for

prospective injunctive relief in federal court. Quick v. Ill. Dep’t of Fin. & Prof’l

Regulation, 468 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1009 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 2020). Consequently, while

Count I against IDOC is dismissed in its entirety, the inquiry does not yet end with

respect to the injunctive relief claims sought against Vitale, Rodgers, and Elliott in their

official capacities.

There is a limited exception that allows for parties to sue state officials in their

official capacity for equitable relief that is prospective in nature. Ex Parte Young, 209

U.S. 123 (1908). As hereinbefore demonstrated, Brown seeks reinstatement, which has

been allowed and deemed permissible. See Kashani v. Purdue Univ., 813 F.2d 843, 848

(7th Cir.1987); Doe v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 429 F.Supp.2d 930, 941

(N.D.Ill.2006) (“when an individual's termination or dismissal directly violates a

federal constitutional or statutory guarantee, he may maintain a suit for

reinstatement”). Indeed, claims for injunctive relief under § 1983 against the individual

defendants in their official capacities survive because “official capacity actions for

injunctive relief are not treated as actions against the State.” Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.

123, 159–160 (1908); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985).

Finally, this Court must address whether Brown has stated a plausible claim

under Section 1983 against Vitale, Rodgers, and Elliott, in their individual capacities.

A § 1983 suit against an individual state officer in his personal capacity is not subject

to the state sovereign immunity bar. See Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 613 (7th Cir.

2012).

In order to succeed on an individual capacity claim against a state actor under §

1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendant was personally involved in the alleged

constitutional deprivation. Palmer v. Marion Cnty., 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 2003).

Agency principles of respondeat superior and vicarious liability do not apply to § 1983

claims. Kinslow v. Pullara, 538 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2008). Therefore, supervisors are

held individually liable for violating the constitution only where they “kn[ew] about the

unconstitutional conduct and facilitate[d] it, approve[d] it, condone[d] it, or turn[ed] a

blind eye for fear of what they might see.” T.E. v. Grindle, 599 F.3d 583, 588 (7th

Cir.2010) (quoting Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir.1988)); see

also Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996, 1005 (7th Cir.1982) (“An official satisfies the

personal responsibility requirement of section 1983 if she acts or fails to act with a

deliberate or reckless disregard of plaintiff's constitutional rights, or if the conduct

causing the constitutional deprivation occurs at her direction or with her knowledge and

consent.”). Additionally, “a senior jail official who was not personally involved in the acts

or omissions complained of nonetheless may be liable in his individual capacity if he can

be expected to have either known of or participated in creating systemic inadequate

conditions at the jail.” Warren ex rel. Warren v. Dart, No. 09 C 3512, 2010 WL 4883923,

at *6 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 24, 2010) (citing Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1428–29 (7th

Cir.1996)).

This is the pleading stage, not the proving stage. At this time and without the

benefit of a fully developed evidentiary record, the Court is not tasked with determining

whether Brown will prevail. IDOC is dismissed from Count I, but Brown may proceed

against Vitale, Rodgers, and Elliott, in their official capacity, with respect to prospective

relief, and Brown may also proceed against Vitale, Rodgers, and Elliott, in their

individual capacity, with respect to both prospective relief and monetary damages.

II. Counts V through VIII under the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA)

A. Law

Defendants next contend that Counts V through VIII are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment under Sovereign Immunity (Doc. 21, p. 6). Specifically, defendants argue

that Congress has not abrogated the state's immunity, nor has IDOC waived its

immunity or consented to suit by Brown in federal court (Id.). Brown filed a response in

opposition to the motion to dismiss, acknowledging that the State Lawsuit Immunity

Act “may” immunize the IDOC from claims under the IHRA but arguing that the

Eleventh Amendment only immunizes the IDOC from claims for money damages, not

claims for injunctive relief (Doc. 23).

The parties' arguments pertain to immunity under both the Eleventh

Amendment and the Illinois State Lawsuit Immunity Act (see Docs. 21, 23). Before the

Court can consider the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment, it must determine

whether the State Lawsuit Immunity Act would allow IHRA claims in any form against

the IDOC to proceed. Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 441 (7th Cir. 2001) (state

sovereign rules apply to state law claims brought in federal court).

Under the State Lawsuit Immunity Act, “the State of Illinois shall not be made a

defendant in any court,” except as provided in certain state statutes. 745 ILCS 5/1, 5/1.5.

The Illinois Human Rights Act is not one of those statutes mentioned as an

exception. Id. Consequently, Brown’s claims under the IHRA against the IDOC—

Counts 5, 7, and 8—must be dismissed. See Harris v. Illinois, 753 F. Supp. 2d 734, 740–

41 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (dismissing IHRA claim against the Illinois Department of

Corrections as barred by the State Lawsuit Immunity Act); Coleman v. Illinois, No. 19-

CV-03789, 2020 WL 6717341, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2020) (same); Cook v. Illinois Dep't

Of Corr., No. 09-CV-0133-DRH, 2009 WL 2588871, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2009)

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Brown also asserts claims in Counts V through

VIII against Vitale, Rodgers, and Elliott, in both their individual and official capacities

(Doc. 18). This Court does not accept the argument that the claim for injunctive relief

circumvents the IHRA. Under any scenario, any alleged acts under the IHRA are based

upon State law, not federal law, and as such, are not allowable. Accordingly, Counts V

through VIII are dismissed.

III. Rule 8 Pleading Requirements

A. Law

Defendants last raise pleading concerns in their motion to dismiss (Doc. 21). A

complaint must include a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). This requirement of brevity fosters

two goals: it allows trial courts to speed a case to resolution and it allows a defendant to

capably respond to the allegations in the complaint. United States ex rel. Garst v.

Lockheed–Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir.2003).

In practice, a complaint violates Rule 8(a) when it fails to provide notice to a

party of the claim or is “unintelligible.” Fidelity National Title Insurance Company of

New York v. Intercounty National Title Insurance Company, 412 F.3d 745, 749 (7th

Cir.2005). While a minor amount of surplus material in a complaint is not enough to

frustrate these goals and violate Rule 8, unnecessary length coupled with

repetitiveness, needless complexity, and immaterial allegations can push a complaint

past Rule 8’s breaking point—in other words, it can make a “complaint unintelligible”

by “scattering and concealing in a morass of irrelevancies the few allegations that

matter.” Kadamovas v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843, 844 (7th Cir.2013).

B. Analysis

Brown’s amended complaint consists of 28 pages and 251 paragraphs (Doc. 18).

Indeed, it was a lengthy document; however, the word “short” in Rule 8(a)(2) is a relative

term. Kadamovas, 706 F.3d at 844. Brevity must be calibrated to the number of claims

and also to their character, since some require more explanation than others to establish

their plausibility—and the Supreme Court requires that a complaint establish the

plausibility of its claims. Kadamovas, 706 F.3d at 844 citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

544 (2008); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.544 (2007).

Similar to this case, Kadamovas was a 28 page complaint, which the appellate

court held was not excessively long given the number of separate claims the plaintiff

was raising. Id. Indeed, “[p]rolixity is a bane of the legal profession but a poor ground

for rejecting potentially meritorious claims.” Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 517 (7th

Cir.1998). As such, this Court declines to dismiss the amended complaint for failing to

comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. Defendants shall answer the complaint within 21 days, or by,

December 21, 2022. The following breakdown will assist in that endeavor:

1. Count I – IDOC is dismissed and official capacity claim against Vitale,

Rodgers, and Elliott is limited to injunctive relief;

2. Count II – No change;

3. Count III – No change;

4. Counts IV – No change;

5. Counts V-VIII – Dismissed; and,

6. Count IX – No change.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 30, 2022

s/ Stephen P. McGlynn_

STEPHEN P. McGLYNN

U.S. District Judge