Brockett v. Niemann

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

THAD F. BROCKETT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 22-cv-44-SMY

)

THE COUNTY OF EFFINGHAM, )

ILLINOIS, a body politic and corporate, )

and JIM NIEMANN, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YANDLE, District Judge:

Plaintiff Thad F. Brockett filed a one-count Complaint in state court against Defendants

the County of Effingham, Illinois, and Jim Niemann (“Defendants”) alleging First Amendment

retaliation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Following removal, this case is now before the Court for

consideration of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7), to which Plaintiff responded (Doc. 15).

For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.

Background

Plaintiff makes the following relevant allegations in the Complaint: Plaintiff worked for

the Effingham County Sheriff’s Department from July 15, 1996, until December 16, 2014. In

September 2012, Plaintiff was promoted by Sheriff John H. Monnet to the position of Operations

Sergeant. Defendant Jim Niemann took office as Chairman of the County Board in 2012 and

began a course of conduct designed to interfere with, control, and manipulate the operations of the

Sheriff’s Department. Plaintiff supported the Sheriff in his disputes with Niemann and Niemann

was aware of Plaintiff’s support. In January 2013, Plaintiff lead an investigation into two

Effingham County correctional officers for violations of inmate safety and security procedures.

Plaintiff reported the misconduct to the Sheriff, who discharged the correctional officers. The

correctional officers were subsequently reinstated due to the demands of the Defendants. In mid-

2013, Plaintiff conducted another investigation of the same two correctional officers for violations

of inmate safety. Plaintiff reported his findings to the Sheriff, Effingham County State’s Attorney,

and the Illinois State Police, but the officers were not disciplined or prosecuted due to influence

asserted by the Defendants.

In early 2014, Niemann commenced proceedings with the Illinois Labor Relations Board

designed to have Plaintiff removed from the union and therefore deprive Plaintiff of union

protection in his employment with the Sheriff’s Department. Plaintiff was wrongfully removed as

a member of the union due to a failure of union representatives to properly protect his interests.

Sheriff Monnet did not seek reelection in 2014, and a new Sheriff, David Mahon, took office in

December 2014. On December 16, 2014, acting on instructions from the Defendants, Sheriff

Mahon discharged Plaintiff from the employ of the Sheriff’s Department based on the pretext that

the County Board had deleted funding for the position of Operations Sergeant. Plaintiff alleges

that his termination was in retaliation for his exercise of his constitutional right of freedom of

speech. Specifically, Plaintiff maintains that he was terminated for supporting Sheriff Monnet

against Niemann and for investigating and reporting wrongdoing of the correctional officers.

Discussion

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

a Complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S.

at 678.

To state a viable First Amendment retaliation claim, a public employee must sufficiently

allege that (1) he made the speech as a private citizen, (2) the speech addressed a matter of public

concern, and (3) his interest in expressing that speech was not outweighed by the state's interests

as an employer in promoting effective and efficient public service. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S.

410, 417 (2006). “When public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the

employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does

not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d

476, 481 (7th Cir. 2016). The speech must relate to a community concern rather than “merely a

personal grievance of interest only to the employee.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that he supported the Sheriff in his disputes with Niemann and Niemann

was aware of Plaintiff’s support. These allegations do not demonstrate speech protected by the

First Amendment – they pertain to matters personal to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff also attempts to assert First Amendment protected speech by alleging that he

reported misconduct of two correctional officers to the Sheriff, State’s Attorney’s Office, and the

Illinois State Police. However, Plaintiff, as Operations Sergeant, was tasked with supervising and

providing “oversite” for jail personnel. His investigation of two subordinates for potential criminal

conduct and reporting his findings were done as part of his job duties and not as a private citizen.

See Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1091 (7th Cir. 2008) (If the employee reports

misconduct in the manner directed by official policy, to a supervisor, or to an external body with

formal oversight responsibility, then the employee speaks pursuant to his official duties and his

speech is unprotected). As such, Plaintiff has failed to allege a plausible protected speech.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Complaint is

DISMISSED without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 5, 2022

STACI M. YANDLE

United States District Judge

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