Titus v. Mitchell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ADAM TITUS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:17-cv-01297-GCS

)

DAVID MITCHELL, )

SHAUN REIMAN, )

BRADLEY SADLER, )

DONNIE KELLER, )

JOHN HARRISON, )

JOHN TOURVILLE, )

GEORGE WELBORN, )

WILLIAM QUALLS, )

KELLIE ELLIS, )

JAMES RIGDON, )

LUCAS MAUE, )

DANIEL LEE, )

JAMES MALLORY1, )

PHILLIP SHIELDS, )

CLETUS MCGEE, )

MARTHA M. OAKLEY )

and JACQUELINE LASHBROOK, )

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SISON, Magistrate Judge:

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

On November 30, 2017, Plaintiff Adam Titus, an inmate in the custody of the

Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

1 Throughout the course of this litigation and in the parties’ pleadings regarding the partial motion

for summary judgment, Defendant James Mallory is referred to as “Malloy” and “Mallory.” The Court will

utilize “Mallory” throughout this Memorandum & Order as that is the name contained in the documents

in support of the motion for partial summary judgment despite being named in the caption of the Second

Amended Complaint and in some of the pleadings as “Malloy.”

against Defendants after a multi-person assault on the yard at Menard Correctional

Center (“Menard”) on June 16, 2017. (Doc. 1). In his original complaint, Plaintiff alleged

that on June 16, 2017, Plaintiff was “tackled by three prison guards (John Does [1-3]) and

slammed to the ground.” Id. Plaintiff was restrained, and John Does 1-3 punched him in

the face and back repeatedly; they also squeezed the handcuffs while placing Plaintiff in

a headlock and twisting his wrist. Id. Lieutenant Mitchell walked up to Plaintiff and

kicked him in the face, grabbed him by the leg, and twisted it. Id.

“Plaintiff was taken to healthcare by two prison guards (John Does [4-5]), while

Plaintiff repeatedly requested medical attention as Plaintiff complained of not being able

to see out his left eye to mental health (Jane Doe).” (Doc. 1, p. 13-14). Plaintiff was seen

by a Med-Tech (Jane Doe [1]), who noted that Plaintiff was bleeding from his face and

head. (Doc. 1, p. 14). A group of prison guards (John Does 6-8) then entered and began to

punch and knee Plaintiff in the back, face, and head. Id. Plaintiff was then dragged to

segregation, as three prison guards kneed and punched Plaintiff and called him

derogatory names. Id. Plaintiff was taken to the shower in segregation as he repeatedly

asked four guards (John Does) for medical attention. Id. Plaintiff was then placed in a cell,

and minutes later a sergeant (Sergeant John Doe 1) and gallery officer (C/O John Doe 9)

took Plaintiff to Med-Tec Jane Doe [2] and Med-Tech Jane Doe [3]. Id. Plaintiff tried to

explain his injuries to the medical staff, but he was ignored. Id. Plaintiff was then taken

back to his cell, and Sergeant John Doe 1 twisted Plaintiff’s wrist as Plaintiff directed

requests for medical attention to Sergeant John Doe 1 and C/O John Doe 9. (Doc. 1, p.

15).

Thereafter, Plaintiff, by and through appointed counsel, filed a Second Amended

Complaint on May 2, 2019, containing the following five counts:

Count 1: Cruel and unusual punishment – excessive force against Defendants

Shaun Reiman, Bradley Sadler, Donnie Keller, John Harrison, John Tourville,

George Welborn, William Qualls, Kellie Ellis, Lucas Maue, Daniel Lee, James

Mallory, Phillip Shields, David Mitchell, James Rigdon and Cletus McGee on

June 16, 2017;

Count 2: Cruel and unusual punishment – failure to intervene against

Defendants Shaun Reiman, Bradley Sadler, Donnie Keller, John Harrison, John

Tourville, George Welborn, William Qualls, Kellie Ellis, Lucas Maue, Daniel

Lee, James Mallory, Phillip Shields, David Mitchell, James Rigdon, Cletus

McGee, and Martha Oakley on June 16, 2017;

Count 3: Deliberate indifference to serious medical need against all named

Defendants on June 16, 2017;

Count 4: State law claim of battery against Defendants Shaun Reiman, Bradley

Sadler, Donnie Keller, John Harrison, John Tourville, George Welborn,

William Qualls, Kellie Ellis, Lucas Maue, Daniel Lee, James Mallory, Phillip

Shields, David Mitchell, James Rigdon and Cletus McGee on June 16, 2017;

and

Count 5: State law claim of assault against Defendants Shaun Reiman, Bradley

Sadler, Donnie Keller, John Harrison, John Tourville, George Welborn,

William Qualls, Kellie Ellis, Lucas Maue, Daniel Lee, James Mallory, Phillip

Shields, David Mitchell, James Rigdon and Cletus McGee on June 16, 2017.

(Doc. 108). Also, in his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff designates some of the

named Defendants as follows: Reiman, Sadler, Keller, Harrison, Tourville, Welborn,

Qualls, Ellis, Maue, Lee, Mallory and Shields as “Correctional Officer Defendants” and

Rigdon and McGee as “Sergeant Defendants.” (Doc. 108, p. 2).

Plaintiff alleges that on June 16, 2017, Defendants were agitated and sought to

provoke Plaintiff and other inmates when Defendants began to shake down inmates

including Plaintiff. During this period, Plaintiff maintains that he complied with all

orders and requests from staff. While the altercation with other inmates was taking place,

Defendants tackled Plaintiff and placed him in restraints and then began to beat Plaintiff.

Plaintiff further alleges that he was assaulted on the way to the healthcare unit,

that he was assaulted while at the healthcare unit, and on the way to restrictive housing

after being taken from the healthcare unit. Plaintiff contends that he suffered physical

injuries, i.e., injury and damage to his left eye, as well as mental and emotional injuries;

he seeks monetary damages for these injuries. (Doc. 108).

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ partial motion for summary judgment.

(Doc. 168, 169, 174). Defendants maintain there are no facts to support Plaintiff’s claims

as to the altercation on the yard and the transport to healthcare; no facts to support

Plaintiff’s claims in Counts 1-5 against Defendants Mitchell, Reiman, Tourville, Maue,

Lee, and Mallory, and no facts to support Plaintiff’s claims in Count 3 against Lashbrook

and Oakley. Plaintiff opposes the motion. (Doc. 172).2 Based on the reason delineated

below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the motion for partial summary

judgment.

2 Plaintiff states in his opposition: “Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

seeking only to dismiss Count III against Defendants Lashbrook and Oakley and all claims against

Defendants Lee, Reiman, Mallory, and Tourville – these are the only claims Plaintiff’s present opposition

responds to.” (Doc. 172, p. 2).

FACTS3

The following facts are taken from the record and presented in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in

his favor. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009).

During the relevant time alleged in the complaint, Plaintiff was an inmate of the

Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) housed at Menard. Defendant Jacqueline

Lashbrook was the warden of Menard. Defendant Martha Oakley was employed as a

correctional medical technician and nurse at Menard. Defendant David Mitchell was

employed at Menard as a lieutenant. The Correctional Officer Defendants were employed

at Menard as employees in the position of lieutenant, sergeant, or correctional officer.

Defendants James Rigdon and Cletus McGee were employed at Menard as sergeants.

On June 16, 2017, Plaintiff was participating in recreational activities at the Menard

gym with other inmates. After the recreation period ended, Plaintiff and the other

inmates were led from the gym area back to the West Cell House. Prior to escorting

inmates to the West Cell House, and unbeknownst to Plaintiff or the inmates that were

present in the gym, a physical altercation occurred between another inmate and the

Correctional Officer Defendants, Lieutenant Mitchell, and the Sergeant Defendants.

While Plaintiff was being led from the gym area, Plaintiff claims he was

approached by the Correctional Officer Defendants, Lieutenant Mitchell, Cletus McGee

3 The Court notes that the sequence of events and how the altercations/incidents happened as

presented by the parties have created two largely inconsistent versions of the facts at issue. The Court

further notes that these facts are directed to the issues raised by the parties.

and James Rigdon, who began to “shake down” and harass Plaintiff and the other

inmates. During the “shake down,” a physical altercation broke out between the

Correctional Officer Defendants, Lieutenant Mitchell, and the Sergeant Defendants and

another inmate who was being led to the West Cell House.

Plaintiff left the pat down search area and ran to the area where staff was

attempting to restrain an individual in custody. Plaintiff was given orders to lie on the

ground, but he did not comply. Instead, he charged a group of staff members and struck

them in various areas of the back, head, face, and torso. Plaintiff was physically restrained

with mechanical restraints after Plaintiff refused several direct orders to stop resisting.

At the Adjustment Committee hearing, Plaintiff admitted to striking the staff.

During the initial altercation, Plaintiff was combative and disobeyed orders. He was

found guilty of assault with injury and dangerous disturbance. He received restrictions

to his visits, audio/visual and contact visits, C Grade, restrictive housing, and good

conduct credit revocation of three (3) months which was later reduced to one (1) month.

In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were agitated

and sought to provoke altercations. Plaintiff also asserts that he complied with all staff

orders. In his deposition, Plaintiff denied striking any staff member. The findings by the

Adjustment Committee regarding the first altercation contradict Plaintiff’s Second

Amended Complaint and his deposition testimony.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Lee and Reiman grabbed and tackled him to the

ground and that Defendant Lee placed him in a headlock while Defendant Reiman

handcuffed him. Plaintiff further asserts that while he was on the ground, Defendants

Tourville, Mallory and Maue jumped into the altercation. Thereafter, Defendants Lee,

Reiman, Tourville, Hughes, Mallory, and Maue repeatedly punched Plaintiff in the face

and body and beat him in the back. Additionally, Defendant Reiman squeezed and

twisted Plaintiff’s wrists in the handcuffs. Subsequently, Defendant Mitchell approached

Plaintiff, kicked Plaintiff in the face, and grabbed Plaintiff’s leg and twisted it. Plaintiff

also contends that none of the Defendants attempted to intervene, stop, or prevent the

other Defendants from assaulting Plaintiff.

According to Plaintiff, after the initial assault ended, Plaintiff asked for medical

attention and was taken to the healthcare unit in handcuffs by Defendants Lee, Reiman,

Mallory, Maue and Tourville. On the way to healthcare, these Defendants continued to

twist his wrists, as well as kick and beat him in the back.

Upon arriving at healthcare, Plaintiff requested medical attention and complained

that he could not see out of his left eye; he also complained of a headache. At this time, a

different group of Correctional Officers entered the healthcare unit and assaulted

Plaintiff. They punched the Plaintiff and kneed him in the back, face, and head, while

calling him racial slurs. Again, Plaintiff claims that no one attempted to stop, assist,

intervene, or otherwise impede the attack on Plaintiff.

Instead of being seen by healthcare, Plaintiff was dragged by these Correctional

Officers from the healthcare unit to segregation. These officers continued their assault

until they placed Plaintiff in the shower area in segregation.

Plaintiff claims he repeatedly asked for medical treatment, but the Correctional

Officer Defendants ignored his requests. Thereafter, Plaintiff was taken to a room in

segregation where medical technicians Cassandra Chitty and Defendant Oakley waited

to assess him.

After the altercation, Plaintiff saw Defendant Oakley. Defendant Oakley prepared

the June 16, 2017 medical record regarding Plaintiff. The medical record indicates that

Plaintiff had an injury to his eyes, that he had minimal blood loss, and that it was a pin

point open area injury. Further, the medical record indicates that there was no swelling

or edema, no disfigurement or loss of range of motion, and no signs of impaired

circulation. Additionally, the medical record reflects that Plaintiff’s vitals were:

Temperature 98.2; Pulse 72; Respiration 16; and Blood Pressure 126/80. These vital signs

are indicative of a resting person and are not indicative of high pain, stress, or exertion.

According to Defendant Oakley’s Declaration, Plaintiff did not relay any serious medical

condition to her, she did not observe any serious medical condition on Plaintiff, and the

medical record was prepared based on the medical visit with Plaintiff.

Plaintiff testified that once he arrived at healthcare, he immediately requested

medical attention and noted that he could not see out of his left eye; he also complained

of a headache. Plaintiff further described other physical issues, including leg pain, to

Defendant Oakley. Plaintiff asserts that he was ignored when he tried to explain his

injuries to Defendant Oakley. Before ordering that Plaintiff be taken away, Defendant

Oakley merely mentioned to Plaintiff that he was bleeding from his face and head and

asked him if any of his bones were sticking out.

Plaintiff alleges that after seeing Defendant Oakley, he was returned to his cell by

the Sergeant Defendants and the Correctional Officer Defendants. While escorting

Plaintiff back to his cell, these Defendants assaulted him again by punching him in the

back, twisting his wrists, and threatening to break his wrists. Further, Plaintiff testified

that Lieutenant Mitchell only witnessed the altercation on the yard.4

The incident reports state that Defendant Mallory was present in the yard, that

another officer escorted Plaintiff to the healthcare unit, and that Defendant Mallory

escorted another inmate to the healthcare unit. Further, the investigational interviews

and incident reports state that Defendant Lee was injured during the yard incident, that

Defendant Lee escorted inmates to the West House and not to the healthcare unit, and

that that he did not escort Plaintiff to healthcare. Lastly, these same reports indicate that

Defendants Reiman, Tourville, and Maue were involved in an altercation with other

inmates and sustained injuries from that altercation which required medical treatment.

Due to the June 16, 2017 yard fight/altercation, Plaintiff was transferred from

Menard. He arrived at Pontiac Correctional Center (“Pontiac”) on June 17, 2017.

On June 20, 2017, Plaintiff received treatment at Pontiac for swelling and

discoloration around his left eye and for an ear ache. The medical records do not indicate

any further assaults other than the one that allegedly took place at Menard on June 16,

2017.

4 Plaintiff testified to the following:

A. To my knowledge, that was for that portion. He seen [sic] those officers basically beat me.

Q. Did Lieutenant Mitchell see anything in the health care unit?

A. No. He wasn’t in – he wasn’t in that batch. No.

Q. Was he – Lieutenant Mitchell, did see any other incidents where you allege you were hurt?

A. No.

(Doc. 169-3, p. 4).

If an individual in custody were to be transferred out of Menard, his grievances

would not be redirected to Menard, but would go to his current facility or to the

Administrative Review Board. Any grievance Plaintiff had about Menard after he was

transferred to Pontiac would not come to Menard and it would not have been seen by

Defendant Lashbrook, as it would have gone to Pontiac. Defendant Lashbrook does not

recall Plaintiff needing or requesting any further medical treatment while housed at

Menard.

Plaintiff testified that Defendant Lashbrook only had knowledge of his injuries

through the grievance process; otherwise, she did not know about his injuries.5 Plaintiff

also testified that he does not know if Defendant Lashbrook knew that Plaintiff would be

seriously harmed if he did not receive medical treatment.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See

Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Doe, 743 F.3d 1101, 1105 (7th Cir. 2014)(citing FED. R. CIV.

5 Plaintiff testified to the following:

Q. What about Warden Lashbrook? Did she have knowledge of all those injuries or any of those

injuries?

A. I believe so through my grievance process.

…

Q. But as you sit here today, do you know if she knew?

A. No. I can’t personally say that she did, but in my grievance – she should have known through

the grievance process.

(Doc. 169-3, p. 7-8).

PROC. 56(a)). Accord Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2012). A genuine issue

of material fact remains “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). Accord Bunn v. Khoury Enter., Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 681-682 (7th Cir. 2014).

In assessing a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the

light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the non-moving

party. See Anderson, 699 F.3d at 994; Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011).

As the Seventh Circuit has explained, and as required by Rule 56(a), “we set forth the

facts by examining the evidence in the light reasonably most favorable to the non-moving

party, giving [him] the benefit of reasonable, favorable inferences and resolving conflicts

in the evidence in [his] favor.” Spaine v. Community Contacts, Inc., 756 F.3d 542, 544 (7th

Cir. 2014).

B. Excessive Force and Failure to Intervene

The Eighth Amendment’s proscription on cruel and unusual punishment extends

to prohibit the use of excessive force against prisoners. The use of force is excessive when

it involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. See Rice ex rel. Rice v. Correctional

Medical Services, 675 F.3d 650, 667 (7th Cir. 2012), abrogation recognized on other grounds

by Kemp v. Fulton County, 27 F.4th 491 (7th Cir. 2022). When prison officials are accused of

using excessive force, the core inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort

to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson

v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). Several factors are relevant to this determination,

including the need for force, the amount of force applied, the threat a guard reasonably

perceived, the effort made to temper the severity of the force used, and the extent of the

injury caused to the prisoner. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496, 504

(7th Cir. 2004).

Even a bystander to the use of excessive force can be held liable under § 1983 for

failure to intervene if a plaintiff can show that the officer (1) had reason to know that a

fellow officer was using excessive force or committing a constitutional violation, and (2)

had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the act from occurring. See Harper v.

Albert, 400 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th Cir. 2005). A plaintiff must establish an underlying

constitutional violation in order to succeed on a claim for failure to intervene. Id. (citing

Fillmore, 358 F.3d at 505-506. That is to say, without establishing that at least some guards

used excessive force, Plaintiff cannot succeed on a failure to intervene claim.

C. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against “cruel and

unusual punishments” if they display deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious

medical needs. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 652–653 (7th Cir. 2005)(quoting Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accord Rodriguez v.

Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 828 (7th Cir. 2009)(stating that

“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of a prisoner constitutes the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain forbidden by the Constitution.”). A prisoner

is entitled to reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm—not to

demand specific care. See Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997).

To prevail on such a claim, a prisoner who brings an Eighth Amendment challenge

of constitutionally deficient medical care must satisfy a two-part test. See Arnett v.

Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 2011). The first prong that must be satisfied is whether

the prisoner has shown he has an objectively serious medical need. See Arnett, 658 F.3d at

750; accord Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653. A medical condition need not be life-threatening to be

serious; rather, it could be a condition that would result in further significant injury or

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain if not treated. See Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d

610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010). Accord Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994)(violating the

Eighth Amendment requires “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious

harm.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Prevailing on the second prong requires a prisoner to show that a prison official

has subjective knowledge of — and then disregards — an excessive risk to inmate

health. See Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653. A plaintiff need not show the individual “literally

ignored” his complaint, just that the individual was aware of the serious medical

condition and either knowingly or recklessly disregarded it. See Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d

516, 524 (7th Cir. 2008). “Negligence, gross negligence, or even ‘recklessness’ as that term

is used in tort cases, is not enough.” Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068, 1072 (7th Cir. 1987)

(citation omitted). Also, “mere disagreement with the course of the inmate's medical

treatment does not constitute an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate

indifference.” Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations and

citations omitted).

Assessing the second prong is more difficult in cases alleging inadequate care as

opposed to a lack of care. Without more, a “mistake in professional judgment cannot be

deliberate indifference.” Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir.

2016). The Seventh Circuit explained the distinction as follows:

By definition a treatment decision that’s based on professional judgment

cannot evince deliberate indifference because professional judgment implies a

choice of what the defendant believed to be the best course of treatment. A

doctor who claims to have exercised professional judgment is effectively

asserting that he lacked a sufficiently culpable mental state, and if no

reasonable jury could discredit that claim, the doctor is entitled to summary

judgment.

Id. (citing Zaya v. Sood, 836 F.3d 800, 805-806 (7th Cir. 2016)). This is in contrast to a case

“where evidence exists that the defendant [ ] knew better than to make the medical

decision[ ] that [he] did,” Id. (quoting Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 731 (7th Cir. 2016)

(alterations in original). However, a medical professional’s choice of an easier, less

efficacious treatment can rise to the level of violating the Eighth Amendment where the

treatment is known to be ineffective but is chosen anyway. See Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d

435, 441 (7th Cir. 2010).

ANALYSIS

A. Application of Heck v. Humphrey

All Defendants, including Defendants Mitchell, Lee, Reiman, Tourville, Hughes,

Mallory and Maue, first argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

claims regarding the altercation in the yard pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a § 1983 action for damages is unavailable if

success on the merits necessarily would imply the invalidity of a plaintiff’s conviction or

sentence, unless that underlying conviction or sentence has been invalidated on direct

appeal, expunged by executive order, or declared invalid on habeas review. Id. at 486-

487. See also McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2157 (2019)(stating that “to recover

damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm

caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” a

§ 1983 plaintiff must first “prove that his conviction had been invalidated in some way.”).

The Supreme Court extended the Heck doctrine to civil rights claims arising out of prison

disciplinary hearings. See, e.g., Burd v. Sessler, 702 F.3d 429, 434 (7th Cir. 2012), abrogated

on other grounds by Savory v. Cannon, 947 F.3d 409 (7th Cir. 2020)(noting that claims

which “necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of . . . [an inmate’s] good time

credits” are barred by Heck until otherwise invalidated) (citing Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S.

641, 648 (1997)).

Heck prohibits a prisoner in a later civil rights case from challenging a finding that

was essential to a decision in his criminal or prison disciplinary case. If the prisoner insists

on doing so, the civil rights case must be dismissed. See Moore v. Mahone, 652 F.3d 722,

723 (7th Cir. 2011)(citing Okoro v. Callaghan, 324 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir. 2003)). Heck is

analogous to collateral estoppel in that “an issue determined with finality in a full and

fair adjudicative proceeding (and essential to the decision in that proceeding) cannot be

reopened in a subsequent case.” Id. In order to determine whether the Heck rule applies,

the Court must compare the factual basis of a § 1983 claim with the essential facts that

supported the disciplinary action. See Viramontes v. City of Chicago, 840 F.3d 423, 428 (7th

Cir. 2016). If the factual basis of the § 1983 claim and the disciplinary decision are

contradictory, the lawsuit must be dismissed without prejudice so long as the

disciplinary decision remains in place and is valid. Id.

Here, Defendants argue that the findings of the Adjustment Committee require

dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims as to the altercation on the yard against all Defendants,

including Mitchell, Lee, Reiman, Tourville, Hughes, Mallory and Maue. Plaintiff,

however, argues that he can take an “agnostic posture,” neither confirming nor denying

the prior findings of the Adjustment Committee. According to Plaintiff, he does not need

to concede to these facts nor deny that he did anything wrong because it is possible that

Defendants acted with excessive force, failed to intervene, violated his constitutional

rights, and committed assault and battery.

The Court first considers the facts underlying Plaintiff’s disciplinary decision. The

Adjustment Committee’s complaint against Plaintiff alleged the following:

Offender TITUS, Adam R43512 is being issued this disciplinary report based

on the findings of an External investigation that was initiated on 6/16/2017.

On 6/16/2017 multiple staff was [sic] assaulted while 5 and 8 galleries of the

West Cell House were being escorted from the Multi-Purpose Building back

to the West Cell House. Multiple offenders began striking staff members with

closed fist punches. Multiple direct orders were given for offenders to stop

fighting and get on the ground but all were ignored. As a result, two warning

shots were fired and O.C. pepper spray was used in order to gain compliance.

The Menard Security Camera System was utilized and revealed offender

TITUS left the pat search area and ran to the area where staff was attempting

to restrain one of the inmates involved in the initial assault on staff. TITUS was

given orders to lie on the ground but refused and charged a group of staff

members who were attempting to secure other offenders. TITUS began

swinging closed fist punches at the group of staff members striking them in

various areas across the back of the head, face, and torso. This was verified by

the Camera system and was identified by three staff members who had to

physically restrain TITUS with mechanical restraints after he refused several

direct orders to stop resisting. Due to offender TITUS being identified on

camera and by three staff members, assaulting staff, TITUS R43512 is being

charged with violating Departmental Rules 504A: 100-Violent Assault, 102a –

Assault with injury, 105-Dangerous Disturbance and 313–Disobeying a Direct

Order. Offender TITUS was identified by his state ID card and Offender 360.

(Doc. 169-1, p. 4-5). Plaintiff entered no plea and provided a written statement which

stated he was not guilty. During the hearing, however, Plaintiff admitted to striking

officers. Thus, Plaintiff was found guilty of 102a–Assault with injury: striking staff with

closed fist and 105-Dangerous Disturbances: multiple offenders. (Doc. 169-1, p. 2).

Plaintiff received restrictions to his visits, audio/visual and contact visits, C Grade,

restrictive housing, and good conduct credit revocation of three (3) months, which was

later reduced to one (1) month. (Doc. 169-1, p. 3; Doc. 169-2, p. 3).

What is clear from the record is that Plaintiff admitted he struck staff in the course

of proceedings that have not been invalidated. If this case involved issues related to the

discipline Plaintiff received, then it would have to be dismissed pursuant to Heck. This

case, however, is more complicated, in that Plaintiff alleges he was beaten repeatedly and

denied medical care for the altercation in the yard; he was also beaten during his

transport to healthcare, while in healthcare, and on the way to restrictive housing.

In assessing whether his § 1983 claims are barred by Heck, the Court looks to the

Seventh Circuit cases of Helman v. Duhaime, 742 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2014) and Evans v.

Poskon, 603 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 2010). In Evans, police burst into the plaintiff’s home,

believing he was attempting to strangle someone. The police arrested the plaintiff after a

struggle. Evans was convicted of attempted murder and resisting arrest. He subsequently

filed suit pursuant to § 1983 alleging that the arresting officers used excessive force during

and after his arrest. The Seventh Circuit held that Evans could not maintain an action

premised on the claim that he did not resist being taken into custody. However, he could

proceed with claims that the police used excessive force in effecting his custody and after

he was in custody. See Evans, 603 F.3d at 363-364.

The Helman court considered Evans in the context of a plaintiff who was convicted

of resisting arrest. The plaintiff was shot by police officers because he attempted to draw

a weapon during the execution of an arrest warrant. Helman pleaded guilty, but he filed

an excessive force claim against the arresting officers for shooting him. See Helman, 742

F.3d at 761-762. The Seventh Circuit found that Helman’s “only viable theory of § 1983

liability [wa]s Helman’s theory that he did not attempt to draw his weapon until after

shots were fired at him.” Id. at 762-763. The Court determined that such a theory

necessarily implied the invalidity of Helman’s conviction. Taken together, Evans and

Helman suggest that the timing of and interaction between the offense conduct leading to

a conviction and the alleged use of excessive force are important factors in determining

whether a § 1983 action is barred by Heck.

Here, Plaintiff’s claims are more closely aligned with the plaintiff’s claims in Evans.

Even accepting that Plaintiff admitted to striking staff during the first altercation in the

yard, that does not negate the possibility that Defendants, like the officers in Evans, could

have used excessive force in subduing Plaintiff and while transporting Plaintiff to

healthcare and to segregation. Plaintiff’s claims do not imply the invalidity of the

underlying Adjustment Committee findings/proceedings. As such, Plaintiff’s claims are

not barred by Heck. Thus, the Court denies this portion of the partial motion for summary

judgment.

B. Excessive Force, Failure to Intervene, Deliberate Indifference, Battery and

Assault claims against Lee, Reiman, Mallory, Tourville and Maue – Counts 1-56

Defendants further challenge Plaintiff’s claims against Lee, Reiman, Tourville,

Maue, Lee, and Mallory contending that the records and the undisputed facts

demonstrate that these Defendants were not involved in any altercation with Plaintiff.

Specifically, these Defendants claim that they did not escort Plaintiff to the healthcare

unit. Therefore, they could not have been involved in the assault, battery, and use of

excessive force. Nor could they have showed any deliberate indifference or failed to

intervene on Plaintiff’s behalf. Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s version of the

facts, i.e., that Defendants Lee, Reiman, Mallory, and Tourville escorted him to the

healthcare unit after the altercation in the yard and that Defendant Maue was involved

in the assault at the healthcare unit, are not supported by the evidence. According to

Defendants, Defendant Mallory was only present during the yard incident and did not

escort Plaintiff to the healthcare unit as Defendant Mallory escorted a different individual

to the healthcare unit. See (Doc. 169-11). Also, Defendants maintain that Defendant Lee

was injured during the yard incident, that Defendant Lee was only present during the

6 Defendants’ section of the brief in support of partial summary judgment includes arguments as to

Defendant Maue even though his name is not included in the heading of the section. See (Doc. 169, p. 15).

Plaintiff did not address Defendant Maue in his brief in opposition. Despite Defendant Maue not being

named in the heading, the Court will address the arguments presented by Defendant Maue in the

memorandum in support of the motion for partial summary judgment.

yard incident, and that Defendant Lee escorted inmates to the West House and not to the

healthcare unit. See (Doc. 169-13, 203-204). Lastly, Defendants contend that Defendants

Reiman, Tourville, and Maue were involved in an altercation with another inmate and

sustained injuries from that altercation which required medical treatment. See (Doc. 169-

12, p. 11; Doc. 169-13, p.214-216; Doc. 169-13, p. 232-235; Doc. 169-13, p. 266-269). Plaintiff

counters that Defendants’ reports are self-serving, that Defendants do not address the

factual discrepancies, and that Defendants completely ignore Plaintiff’s version of the

facts.

Based on the record before the Court, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that there are

genuine issues of material fact that must be decided by a jury. Plaintiff claims that

Defendants Lee and Reiman were the officers that originally tackled him in the prison

yard and that Defendants Mallory and Tourville jumped in to help subdue Plaintiff.

Plaintiff further claims that these four Defendants punched and beat him while

attempting to restrain him. Regarding the escort to healthcare, Plaintiff testified that

Defendants Lee, Reiman, Mallory, Maue, and Tourville dragged him on the ground,

called him names, and punched and kneed him in the back, body, and head. They also

did not stop beating him until he arrived at the healthcare unit and sat him on the bench.

Plaintiff also testified that he was able to identify these Defendants as he was familiar

with them. Plaintiff furthermore testified that Defendants Lee, Tourville, Reiman, Maue,

and Mallory assaulted him in the healthcare unit and that Reiman witnessed it.

Defendants Reiman, Mallory, Maue, and Lee then took him from the healthcare unit to

segregation. Plaintiff’s allegations and testimony are in direct conflict with the evidence

presented by Defendants. Plaintiff’s testimony is sufficient to establish a level of personal

involvement as to these Defendants. Thus, the Court finds that there are material disputes

of fact and credibility issues that must be decided by a trier of fact. Accordingly, the Court

finds that summary judgment as to these Defendants is not appropriate.

C. Deliberate Indifference claim against Defendant Oakley and Defendant

Lashbrook – Count 3

1. Defendant Oakley

For the purposes of this motion and based on the record before the Court, the

Court finds that the injury to Plaintiff’s eye along with his other alleged injuries constitute

objectively serious medical conditions. Thus, the Court must determine, based on that

same record and construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, whether

Defendant Oakley was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs.

The parties do not agree that the medical records accurately reflect Plaintiff’s

condition/conditions and treatment from Defendant Oakley, with Plaintiff pointing to

documentation of additional and more serious injuries by healthcare staff at Pontiac after

his transfer, including the swelling of his eye. While there could be innocent explanations,

like delays in the appearance of contusions and abrasions, those determinations are best

left to a trier of fact. As such, the Court finds that Defendant Oakley is not entitled to

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim.

2. Defendant Lashbrook

Defendants argue that Defendant Lashbrook is entitled to summary judgment as

she was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs because she could

not have reviewed Plaintiff’s grievance. Specifically, Defendants argue that Lashbrook

does not recall Plaintiff needing or requesting further medical treatment while in Menard.

Further, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s grievances regarding medical care would not

have gone to Defendant Lashbrook because Plaintiff was transferred to Pontiac right after

the June 16, 2017 altercation.

In response to Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, Plaintiff does

not address this issue. The Court considers this failure to respond as an admission of the

merits. See SDIL Local Rule 7.1(c)(1); Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003). See

also Flynn v. Sandahl, 58 F.3d 283, 288 (7th Cir. 1995)(noting that a failure to respond

constitutes an admission that there are no undisputed material facts). Thus, the Court

finds that Defendant Lashbrook was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious

medical needs and that Defendant Lashbrook is entitled to summary judgment on Count

3 of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint.

D. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity shields “government officials from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223, 231 (2009). The doctrine “balances two important interests – the need to hold public

officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield

officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties

reasonably.” Id. It protects an official from suit “when she makes a decision that, even if

constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the

circumstances she confronted.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).

The qualified immunity test has two prongs: (1) whether the facts shown, taken in

the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, demonstrate that the officer’s

conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right at issue was clearly

established at the time of the alleged misconduct. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. See also

Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 197; Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). To be “‘clearly

established’, a right must be defined so clearly that every reasonable official would have

understood that what he was doing violated that right.” Dibble v. Quinn, 793 F.3d 803, 808

(7th Cir. 2015)(citing Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). There need not be a case

directly on point, but “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional

question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). The right must be

established “not as a broad general proposition.” Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664. Instead, it must

be “particularized” such that the “contours” of it are clear to a reasonable official. Id. That

is, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond

debate.” Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014).

Defendant Lashbrook is entitled to qualified immunity because, even when the

facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, she engaged in no conduct that

violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights as alleged in Count 3. As to all other claims

against Defendants, Defendants’ conduct could be said to have violated Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights such that they are not entitled to qualified immunity.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ motion

for partial summary judgment. (Doc. 168). The Court GRANTS the motion as to the claim

against Defendant Lashbrook in Count 3 and FINDS that she is entitled to qualified

immunity. At the close of the case, the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of

Defendant Jacqueline Lashbrook and against Adam Titus on Count 3 of the Second

Amended Complaint.

The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion in all other regards, and the following

claims remain pending: Count 1 (Excessive Force), Count 2 (Failure to Intervene), Count

3 (Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs) against all Defendants except Defendant

Lashbrook, Count 4 (Battery), and Count 5 (Assault).

The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to set this matter for a telephone status

conference to discuss the possibility of a settlement conference and potential trial dates.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 22, 2022. Digitally signed by

ATbet date, 70220822

14:34:05 -05'00'

GILBERTC.SISON

United States Magistrate Judge

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