The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DARRYL SMITH, #M51792,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 3:19-cv-01138-SMY
JASON MORRIS,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 54),
which Plaintiff opposes (Doc. 60). For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Darryl Smith, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections, filed the instant
lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights at Menard
Correctional Center. Following preliminary review of the Complaint, Plaintiff is proceeding on
the following claim:
Count 1: Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Morris for deliberate
indifference to Plaintiff’s risk of self-harm and attempted suicide.
(Doc. 18).
FACTS1
Smith was housed in segregation in the North 2-4 Gallery of Menard on March 20, 2019.
(Doc. 59). He met with Qualified Mental Health Provider Pappas that day for a wellness check
due to a mental health services referral. (Doc. 55-2). Smith reported to Pappas that his mother
1 The facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
had died. (Id.). Based upon their discussion, Pappas found that Plaintiff was “not at immediate
risk for himself or others” at that time. (Id.).
Defendant Jason Morris was employed as a correctional officer at Menard and worked
from 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. on March 20, 2019. (Doc. 59). Morris was assigned to segregation
in the North 2-4 Gallery. (Id.). His duties and responsibilities included, but were not limited to,
performing counts, escorting inmates for phone calls, escorting inmates to medical technicians,
completing rounds every thirty minutes, and assisting with chow time. (Id.). Morris did not
provide medical or mental health treatment to inmates. (Id.).
On the evening of March 20, 2019, Morris completed his last security round between 10:35
p.m. and 10:45 p.m. (Id.). The shift change occurs just before 11:00 p.m. on the second shift.
(Id.). Before 11:00, the third shift employees arrive and the officers pass on any necessary
information. (Id.). Morris would have left the gallery prior to 11:00 p.m., walked to the front
gate, and walked out of the facility at 11:00 p.m. (Id.).
At approximately 11:00 p.m., correctional officer Hecht, who was assigned to the North 2-
4 Gallery, was performing a count when he observed Smith in his cell lying on his bed
unresponsive with blood on the cell floor. (Docs. 55-3, 59). Smith was taken to the health care
unit to be evaluated by medical staff and was subsequently sent by ambulance to Chester Memorial
Hospital. (Doc. 55-3).
The remaining facts are disputed. Morris was interviewed by internal affairs on May 12,
2019 and reported the following: Smith never told him that he had cut himself. There was no
medical emergency involving Smith when he interacted with him on the evening of March 20,
2019 or when he completed his last security round of the evening. (Id. at p. 7). Smith did not
request medical assistance, tell him that he was suicidal, or show him cuts on his forearms on the
evening of March 20, 2019. (Id.).
Smith asserts the following: he told Morris he was suicidal and showed him that he had cut
his arm open in two places. (Doc. 60). Morris asked him to stick his arms out of the chuck hole
so he could get a better look. (Id.). He told Morris that he felt like he was going to pass out
because he took “multiple different pills” and had lost a lot of blood due to the cuts on his arm.
He requested medical attention. (Id.). Morris told him he would have to wait until the next shift
to get medical attention, gave him paper towels for the bleeding, and left. (Id.).
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of
any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion
for summary judgment is made, the adverse party must set forth specific facts showing there is a
genuine issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court’s role is not to determine the truth
of the matter, and it may not “choose between competing inferences or balance the relative weight
of conflicting evidence.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Instead,
“it must view all the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
and resolve all factual disputes in favor of the non-moving party.” Hansen v. Fincantieri Marine
Grp., LLC, 763 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 2014).
The Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment imposes an
obligation on states “to provide adequate medical care to incarcerated individuals.” Holloway v.
Delaware Cty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1072 (7th Cir. 2012). Prison officials and medical staff
violate the Eighth Amendment if they act with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious
medical needs. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 475 (7th Cir. 2017). To succeed on a claim for
deliberate indifference, a prisoner must demonstrate that he suffered from an objectively serious
medical condition, and the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Id.
The risk of suicide is an objectively serious medical condition; inmates have the right to be
free from deliberate indifference to this risk while in custody. Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705,
716 (7th Cir. 2019). “Where the harm at issue is a suicide or attempted suicide,” deliberate
indifference “requires a dual showing that the defendant: (1) subjectively knew the prisoner was
at substantial risk of committing suicide and (2) intentionally disregarded that risk.” Id. A prison
official ignoring a request for medical assistance may constitute deliberate indifference. Petties
v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 729 (7th Cir. 2016). And “an inmate is not required to show that he was
literally ignored by prison staff to demonstrate deliberate indifference.” Id. If a risk from a
particular course of medical treatment (or lack thereof) is obvious enough, a factfinder can infer
that a prison official knew about it and disregarded it. Id.
Here, Smith’s assertions that he told Morris he was suicidal, showed him cuts on his arm,
told him he felt like he was going to pass out because he took “multiple different pills” and had
lost a lot of blood, and requested medical care, create factual disputes that prelude summary
judgment.
Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity shields “government officials from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). When
determining whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court considers: (1) whether
the facts shown, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, demonstrate that
the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right at issue was clearly
established at the time of the alleged misconduct. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. “…[Q]ualified
immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages when their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Humphries v. Milwaukee Cty., 702 F.3d 1003, 1006 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
As previously noted, material issues of fact preclude a finding as a matter of law that Morris
did not engage in a constitutional violation. And accepting Smith’s allegations as true, any
reasonable officer would know he had a duty to seek medication attention for Smith under the
circumstances. See, Orlowski v. Milwaukee Cty., 872 F.3d 417, 422 (7th Cir. 2012). For these
reasons, Morris is not entitled to qualified immunity.
DISPOSITION
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. This matter will proceed to trial
on Smith’s claim in Count 1 against Defendant Morris. A separate order will be issued recruiting
Standby Counsel for purposes of trial and setting a status conference to schedule final pretrial
conference and trial dates.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: October 3, 2022
s/ Staci M. Yandle_____
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge