Richmond v. Rutherford

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

RASHAD RICHMOND,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:19-CV-1097-NJR

CHAD RUTHERFORD, AUSTIN

THOMPSON, and DAKOTA

HANNAH,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:

Pending before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants

Chad Rutherford, Austin Thompson, and Dakota Hannah (Doc. 57). Plaintiff Richmond

filed a timely response (Doc. 60), where he fully incorporated his prior motion for

summary judgment (Doc. 41) as his argument in opposition. For the reasons set forth

below, Defendants’ motion is granted.

INTRODUCTION

On October 4, 2019, Plaintiff Rashad Richmond, formerly a prisoner in the custody

of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), filed this action pro se pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging his constitutional rights were violated while he was incarcerated

at Lawrence Correctional Center (“Lawrence”) (Doc. 1). Richmond currently resides at

DeKalb County Jail, but his allegations concern an incident during his incarceration at

Lawrence (Doc. 1; 15). This action proceeds on two counts: one for retaliation in violation

of the First Amendment and one for cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth

Amendment (Doc. 17). Richmond alleges that Defendants held him captive in the shower

for six hours in retaliation for a Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) report that

Richmond filed against Rutherford and for Richmond’s involvement in a staff assault

incident weeks prior (Doc. 1). Defendants also purportedly denied Richmond access to

his pain medication (Id.).

At the time of the underlying events, Defendants worked at Lawrence as

correctional officers (Docs. 58-5; 58-6; 58-7). In their motion for summary judgment,

Defendants argue that Richmond has not set forth any evidence demonstrating retaliation

or that they subjected him to an extreme deprivation (Doc. 58). Moreover, Defendants

assert that they were not deliberately indifferent to an excessive risk to Richmond’s health

or safety (Id.). Thompson and Hannah contend that they had no personal involvement in

the incident (Id.). Defendants also assert qualified immunity as a defense (Id.).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed for purposes of summary judgment and are

construed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, Richmond.1

After a two-week stint in crisis watch, Richmond arrived at his cell in Lawrence’s

Segregation B Wing at approximately 1:00 p.m. on July 23, 2019 (Docs. 1, 58, 58-4). He

noticed that his cell lacked a mattress and a bed roll, which he immediately brought to the

attention of first shift (officers working from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.) to no avail (Docs. 58;

1 Instead of filing a traditional response, Richmond filed a notice stating that he incorporated his prior

motion for summary judgment as his response to Defendants’ motion (Doc. 60). As such, he did not

respond directly to Defendants’ version of the undisputed material facts. The facts, however, primarily

stem from Richmond’s deposition testimony.

58-1, p. 25). At the beginning of second shift (3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.), Rutherford, an officer

assigned to Segregation B Wing, arrived at Richmond’s cell (Doc. 58-1, p. 25). During this

time, Richmond alerted Rutherford about his need for a bedroll and mattress (Id.).

Rutherford placed Richmond in restraints and escorted him to the shower (Docs. 58; 58-1,

pp. 25-27; 58-2, p. 2).

Generally, the shower area in Lawrence’s segregation unit is comprised of

multiple standing shower cells (Doc. 58-1, pp. 28-29). Richmond described the cells as a

bit smaller than a parking space (Id.). Each cell has walls to the ceiling on either side, a

door that locks, bars on the top, a solid pane at the bottom, and a “chuckhole” to allow

prison personnel to apply or remove handcuffs (Id. at pp. 28-32). The space in each

shower cell is cramped with no bench or ledge for sitting (Id. at pp. 28-30). Richmond also

testified that the segregation shower area is “loud as hell” (Id. at p. 39).

After being placed in a secluded, corner cell, Richmond took a shower, shut off the

water, and put on his clothes (Id. at pp. 31, 38, 39). At this point, Rutherford returned to

the shower but did not allow Richmond to exit the shower (Id. at pp. 32-33, 36). While in

the shower, Richmond renewed his request for a bedroll with Rutherford stating that he

just arrived in the unit and wanted to sleep (Id. at p. 36). According to Richmond,

Rutherford cussed at him and told him to sleep in the shower (Docs. 1, p. 18; 58-1, pp. 36-

37). After Rutherford walked away, Lieutenant Dixon, no longer a party to this action,

came into the shower area and signed a logbook (Docs. 1, p. 18; 58-1, p. 33). Richmond

pleaded with Dixon to get a bed roll and mattress, but Dixon walked away without

response (Doc. 1, p. 18).

While locked in the shower cell, Richmond observed Rutherford passing through

the area to escort other prisoners for their showers and signing a logbook each time

(Doc. 1, p. 19; 58-1, pp. 33, 43). Each time he passed through, Richmond begged to be let

out of the shower (Doc. 58-1, pp. 40, 43). Richmond also noticed that Defendants

Thompson and Hannah entered the area to help escort others to their showers (Docs. 1,

p. 18; 58-1, pp. 33, 36). Richmond believes that he implored Defendants Thompson and

Hannah to release him from the shower on multiple occasions (Doc. 58-1, p. 33).

According to Richmond, neither officer responded to him (Id. at p. 40). Hannah was

assigned as the video visit officer during this shift (Doc. 58-2, p. 2). According to Hannah,

he only went to the segregation area during his lunch hour to heat his dinner (Doc. 58-6).

Thompson was assigned to Segregation A Wing, opposite of Richmond’s wing (Doc. 58-

2, p. 2). According to Thompson, he only helped in the B Wing shower area for

approximately 30 minutes (Doc. 58-7).

In his affidavit, Richmond stated that he could see the “bubble,” a control area

where correctional officers sit, from the shower (Docs. 1, p. 18; 58-1, p. 39). Richmond

watched Defendants play cards, eat dinner, smile, and laugh at him in an attempt to

depreciate and humiliate him (Docs. 1, p. 18; 58-1, pp. 44-45). As hours passed, Richmond

remained standing in the shower cell (Docs. 1, p. 20; 58-1, p. 40). A nurse made rounds to

distribute medications, and Richmond testified that he heard someone tell the nurse to

withhold his pain medication (Doc. 58-1, pp. 46-47). He could not identify who gave the

nurse this command (Id.).

Richmond broke his back and leg years earlier in a car accident which caused

lasting, chronic pain (Doc. 1, p. 20). As a result of the injuries, he has hardware in one leg

(Docs. 1, p. 20; 58-1, p. 54). Richmond alleges that the officers knew of his medical issues

and that he had difficulty standing for a long period of time (Doc. 1, p. 20). After being

subjected to prolonged standing over the course of several hours, he experienced knee

and leg pain along with swelling (Doc. 58-1, p. 54).

Finally, Rutherford came to escort Richmond back to his cell (Docs. 1, p. 19; 58-1,

pp. 47-48). Richmond could barely walk and limped back to his cell (Doc. 1, p. 20).

According to Richmond, he returned to his cell at the beginning of third shift, around

9:00 p.m. (Docs. 1, p. 20; 58-1, pp. 47-48). An incident report from that evening, however,

indicates that Richmond returned to his cell at 7:55 p.m. (Doc. 58-4). Richmond asked

Rutherford why he was locked in the shower for several hours (Docs. 1, p. 19; 58-1, pp. 48-

49). Rutherford explained that he did so because of the PREA report that Richmond filed

against him and a staff assault incident two weeks prior2 (Docs. 1, p. 20; 58-1, pp. 48-49).

Essentially, Rutherford retaliated (Id.). Richmond does not recall ever filing a PREA

complaint against Rutherford (Doc. 58-1, p. 49).

Upon arrival at his cell, Richmond again requested a bedroll, mattress, and dinner

(Docs. 1, p. 20; 58-1, p. 50). Rutherford passed responsibility for “third shift [to] figure it

out[.]” (Id.). Richmond reacted by snatching his handcuffs before they were fully

2 According to Richmond, Rutherford mentioned that the shower incident was in retaliation for

involvement in a staff assault incident two weeks prior. But the Court dismissed this portion of the claim

on preliminary review because Richmond did not allege that he engaged in constitutionally protected

activity as to the staff assault (Doc. 17, p. 4).

removed (Id.). He refused to return them until he could speak with someone in higher

command (Docs. 1, p. 21; 58-1, pp. 51-52). Sergeant Anthony Senn, Lieutenant Dixon, and

Major Whelan, all non-parties, arrived on the scene (Id.). Major Whelan accommodated

Richmond with pain medication, a mattress, bedroll, and dinner, and Richmond returned

the handcuffs (Doc. 58-1, p. 52). Richmond transferred to Hill Correctional Center (“Hill”)

the following morning (Doc. 58-3, p. 3).

According to Rutherford, Hannah, and an incident report from that evening,

Richmond refused to be handcuffed to get out of the shower (Docs. 58-4; 58-5). But

Richmond testified that he never refused (Doc. 58-1, pp. 37, 41).

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also

Ruffin Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005).

The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no material facts are in genuine

dispute; any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue must be resolved against the

moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970); see also Lawrence v.

Kenosha Cty., 391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004).

Once the moving party sets forth the basis for summary judgment, the burden then

shifts to the nonmoving party who must go beyond mere allegations and offer specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); see Celotex

Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-24. A moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law where

the nonmoving party “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of

her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.

The party opposing summary judgment must offer admissible evidence in support of his

version of events; hearsay evidence does not create a genuine issue of material fact.

Durling v. Menard, Inc., No. 18 C 4052, 2020 WL 996520, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2020) (citing

McKenzie v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 484 (7th Cir. 1996)).

In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the Court must view the

evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant. Bennington v.

Caterpillar Inc., 275 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[i]nferences that rely upon speculation or conjecture are

insufficient.” Armato v. Grounds, 766 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cir. 2014). “Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is

no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. First Amendment Retaliation

Prison officials may not retaliate against inmates for filing grievances, exercising

First Amendment rights, or otherwise complaining about their conditions of

confinement. See Manuel v. Nalley, 966 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 2020); see also Gomez v. Randle,

680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012). To substantiate a First Amendment retaliation claim, a

prisoner must show “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he

suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future;

and (3) the First Amendment activity was ‘at least a motivating factor’ in the Defendants’

decision to take the retaliatory action.” Douglas v. Reeves, 964 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2020)

(quoting Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009)); see also Jones v. Van Lanen, 27

F.4th 1280, 1284 (7th Cir. 2022). Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, “the

burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the claim, that the activity would have occurred

regardless of the protected activity.” Manuel, 966 F.3d at 680.

Here, Richmond fails as to the first prong. He has not offered evidence sufficient

to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that he engaged in protected First Amendment

activity. Richmond testified that he does not recall ever submitting a PREA report against

Rutherford. Even though Rutherford purportedly described the PREA report as his

motivation for abandoning Richmond in the showers, there is no evidence of any such

report in the record. Thus, Richmond has not shown that he engaged in protected First

Amendment activity, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Richmond’s

retaliation claim.

II. Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment

“Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a prisoner may bring suit against any person who

caused a violation of the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights while acting under color

of state law.” Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 439 (7th Cir. 2010). The Eighth Amendment

prohibits cruel and unusual punishments that involve the unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). This prohibition extends to

acts “totally without penological justification.” Id. In reviewing Eighth Amendment

claims, courts must conduct both an objective and a subjective inquiry. Whitman v. Nesic,

368 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2004).

The Court must first evaluate whether the alleged deprivation is “sufficiently

serious” so that “a prison official’s act or omission results in the denial of the ‘minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

“[P]rison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and

medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the

inmates.’” Id. at 832 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-527 (1984)). “[T]he harm

that befell the prisoner must be objectively, sufficiently serious and a substantial risk to

his or her health or safety[.]” Collins v. Seeman, 462 F.3d 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2006). Merely

unpleasant conditions do not satisfy the objective component. Hernandez v. Battaglia, 673

F. Supp. 2d 673, 676 (N.D. Ill. 2009).

Second, to satisfy the subjective element, a prison official must be “deliberately

indifferent to the substantial risk to the prisoner’s health and safety.” Collins, 462 F.3d at

760. A prison official is deliberately indifferent if “he knows that inmates face a

substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable

measures to abate it.” Whitman, 368 F.3d at 934 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847).

A prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights may also be violated when prison officials

act in a harassing manner intended to humiliate and cause psychological pain. Mays v.

Springborn, 575 F.3d 643, 649-50 (7th Cir. 2009). Such unnecessary and wanton infliction

of pain is unconstitutional when it is “so totally without penological justification that it

results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.” Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 939 (7th

Cir. 2003) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 183 (1976)). For an Eighth

Amendment claim based on harassment, the objective element requires a prison official’s

harassing behavior to approach the level of presenting a genuine threat to the prisoner.

Parrilla v. Beahm, No. 17-C-841, 2018 WL 3717026, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 3, 2018).

a. Objective Prong

The facts, construed in favor of Richmond, demonstrate that Rutherford locked

Richmond in a secluded shower cell for several hours. Taking Richmond’s version of

events as true, he stood in the shower for six hours from approximately 3:00 p.m. to

9:00 p.m. repeatedly asking Defendants to be released. While in the shower, Richmond

remained fully clothed without handcuffs or restraints. The shower cell offered no place

to sit other than the floor. When a nurse came to the shower area to distribute medication,

Richmond recalls hearing someone tell her to withhold his medication. Rutherford

eventually escorted Richmond to his cell. In explaining his motivation for leaving

Richmond in the shower, Rutherford said he retaliated for a PREA report and a prior staff

assault incident. Back at his cell, Richmond took his restraints hostage until he received a

bedroll, mattress, dinner tray, and his medications from Major Whelan.

Richmond’s Eighth Amendment count stands on two premises that:

(1) Defendants denied him pain medication by instructing the nurse to withhold his

medication constituting a deprivation of the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities, and (2) Defendants knew it was difficult for Richmond to stand for long

periods of time due to his injuries, but left him in the shower while they carried on in

folly to humiliate him. On this record, even construing the facts in favor of Richmond,

the Court finds that the alleged deprivation is not an objective, sufficiently serious one

rising to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.

As prison officials, Rutherford, Thompson, and Hannah must take reasonable

measures to ensure Richmond received appropriate medical care. Denying Richmond his

pain medication could rise to a level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Richmond

testified that he heard someone tell the nurse to withhold his medication, but he could

not identify who did so. No reasonable juror could decide, based on this testimony, that

Defendant Rutherford, Thompson, or Hannah issued such a command. Further, even if

Richmond could identify which officer, if any, attempted to deny him access to his pain

medication, this was a one-time incident. Hours later, Richmond received his necessary

medication. This one-time deprivation of pain medication, even if supported by the

record, does not cross the line into an Eighth Amendment violation.

Richmond also states that forcing him to stand for several hours, in and of itself,

amounted to a serious deprivation. He contends that he had no access to a chair or a way

to sit for several hours. Defendants argue that Richmond had the opportunity to sit on

the floor. The Court tends to agree with Richmond, though, that the prison’s shower floor

did not provide a decent option for sitting.3 A short-term deprivation, however, does not

ordinarily amount to a constitutional violation. See Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235

(7th Cir. 1988); see also Hernandez, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 677-78 (finding that handcuffing

prisoners behind their backs for eight to nine hours and exposing them to extreme

temperatures for three to five hours did not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation);

see also Evans v. Dorn, No. 17-C-1435, 2019 WL 2579444, at *3 (E.D. Wis. June 24, 2019)

3 When asked if he was able to sit on the floor in the shower, Richmond testified, “Yes, if you’re trifling

enough to sit on the floor then suit yourself, but I didn’t.” (Doc. 58-1, p. 30).

(holding that prison official’s action in shackling plaintiff to a table and locking him in a

cold room for several hours did not rise to a constitutional violation). While certainly

unpleasant, the conditions Richmond endured were temporary and not sufficiently

severe to implicate the Eighth Amendment.

Richmond also states in his complaint and affidavit that the officers played cards,

ate dinner, smiled, and laughed at him while he stood in the shower cell. He surmised

that the officers acted this way to humiliate and demean him because they knew of his

painful medical ailments and difficulty standing. Typically, humiliation and harassment

claims under the Eighth Amendment arise in the context of strip searches or

inappropriate sexual conduct. That is not to say these claims are limited to those contexts.

But it is worth highlighting that those typical situations involve much more intimate and

vulnerable conditions than Richmond describes. See Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 643, 649-

50 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Whitman, 368 F.3d at 934-36.

Here, aside from conclusory and speculative statements in his complaint and

accompanying affidavit, Richmond does not offer any evidence that Defendants sought

to humiliate him. He did not testify about any conduct other than normal breakroom

behavior like playing cards, eating, and laughing. Richmond remained fully clothed and

uncuffed in the shower cell. He was not displayed in front of other prisoners as he

testified that he was secluded in a corner. His suspicions alone do not create a genuine

issue of material fact. Based on this record, Richmond’s situation does not rise to the level

of an Eighth Amendment violation based on harassment and humiliation.

Richmond also alleges that Defendants harassed him knowing his particular

vulnerability due to his leg and back injuries. Typically, this argument arises in cases

involving sexual assault or vulnerability to suicide. See Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705, 718-

19 (7th Cir. 2019) (reversing summary judgment where defendant knew of a prisoner’s

deteriorating mental health and particular vulnerability to self-harm but taunted him and

encouraged him to take his own life); see also Beal v. Foster, 803 F.3d 356, (7th Cir. 2015)

(reasoning that taunting behavior paired with public, homophobic innuendos could

violate the Eighth Amendment by inflicting significant psychological harm on an inmate

who feared an increased risk of sexual assault by other inmates).

Here, first and foremost, the record is devoid of any evidence that Defendants

knew of Richmond’s medical issues. He simply asserts in his affidavit that they knew of

his medical conditions. There is no testimony that Richmond told Defendants about his

pain or medical condition, only that he asked to be released from the shower cell. Perhaps

an inference could be made that Defendants became aware of Richmond’s medical issues

when the nurse came around to administer medications to the prisoners. This is a stretch,

however, because Richmond does not know who spoke with the nurse, and there is no

evidence that the nurse disclosed Richmond’s medication or condition to anyone. Again,

the record fails to support the contention that Defendants knew of his medical condition

and exploited his vulnerabilities in an attempt to humiliate or harass him. Further, while

Richmond says he could barely walk and his legs were swollen, he admits that his

symptoms resolved quickly and did not create any lasting impact. While lockdown in a

shower cell for several hours was undoubtedly unpleasant and caused substantial

discomfort, the Court cannot find that these circumstances were objectively, sufficiently

serious as to implicate the Eighth Amendment. As such, Defendants are entitled to

summary judgment on Richmond’s Eighth Amendment claim.

b. Subjective Prong

Even if the alleged conditions should qualify as objectively serious, Richmond has

failed to prove that Defendants had the requisite mindset, that is, deliberate indifference.

Turning first to Defendants Thompson and Hannah, each occupied the shower

area for a relatively short period of time. Thompson, assigned to the opposite segregation

wing, only helped in the shower area for 30 minutes moving in and out to escort other

prisoners. Hannah, assigned to the video visit post, only went to the segregation area

during his lunch hour. Neither Thompson nor Hannah locked Richmond in the shower.

Richmond recalls asking Thompson and Hannah on multiple occasions to let him out of

the shower cell and that each ignored his complaints.

As discussed above, Richmond simply stated in his complaint and affidavit that

Defendants knew of his medical issues. The record does not contain any support for this

contention. Richmond only testified to asking Defendants to release him from the shower.

He does not assert that he complained to any officer about his severe discomfort and

medical issues, or that they had known about his medical conditions from prior

interactions.

There is also insufficient evidence in the record to show that Thompson or Hannah

knew how long Richmond had been in the shower. Moreover, Richmond testified that

the showers in segregation are very loud. Considering the short time each defendant

spent in the area, the noisy environment, and their preoccupation with escorting other

prisoners in and out of the showers, the Court finds that Richmond has failed to provide

evidence that Thompson or Hannah knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his

health or safety. To the extent Richmond argues Hannah and Thompson failed to

intervene, he must similarly show that he faced a substantial risk of serious harm, and

that Defendants knew of and disregarded that risk. See Wilson v. Ryker, 451 F. App’x 588,

589 (7th Cir. 2011). As discussed, there is no evidence in the record to support this finding.

Pivoting to Rutherford, he placed Richmond in the shower cell, initially refused to

let him out, and escorted Richmond to and from his cell. Rutherford was present

throughout the entire incident, even though he also escorted other prisoners to and from

the showers during the same time. Apparently, Rutherford intentionally left Richmond

in the shower in retaliation for a PREA report and staff assault incident. There is no

question that Rutherford knew how long Richmond had been standing in the shower.

Even so, no evidence exists in the record to show that he knew of Richmond’s underlying

medical condition that made standing difficult or that, generally, standing for up to six

hours posed a substantial risk to Richmond’s health or safety. Richmond’s bare assertion

that Rutherford knew of his medical condition, without more, does not create a genuine

issue of material fact as to this point.

The Court cannot find, on this record, that Defendants knew of a substantial risk

of serious harm to Richmond and subsequently disregarded that risk. So even if the

deprivation objectively amounted to a sufficiently serious one, Rutherford, Thompson,

and Hannah are still entitled to summary judgment as Richmond failed to support the

subjective prong of his Eighth Amendment claim as well.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Chad

Rutherford, Austin Thompson, and Dakota Hannah (Doc. 57) is GRANTED. The Clerk

of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 19, 2022 □□

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

Chief U.S. District Judge

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