Charleston v. Jones

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CALEB CHARLESTON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 19-cv-764-DWD

)

ALEX JONES, )

JOSHUA SCHOENBECK, )

PAMELA WESTERMAN, )

SARAH WOOLEY, )

JOHN MCCALEB, )

CHASE CARON, )

JEFFREY GARDNER, )

SHAUN GEE, )

HEATHER MCGHEE, and )

TANGELA OLIVER, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

As narrowed by the Court’s threshold order (Doc. 10), and the Court’s rulings on

Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment concerning exhaustion (Doc. 71; Doc. 80),

Plaintiff Caleb Charleston asserts an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim

against Defendants Jones, Westerman, Schoenbeck, Wooley, McCaleb, Caron, Gardiner,

Gee and McGhee (the “IDOC Defendants”), and Defendant Oliver for failing to provide

Plaintiff with adequate medical treatment after he was stabbed in his arm by another

inmate on September 6, 2017.

Now before the Court are the Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant

Oliver (Doc. 106) and the IDOC Defendants (Doc. 109). On June 30, 2022, Plaintiff filed a

response to the motions (Doc. 117). For the reasons detailed below, the Motions will be

granted.

Undisputed Facts

Plaintiff has been an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections since 2013

(Doc. 107-2, p. 13). Plaintiff claims to suffer from nerve pain or damage in his right arm

which started after Plaintiff was stabbed by another inmate at Menard Correctional

Center on September 6, 2017 (Doc. 107-2, pp. 28, 30). At the time of his injury, Defendants

held various positions at Menard: Jones was the assistant warden; Schoenbeck,

Westerman, Wooley, McCaleb, Caron, Gardiner, and Gee were correctional officers;

McGhee was a nurse; and Oliver was a mental health professional. Following his injury,

Plaintiff interreacted with Defendants at various times until he was transferred to Pontiac

Correctional Center on September 15, 2017 (Doc. 110-1). Sometime in 2018, Plaintiff was

diagnosed with forearm neuropathy and prescribed Neurontin (Doc. 110-3, p. 117). On

March 25, 2022, Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he continues to take Neurontin

twice a day for his arm injury (Doc. 107-2, p. 9).

September 6, 2017

On September 6, 2017, a fight involving approximately 30 inmates started in the

prison yard at Menard (Doc. 110-2, pp. 29-30). During the fight, Plaintiff was attacked by

an unidentified inmate who stabbed Plaintiff in his right arm (Doc. 110-2, p. 30). Plaintiff

speculates that he was stabbed by “an ice pick type of shank or knife” (Doc. 110-2, p. 32).

Plaintiff described the puncture wound as “small” (Doc. 110-2, pp. 62-63), or

approximately a “finger-length deep” (Doc. 110-2, p. 32). Plaintiff’s medical records

indicate that the wound was “1 to 2 millimeters” deep, with a “4-centimeter laceration.”

(Doc. 107-2, p. 40). In addition to the puncture wound, Plaintiff jammed his finger and

had a swollen hand (Doc. 110-2, pp. 30-32).

Immediately after the fight started, correctional officers shot gunshots, so inmates

got on the ground (Doc. 110-2, p. 34). Officers then directed inmates, including Plaintiff,

to go to the yard gate to get handcuffed (Doc. 110-2, p. 34). Plaintiff informed Assistant

Warden Jones, and Correctional Officers Schoenbeck and Westerman, that he needed

medical attention, but they did not respond “productive[ly]” (Doc. 110-2, pp. 35-36).

Instead, Plaintiff was instructed to go to the gate where he was handcuffed, and Officer

Westerman escorted Plaintiff to the health care unit where he was seen by Nurse McGhee

and Correctional Officer Wooley (Doc. 110-2, pp. 36-37). Plaintiff described the health

care unit as busy or “a revolving door” because of the fight (Doc. 110-2, p. 68).

Plaintiff told Nurse McGhee that he could not move his arm, that it was bleeding

and in pain, and he thought something was stuck in there (Doc. 110-2, p. 37). Plaintiff

also explained that he felt dizzy and lightheaded, and his finger was jammed and swollen

(Id.). McGhee observed that Plaintiff’s middle finger had a limited range of motion (Doc.

110-2, p. 40). She then cleaned his puncture wound, applied ointment and a bandage

(Doc. 110-2, pp. 38-40). McGhee also administered a tetanus shot (Doc. 110-2, p. 38).

Plaintiff recalls that “after a nice amount of time” blood continued to flow down his arm,

so he asked McGhee for additional bandages or treatment (Doc. 110-2, p. 38). However,

McGhee replied that “[t]here is no doctor here. There is nothing else I can do.” (Doc. 110-

2, p. 38). The medical note from Plaintiff’s encounter with McGhee indicates that Plaintiff

was referred to a medical doctor to follow up for his puncture wound and to check his

middle finger (Doc. 110-2, pp. 40-41; Doc. 1-1, p. 30). McGhee also recommended that

Plaintiff follow up with care for any additional issues (Id.).

Correctional Officer Wooley was at the health care unit the entire time Plaintiff

was treated by Nurse McGhee. Plaintiff told Wooley that he was still bleeding, could not

move his arm, and needed further medical treatment (Doc. 110-2, pp. 41-42). However,

Wooley said she could not do anything, and instead took pictures of Plaintiff’s injuries

and bloody clothes (Doc. 110-2, p. 42).

After leaving the health care unit, Plaintiff was taken to the segregation building

and did not see anyone until approximately an hour later when Correctional Officer

Gardiner took Plaintiff to an interview room (Doc. 110-2, pp. 42-44). Plaintiff told

Gardiner that his arm was in pain, and he needed medical treatment, but Gardiner stated

that he had to complete the interview (Doc. 110-2, p. 44). After the interview, Plaintiff

returned to his cell (Doc. 110-2, p. 45).

Plaintiff was then taken to see Defendant Oliver, a mental health professional, for

a segregation assessment (Doc. 110-2, p. 46). Plaintiff’s encounter with Defendant Oliver

lasted approximately 10 minutes (Doc. 107-2, pp. 69-70). Plaintiff recalls that he was

handcuffed with his arms behind his back the encounter, but that his bandage and blood

were visible (Doc. 107-2, pp. 69-71). Defendant Oliver asked Plaintiff questions about his

mental health (Doc. 107-2, p. 71). Plaintiff asked Oliver for medical treatment, but she

did not provide it (Doc. 107-2, p. 72). Plaintiff testified that he did not know if Oliver was

qualified to provide him with medical treatment for his injury (Doc. 107-2, p. 72). After

seeing Defendant Oliver, Plaintiff was escorted back to his cell.

After returning to his cell, Plaintiff believes he asked Correctional Officers

McCaleb and Caron for medical attention two or three times on September 6th, but they

stated something to the effect of “there is nothing they can do.” (Doc. 107-2, pp. 48-50).

September 7, 2017 to September 15, 2017

Plaintiff’s wound started to scab overnight into September 7, 2017 (Doc. 110-2, p.

50). Plaintiff testified that the scab would come off when he moved his arm, and that this

continued for “some days.” (Doc. 110-2, p. 50). After about a week, Plaintiff testified that

the scab fully formed and he no longer worried about bleeding (Doc. 110-2, p. 62).

However, he did not regain full movement in his arm for a couple of months after the

injury (Doc. 110-2, pp. 62-63). Plaintiff’s wound never became infected (Doc. 110-2, p. 62).

When describing the healing process, Plaintiff stated that the wound “looked good on the

outside, but probably on the inside, it still wasn’t healed up right” (Doc. 110-2, p. 63).

Plaintiff believes that Menard “didn’t take the stab wound so serious because of how

small the puncture wound was” and because it appeared to be healed and was “small”

and “only a little scab” (Doc. 110-2, pp. 62-63). Plaintiff speculates that Menard officials

did not take into consideration the inside of the wound or “how deep the icepick … went

in” (Doc. 110-2, pp. 62-63).

Plaintiff does not recall requesting any medical treatment from staff members on

September 7, 2017 (Doc. 107-2, p. 49), although he testified that other inmates tried to

request care on his behalf, and he tried to speak to different nurses who walked through

segregation (Doc. 107-2, pp. 52-56).

On September 10, 2017, Plaintiff was interviewed by Defendants Gee and Wooley

about the September 6th fight (Doc. 110-2, p. 56). Plaintiff recalls asking Gee and Wooley

for medical treatment because he could not move his arm, and it would still bleed when

he moved it, but they ignored his request and continued asking Plaintiff questions about

the fight (Id.).

In the days following his injury, Plaintiff claims he continued to request medical

treatment from unidentified nurses and correctional officers but was ignored (Doc. 110-

2, pp. 53-56). Plaintiff estimates that he might have seen Correctional Officers McCaleb

and Caron about twice a day following his injury until his transfer on September 15, 2017,

but could not recall specific dates (Doc. 110-2, p. 48-49). Plaintiff did not submit any

requests for “sick-call”, did not see a counselor, and did not submit grievances while at

Menard (See generally, Doc. 110-2, pp. 53-59). Plaintiff testified that he did not have any

paper to write a sick-call, and unnamed correctional officers refused to provide it because

he was in lockdown (Doc. 110-2, pp. 59-60).

Plaintiff transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center on September 15, 2017, nine

days after his injury (Doc. 110-1).

Events After September 15, 2017

Once at Pontiac, Plaintiff began receiving treatment for his arm (Doc. 107-1, p. 3;

Doc. 110-3, p. 77). This treatment included pain medication (Doc. 110-3, p. 77). On

October 5, 2017, Plaintiff represented that his wound area was “perfectly healed” but that

he had not been exercising because he wanted his arm to heal (Doc. 107-1, p. 2; Doc. 1-1,

p. 45). Plaintiff was prescribed Motrin for his pain and advised to start exercising (Doc.

107-1, p. 3; Doc. 110-3, p. 77; Doc. 1-1, p. 45). Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that he

consistently complained about his right arm pain over the next few months, although it

was not always his chief complaint (See, generally Doc. 110-3; Doc. 1-1).

In March 2018, Plaintiff transferred to Stateville Correctional Center (Doc. 107-2,

p. 79). While at Stateville, an x-ray was taken of his arm (Doc. 110-3, p. 98) and the results

came back as normal (Doc. 110-3, p. 41; Doc. 1-3, p. 36). Plaintiff also underwent physical

therapy at Stateville and was prescribed nerve pain medication for right arm neuropathy

(Doc. 110-3, p. 117; Doc. 1-3, p. 55). On March 25, 2022, Plaintiff testified that he continues

to take Neurontin twice a day for his arm injury (Doc. 107-2, p. 9). Plaintiff also testified

that he had no problems with his arm “prior to being stabbed” (Doc. 110-2, p. 65).

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). “Factual disputes are genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable

jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party on the evidence presented, and

they are material only if their resolution might change the suit's outcome under the

governing law.” Maniscalco v. Simon, 712 F.3d 1139, 1143 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court

must view the evidence in the light most favorable to, and draw all reasonable inferences

in favor of, the non-moving party. Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962,

965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

Discussion

The Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment

imposes an obligation on states “to provide adequate medical care to incarcerated

individuals.” Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1072 (7th Cir.

2012) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). “Prison officials violate this

proscription when they act with deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of

an inmate.” Holloway, 700 F.3d at 1072 (citations omitted). To succeed on a deliberate

indifferent claim, Plaintiff must establish that he “suffered from ‘(1) an objectively serious

medical condition to which (2) a state official was deliberately, that is subjectively,

indifferent.’” Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 964 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing

Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008)).

Plaintiff argues that all Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious

medical needs by failing to provide him with adequate medical treatment or delaying his

treatment immediately following his stabbing on September 6, 2017 until his transfer

from Menard on September 15, 2017. The IDOC Defendants concede that Plaintiff’s

puncture wound following the September 6th fight was an objectively serious medical

condition (Doc. 110, p. 11), and the Court agrees at this stage.1 Thus, only the subjective

component is at issue here.

1 Defendant Oliver argues that the small size of the wound made it such that no person would perceive the

need for a doctor’s attention. However, Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that he had a stab wound that

required treatment. Moreover, a reasonable lay person might perceive that a bleeding puncture wound

To establish the subjective component, Plaintiff must show that each Defendant

“knew of facts from which he could infer that a substantial risk of serious harm existed,

and that he did, in fact, draw that inference.” Walker, 940 F.3d at 964 (citing Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This standard “requires more than negligence and it

approaches intentional wrongdoing.” Holloway, 700 F.3d at 1073; accord Berry v. Peterman,

604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Deliberate indifference is intentional or reckless

conduct, not mere negligence.”); McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir.

2010) (“[N]egligence, even gross negligence does not violate the Constitution.”). In

determining whether an inmate’s care evidences deliberate indifference, courts “must

examine the totality of an inmate’s medical care.” See Dunigan ex rel. Nyman v. Winnebago

Cnty., 165 F.3d 587, 591 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1374–75

(7th Cir. 1997) (isolated incidents of neglect during an otherwise continuous stretch of

adequate medical care is insufficient to support an inference of deliberate indifference)).

“In cases where prison officials delayed rather than denied medical assistance to

an inmate, courts have required the plaintiff to offer ‘verifying medical evidence’ that the

delay (rather than the inmate's underlying condition) caused some degree of

harm.” Williams v. Liefer, 491 F.3d 710, 714–15 (7th Cir. 2007). In other words, “a plaintiff

must offer medical evidence that tends to confirm or corroborate a claim that the delay

was detrimental.” Id. Certainly, expert testimony would constitute acceptable medical

from an unknown object would mandate care. Thus, the undisputed material facts suggest that Plaintiff

suffered from an objectively serious medical condition. See Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir.

2010) (“An objectively serious medical condition is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as

mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor's

attention.”).

evidence, but that is not the only form of verifiable medical evidence that a plaintiff can

use to get past summary judgment on a case like this. See Williams, 491 F.3d at

715 (finding the plaintiff offered sufficient medical evidence to satisfy the objective prong

through the use of medical records and plaintiff's own testimony about his symptoms,

care, treatment, and injuries). In delayed treatment cases, the Seventh Circuit has stated:

No matter how serious a medical condition is, the sufferer from it cannot

prove tortious misconduct (including misconduct constituting a

constitutional tort) as a result of failure to treat the condition without

providing evidence that the failure caused injury or a serious risk of injury.

For there is no tort—common law, statutory, or constitutional—without an

injury, actual or at least probabilistic.

Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2013).

Plaintiff testified that he continues to take nerve pain medication for his right arm

neuropathy resulting from the stabbing (Doc. 107-2, p. 9). However, Plaintiff has not

presented evidence that this ongoing neuropathy or pain resulted from anything but the

physical stabbing. In examining the totality of Plaintiff’s medical care, the undisputed

evidence in the record shows that Plaintiff received medical treatment for his puncture

wound almost immediately following the stabbing on September 6th. Nurse McGhee

cleaned Plaintiff’s puncture wound, applied ointment and a bandage. She also

administered a tetanus shot, recommended follow up treatment for Plaintiff’s injuries,

and referred him to a medical doctor. The wound began healing overnight, with a scab

forming on September 7th. Plaintiff’s testimony then confirms that the puncture wound

was small and appeared to be healing properly “on the outside.” (See Doc. 110-2, pp. 50,

62-63).

Plaintiff did not receive additional treatment at Menard but was transferred to

Pontiac nine-days after his injury. Once at Pontiac, Plaintiff described the wound as

“perfectly healed” and began treatment for the unresolved pain he continued to

experience (Doc. 107-1, p. 3). In the months that followed, Plaintiff continued to complain

about his arm pain and underwent additional medical treatment, including a diagnostic

x-ray and physical therapy. Ultimately, he was diagnosed with neuropathy and began

taking nerve pain medication (Doc. 110-3, pp. 41, 117; Doc. 1-3, pp. 36, 55).

In short, Plaintiff has failed to present evidence of any harm allegedly caused by

Defendants’ treatment, lack of treatment, or delay in treatment from September 6, 2017

until his transfer from Menard on September 15, 2017. It was only with the benefit of

hindsight in the days and weeks following his injury that Plaintiff began to suspect that

his puncture wound might not have healed properly “on the inside” leading him to

request additional medical treatment at Pontiac and Stateville (See Doc. 110-2, p. 63).

Thus, there is no verifiable evidence connecting any alleged deficient treatment or delay

in treatment allegedly caused by Defendants to the long-term consequences or harm

Plaintiff suffers now because of the stabbing. See, e.g., Jackson, 733 F.3d at 790 (some

verifiable medical evidence is required to determine “whether the withholding of

treatment during a brief period in the early stages of the conditions in an otherwise

healthy man … was likely to cause serious, or indeed any, harm”); Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at

1374 (finding that plaintiff could not survive summary judgment when officials delayed

treating a mild cyst infection for six days); Martin v. Tyson, 845 F.2d 1451, 1458 (7th Cir.

1988) (rejecting Eighth Amendment claim for delay in treatment, in part, because prisoner

failed to produce any evidence of injury caused by the delay); Stevens v. Bukowski, No. 15-

2177, 2017 WL 1088079, at *5 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2017) (“[S]hort delays in receiving medical

treatment, standing alone, are not sufficient to show deliberate indifference.”) (citing

Burton v. Downey, 805 F.3d 776, 785 (7th Cir. 2015)); LaBrec v. Syed, No. 19-CV-804-JDP,

2021 WL 4206690, at *9 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 16, 2021) (finding that a failure to timely schedule

a follow-up appointment after surgery for additional x-rays was not deliberate

indifference when no evidence indicated that the delay caused a complication). Because

Plaintiff has offered no verifying medical evidence that any alleged delay in his care,

opposed to the actual stabbing he suffered, harmed him, Defendants are entitled to

summary judgment.

Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that Defendants acted with a sufficiently

culpable state of mind. Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1010 (7th Cir. 2006) (“to be

deliberately indifferent, the defendants must have acted with ‘a sufficiently culpable state

of mind.’”) (citation omitted). Applying this standard to medical officials, to be held

liable under the deliberate indifference standard, he or she must respond in a way that is

“so plainly inappropriate” or make a decision that is “such a substantial departure from

accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards,” that it gives rise to the inference

that they intentionally or recklessly disregarded the prisoner's needs. Holloway, 700 F.3d

at 1073; Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 524 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sherrod v. Lingle, 223

F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2000)). In other words, a prison medical professional is “entitled to

deference in treatment decisions unless no minimally competent professional would

have so responded under those circumstances.” Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 857 (7th Cir.

2011) (citation omitted).

Here, Nurse McGhee and Mental Health Professional Oliver are members of the

medical staff. Nurse McGhee treated Plaintiff’s wound, administered a tetanus shot, and

referred him to a medical doctor almost immediately after his injury on September 6th.

Defendant Oliver saw Plaintiff for a mental health evaluation a few hours after he was

treated by Nurse McGhee. Plaintiff’s encounter with Defendant Oliver lasted

approximately 10-minutes, and Oliver cleared him for segregation (Doc. 107-2, pp. 69-

70). Although Plaintiff argues that he needed additional bandages for his wound, or

some other unidentified treatment, a “[d]isagreement between a prisoner and his doctor,

or even two medical providers, about the proper course of treatment generally is

insufficient, by itself, to establish an Eighth Amendment violation.” Pyles v. Fahim, 771

F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1996) (the

mere dissatisfaction or disagreement with a doctor’s course of treatment is generally

insufficient to establish deliberate indifference).

Further, an inmate “is not entitled to demand specific care,” nor is he “entitled to

the best care.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997) (a prisoner is entitled to

“reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm”—not to demand specific

care, or even to receive “the best care possible.”). Thus, even though Plaintiff may have

suggested additional measures to treat his puncture wound, he has presented no

evidence that a “minimally competent professional would have [recommended those

additional measures] under those circumstances.” Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409. “To infer

deliberate indifference on the basis of a physician’s treatment decision, the decision must

be so far afield of accepted professional standards as to raise the inference that it was not

actually based on a medical judgment,” Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir.

2006), but there is no such evidence here.

As for the non-medical officials, they will generally be justified in believing the

prisoner is in capable hands. Hayes, 546 F.3d at 526–527; Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656

(7th Cir. 2005). A non-medical defendant cannot be held “deliberately indifferent simply

because he failed to respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was

already being treated by the prison doctor.” Johnson, 433 F.3d at 1012 (internal citations

and markings omitted); Bond v. Aguinaldo, 228 F. Supp. 2d 918, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2002)

(“Except in the unusual case where it would be evident to a layperson that a prisoner is

receiving inadequate or inappropriate treatment, prison officials may reasonably rely on

the judgment of medical professionals.”).

Here, Plaintiff claims to have complained to non-medical staff members,

Defendants Jones, Westerman, Schoenbeck, Wooley, Gee, Gardiner, McCaleb, and Caron

about his injury at various times from September 6, 2017 until his transfer on September

15, 2017. Plaintiff complained to Defendants Jones, Westerman, and Schoenbeck about

his injury almost immediately after the fight ended on September 6, 2017. At that time,

Jones, Westerman, and Shoenbeck were instructing those involved with the fight to go to

the yard gate to be handcuffed. Thus, when Plaintiff complained of his injuries, Jones

instructed Plaintiff to go to the gate, where he was then handcuffed and escorted to

medical by Westerman. The undisputed facts do not show that Jones, Schoenbeck, or

Westerman ignored Plaintiff’s complaints for care, delayed his care, or had any reason to

believe that the prison medical doctors or assistants would not treat him. Accordingly,

under these facts, no reasonable jury could conclude that Jones, Schoenbeck, or

Westerman were deliberately indifferent.

Plaintiff also encountered Defendants Wooley and Gardiner on September 6th.

Defendant Wooley was present with Plaintiff while he was evaluated by Nurse McGhee

after the fight. Plaintiff claims that he told Wooley that he needed additional medical

care while he was being treated by Nurse McGhee or immediately thereafter. However,

non-medical officials, like Wooley, may defer to the judgment of the medical

professionals. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 755 (7th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff has not

presented any evidence to show that Wooley had reason to believe that Nurse McGhee’s

assessment was resulting in mistreatment, and thus, Wooley was entitled to rely on the

assessment. See Hayes, 546 F.3d at 527 (nonmedical officials act with deliberate

indifference “where they have ‘a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison

doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner.’”) (quoting Spruill

v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)). Thus, Plaintiff cannot show that Wooley acted

with deliberate indifference on September 6, 2017.

Similarly, Defendant Gardiner interviewed Plaintiff approximately two hours

after the fight on September 6, 2017, and after Plaintiff had received medical treatment

from Nurse McGhee. Plaintiff complains that he told Gardiner that he needed medical

treatment, however, Gardiner did not do anything. Just as with Defendant Wooley, no

reasonable jury could find that Defendant Gardiner was deliberately indifferent to

Plaintiff’s medical needs. Gardiner was entitled to defer to the judgment of the medical

professional who had evaluated him a few hours before the interview, and nothing in the

record suggests that Gardiner had a reason to believe that prison doctors or their

assistants were mistreating or not treating him. See Hayes, 546 F.3d at 527. Moreover, the

“mere negligence in failing to detect and prevent subordinates’ misconduct is not

sufficient” to establish a deliberate indifference claim. See, Arnett, 658 F.3d at 756.

Instead, Plaintiff “must demonstrate that ‘the communication, in its content and manner

or transmission, gave the prison official sufficient notice to alert him or her to ‘an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety.’” Id. There is no evidence in the record that

Gardiner had reason to believe that Plaintiff’s injury was not being treated or that it posed

“an excessive risk” to Plaintiff’s health or safety. Thus, Plaintiff cannot show that he acted

with deliberate indifference on September 6, 2017.

Defendant Wooley also saw Plaintiff on September 10, 2017, this time with

Defendant Gee. Plaintiff claims that he told Wooley and Gee that he could not move his

arm without it bleeding, but they ignored his request for additional medical care. The

undisputed facts show that Plaintiff’s injury was small and had started to heal before his

interaction with Wooley and Gee. Thus, although Plaintiff believes he asked Wooley and

Gee for medical treatment and was refused, this is not enough to show deliberate

indifference. Instead, Defendants must have had “actual knowledge” of Plaintiff’s

injuries so to infer that he required medical attention. See Troutwine v. Kuhse, No. 16 C

50251, 2019 WL 1227833, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2019) (citing Haley v. Feinerman, 168 F.

App'x 113, 117 (7th Cir. 2006), Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). Nothing in the record suggests

that Wooley or Gee had reason to believe that Plaintiff’s injury on September 10th required

medical attention or posed an excessive risk to his health or safety, see, Arnett, 658 F.3d at

756, particularly in light in Plaintiff’s concessions that the wound was small, had begun

healing, was not infected, and “looked good on the outside.” Doc. 110-2, pp. 62-63). Thus,

Plaintiff cannot show that Wooley or Gee were delibaretly indifferent on September 10,

2017.

Finally, Defendants McCaleb and Caron were correctional officers in Plaintiff’s

segregation unit. Plaintiff claims to have told Defendant McCaleb and Caron “multiple

times” about his need for medical care while he was in the segregation unit, both on

September 6, 2017 and the days thereafter, but they told him “there was nothing they can

do.” (Doc. 107-2, pp. 48-50). Plaintiff offers few details on his communications with

McCaleb and Caron. Thus, even crediting Plaintiff’s representation of these

communications as true, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his communications, either

by their content or manner of transmission, gave McCaleb and Caron “sufficient notice

to alert [them] to ‘an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.’” See, Arnett, 658 F.3d at

756. Instead, the undisputed facts show that before his encounters with McCaleb and

Caron, Plaintiff had either just been evaluated and treated by Nurse McGhee on

September 6th, or his injury had started to heal “on the outside” in the days following.

Thus, there is no indication in the record that McCaleb or Caron had reason to believe

that Plaintiff’s injury was not being treated or that it posed “an excessive risk” to

Plaintiff’s health or safety. Thus, no reasonable jury could find that McCaleb and Caron

were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's injuries on September 6, 2017 or until his

transfer on September 15, 2017.

In sum, no reasonable jury could conclude that any of the Defendants acted with

deliberate indifference in responding to Plaintiff's injury or complaints in the nine-days

following his injury before he transferred from Menard. Accordingly, Defendants are

entitled to summary judgment. Because the Court has reached a decision in Defendants’

favor on the merits of Plaintiff's claims and concluded that the evidence does not create

a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Defendants violated Plaintiff's Eighth

Amendment rights, the Court declines to reach the IDOC Defendants’ qualified

immunity argument.

Disposition

For these reasons, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact

regarding the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference test. Defendants’ Motions

for Summary Judgment (Doc. 106; Doc. 109) are therefore GRANTED. The Clerk of

Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff, and

to close this case.

SO ORDERED. ll

Dated: September 8, 2022

DAVIDW.DUGAN

United States District Judge

18