The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DARREN BROWN, #M50137, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 3:22-cv-01321-SMY
)
CODY PIPER, )
JOSHUA CRAWFORD, )
KEVIN T. JOHNSON, and )
NATHAN ATTEBURY, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Darren Brown, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections, filed the
instant lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging deprivations of his constitutional rights at
Lawrence Correctional Center. This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the
Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Any portion of the Complaint that is legally frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant
must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
The Complaint
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the Complaint (Doc. 7): Following an
investigation initiated by Internal Affairs Officer Cody Piper regarding the sale and distribution of
K2 (synthetic marijuana) at Lawrence, Internal Affairs Officer J. Crawford issued Plaintiff a
disciplinary report. Plaintiff was found guilty after a hearing before Adjustment Committee
Members Kevin Johnson and Nathan Attebury and given three months segregation and six months
contact visit restriction. Several days later, Plaintiff received notice that Jasmine Willis-Rucker
was permanently restricted from visiting any inmate in IDOC because Internal Affairs believed
her to be the source of the K2.
Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following claim in this
pro se action:1
Count 1: Fourteenth Amendment claim against Piper, Crawford, Johnson,
and Attebury for due process violations in the disciplinary
proceedings against Plaintiff including withholding evidence,
relying on misleading evidence from confidential sources, and
finding Plaintiff guilty without sufficient evidence
Discussion
To state a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must
show that the state deprived him of a constitutionally protected interest in “life, liberty, or
property” without due process of law. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). A court
analyzing a due process claim in the context of prison disciplinary hearings must consider: (1)
whether there was a protected interest at stake that necessitated due process protections; and (2)
whether the disciplinary hearing was conducted in accordance with procedural due process
requirements. Id. Relatedly, in assessing whether disciplinary segregation triggers a protected
interest, a court must examine the length of a prisoner's confinement in segregation in combination
with the conditions he endured there. See Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833, 836-37 (7th Cir. 2015).
According to the Adjustment Committee Final Summary Report, Plaintiff received three
months segregation and six months contact visit restriction as a result of the disciplinary
proceedings. Plaintiff has not included any allegations in the Complaint regarding the conditions
of his confinement during his time in segregation, and three months in segregation, standing alone,
1Any claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is dismissed without prejudice as
inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading standard. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a
claim that is plausible on its face.”).
does not implicate a protected liberty interest. See Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F3d 693,
698 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, a six month contact visit restriction does not implicate a
protected interest. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 136 (2003). Nor does the permanent
visitor restriction for Ms. Rucker implicate a protected interest. Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson,
490 U.S. 454, 461 (1989).
Because Plaintiff’s allegations do not show that a potential violation of a protected interest,
he fails to state a claim. Therefore, the Complaint will be dismissed. Plaintiff will be granted
leave to file a First Amended Complaint to address the deficiencies the Court has identified.
Disposition
The Complaint (Doc. 7) is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim for
relief. Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file a First Amended Complaint by August 24, 2022.
Should Plaintiff file a First Amended Complaint, it is strongly recommended that he use
the civil rights complaint form designed for use in this District. He should label the form “First
Amended Complaint” and use the case number for this action (No. 22-1321). The First
Amended Complaint will be subject to review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. To facilitate Plaintiff’s
compliance with this Order, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail him a civil rights complaint
form.
An amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original complaint, rendering the
original complaint void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n. 1
(7th Cir. 2004). Therefore, the Court will not accept piecemeal amendments to a previously filed
Complaint. The First Amended Complaint must stand on its own, without reference to any
previous pleading. Plaintiff should attach any exhibits that he wishes to submit with the First
Amended Complaint.
If Plaintiff fails to file his First Amended Complaint within the allotted time or consistent
with the instructions set forth in this Order, the case will be dismissed with prejudice for failure to
state a claim for relief, failure to comply with a court order, and for failure to prosecute his claims.
The dismissal will count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under 28 U.S.C. §1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the costs. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of Court informed of any change
in his address; the Court will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in
writing and not later than 7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to
comply with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result
in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 25, 2022
s/ Staci M. Yandle_____
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge