Hollis v. Truitt

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

MARTE HOLLIS, R67003, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

CHARLES TRUITT, ) Case No. 22-cv-1171-DWD

M. ROLING, )

J. RIOS, )

ROB JEFFREYS, )

LT. KEVIN RIECHERT1, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Marte Hollis, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC),

brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his

constitutional rights at Stateville and Menard Correctional Centers (Stateville/Menard).

(Doc. 1). Plaintiff claims that the defendants violated his rights by strip searching his wife

after a visit, threatening him with retaliation if he would not disclose information, and

restricting his visitation privileges at Stateville and Menard. He requests compensatory

damages and injunctive relief.

Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is now before the Court for preliminary review

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen

prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b).

1 In the caption of the case, Plaintiff listed this Defendant as Kevin Riechert, but in the body text he referred to him

as Kevin Reichert.

Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law

is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture,

the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v.

Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

The Complaint

Plaintiff alleges beginning in January of 2019, internal affairs interviewed him

about his knowledge of activity outside of prison, and when he denied any knowledge,

they threatened to make his life at Stateville miserable. (Doc. 1 at 7). From January to

July of 2019, Plaintiff endured many shakedowns, harassment, and confiscation of his

property. In July of 2019 he received a fabricated disciplinary ticket, which was

eventually dismissed. (Id. at 8). On October 18, 2019, he was married at Stateville. On

December 19, 2019, his wife visited him and they inspected each other’s rings. Plaintiff

alleges that internal affairs ended the visit and escorted them to separate locations.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rios threatened and intimidated his wife, took her ring,

and subjected her to a strip and cavity search in front of male officers. He claims that the

search violated IDOC policy.

Plaintiff alleges that he was issued another false disciplinary ticket related to the

visit, but the ticket was dismissed on December 24, 2019, by the adjustment committee.

(Doc. 1 at 9). Immediately after the ticket was dismissed, he was transferred to Menard

on December 26, 2019, out of retaliation.

In February of 2020, Plaintiff alleges that Stateville told Menard to place him under

investigation. (Doc. 1 at 9). On March 23, 2020, Plaintiff got a disciplinary report from

Stateville’s Officer Roling for possession of contraband (a cell phone). The adjustment

committee at Menard sanctioned Plaintiff to 3 months of segregation and 3 months of C-

grade. In support of the complaint, Plaintiff submitted the disciplinary report. Plaintiff

alleges that Roling was one of the officers at Stateville that had previously retaliated

against him.

Around May 3, 2021, Plaintiff alleges that his wife attempted to schedule a video

visit, but she was informed she could not visit by video or in person. (Doc. 1 at 9).

Plaintiff alleges he had never received notice of any visitation restrictions associated with

the discipline for the cell phone. Plaintiff alleges that finally, on May 17, 2021, he received

a letter from Defendant Truitt (an assistant warden at Stateville) that informed him of a

permanent visiting restriction between he and his wife. Plaintiff claims that the letter

indicated that the basis for the restriction was illicit cell phone communications between

the couple. Plaintiff alleges that when he went to the adjustment committee in April of

2020, he never received notice of this restriction. Plaintiff states that under Rule 504, he

could lose visitation privileges for a rule violation, but he alleges that the adjustment

committee felt this was not appropriate so he got segregation and C-grade instead. (Doc.

1 at 10). He alleges that the delayed notification of the restriction on his visits was cruel

and unusual, and it is a form of continued retaliation for something that began at

Stateville and has nothing to do with Menard.

Plaintiff further alleges that “since completing this lawsuit Stateville Correctional

Center did away with the visiting restriction and now Menard is upholding it when the

incident in question never happened at Menard. He argues that if Stateville was willing

to lift the restriction, Menard without a doubt should also. These restrictions are being

upheld by Kevin Riechert Asst. Warden of Operations.” (Doc. 1 at 10).

Plaintiff claims he wrote to Defendant Jeffreys about the incident but Jeffrey’s

refused to answer and has turned a blind eye. (Doc. 1 at 11). He alleges that Defendant

Truitt illegally began the process for the restriction 13 months after his discipline and

without notice. He also alleges that Defendant Riechert is participating in ongoing

retaliation by upholding the visitation restriction after Stateville discontinued it. Finally,

he claims that the whole issue has driven him to suicide attempts.

As relief, Plaintiff seeks $300,000 and the restoration of his visits.

In support of his complaint, Plaintiff included the three alleged disciplinary

reports, and a May 3, 2021, letter from Truitt. The disciplinary report about the cell phone

does not reflect the assessed punishment. The letter from Truitt states that Plaintiff was

put on the visitor restriction because of illicit cell phone use, but it does not explicitly

mention his wife. (Doc. 1 at 19). The letter stated that Plaintiff could challenge it in

writing within 14 days of receipt, or he could request the removal of the restriction after

six months.

Discussion

Plaintiff’s complaint suffers from multiple defects, and for reasons explained

below, he has failed to state a valid claim.

As to any retaliation at Stateville from January to July 2019, Plaintiff filed this case

too late. The applicable statute of limitations period for actions brought pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 is a state’s period for personal injury torts. See Kalimara v. Ill. Dept. of

Corrections, 879 F.2d 276, 277 (7th Cir. 1989). In Illinois, where the events in Plaintiff’s

complaint occurred, that period is two years. See Woods v. Illinois Dept. of Children and

Family Svcs., 710 F.3d 762, 765-766 (7th Cir. 2013); 735 ILCS § 5/13-202. Illinois recognizes

equitable tolling of the two-year period for an inmate to pursue administrative

exhaustion of a claim at the institutional level. See Terry v. Spencer, 888 F.3d 890, 894 (7th

Cir. 2015). A court may sua sponte dismiss a case at § 1915A review if the applicability

of the statute of limitations is “so plain from the language of the complaint…that it

renders the suit frivolous.” Id. at 894; Dickens v. Illinois, 753 Fed. App’x 390 (7th Cir. 2018)

(a court may dismiss a complaint upon screening if it is clearly barred by the statute of

limitations). Plaintiff filed the current complaint on June 7, 2022, which is nearly three

years after the bulk of the retaliatory conduct he identified. Accordingly, he cannot state

a claim here for this alleged retaliation. Defendant Rios was only discussed in relation to

this early retaliatory conduct, so Rios is dismissed. To the extent Roling was discussed

in this early conduct, or in the March 2020 disciplinary ticket, such claims would also be

untimely.

As to any claims pertaining to his wife, a pro se litigant is not allowed to bring

legal claims on behalf of another party, so he cannot represent her interests in this lawsuit.

In re IFC Credit Corp., 663 F.3d 315, 318-19 (7th Cir. 2011) (“individuals are permitted to

litigate pro se, though not to represent other litigants.”). Any claim Plaintiff brings on his

wife’s behalf related to conduct in 2019 is time-barred, and he cannot represent her, so

the claims are dismissed.

Plaintiff’s remaining claim is that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

were somehow violated by what he views as a retroactive imposition of a restriction on

his visitation privileges. Plaintiff admits that on March 23, 2020, he received a

disciplinary report for electronic contraband he possessed at Stateville, and that the

adjustment committee gave him three months of segregation and C-grade as discipline.

He also acknowledges that per IDOC rules, he could theoretically receive a restriction on

his visitation privileges, though he argues that the adjustment committee felt it was not

appropriate so they did not impose the restriction. Plaintiff adds that Stateville somehow

agreed to remove the restriction, but Defendant Riechert continues to impose it. In

support of the complaint, Plaintiff submitted the disciplinary report, as well as the May

3, 2021, letter from Defendant Truitt informing him of a minimum of six months of visitor

restrictions. The letter indicated that he could contest the restriction within 14 days, or

after six months, he could request restoration of privileges.

Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim based on the visitation restriction because he does

not provide any information about efforts to challenge the restriction at the institutional

level, but even if he did, a visitation restriction does not violate the Fourteenth

Amendment. Generally, the only form of punishment from prison disciplinary

proceedings that invokes due process is the loss of good time credits. See Antoine v.

Uchtman, 275 Fed. App’x 539, 541 (7th Cir. 2008) (A month’s segregation, loss of

commissary privileges, and loss of prison employment affect neither a liberty nor a

property interest); Hoskins v. Lenear, 395 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2005) (demotion in status,

segregation, and transfer do not raise due process concerns); citing Thomas v. Ramos, 130

F.3d 754, 761-62 & n.8 (7th Cir. 1997) (temporary segregation and demotion to C-grade

status do not violate due process). To establish a due process violation, a Plaintiff must

show that the discipline imposes an “atypical and signification hardship” on the inmate.

See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 222-23 (2005). Courts have found that the loss

of visitation privileges does not constitute an “atypical and significant hardship.” Woody

v. Zatecky, 594 Fed. App’x 311, 312 (7th Cir. 2015) (loss of visitation, including contact

visits is not an atypical and significant hardship). The restriction on Plaintiff’s visits,

which apparently stemmed from a prison rule violation that he does not contest, does not

constitute an atypical and significant hardship.

Plaintiff alleges that Stateville agreed to remove the restriction, but Riechert has

continued to impose it. There is no constitutional right to demand that the head of one

prison follow disciplinary decisions made by another facility. Additionally, Plaintiff does

not make it clear how Defendant Riechert is personally involved in the continued

imposition of the visitation restriction. He does not for example, describe grievances or

letters to Riechert, nor does he detail Riechert’s personal actions to effectuate the

restriction. Riechert is tied to the due process claim by a single sentence stating that

“these restrictions are being upheld by Kevin Riechert, Assistant Warden of Operations.”

To state a valid § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant was personally

responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right. Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555,

561 (7th Cir. 1995). The threadbare assertion that a supervisor is responsible with no

supporting information is insufficient to state a claim.

As to Defendant Roling, Plaintiff discussed Roling’s participation in the

disciplinary report for the cell phone, but he does not allege that Roling did anything

improper with respect to this disciplinary incident, and he admits he was found guilty of

the infraction. Based on the facts presented, there is no valid claim against Roling.

As to Defendant Truitt, Plaintiff suggests that Truitt violated his rights because he

waited 13 months beyond the disciplinary proceedings to inform him via letter of the

visitation restriction. The delay in notification itself does not amount to a claim under

the Due Process clause. As previously explained, the restriction on visitors also does not

violate Due Process, so Plaintiff failed to state a claim against Truitt.

Finally, as to Defendant Jeffreys, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim because

Jeffreys cannot be responsible in any sense for failing to respond if there is no underlying

constitutional violation. The restriction on visitation does not violate the constitution, so

Jeffreys has not failed to take any action.

Plaintiff’s allegation that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated is

unsupported by any specific factual allegations, and it is not clearly tied to particular

individual defendants. Accordingly, this claim is subject to dismissal.

In sum, Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed in its entirety because he has failed

to present factual or legal allegations sufficient to state a claim against any named

defendant. Typically, the Court would afford the Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his

complaint, but here the Court does not believe an opportunity to amend is necessary

because it is not apparent that plaintiff could produce any set of allegations related to the

underlying factual allegations that would be sufficient to state a claim based upon the

identified legal theories. The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state

a claim. See Always Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2 F.4th 695, 707 (7th Cir.

2021) (courts may deny leave to amend if an amendment would be futile); McCree v.

Grissom, 657 F.3d 623, 624 (7th Cir. 2011) (leave to amend shall be granted where justice

so requires, but leave to amend need not be given if an amendment to the complaint

would be futile).

The Court additionally notes that Plaintiff has failed to comply with any directives

related to his case. Specifically, on June 7, 2022, he was directed to pay a filing fee or to

apply for pauper status. He was also directed to file a notice of consent within 21 days

of June 7. Plaintiff has not communicated with the Court at all about his case since filing

it and these failures provide an additional basis for dismissal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule

41(b) (allowing dismissal for failure to prosecute); James v. McDonald’s Corp., 417 F.3d 672,

681 (7th Cir. 2005) (under Rule 41(b) a court has authority to dismiss an action with

prejudice for failure to prosecute if a party does not provide a timely response to a court

order).

Disposition

Plaintiff’s Complaint will be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a

claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff’s obligation to pay the filing fee for this

action was incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee of $402.00 remains

due and payable regardless of the dismissal of this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (1); Lucien

v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).

If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this Order, he must file a notice of appeal with this

Court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). If Plaintiff

chooses to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 filing fee irrespective of the outcome

of the appeal. See FED. R. App. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d

724, 725-56 (7th Cir. 2008). Moreover, if the appeal is found to be nonmeritorious, Plaintiff

may incur another “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A proper and timely motion filed

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal deadline.

Feb. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no later than 28 days after the

entry of judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be extended.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly and to close this

case.

IT IS SO ORDERED. U L

Dated: July 12, 2022 deat « WV □

DAVIDW.DUGAN

United States District Judge