The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DONTANEOUS SALLEY,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 3:19-CV-392-NJR
MICHAEL BAILEY, CAROL MCBRIDE,
and YLANA MASON,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
This matter is before the Court on the motions for summary judgment filed by
Defendant Ylana Mason (Doc. 60) and Defendants Michael Bailey and Carol McBride
(Doc. 65). Plaintiff Dontaneous Salley filed a response in opposition (Doc. 68), and
Defendant Mason filed a reply brief (Doc. 68). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant
Mason’s motion is granted. The motion filed by Defendants Bailey and McBride is
granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed for purposes of summary judgment and are
viewed in a light most favorable to Salley.
On September 21, 2018, Salley filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of Illinois captioned Salley v. Johnson et. al., Case No. 1:18-cv-1343, Doc. 1
(Sept. 21, 2018). On November 9, 2018, the court in that case entered a Merit Review Order
dismissing Salley’s complaint for violating Federal Rule Civil Procedure 8. Id. at Doc. 14.
The court described Salley’s complaint as a “confused 121-page, handwritten document”
combining unrelated claims against 15 defendants, with exhibits intertwined among the
various sections of the complaint. Id. The court further informed Salley that he
improperly combined those unrelated claims with one vague allegation of retaliation, and
he failed to clearly articulate the specific facts that allegedly gave rise to the retaliation.
Id. The court gave Salley until November 30, 2018, to file an amended complaint with no
exhibits attached. Id. After that date, his case would be dismissed with prejudice. Id.
Salley was transferred from Illinois River Correctional Center to Pinckneyville
Correctional Center on November 20, 2018. (Doc. 66-1 at p. 9). In a letter dated November
21, 2018, Salley explained to the Central District of Illinois that he had been transferred to
another prison and his legal documents had not yet arrived; therefore, he would be
unable to amend his complaint by the deadline. Salley v. Johnson et. al., Case No. 1:18-cv-
1343, Doc. 16. In a text order, the court said it would allow Salley to have one extension
of time to file an amended complaint and gave Salley until January 4, 2019, to do so. Id.
at Doc. 18. Salley received his legal paperwork from Illinois River around November 28,
2018. (Doc. 61-3 at p. 39).
Salley was scheduled to leave Pinckneyville on December 12, 2018, on a court writ
for a hearing the following Monday, December 17, 2018. (Id. at p. 47). On December 9,
2018, Salley packed up all of his property for storage while he was gone. (Id. at p. 119).
Salley was anxious about going to Stateville, however, due to death threats against him
at that prison. (Id. at p. 47). Instead of getting on the writ bus, Salley admitted that he
went on a mental health crisis watch. (Id. at p. 48). That way, Salley would have to be
transported from Pinckneyville to Chicago on the morning of his hearing and return the
same day. (Id.). Salley testified the transport was eight to nine hours one-way, so the
correctional officers were angry that he missed his writ bus. (Id. at p. 97).
Salley remained on crisis watch until December 13, 2018, and was not due to get
his property back until his crisis watch was over. (Id. at p. 49). Defendant Bailey was the
property officer at Pinckneyville, meaning he would search all inmate personal property
going out of and coming into the facility. (Id. at p. 104). Salley testified that Bailey was
scheduled to go on vacation around the date his crisis watch ended, and that Bailey told
him, prior to leaving for vacation, that he would not get his property back. (Id. at pp. 93,
107). Salley testified that Bailey told Officer Grigsby, his replacement while on vacation,
not to give Salley his property. (Id. at p. 93). Sometime after Bailey returned from vacation,
he told Salley he found out Salley was a “grievance writer.” (Id. at p. 133).
On December 16, 2018, Salley spoke with Defendant Mason, a Qualified Mental
Health Professional, as part of his Crisis Watch Discharge Assessment. (Doc. 61-1 at p. 2).
Salley mentioned he was missing his property at that evaluation. (Id.). Salley left for his
court writ on December 17, 2018, and returned the same day. (Id. at p. 66). When he
returned, Mason evaluated Salley’s suicide potential. (Id. at p. 68). During his evaluation,
Salley told Mason he had been harassed by the property officer, he was only worried
about receiving his personal and legal property because he had a court deadline, and that
he would like to speak to internal affairs so he could have evidence that he exhausted all
remedies. (Id.). Mason wrote in her report that she would notify internal affairs of Salley’s
request to speak with them. (Id.). This was the last interaction Mason had with Salley.
(Doc. 61-1 at p. 2).
Salley also spoke with Defendant McBride, the zone lieutenant, about 10 times
regarding his property. (Doc. 61-3 at p. 134). As a zone lieutenant, McBride was in charge
of ensuring the officers were doing their jobs properly. (Id. at p. 106). Salley asked
McBride where his property was because he needed it for a court deadline, and she told
him he might not ever get it back because he went on crisis watch and missed the writ
bus. (Id. at 136-37). As a result, the prison had to pay officers overtime for his
transportation to his hearing. (Id.). When Salley continued to bring it up to McBride, she
told him, “They give it to you when they give it to you.” (Id. at p. 153).
Salley testified that he had no pens or paper, or any means of filing anything with
the court at that time. (Id. at p. 76). He also could not recall if he asked any mental health
staff to assist him in contacting the court. (Id.). Salley did, however, execute a declaration
on December 18, 2018, which was e-filed on January 2, 2019, in a Northern District of
Illinois case, Salley v. Sgt. Parker, No. 18-5700, Doc. 29. (Doc. 66-2). He also prepared a
memorandum in support of preliminary injunction on December 23, 2018, which was e-
filed, along with a proposed order, in his Northern District of Illinois case on January 2,
2019. (Docs. 66-3, 66-4).
Salley ultimately failed to file an amended complaint in his Central District case
by January 4, 2019. Salley v. Johnson et. al., 1:18-cv-1343, Doc. 19. As a consequence, the
court dismissed his complaint with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(b) for failure to prosecute and repeated failure to follow court orders. Id. The court
entered judgment on January 14, 2019. Id.
On April 9, 2019, Salley filed his Complaint in this matter. (Doc. 1). After this
Court’s preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Salley is
proceeding on his claim that Defendants violated his First Amendment rights by
restricting his access to the courts (Count 1) and by retaliating against him for filing civil
lawsuits against IDOC officials (Count 2).
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also
Ruffin Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005).
The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no material facts are in genuine
dispute; any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue must be resolved against the
moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970); see also Lawrence v.
Kenosha Cty., 391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004).
Once the moving party sets forth the basis for summary judgment, the burden then
shifts to the nonmoving party who must go beyond mere allegations and offer specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); see Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 232-24 (1986). A moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law where the non-moving party “has failed to make a sufficient showing on
an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The party opposing summary judgment must offer admissible
evidence in support of his version of events; hearsay evidence does not create a genuine
issue of material fact. Durling v. Menard, Inc., No. 18 C 4052, 2020 WL 996520, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 2, 2020) (citing McKenzie v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 484 (7th Cir. 1996)).
In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the Court must view the
evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Bennington v.
Caterpillar Inc., 275 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[i]nferences that rely upon speculation or conjecture are
insufficient.” Armato v. Grounds, 766 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cir. 2014). “Where the record taken
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is
no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. First Amendment Right to Access the Court
“The right to access the court is fundamental and essential to prisoners’ ability to
vindicate legal rights.” Jones v. Van Lanen, 27 F.4th 1280, 1287 (7th Cir. 2022). Denial of
access to the courts must be intentional; “simple negligence will not support a claim that
an official has denied an individual of access to the courts.” Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279,
291 n.11 (7th Cir. 2004).
To prove that a prison official violated an individual’s right to access the court, the
prisoner must show more than just some minimal degree of impediment in filing claims.
Jones, 27 F.4th at 1288. He must present evidence demonstrating (1) a non-frivolous
underlying claim; (2) official acts hindering the inmate’s efforts to pursue that claim; and
(3) that actual injury or harm resulted. Id. at 1287.
The second element requires proof that the officials took action to frustrate the
prisoner’s efforts “to vindicate his rights through litigation.” Id. The third element
requires a plaintiff to specify a remedy the alleged action has put out of reach. Harer v.
Casey, 962 F.3d 299, 308 (7th Cir. 2020). “In other words, a plaintiff must demonstrate
substantial and irreparable prejudice to his or her sought-after remedy.” Id. at 309
(quotation omitted). “[T]he mere denial of access to a prison law library or to other legal
materials is not itself a violation of a prisoner’s rights; his right is to access the courts, and
only if the defendants’ conduct prejudices a potentially meritorious challenge to the
prisoner’s conviction, sentence, or conditions of confinement has this right been
infringed.” Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2006).
A. Defendant Mason
Defendant Mason argues she is entitled to summary judgment because she had no
personal involvement in any actions involving Salley’s legal documents, she had no
authority over Salley’s property, and she could not override security to compel the return
of his documents. And Salley admits he has no evidence that Mason purposely did not
provide his legal paperwork because she wanted his lawsuit to be dismissed. (Doc. 61-3
at p. 82). He also admitted that Mason, as a mental health professional, had no authority
to review his property and determine which items he should receive. (Id.). Accordingly,
the Court finds that Salley is unable to prove that Mason took action to keep Salley from
vindicating his rights through litigation, and Mason is entitled to summary judgment.
B. Defendants Bailey and McBride
Defendants Bailey and McBride also move for summary judgment, arguing only
that Salley cannot establish he suffered any actual injury because of Defendants’ alleged
actions. Defendants point to evidence that Salley was able to file three documents on
January 2, 2019, in a different case he had pending. Additionally, they argue, it was
Salley’s responsibility to file an amended complaint by January 4, 2019, in order to
prevent the dismissal of his case, and it was his fault—not Defendants’ fault—when he
failed to file anything.
Defendants’ response falls short of demonstrating they are entitled to summary
judgment. Salley testified that Bailey told him he would not be getting his property back
and that he would tell the officer covering his vacation not to give Salley his property.
(Doc. 61-3 at p. 102). Salley also testified that he told Bailey and McBride that he needed
his legal documents because he had a court deadline and that, if he did not get his
documents, his case would be dismissed. (Id. at pp. 136-37). Salley testified that McBride
did not care and that the reason he didn’t have his property is because he went on crisis
watch. (Id. at p. 137). Defendants have presented no evidence refuting this testimony in
the form of affidavits, deposition testimony, or other materials in the record.
A reasonable jury could conclude, based on Salley’s undisputed testimony, that he
had a non-frivolous claim,1 that Bailey and McBride knew he needed his legal property
in order to draft an amended complaint but refused to give it to him, and that, as a result,
he missed his deadline and his case was dismissed with prejudice. Although Salley was
able to file three documents in a separate court case on January 2, 2019, those documents
consisted of a two-page declaration, a one-page proposed order, and a three-page
1 Salley’s complaint in his Central District case was dismissed without prejudice for failure to comply with
Rule 8, not because it was frivolous.
memorandum in support of a preliminary injunction. (Docs. 66-2, 66-3, 66-4). Salley easily
could create these documents from scratch; amending a 121-page, handwritten complaint
against 15 defendants without access to the original document or any other personal
records would be nearly impossible for an attorney, much less a pro se prisoner plaintiff.
For these reasons, the Court finds that Bailey and McBride are not entitled to summary
judgment.
II. Retaliation
Prison officials may not retaliate against inmates for filing grievances, exercising
First Amendment rights, or otherwise complaining about their conditions of
confinement. See Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012). To prove a claim for
First Amendment retaliation, a prisoner must provide evidence sufficient to allow a
reasonable jury to conclude that he “engaged in protected First Amendment activity,
suffered a deprivation that would likely deter future First Amendment activity, and the
First Amendment activity was a motivating factor in the defendant’s decision to take the
retaliatory action.” Jones, 27 F.4th at 1284.
As argued by Defendants, Salley has no evidence he was retaliated against because
he exercised his First Amendment rights.2 Rather, Salley admitted in his deposition that
his property was withheld because he purposefully went on crisis watch to avoid going
to Stateville on a court writ. He also claims he was retaliated against for having a mental
illness. These are not First Amendment activities. Even if they were, keeping one’s
2 While Salley testified that Bailey called him a “grievance writer,” this interaction occurred after Bailey
returned from vacation, i.e., after he told the officer filling in for him to withhold Salley’s property.
property from them is not a deprivation likely to deter future First Amendment activity.
Indeed, Salley has filed four cases in federal courts since his property was withheld.
Because no reasonable jury could conclude that Salley’s First Amendment
activities were a motivating factor in Defendants’ decision to retaliate or that Salley
suffered a deprivation that would likely deter his future First Amendment activity,
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Salley’s retaliation claim.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Ylana
Mason (Doc. 60) is GRANTED.
The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Michael Bailey and Carol
McBride (Doc. 65) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
This case shall proceed on Plaintiff Dontaneous Salley’s claim that Defendants
Bailey and McBride violated his First Amendment right to access the court.
A status conference will be set by separate order for the purpose of discussing
(1) recruitment of counsel to represent Salley at trial; (2) the possibility of a settlement
conference; and/or (3) a firm trial date.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 20, 2022
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge
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