Opinion

Cruz v. State of Illinois

Court: District Court, S.D. Illinois
Filed: May 17, 2022
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 21.3%

“Even a few days’ delay in addressing a severely painful but readily treasonable condition suffices to state a claim of deliberate indifference”

How later courts described this case

“Even a few days’ delay in addressing a severely painful but readily treasonable condition suffices to state a claim of deliberate indifference”
“[W]e can see no deliberate indifference given that [the non-medical defendant] investigated the complaints and referred them to the medical providers who could be expected to address [the plaintiff’s] concerns”
failure to treat a broken nose for a day and a half sufficient to withstand summary judgment
one-and-a-half hours delay in assisting an inmate with severe and immobilizing back pain sufficient to overcome summary judgment

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

RICKY EDWARD CRUZ, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:18-CV-1321-MAB

)

LORIE CUNNINGHAM,1 MARK )

MCFARLAND, TREVOR GOODRUM, )

JAMES HANSON, FAIYAZ AHMED, )

JOHN MCGRATH, LEIF MCCARTHY, )

AND NOLAN THOMPSON, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:

This matter is before the Court on the motions for summary judgment filed by

Defendant Mark McFarland (Doc. 158), Defendants Lorie Cunningham, Trevor

Goodrum, James Hanson, John McGrath, Leif McCarthy, and Nolan Thompson (Doc.

160), and Defendant Dr. Faiyaz Ahmed (Doc. 162). For the reasons explained below,

summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendants McFarland, Hanson, and Ahmed.

Summary judgment is denied as to Defendants Cunningham, Goodrum, McGrath,

McCarthy, and Thompson.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Ricky Cruz is a prisoner under the care of the Illinois Department of

1 The docket sheet refers to Defendant Cunningham as “Laura Cunningham.” However, filings indicate

the correct spelling of Defendant Cunningham’s name is “Lorie.” The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to

update the docket sheet to reflect that the true and correct name of Defendant “Laura Cunningham” is

“Lorie Cunningham.”

Corrections who brings this civil rights actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed his

Second Amended Complaint on November 16, 2018 (Doc. 27). Plaintiff alleges he

received unconstitutionally inadequate medical care after he sustained an injury to his

leg (Id.).

The Court performed a merits review of the Second Amended Complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and permitted Plaintiff to proceed on the following count:

Count 1: Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendment claim against Nolan

Thompson, Faiyaz Ahmed, Mark McFarland, Laura Cuningham,

John McGrath, Trevor Goodrum, James Hanson, and Leif McCarthy

for delaying or denying Plaintiff medical care for the right shin

injury he sustained at Lawrence on or around June 16, 2017.

(Doc. 29).

UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

The following materials facts are not genuinely disputed. Plaintiff was housed at

Lawrence Correctional Facility (“Lawrence”) from January 2017 through March 2019

(Doc. 167-1, p. 1). On June 16, 2017, Plaintiff sustained an injury to his right leg and

pressed the emergency call button in his cell (Doc. 167-2, p. 8) (Doc. 163-3) (Doc. 167-4, p.

96-98 & 169). Plaintiff testified a correctional officer responded and indicated he would

contact medical professionals (Doc. 167-4, p. 98 & 171-72).

Plaintiff attempted to notify other inmates to press their emergency call buttons

and was yelling (Id. at p. 175). He testified he was “in a lot of pain” and “losing a lot of

blood” (Id.). Another inmate, Gilbert Mojena, heard Plaintiff’s pleas (Doc. 167-5). Plaintiff

was not seen in the Health Care Unit (“HCU”) on June 16, 2017 (Id. at p. 98-99).

During the relevant times, protocol at Lawrence required correctional officers on

the Housing Unit wings to perform “checks” every 30 minutes and record the checks in

a log (Doc. 167-6, p. 11). Defendant Thompson was the officer on duty on the A wing in

R8 on June 16, 2017, during the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift (Doc. 167-3, p. 3). The wing

log for June 16, 2017 indicates the R8 A wing was checked and marked secure at 8:50 p.m.,

9:19 p.m., 9:48 p.m., 10:15 p.m., 10:30 p.m., and 10:34 p.m. (Doc. 167-7).

Plaintiff did not speak to any correctional officers or medical staff who were

working the third shift (the overnight shift) between 11:00 p.m. on June 16, 2017 and 7:00

a.m. on June 17, 2017 (Doc. 161-1, p. 45). Plaintiff wrapped his leg to keep it from bleeding

and fell asleep (Id.).

A. Plaintiff’s Medical Treatment

On June 17, 2017 at 9:40 p.m., approximately 24 hours after he sustained the cut to

his right leg, Plaintiff was seen in the HCU (Doc. 167-2, p. 8-9). Plaintiff’s cut was

approximately one to one-and-a-half inches long and one-half inch wide (Id. at p. 9). The

nurse noted no bleeding or drainage but noted swelling (Doc. 163-6, p. 2-3). The nurse

cleaned the wound, applied triple antibiotic ointment, and applied a bandage (Id.). While

Plaintiff was in the HCU, Dr. Vipin Shah was notified by telephone of Plaintiff’s injuries

and directed Plaintiff to see a physician on June 19, 2017 (Id. at p. 3 & 34). Dr. Shah

instructed that the wound not be sutured or stitched because of the time frame of the

injury (Id.). Defendant Ahmed testified that if more than six hours passes between a

wound occurring and receiving medical treatment, it is generally too late to stitch or

suture a wound (Doc. 163-2, p. 23-24, 39-40, & 41).

Plaintiff alleges he saw Defendant Cunningham on June 17, 2017, but did not see

her in person any time after this date (Doc. 161-1, p. 17). However, Plaintiff’s medical

records do not show Plaintiff saw Defendant Cunningham for any medical treatment

related to his leg wound (Doc. 161-2, p. 6-28).

On June 18, 2017, a licensed practical nurse (“LPN”) cleaned Plaintiff’s wound,

changed his dressings, and noted the laceration was red with moderate pus (Doc. 167-2,

p. 7). The LPN recorded that Plaintiff was provided bandages and triple antibiotic

ointment (Id.).

On June 19, 2018, Defendant Ahmed treated Plaintiff and prescribed him a course

of treatment to be administered by Lawrence’s nursing staff, which included antibiotics

and daily dressing changes (Id. at p. 10). Defendant Ahmed observed serosanguinous

discharge from the wound and ordered a culture (Id. at p. 10 & 114).

For the following seven weeks, from June 19 to August 2, 2017, Plaintiff saw

nursing staff at Lawrence (Id. at p. 10-28). On June 21, 2017, an LPN changed Plaintiff’s

dressings, cleaned the wound, and noted a small amount of drainage (Id. at p. 10). On

June 23, 2017, an RN performed a dressing change and charted there was drainage on the

old dressings but the margins were clean (Id. at p. 11). Also on June 23, 2017, Defendant

Ahmed reviewed the lab results of Plaintiff’s wound culture from June 19 and the culture

was negative for infection (Id. at p. 119). On June 24, 2017, an LPN performed a dressing

change and noted there was a small amount of dark red drainage on the old dressing and

that the wound’s margins were clean and pink (Id. at p. 11). On June 25 and June 28, an

LPN performed dressing changes on Plaintiff’s leg wound (Id. at p. 12).

Plaintiff recalls his wound was getting better around June 23, 2017 (Doc. 161-1, p.

21). On July 2, 2017, an LPN performed a dressing change and noted the wound was

tender, open, and there was a small amount of drainage (Doc. 167-2, p. 12). When the

LPN performed the dressing change on July 2, the LPN noted the Plaintiff was to be put

on the M.D. line for the next available date for reevaluation with a doctor (Id.). On July 6,

2017, an LPN performed a dressing change on Plaintiff’s right leg and noted the area was

healing (Id. at p. 13). On July 7, 2017, an LPN performed a dressing change and observed

the wound had clean pink skin and good borders (Id. at p. 14). On July 12, 2017, an LPN

performed a dressing change on Plaintiff’s right leg wound and noted the area was

healing and there were no signs or symptoms of infection (Id. at p. 15) (Doc. 163-1, p. 120-

21). Plaintiff recalled his wound was getting better around June 30, 2017 to July 12, 2017

(Doc. 161-1, p. 21 & 31-32).

On July 14, 2017, Plaintiff saw Defendant Ahmed, who noted the area was tender

but healing (Doc. 163-2, p. 71-73) (Doc. 167-2, p. 18). Dr. Ahmed ordered triple antibiotic

ointment and Band-Aids be applied to the wound daily for two weeks and Plaintiff was

issued triple antibiotic ointment and Band-Aids (Doc. 163-2, p. 44-45) (Doc. 167-2, p. 114).

On July 18, 2017, an LPN examined Plaintiff’s leg and observed that one inch of the area

was open and there were no signs or symptoms of infection (Doc. 167-2, p. 19). The LPN

educated Plaintiff to continue with the treatment and issued him supplies; the LPN noted

that Plaintiff understood (Doc. 163-5, p. 39-40) (Doc. 167-2, p. 19).

Plaintiff testified he was instructed to rinse the wound with water, apply ointment,

and apply a bandage (Doc. 161-1, p. 18). However, Plaintiff testified he tried to keep water

from getting into the wound while in the shower and would leave a bandage on during

showers (Id. at p. 19).

On July 24, 2017, Plaintiff presented to nurse sick call and reported his right leg

wound was severely hurting and he had chills (Doc. 167-2, p. 21-22). The medical record

indicates that Plaintiff reported he was keeping the wound clean and applying antibiotic

ointment, as ordered (Id. at p. 22). The nurse recorded that Plaintiff’s wound was swollen

with slightly dark edges and redness surrounding the tissue (Id.). Plaintiff reported that

he had been keeping his wound clean and applying the ointment as ordered (Id.). A

physician on site prescribed the antibiotic Augmentin and prescribed ibuprofen for his

leg and another medical issue (Doc. 163-2, p. 73-76) (Doc. 167-2, p. 22).

On July 26, 2017, a nurse entered a medical note in Plaintiff’s medical records,

which indicated Defendant Hanson stopped the nurse while she was conducting a

medical line and asked her to see Plaintiff about his leg wound (Doc. 167-2, p. 23). The

note stated Plaintiff was already scheduled to see a medical provider the next day, July

27, 2017 (Id.).

On July 27, 2017, Plaintiff saw Defendant Ahmed, who noted Plaintiff’s wound

was tender with redness and no discharge (Doc. 167-2, p. 24). Defendant Ahmed assessed

Plaintiff with a right leg laceration with cellulitis (Id.). Defendant Ahmed discontinued

the Augment, prescribed Plaintiff Clindamycin, which is used to treat Methicillin-

Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (“MRSA”), ordered a culture and blood laboratory

tests, and ordered a dressing change every day by a nurse (Doc. 167-2, p. 24-25, 115, &

120-22). On July 28, 2017, Plaintiff’s blood was drawn for the labs ordered by Defendant

Ahmed and an RN performed a dressing change (Doc. 167-3, p. 120-22).

On July 30, 2017, the HCU received the results of Plaintiff’s culture, which

indicated Plaintiff had MRSA, but the MRSA was susceptible to the antibiotic

Clindamycin (Doc. 167-2, p. 26-27 & 120-21). An RN advised Dr. Shah of the culture

results and medication susceptibility received that day and Plaintiff’s current

prescriptions; Dr. Shah gave no new orders (Doc. 167-2, p. 27). Also on July 30, 2021, an

RN performed a dressing change (Id. at p. 26-27).

Nothing in Plaintiff’s medical records show he was infected with MRSA due to the

medical treatment he received for his leg wound (Doc. 161-1, p. 54). On August 2, 2017,

Plaintiff saw Defendant Ahmed, who examined Plaintiff’s wound and reviewed the

culture and lab results (Doc. 163-2, p. 58-59) (Doc. 167-2, p. 28). Defendant Ahmed

observed Plaintiff’s wound was healing, there was granulation, and there was no redness

or discharge (Doc. 163-2, p. 58-59) (Doc. 167-2, p. 28). Defendant Ahmed discontinued

the Clindamycin because the leg was healing, there were no signs of infection, and he

wanted Plaintiff to avoid side effects from the antibiotic (Doc. 163-2, p. 58-60) (Doc. 167-

2, p. 28).

The dressings on Plaintiff’s right leg were changed on August 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12,

13, & 14 (Doc. 167-2, p. 91). The laceration and infection healed after the treatments in

August 2017 (Doc. 163-1, p. 138-39) (Doc. 167-2, p. 91).

To Defendant Ahmed’s knowledge, nurses were following his orders through the

treatment of Plaintiff’s leg wound (Doc. 163-2, p. 82-83).

When an inmate is placed on the med line, a nurse schedules the appointment with

the physician and the physicians do not schedule when a patient is seen by a nurse or

physician (Doc. 163-2, p. 78) (Doc. 163-5, p. 36). When a physician sets up a treatment

plan, the nurses are required to follow that treatment plan when it is in the scope of their

practice (Doc. 163-5, p. 31). The nurse who is assigned to the housing unit has the

responsibility to make sure the nurses are following the doctor’s treatment plans for the

inmates in that unit, such as changing the dressings of an inmate in that housing unit

(Doc. 163-5, p. 31-32).

B. Plaintiff’s Grievances

On July 1, 2017, Plaintiff filed a grievance that states:

Due to my personal injury to my right leg that took place from a slip and

fall from top bunk sli[p]ping off of in location R8 AL15 now this taking

place I have a deep cut. Deep enough to see the muscle in my leg this slip

was from the sink and I was seen from the Doctor Ahmed. And told me

M30089 that I could not receive [stitches] to close the wound on 6.17.17

because of it being to[o] late. And this was an order from Laura

[Cunningham] that this wound could not be stitched. Now this being said

directions an[d] orders from the Doctor after being seen on 6.17.17 was that

I be seen every day to monitor the wound. To be cleaned an[d] bandage

[until the] wound started to get better on 6.30.17 Ms. Gates that passed out

medication on 2nd shift was the only one to help me with at that time with

adhesive bandages to keep this cut from getting infected[.] [N]ow this being

said on 7.1.17 not one of the nurses on 1st shift came to tend to this wound.

This wound is not healing in a healthy way[.] [It’s] getting infected and

when they do see me they try to steril[ize] the wound with just water. I keep

putting in for medical for treatment on other treatment that I want to have

taken care of while I put in request after request and still I wait patient and

do not get called to see the doctor. Now this being said on 1st shift from

6.18.17 I was seen from nurses to tend the wound 6 25 17 6 26 17 6 28 17 6

29 17 6 30 17 Ms. Gates and officer Simpson was the ones I had to call on to

help me with this wound I spoke to officer Pieper today on 7.1.17 and he

called over there to medical to find out what has [taken] place and see if

they [could] send someone over to see me about this cut[.] I even told Mr.

McCaslin and he told me on 1st shift to talk to 1st shift officer on 7.1.17

Kurkwood and he even called over to medical to find out what was taking

place and still nothing took place. Now when R/O Piper came with nurse

on medication line on 2d shift on 7.1.17 the nurse [once] again made [sure]

I had a bandage to keep wound closed if it was not for me reaching out to

officer Piper and officer Piper making [sure] I had something to keep this

wound closed off so it [would] not get infected even more [than] it is. I don’t

know what I would do[.] This large cut is still open and is not healing at all

or get[t]ing any better from [inadequate medical attention[.] this was an

emergency at [the] time because my leg was very badly infected and staff

here at Lawrence was doing nothing about it.

(Doc. 167-9, p. 4-5).

The grievance is stamped “RECEIVED” by the grievance office at Lawrence (Id. at

p. 4). A grievance counselor responded on August 8, 2017 and stated, “addressed by 7-

10-17 grievance” (Id. at p. 5)

On July 2, 2017, Plaintiff filed another grievance that states, in part:

On date 7 2 17 I was seen by Nurse Shriver and another that told me she’s

not taking care of that to officer. Nurse Shriver came looked at the wound

gave me a bandage. Looked at the wound did not clean it put some

antib[i]otic ointment on a bandage and then placed it on the wound[.] It

seems to me that since [I] put in request for my other situation th[ese] nurses

are not trying to help me with [either] or because the request.

(Id. at p. 6).

The grievance is stamped “RECEIVED” by the grievance office at Lawrence (Id.).

A grievance counselor responded on August 8, 2017 and stated, “addressed by 7-10-17

grievance” (Id.).

On July 3, 2017, Plaintiff failed a grievance that states, in part:

On 7 3 17 Again I was not seen for a nurse check up on the wound on my

leg – right leg to keep clean. I have been asking doctors through request to

be seen let[t]ing officers I need to be t[ak]en care of all I needed was it to be

cleaned and bandaged and today they did not do anything. This was the

doctor’s orders and every other day I have to let officer simpson know that

I need a bandage to at least keep it from get[t]ing infected. I’m also let[t]ing

officer Simpson know today on 7 4 17 that the nurse has not seen me again

for this treatment. And I asked officer Simpson on[ce] again that I needed

for this deep cut to be cleaned. I [illegible] bandages to cover the wound.. .

(Doc. 161-3, p. 85).

The grievance indicates it was received by the Administrative Review Board

(“ARB”), which responded that the grievance was misdirected because medical issues

must be reviewed at the facility prior to review by the ARB (Id. at p. 84).

On July 10, 2017, Plaintiff file a grievance that states:

On July 8th as I was coming back from the yard Lt McCarthy was told from

I/M M30089 that I M30089 had on my right leg that was open and not

bandaged because I had nothing to bandage this wound with. Because of

nurses not seeing if it was bandage[d]. Now this being said this wound has

been open since the 17th of June really the 16th so this being said I asked Lt

McCarthy if he could phone H.C.U. for this purpose of my wound[.] [H]e

told me as I was showing him my wound that he would call over there now

as I’m showing him my wound. I sa[id] to Lt McCarthy why is this wound

turning green[.] [H]e told me its because its getting better and that means

that its healing for some reason. I did not believe so and I don’t understand

why it was such a big problem for nurse with a order form the doctor to

treat this wound and monitor it [u]ntil it has gotten better[.] Ever since this

slip and fall from top bunk off the sink that split my right leg open has let

me a nasty scar[] and will be like that now for the rest of my life[.] Now I’m

having problems walking on my right leg[.] Ive be[e]n scheduled to see the

doctor and still nothing. I even been putting in request slips about this to

see the doctor.

(Doc. 167-9, p. 2-3). The grievance is stamped “RECEIVED” by the grievance office at

Lawrence (Id. at p. 2). On July 17, a grievance counselor responded, “Per HCU as

documented in medical chart Offender Cruz is being seen and treated by a licensed

Illinois physician within community standards of care” (Id.).

Plaintiff filed another grievance on August 15, 2017, which states:

On 6.16.17 I/M M30089 has slip[p]ed off of top bunk off the sink split[t]ing

right leg open on shin opening my leg about 4 inch in size on win A,8,L15.

Now this being said, on 6 17 17 – 6, 19, 17, 6, 21, 17 – 6, 23, 17 – 6, 24, 17 6,

25, 17 – 6, 28, 17 I had a[n] infection starting in right leg because of

inadequate medical attention from doctor ahmed’s orders to clean wound

properly and bandage wound properly but nurs[e]s failed to do so on these

dates giving me one bandage at on dates telling me to wash with water and

my soap[.] [T]hey told me the same thing on dates 7, 2, 17 7, 16, 17 7, 7, 17

was the last they seen me kept telling me it was get[t]ing better and not

paying attention to doctor[s] orders, as I kept on R/O [illegible] seeing that

nurs[e]s paid attention to this wound it took all the way to the date 7, 23, 17

that my right leg had got real bad with a[] staff infection from staff in

Lawrence not car[]ing when I/M Ricky Cruz kept alerting officers nurs[es]

director of nurs[e]s Laura Cunni[n]gham Mark Mcfarland that run medical.

I even let the warden know about it warden Lamb. The staff here took so

much time to get on to what needed to be done that I had got very sick and

had a very bad infection in my leg that the doctor had to give me antibiotic

Clindamyein to try to take the swollen down and infection away first doctor

ahmed put me on [Amoxicillin]…and Ibuprofen…for pain [be]cause the

infection was causing me so much pain I could[n’t] walk caus[ing] me to

have a temperature of 97 on 7/23/17 because of inadequate medical

attention[.] [E]very time I told Officers Goodrum R/O McGrath R/O

Johnson R/O Imboeen and Lts that work 8-B they told me after seeing this

bad infection that they would phone[] medical and it took all the way for

medical doctor Ahmed to properly wrap an clean the infected wound on

7,28,17 after [already] being infected with [illegible] also I had to walk on

swollen painful right leg from dates to an[d] from chow and medical after

staff seeing what they seen my leg is still seriously infected because of

medical staff not doing the[i]r jobs. None of these officers or staff here at

Lawrence [were] concerned when this infection had started to take affect[.]

this infection has caused affliction to my person[.] I let staff here know so

many times [u]ntil it came to these proven facts of lack of medical nurses

not taking care of wound by doctor[‘]s orders. This is a proven fact

[be]cause if it was not I [would] have been fine with no infection.

(Doc. 161-3, p. 70-71).

The grievance is stamped “RECEIVED” by the grievance office at Lawrence (Id. at

p. 70). A grievance counselor responded to the grievance on August 18 and wrote, “Per

HCUA, Ms. Cunningham, ‘As documented in medical chart, Offender Cruz being seen

and treated by licensed Illinois physician within community standards of care.’” (Id. at p.

69). Plaintiff appealed the grievance to the ARB and the ARB emailed Defendant

Cunningham about Plaintiff’s treatment on November 6, 2017 (Id. at p. 68). Defendant

Cunningham responded on November 7, 2017 with a summary of Plaintiff’s medical care

(Id. at p. 67-68). The summary states Plaintiff was treated by either a nurse or a physician

on June 17, June 18, June 19, June 21, June 22, June 24, June 25, June 28, July 2, July 6, July

7, July 12, July 13, July 14, July 18, July 24, July 26, July 27, July 28, July 29, July 30, July

31, August 2, August 5, August 6, August 7, August 8, August 10, August 11, August 12,

August 13, and August 14 (Id.). The summary also states that on August 15, the right leg

wound healed (Id. at p. 67).

C. Defendants’ Job Duties

Defendant McFarland was the Director of Nursing who was in charge of

Lawrence’s nursing staff during June, July, and August, 2017 (Doc. 167-10, p. 5).

Defendant McFarland did not provide any treatment to Plaintiff (Doc. 163-1, p. 65). The

Director of Nursing at a correctional center does not provide direct care to inmate patients

(Doc. 167-10, p. 5). Medical personnel that provide direct treatment of inmate patients are

part of a union, and it would be against union rules for a Director of Nursing to provide

any direct patient care (Id. at p. 17). Defendant McFarland’s position as Director of

Nursing is a non-union position (Id.). The role of the Director of Nursing is more of a site

manager and Defendant McFarland was in charge of coordinating staffing and

scheduling the medical unit (Id.). A physician prepares the treatment plans for

lacerations, not the Director of Nursing (Id. at p. 18). Defendant McFarland would not

have been involved in Plaintiff’s treatment unless a complaint was made about his

treatment after the doctor and nurses had provided treatment (Doc. 159-3, p. 17-18).

Defendant Ahmed testified he did not speak with Defendant McFarland about Plaintiff’s

treatment because treatment was going well (Id.).

During the relevant timeframe, Defendant Cunningham was the HCU

Administrator who reviewed and responded to inmate grievances related to medical

needs (Doc. 167-11, p. 12-15). Plaintiff testified he sent letters to Defendant Cunningham

about “what was going on with Medical” (Doc. 163-1, p. 183). Plaintiff’s medical records

do not contain copies of any letters sent to Defendant Cunningham related to Plaintiff’s

medical treatment (Doc. 161-2). Plaintiff states Defendant Cunningham never provided

him direct medical treatment (Doc. 163-1 p. 185). Plaintiff stated he does not know if

Defendant Cunningham was consulted regarding his grievances or ever saw a copy of

those grievances (Doc. 161-1, p. 184-85). Plaintiff testified his claim against Defendant

Cunningham is based on the fact that she “runs medical” (Doc. 161-1, p. 182-83).

Defendant Cunningham is not licensed to provide a plan of care for an offender, because

she was a nurse serving in an administrative role in 2017 (Doc. 161-4, p. 8 & 15).

During the relevant times, Defendant Goodrum was a correctional officer at

Lawrence (Doc. 161-1, p. 48) (Doc. 161-5, p. 3-4). Plaintiff alleges he told Defendant

Goodrum he was unsatisfied with his medical treatment and Defendant Goodrum did

not fix the issue (Doc. 161-1, p. 48). Plaintiff testified he spoke to Defendant Goodrum

about his medical issues “a few” times (Doc. 161-1, p. 48). Plaintiff stated he does not

know if Defendant Goodrum has any medical training (Id.). Defendant Goodrum testified

he relays medical complaints he receives from individuals in custody to the health care

unit and takes direction on how to act from the medical professionals (Doc. 161-5, p. 13-

14).

During the relevant times, Defendant Hanson was a correctional sergeant at

Lawrence (Doc. 161-1, p. 48) (Doc. 161-6, p. 3). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Hanson was

not respectful enough to Plaintiff when Plaintiff complained about his medical treatment

(Doc. 161-1, p. 49). Plaintiff did not make any complaints about his leg to Defendant

Hanson until he believed his leg was getting infected, around the end of July 2017 (Id. at

p. 49-49). Plaintiff received medical treatment approximately ten to fifteen minutes after

speaking to Defendant Hanson about his medical issues (Id.). Plaintiff spoke to Defendant

Hanson two times regarding his medical treatment (Id. at p. 49) Both conversations

occurred on the same day (Id.). Plaintiff received additional medical treatment the same

day he spoke to Defendant Hanson (Id.). Plaintiff does not know if Defendant Hanson

has any medical training (Id.). Defendant Hanson is not a medical provider and does not

provide ordinary medical treatment to offenders housed at Lawrence (Doc. 161-6, p. 12).

During the relevant times, Defendant McCarthy was a correctional lieutenant at

Lawrence (Doc. 161-1, p. 51) (Doc. 161-7, p. 3). Plaintiff testified he told Defendant

McCarthy about his wound but Defendant McCarthy told Plaintiff it was getting better

and that he was not a medical doctor (Doc. 161-1, p. 51-52). Plaintiff testified he told

Defendant McCarthy he was unhappy with his medical treatment while he was in

segregation (Id.). Plaintiff asked Defendant McCarthy to call the HCU (Id. at p. 52).

Plaintiff cannot say how many times he spoke to Defendant McCarthy about his medical

care or what he expected Defendant McCarthy to do in response (Doc. 161-1, p. 51).

Plaintiff does not know if Defendant McCarthy has any medical training (Id. at p. 51).

Defendant McCarthy is not a medical professional and has only basic first aid and CPR

training (Doc. 161-7, p. 14).

During the relevant times, Defendant McGrath was a correctional officer at

Lawrence (Doc. 161-1, p. 49) (Doc. 161-8, p. 8). Plaintiff talked to Defendant McGrath after

he thought his leg was infected, around the end of July 2017 (Doc. 161-1, p. 50). Plaintiff

spoke to Defendant McGrath approximately three or four times concerning his medical

treatment on one or two days (Id.). Plaintiff testified that he showed Defendant McGrath

his leg and told Defendant McGrath his leg was “bad,” he was in pain, and he had a fever

(Id.). At least one of those days was the same day Defendant Hanson took Plaintiff to the

HCU for additional treatment (Id.). Plaintiff does not know if Defendant McGrath has any

medical training (Id.). Defendant McGrath is trained in basic first aid every year at

Lawrence (Doc. 161-8, p. 14). Plaintiff testified nurses make rounds in segregation

housing and if an offender has an issue with his medical treatment, the officer gets a

nurse’s attention to tell them about said issue (Doc. 161-1, p. 51).

During the relevant times, Defendant Thompson was a correctional officer at

Lawrence (Doc. 161-1, p. 43) (Doc. 161-9, p. 4-5). Plaintiff alleges he spoke to Defendant

Thompson regarding his leg injury on June 16, 2017, during the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.

shift (Doc. 161-1, p. 44). Plaintiff does not know if Defendant Thompson called the HCU

regarding Plaintiff’s injury after Plaintiff talked to him (Id.). Plaintiff does not know if

Defendant Thompson has any medical training (Id.). Defendant Thompson testified that

if an offender would have complained about a medical issue, he would have verified that

he could see the injury and would have contacted a supervisor for direction (Doc. 161-9,

p. 8). Plaintiff stated there are multiple other ways to obtain medical attention outside of

requesting attention from correctional staff (Doc. 161-1, p. 56).

LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is proper when the moving party “shows that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “Factual disputes are genuine only if there is sufficient

evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party on the

evidence presented, and they are material only if their resolution might change the suit’s

outcome under the governing law.” Maniscalco v. Simon, 712 F.3d 1139, 1143 (7th Cir.

2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding a motion for summary

judgment, the court’s role is not to determine the truth of the matter, and the court may

not “choose between competing inferences or balance the relative weight of conflicting

evidence.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Hansen v. Fincantieri

Marine Grp., LLC, 763 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted); Doe v. R.R. Donnelley

& Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1994). Instead, “it must view all the evidence in the

record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all factual disputes

in favor of the non-moving party.” Hansen, 763 F.3d at 836.

DISCUSSION

The Supreme Court has recognized that deliberate indifference to the serious

medical needs of prisoners may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the

Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). In order to prevail on a claim

for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, there are “two high hurdles, which

every inmate-plaintiff must clear.” Dunigan ex rel. Nyman v. Winnebago Cnty., 165 F.3d

587, 590 (7th Cir. 1999). First, the plaintiff must demonstrate he suffered from an

objectively serious medical condition. Id. at 591-92. Second, the plaintiff must establish

the individual prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that condition. Id.

A prison official exhibits deliberate indifference when they know a serious risk to

the prisoner’s health exists but they consciously disregard that risk. Holloway, 700 F.3d at

1073 (citation omitted). “The standard is a subjective one: The defendant must know facts

from which he could infer that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must

actually draw the inference.” Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 476 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Zaya

v. Sood, 836 F.3d 800, 804 (7th Cir. 2016)).

Here, no one disputes that Plaintiff suffered from an objectively serious medical

condition. However, Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because

there is no evidence they knew of a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff or

consciously disregarded that risk.

I. Defendant Ahmed

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Ahmed was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s

serious medical needs because Defendant Ahmed did not suture Plaintiff’s wound,

nurses did not follow Defendant Ahmed’s orders to change Plaintiff’s bandages daily,

and Defendant Ahmed did not order the nurses to change Plaintiff’s bandages.

The parties agree that Plaintiff sustained the wound to his right leg on June 16,

2017, around 9:00 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. (Doc. 167-2, p. 8) (Doc. 163-3) and that Plaintiff did

not receive treatment from the Health Care Unit until approximately 24 hours later, on

June 17, 2017, at 9:40 p.m. (Doc. 167-4, p. 98-99). It is also undisputed that Defendant

Ahmed first treated Plaintiff’s wound on June 19, 2017, and again on July 14, July 27, and

August 2, 2017 (Doc. 167-2, p. 10, 18, 24, & 28)2

Defendant Ahmed testified that in his medical opinion, if more than six hours

passes between a wound occurring and receiving medical treatment, it is generally too

late to stitch or suture the wound (Doc. 163-2, p. 23-24, 39-40, & 41). For this reason,

Defendant Ahmed did not suture or stitch Plaintiff’s wound when he initially examined

Plaintiff on June 19, 2017 (Doc. 163-2, p. 23-24). Instead, Defendant Ahmed continued the

treatment plan to clean the wound (Id. at p. 23-24 & 29-33). Defendant Ahmed prescribed

Plaintiff the antibiotic Amoxicillin, ordered nurses to change Plaintiff’s wound and

dressing daily with triple antibiotic ointment, and ordered a wound culture (Id. at p. 29-

33) (Doc. 163-6, p. 4). On June 23, 2017, Defendant Ahmed reviewed the lab results of

Plaintiff’s wound culture from June 19 and the culture was negative for infection (Doc.

167-2, p. 119).

Defendant Ahmed treated Plaintiff an additional three times. On July 14, 2017,

Defendant Ahmed noted the area of Plaintiff’s wound was tender but healing (Doc. 163-

2, p. 71-73) (Doc. 167-2, p. 18). Defendant Ahmed ordered that Plaintiff be issued triple

2 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint suggests Defendant Ahmed treated Plaintiff on June 16, 2017 (Doc.

27, p. 11, ¶ 20). However, Plaintiff abandons this argument in his response to Defendant Ahmed’s summary

judgment motion and states Defendant Ahmed first treated Plaintiff for his leg wound on June 19, 2017

(Doc. 167, p. 12). However, whether Defendant Ahmed initially treated Plaintiff on June 16 or June 19, 2017

has no bearing on the deliberate indifference analysis. Either medical visit occurred after six hours from

when Plaintiff sustained the wound, which according to Defendant Ahmed’s professional judgment, was

too long to suture or stitch the wound.

antibiotic ointment and Band-Aids and educated Plaintiff on wound care (Doc. 163-2, p.

44-45) (Doc. 167-2, p. 114).

Defendant Ahmed treated Plaintiff on July 27, 2017 and he assessed Plaintiff with

cellulitis (Doc. 167-2, p. 24). Defendant Ahmed prescribed Plaintiff Clindamycin, which

is used to treat MRSA, ordered a culture and blood laboratory tests, and again ordered

nurses to change Plaintiff’s dressing every day (Doc. 163-6, p. 18-19, 36, & 38-40).

The HCU determined Plaintiff’s culture was positive for MRSA on July 30, 2017

(Doc. 163-6, p. 20-21 & 38-39). Defendant Ahmed saw Plaintiff on August 2, 2017 and

observed Plaintiff’s wound was healing, there was granulation, and there was no redness

or discharge (Doc. 163-2, p. 57-59) (Doc. 163-6, p. 22). Defendant Ahmed discontinued the

Clindamycin because the leg was healing, there were no signs of infection, and he wanted

Plaintiff to avoid side effects from the antibiotic (Doc. 163-2, p. 58-59) (Doc. 167-2, p. 24-

25, 115, & 120-22). Plaintiff testified his wound healed around August 2, 2017 and did not

require any additional treatment (Doc. 163-1, p. 138-39).

To the extent Plaintiff disagrees with Defendant Ahmed’s decision not to suture

the wound or to pursue the course of treatment that he did, the constitution does not

entitle a prisoner to “demand specific care” or to receive the “best care possible.” Arnett

v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 754 (7th Cir. 2011). “Neither medical malpractice nor a mere

disagreement with a doctor’s medical judgment amounts to deliberate indifference.”

Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citations,

alterations, and quotations omitted). A prisoner’s dissatisfaction with a medical

professional’s prescribed course of treatment cannot support a deliberate indifference

claim unless there is evidence the defendant “knew better than to make the medical

decision” he made. Id. at 662-63. Sufficient evidence to support this inference may include

“the obviousness of the risk from a particular course of treatment, the defendant’s

persistence in a course of treatment known to be ineffective, or proof that the defendant’s

treatment decision departed so radically from accepted professional judgment, practice,

or standards that a jury may reasonably infer that the decision was not based on

professional judgment.” Id. at 663 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Here, there is no inference that Defendant Ahmed “knew better” than to pursue

the course of treatment that Plaintiff contends was unconstitutional. Defendant Ahmed

explained at his deposition that he does not stitch a laceration if more than six hours has

passed and instead treats the wound with saline and a dressing with an antibiotic (Doc.

163-2, p. 24). He also takes a culture to determine if there is an infection to assess if oral

antibiotics are appropriate, which is how he treated Plaintiff here (Id.). Plaintiff has not

pointed out any medical standard that Defendant Ahmed violated by not suturing the

wound or by pursuing the course of treatment that he did. Further, no expert testified

that Defendant Ahmed’s chosen course of treatment was a substantial departure from

accepted medical judgment, and the decision was not so obviously wrong that a

layperson could draw the inference without an expert. See Owens v. Duncan, 788 F. App’x

371, 375 (7th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal of a deliberate indifference claim because the

defendant’s decision to let the plaintiff’s incision heal naturally instead of stitching it was

insufficient to support any inference of an improper motive); Reaves v. Riggs, 2020 WL

6689109, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2020) (granting summary judgment on a plaintiff’s

deliberate indifference claim based on a nurse’s decision to provide the plaintiff with

supplies to change his wound dressing rather than order medical staff to change the

dressing daily).

Also, there is no evidence that Defendant Ahmed persisted in a course of treatment

he knew was ineffective. According to the undisputed evidence, Defendant Ahmed first

noted an infection on July 27, 2017 and he immediately modified Plaintiff’s treatment

plan and ordered laboratory tests. When Defendant Ahmed saw Plaintiff around a week

later, on August 2, 2017, Plaintiff’s wound was healing. The wound did not require any

further treatment.

No reasonable jury could determine Defendant Ahmed was deliberately

indifferent in his treatment of Plaintiff’s laceration. Plaintiff merely disagrees with

Defendant Ahmed’s medical judgment and is dissatisfied he did not receive specific care

or the best care possible. But none of these complaints are sufficient to sustain a claim for

deliberate indifference.

Further, Plaintiff contends Defendant Ahmed was deliberately indifferent because

he ignored Plaintiff’s complaints that nurses at Lawrence were not cleaning his wounds

and dressings every day. Individual liability under § 1983 requires personal involvement

in the alleged constitutional deprivation. Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th

Cir. 2017). However, “a defendant’s direct participation in the deprivation is not

required.” Miller v. Smith, 220 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2000). “An official satisfies the

personal responsibility requirement of § 1983 if she acts or fails to act with a deliberate or

reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Id. (emphasis in original)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). Thus, a defendant may be held liable under §

1983 if he knows about a plaintiff’s medical condition and does not intervene to remedy

the condition. See Diggs v. Ghosh, 850 F.3d 905, 911 (7th Cir. 2017); Perez v. Fenoglio, 792

F.3d 768, 781-82 (7th Cir. 2015).

Here, there is no evidence Defendant Ahmed received, reviewed, or was aware of

any of Plaintiff’s grievances or complaints concerning his wound treatment or otherwise

knew that nurses were not following instructions. Defendant Ahmed testified that, to his

knowledge, the nurses were following his orders throughout Plaintiff’s treatment (Doc.

163-2, p. 82-83). Because there is no evidence Defendant Ahmed knew of Plaintiff’s

complaints concerning his medical care, Defendant Ahmed could not have recklessly

disregarded those complaints. Defendant Ahmed is entitled to summary judgment. See

Bans v. Patton, 2019 WL 189243, at *6 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 14, 2019) (nurse practitioner entitled

to summary judgment on deliberate indifference claim where she had no knowledge the

jail staff failed to follow her orders to change the plaintiff’s bandage daily).

II. Defendants Cunningham, Goodrum, Hanson, McCarthy, McGrath, and

Thompson

Defendants Cunningham, Goodrum, Hanson, McCarthy, McGrath, and

Thompson argue they are entitled to summary judgment because they were not

personally involved in providing Plaintiff medical treatment. During the relevant times,

Defendants Goodrum, McCarthy, Hanson, and McGrath were correctional officers,

sergeants, or lieutenants at Lawrence. Defendant Cunningham was the Health Care Unit

Administrator and Defendant McFarland was the Director of Nursing. None of these

defendants provided direct medical care to Plaintiff.3

If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts, a non-medical prison official will

generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands. Arnett, 658 F.3d

at 755. However, non-medical officials can be held liable for deliberate indifference where

they have a reason to believe or actual knowledge that prison doctors or their assistants

are mistreating or not treating a prisoner. Id. “Non-medical defendants cannot simply

ignore an inmate’s plight.” Id. However, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he gave the

non-medical defendant “sufficient notice to alert him or her to an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

A. Defendant McFarland

Defendant McFarland was the Director of Nursing who was in charge of

Lawrence’s nursing staff during June, July, and August, 2017 (Doc. 167-10, p. 5). As the

Director of Nursing, Defendant McFarland would not have been involved in Plaintiff’s

treatment unless a complaint was made about his medical care (Doc. 159-3, p. 17-18).

Defendant Ahmed testified he did not speak with Defendant McFarland about Plaintiff’s

treatment because treatment was going well (Id.).

3 Plaintiff’s testimony suggests that Defendants Cunningham and McFarland were involved in the decision

not to suture his wound on June 17, 2017 (Doc. 163-1, p. 109, 182, & 219). Defendants dispute this. Although

the Court views the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant on summary judgment, Plaintiff

does not reference Defendant Cunningham or Defendant McFarland’s alleged treatment, argue that their

treatment was deliberately indifferent, or otherwise pursue this theory in his opposition to the summary

judgment motions. Arguments not properly developed in a response to a summary judgment motion are

waived. Harper v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 521, 528 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Eastern

Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 2001) (“acquiescence” in response to an argument “operates as a

waiver”). Further, even if Defendant Cunningham and Defendant McFarland provided input on the

decision not to stitch or suture Plaintiff’s wound on June 17, 2017, there is no evidence that the treatment

was deliberately indifferent.

On August 15, 2017, Plaintiff filed a grievance that states, in relevant part:

it took all the way to the date 7, 23, 17 that my right leg had got real bad

with a[] staff infection from staff in Lawrence not car[]ing when I/M Ricky

Cruz kept alerting officers nurs[es] director of nurs[e]s Laura

Cunni[n]gham Mark Mcfarland that run medical. I even let the warden

know about it warden Lamb. The staff here took so much time to get on to

what needed to be done that I had got very sick and had a very bad infection

in my leg. . .

(Doc. 161-3, p. 70-71) (errors in original).

Although Plaintiff states he “kept alerting” Defendant McFarland, there is no

evidence of what he alerted McFarland about or of the timing or substance of his

complaints. Neither the grievance, Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, nor any other

evidence identifies the details of Plaintiff’s complaints to Defendant McFarland. Thus, no

reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff’s communications put Defendant

McFarland on notice of an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health. See Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d

987, 994 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming summary judgment for prison warden where the

inmate argued she sent letters describing inadequate medical care but did “not supply,

in her description of the purported letters, any detail to permit the conclusion that the

letters sufficiently advised the warden of the situation to require her intervention”).

Plaintiff relies on deposition testimony that he complained to nurses that his leg

was not healing (Doc. 167, p. 12) (citing Doc. 167-4, p. 199), and points out that Defendant

McFarland supervised those nurses (Doc. 167, p. 13). However, there is no evidence

Defendant McFarland knew the nurses were not following orders. Defendant McFarland

cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of nurses under his supervision. Burks v.

Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009). Even if Defendant McFarland was negligent in

supervising the nurses, “[s]upervisors who are merely negligent in failing to detect and

prevent subordinates’ misconduct are not liable. The supervisors must know about the

conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they

might see.” Chavez v. Illinois States Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal

citations, quotations, and alterations omitted). Because Plaintiff has no evidence of

Defendant McFarland’s involvement in the alleged constitutional violation, his claim

against Defendant McFarland fails as a matter of law.

B. Defendant Cunningham

Defendant Cunningham reviewed and responded to inmate grievances related to

medical needs during the relevant times (Doc. 167-11, p. 12-15). She provided input on

grievance responses and spoke to medical professionals whose conduct was at issue in

grievances (Id.).

On July 1, 2017, Plaintiff filed a grievance that states a physician ordered that he

receive bandage changes and wound cleaning every day, beginning on June 17, 2017

(Doc. 167-9, p. 4-5). Plaintiff complained that nurses were not treating him at all or were

only cleaning the wound with water (Id. at p. 5). The grievance states that on July 1, 2017,

a nurse eventually tended to Plaintiff’s wound (Id.). The grievance is stamped

“RECEIVED” by the grievance office at Lawrence (Id. at p. 4). A grievance counselor

responded on August 8, 2017 and stated, “addressed by 7-10-17 grievance” (Id. at p. 5)

On July 2, 2017, Plaintiff filed another grievance that states a nurse looked at his

wound and gave him a bandage but did not clean it or apply antibiotic ointment (Id. at p.

6). The grievance is stamped “RECEIVED” by the grievance office at Lawrence (Id.). A

grievance counselor responded on August 8, 2017 and stated, “addressed by 7-10-17

grievance” (Id.).

On July 3, 2017, Plaintiff filed a grievance that states he had not been seen by a

nurse for his leg wound on that date and needed the wound cleaned and bandaged (Doc.

161-3, p. 85). The grievance indicates it was received by the Administrative Review Board

(“ARB”), which responded that the grievance was misdirected because medical issues

must be reviewed at the facility prior to review by the ARB (Id. at p. 84).

On July 10, 2017, Plaintiff file a grievance about his medical treatment (Doc. 167-9,

p. 2-3). The grievance states Plaintiff’s wound was open and he did not have bandages to

dress the wound (Id.). Further, the wound was turning green and Plaintiff believed it was

infected (Id.). The grievance is stamped “RECEIVED” by the grievance office at Lawrence

(Id. at p. 2). On July 17, a grievance counselor responded, “Per HCU as documented in

medical chart Offender Cruz is being seen and treated by a licensed Illinois physician

within community standards of care” (Id.). Defendant Cunningham indicated she was

the individual from the HCU who reviewed Plaintiff’s medical chart and responded to

the grievance counselor (Doc. 161-4, p. 15-16).

Plaintiff filed another grievance on August 15, 2017, which states, in part: