The opinion
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LUKE ALEXANDER PRINDABLE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 21-cv-418-RJD
)
C/O BRIGGS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DALY, Magistrate Judge:
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Joint Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 64). For
the reasons set forth below, the Motion is GRANTED, and this matter is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE
Background
Plaintiff Luke Alexander Prindable is an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department
of Corrections (“IDOC”), currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center. Plaintiff filed
this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging his constitutional rights were violated while he
was incarcerated at the St. Clair County Jail. Plaintiff is proceeding in this action on the
following claims:
Count One: Defendants Briggs, Gumber, Chambers, and Watson failed to intervene
and protect Plaintiff from the inmate attack that occurred on or around
March 25, 2021, in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth and/or
Eighth Amendment.
Count Two: Defendant Gumber subjected Plaintiff to excessive force when he dragged
Plaintiff from the medical unit floor to a holding cell in a manner that
inflicted further injuries for no penological reason on or around March 25,
2021, in violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth and/or Eighth
Amendment.
sustained during the assault on or around March 25, 2021, in violation of
Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth and/or Eighth Amendment.
On November 4, 2021, the Court entered a Scheduling and Discovery Order setting the
deadline for Plaintiff to provide Defendants certain initial disclosures by December 6, 2021 (see
Doc. 61). On January 4, 2022, Defendants moved to compel Plaintiff to provide his initial
disclosures in accordance with the Scheduling and Discovery Order (Doc. 62). The Court
granted Defendant’s motion to compel on January 7, 2022, and Plaintiff was ordered to provide
his initial disclosures by January 21, 2022 (Doc. 63). The Court advised Plaintiff that if he failed
to abide by the Court’s Order, the undersigned would entertain a request for sanctions by
Defendants.
On January 24, 2022, Defendants filed a joint motion for sanctions seeking dismissal of
this matter citing Federal Rules of Civil 37 and 41. Defendants assert they have not received
Plaintiff’s initial disclosures and argue dismissal is appropriate due to Plaintiff’s continued
failure to abide by the Court’s Orders.
Soon after Defendants’ motion was filed, Plaintiff filed a notice of change of address
(Doc. 66). Because it was not clear that Plaintiff received Defendants’ motion for sanctions, out
of an abundance of caution, the undersigned ensured a copy of the motion was again sent to
Plaintiff on February 28, 2022 (see Doc. 68). The undersigned also ordered that Plaintiff’s
response to the motion be filed by March 21, 2022. There is nothing in the docket to suggest
Plaintiff has not received any of the filings in this matter and Plaintiff has not yet responded to
Defendants’ Joint Motion for Sanctions.
Discussion
Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that dismissal of an action
may be an appropriate sanction if a party “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery.”
Court finds “willfulness, bad faith or fault on the part of the defaulting party.” Brown v.
Columbia Sussex Corp., 664 F.3d 182, 190 (7th Cir. 2011). However, the sanction of dismissal
must be “proportionate to the circumstances.” Collins v. Illinois, 554 F.3d 693, 696 (7th Cir.
2009).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) also provides for involuntary dismissal for failure
to prosecute an action or to comply with court orders. Pursuant to Rule 41(b), an action may be
dismissed “when there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct, or when other less
drastic sanctions have proven unavailing.” Maynard v. Nygren, 332 F.3d 462, 467 (7th Cir.
2003) (quoting Williams v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 155 F.3d 853, 857 (7th Cir. 1998) (other
citations omitted). Although there is no requirement of graduated sanctions prior to dismissal,
the Court must provide an explicit warning before a case is dismissed. Aura Lamp & Lighting
Inc. v. International Trading Corp., 325 F.3d 903, 908 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Ball v. City of
Chicago, 2 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 1993)). Dismissal is the most severe sanction that a court
may apply; as such, its use must be tempered by a careful exercise of judicial discretion. Webber
v. Eye Corp., 721 F.2d 1067, 1069 (7th Cir. 1983).
The Seventh Circuit has identified several factors a court should consider before entering
an involuntary dismissal, including:
the frequency of the plaintiff’s failure to comply with deadlines; whether the
responsibility for mistakes is attributable to the plaintiff herself or to the
plaintiff’s lawyer; the effect of the mistakes on the judge’s calendar; the prejudice
that the delay caused to the defendant; the merit of the suit; and the consequences
of dismissal for the social objectives that the litigation represents. Aura Lamp &
Lighting Inc. v. Int’l Trading Corp., 325 F.3d 903, 908 (7th Cir. 2003).
Dismissal in this case is appropriate under Rule 37 and Rule 41(b). In this instance, Plaintiff
failed to comply with the Court’s orders directing him to provide Defendants with initial
(see Doc. 61), and in the Court’s order granting Defendants’ motion to compel (see Doc. 63).
Defendants assert, and Plaintiff has not contradicted their assertion, that Plaintiff wholly failed to
comply with the Court’s orders and provide any initial disclosures. Plaintiff also failed to
respond to Defendants’ motion for sanctions despite being provided ample time and opportunity
to do so.
The Court finds that the conduct described above demonstrates a clear record of willful
delay and contumacious conduct that has needlessly delayed this litigation. Accordingly, the
Court finds dismissal is appropriate.
While the Court notes there are lesser sanctions available, they would be unavailing as
Plaintiff has clearly lost interest in litigating this matter. Moreover, the Court finds Defendants
would be prejudiced if this matter were allowed to languish on the Court’s docket any longer.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Joint Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 64) is
GRANTED and this matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 10, 2022
s/ Reona J. Daly
Hon. Reona J. Daly
United States Magistrate Judge