The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CARL L. SPRAGUE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 22-cv-424-NJR
)
)
ROB JEFFREYS, SARAH BROWN )
FOILES, HEATHER WRIGHT, )
RICHARD MORGANTHALER, )
JOHN BALDWIN, and )
SALVADORE GODINEZ, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
Plaintiff Carl L. Sprague, a civilly committed individual under the Sexually
Dangerous Persons Act (“SDPA”), 725 ILCS 205/0.01, et seq., who is currently committed
at Big Muddy River Correctional Center, brings this action for deprivations of his
constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also alleges violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation
Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 794–94e. In the Complaint, Sprague seeks injunctive relief
because he allegedly has not received proper treatment while in the Sexually Dangerous
Persons Program.
This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen
prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any
portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is
immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
The Complaint
In his Complaint, Sprague makes the following allegations: He was adjudicated a
sexually dangerous person (“SDP”) in April 1985 and released on conditional release in
August 1995 (Doc. 1, p. 6). In 2009, his release was violated after seven and a half years in
the community. He also received therapy while on release (Id.). In 2011, he was released
again. Around seven years later, in 2018, he was revoked again and is currently housed
at Big Muddy River Correctional Center. While on conditional release, Sprague alleges
that he did not receive proper treatment (Id.). He believes this is a violation of the SDPA,
ADA, and RA. He believes his release did not focus on rehabilitation or recovery (Id.).
Sprague further alleges that over the past two years, he has not received proper
treatment in the SDP Program due to the Covid-19 pandemic. He claims treatment has
been sporadic and includes packets of homework (Id.).
Discussion
Simply put, Sprague’s Complaint fails to state a claim. Although he identifies
numerous Defendants in the caption of his case, he fails to indicate how these individuals
violated his rights in his statement of claim. He fails to allege that any of the defendants
participated in his treatment either on release or while in custody. A successful complaint
generally alleges “the who, what, when, where, and how…” See DiLeo v. Ernst & Young,
901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990). If Sprague wants to proceed with his claims, he will have
to allege which Defendants were responsible for the program, and how they individually
violated his rights. He also fails to indicate how his rights under the ADA were violated.
Pending Motions
As for Sprague’s motion for counsel (Doc. 3), he indicates that he is not trained in
the law and will need help presenting his case. But he fails to indicate whether he has
tried to obtain counsel on his own. Because Sprague has not sought to obtain counsel on
his own, his motion is DENIED. Should he choose to move for recruitment of counsel at
a later date, the Court directs Sprague to (1) contact at least three attorneys regarding
representation in this case prior to filing another motion, (2) include in the motion the
name and addresses of at least three attorneys he has contacted, and (3) if available, attach
the letters from the attorneys who declined representation. His motion for counsel
(Doc. 3) is DENIED.
Disposition
For the reasons set forth above, Sprague’s Complaint is DISMISSED without
prejudice. Sprague is GRANTED leave to file a “First Amended Complaint” on or before
June 28, 2022. Should Sprague fail to file his First Amended Complaint within the allotted
time or consistent with the instructions set forth in this Order, the entire case shall be
dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with a court order and/or for failure to
prosecute his claims. Fed. R. App. P. 41(b). See generally Ladien v. Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051
(7th Cir. 1997); Johnson v. Kamminga, 34 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The
dismissal shall count as one of Sprague’s three allotted “strikes” under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g).
An amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original complaint, rendering
the original complaint void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638
n. 1 (7th Cir. 2004). The Court will not accept piecemeal amendments to the original
Complaint. Thus, the First Amended Complaint must stand on its own, without reference
to any previous pleading, and Sprague must re-file any exhibits he wishes the Court to
consider along with the First Amended Complaint. The First Amended Complaint is
subject to review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Sprague is further ADVISED that his obligation to pay the filing fee for this action
was incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee remains due and payable,
regardless of whether Sprague elects to file a First Amended Complaint. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
Finally, Sprague is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court
will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not
later than seven days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply
with this Order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result
in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 31, 2022 Tl
J Wosnstegl
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge