Abdulla v. Campbell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ALI ABDULLA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:19-cv-01393-GCS

)

AARON CAMPBELL )

and )

KYLE BRUMLEVE, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SISON, Magistrate Judge:

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Doc. 55, 56, 74).1 Specifically,

Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies as to

Defendant Kyle Brumleve on any claim and that Plaintiff did not exhaust his

administrative remedies as to Defendant Campbell regarding the claims in Counts 2 and

3.2 Plaintiff Ali Abdulla opposes the motion. (Doc. 63). The Court held an evidentiary

hearing on the motion on May 17, 2022 and took the matter under advisement. (Doc. 73).

1 Along with the motion for summary judgment, Defendants filed the required Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56 notice informing Abdulla of the consequences of failing to respond to the motion for

summary judgment and what is required in responding to a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 57).

2 Defendant Campbell concedes Plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies as to the claim against

him in Count 1.

Based on the reasons delineated below, the Court denies in part and grants in part the

motion for summary judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On December 24, 2019, Abdulla, an inmate of the Illinois Department of

Corrections (“IDOC”) currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”),

brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his

constitutional rights that occurred while he was housed at Menard. He requests monetary

damages. (Doc. 1).

Abdulla makes the following allegations. Abdulla was previously housed at

Pinckneyville Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville). On February 8, 2018, Abdulla was

transferred to Menard and was led to his segregation cell by Defendants Aaron Campbell

and Kyle Brumleve. After being stripped searched, Abdulla was physically assaulted by

Defendants while he was handcuffed. He sustained significant injuries including broken

bones and could not walk for weeks. He also alleges that after the assault, Defendants

placed him in a dirty cell with no soap, bedclothes, tissue or towels. He further contends

that he was denied medical treatment for his injuries until more than a month later.

The Court conducted the required review of Abdulla’s complaint pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915A. (Doc. 26). The August 25, 2021 Memorandum and Order allowed Abdulla

to proceed with the following: an Eighth Amendment claim for excessive force against

Defendants (Count 1); an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a

serious medical need against Defendants (Count 2); and an Eighth Amendment claim for

conditions of confinement against Defendants (Count 3). Id.

The record reflects that Abdulla submitted at least 15 grievances from March 2018

to December 2018. See (Doc. 56-1, 56-2, 74). The potentially relevant grievances – those

Abdulla submitted during the relevant time frame are attached as Exhibit A to

Defendants’ memorandum in support of summary judgment. (Doc. 56-1, 56-2). Most of

these grievances are unrelated to the matter at hand and will not be addressed.3 The

record reflects three grievances which are relevant to the allegations in this complaint:

grievance # 396-3-18; grievance # 490-3-18; and grievance # 359-3-18.4

On March 19, 2018, Abdulla filed grievance # 359-3-18 as an emergency. In this

grievance, Abdulla complained about being attacked and about the lack of medical

treatment from the facility for 41 days. Abdulla’s relief requested the following: “I need

and request medical attention immediately for the incident on 2/8/2018 by Officer

Campbell and Officer Bromlee.” On March 22, 2018, this grievance was deemed not an

emergency. (Doc. 56-2, p. 64). The grievance was sent back to Abdulla on March 23, 2018,

and Abdulla resubmitted the grievance which was received on March 29, 2018. (Doc. 74).

On October 1, 2018, the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) denied the grievance

3 Exhibit A consists of grievances that Abdulla filed from February 2018 to April 2021. (Doc. 56-1,

Doc. 56-2).

4 In his opposition, Abdulla also references the following irrelevant grievances: grievance # 360-3-

18 which relates to law library legal mail; grievance # 357-3-18 which relates to shakedowns; and grievance

# 358-3-18 which relates to missing property items. (Doc. 56-2, p. 72-75, 81-84, 85-88). Obviously, these

grievances are not related to the allegations contained in the complaint or the claims that survived the

screening Order.

finding it was appropriately addressed at the facility. Acting Director Baldwin concurred

with the ARB on October 4, 2018. (Doc. 56-2, p. 62-65).

On March 27, 2018, Abdulla filed grievance # 490-3-18, which complained of the

conditions of his cell. (Doc. 56-2, p. 68-11). In this grievance, he does not mention either

Defendants in this grievance. However, he does mention that his galley officer, Officer

Taylor denied him assistance. On June 5, 2018, the grievance officer found the issues

moot. Further the grievance officer noted: “[o]ffender is reminded to follow proper

grievance procedures and submit grievances in locked boxes.” On June 7, 2018, the Chief

Administrative Officer (“CAO”) or designee concurred with the grievance officer.

Abdulla signed his intent to appeal that decision on June 18, 2018. The ARB received the

grievance on August 6, 2018. On August 15, 2018, the ARB issued its decision that it

would not address the grievance as it received the grievance 30 days after the CAO’s

decision. (Doc. 56-2, p. 68-71).

On March 1, 2018, Abdulla filed grievance number 396-3-18(1) as an emergency.

In this grievance, Abdulla complains that Officers Campbell and “Bromlee” attacked him

on February 8, 2018. He also complains about the lack of medical treatment, but he does

not claim Defendants denied him treatment. Further, this grievance does not mention the

conditions of his cell. On March 23, 2018, the CAO deemed this grievance not an

emergency. This grievance was marked as a duplicate issue of 359-3-18. On March 26,

2018, Abdulla filed grievance # 396-3-18(2). In this grievance, he complains about

excessive force by Defendants and that he was denied proper medical care, but he does

not allege that these Defendants denied him medical care. The ARB received these

grievances on May 15, 2018. The ARB did not rule on the merits of the grievance as they

were not submitted in the timeframe outlined by Department Rule 504. (Doc. 56-2, 90-

96).

At the evidentiary hearing held on May 17, 2022, the Court heard testimony from

Evette Baker and Abdulla. (Doc. 73).

Evette Baker has been employed at Menard since 1996 and works in the grievance

office. She testified regarding the grievance procedure process at Menard during the

relevant time period. She also testified that there are lockboxes throughout the cell house

that inmates place the grievances into and that the officers grab the lockboxes and take

them to the grievance office. The officers do not have keys to the lockboxes; only the

grievance office has the key. In segregation, the lockboxes are smaller and heavier. The

officers take the lockbox to the inmates’ cells, and the inmates place the grievances in the

lockboxes. The officers do not have keys. Typically, inmates will get receipts for their

grievances within 48 hours. If an inmate does not receive a receipt within 48 hours, the

inmate should write another grievance. Ms. Baker also testified that the grievances have

to go in the lockbox. If an inmate hands the grievance to the officer or places the grievance

in the institutional mail, it is not properly filed. Baker testified that the CHAMPS system

reflects that from March to December 2018 Abdulla filed at least 15 grievances and that

most of them were fully exhausted at the facility level.

Abdulla testified that he has been in IDOC custody since 2009 and has been housed

at various institutions including Menard, Pinckneyville, Lawrence Correctional Center,

Stateville Correctional Center, and Pontiac Correctional Center. He testified that he was

aware of the grievance process at Menard and that he successfully filed grievances at

Menard prior to 2018.

Abdulla maintains that personnel either lost or destroyed three to five of his

grievances related to the allegations in this case. Abdulla testified that he did not have

copies of any of the grievances that were handled in such a manner. Abdulla indicated

that any serious grievance filed against staff would not be processed. Abdulla testified

that he would give the grievances to an officer to put in the institution mail, give the

grievances to a worker or give the grievances to another inmate to put in the lock box. He

also testified that he would only make copies of these grievances or write a second

grievance if he went to the law library. Abdulla conceded that grievance # 359-3-18,

which is related to staff conduct, went through the grievance process.

In response to questions by the Court, Abdulla stated that he filed three to five

grievances related to the allegations in this complaint that are missing from the record.

However, when pressed for the specifics surrounding the contents of these grievances

and the process that he followed in filing them, Abdulla could not provide the Court with

any meaningful details. Abdulla also could not remember the names or descriptions of

the officers to whom he had submitted the grievances.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is “proper if the pleadings, discovery materials, disclosures,

and affidavits demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact such that [Defendants are]

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Wragg v. Village of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 467

(7th Cir. 2010). Lawsuits filed by inmates are governed by the provisions of the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). That statute states, in pertinent

part, that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983

of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”

Id. (emphasis added).

Generally, the Court’s role on summary judgment is not to evaluate the weight of

the evidence, to judge witness credibility, or to determine the truth of the matter. Instead,

the Court is to determine whether a genuine issue of triable fact exists. See Nat’l Athletic

Sportwear Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 528 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 2008). However, the Seventh

Circuit held that “debatable factual issues relating to the defense of failure to exhaust

administrative remedies” are not required to be decided by a jury, but are to be

determined by the judge. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740-741 (7th Cir. 2008).

The Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to the PLRA’s exhaustion

requirement. See, e.g., Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006)(noting that “[t]his

circuit has taken a strict compliance approach to exhaustion.”). Exhaustion must occur

before the suit is filed. See Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004). A prisoner

cannot file suit and then exhaust his administrative remedies while the suit is pending.

Id. Moreover, “[t]o exhaust remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the

place, and at the time, the prison administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286

F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). Consequently, if a prisoner fails to use a prison’s grievance

process properly, “the prison administrative authority can refuse to hear the case, and

the prisoner’s claim can be indefinitely unexhausted.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809.

In Pavey, the Seventh Circuit set forth procedures for a court to follow in a situation

where failure to exhaust administrative remedies is raised as an affirmative defense. The

Seventh Circuit stated the following:

(1) The district judge conducts a hearing on exhaustion and permits

whatever discovery relating to exhaustion he deems appropriate. (2) If the

judge determines that the prisoner did not exhaust his administrative

remedies, the judge will then determine whether (a) the plaintiff has failed

to exhaust his administrative remedies, and so he must go back and

exhaust; (b) or, although he has no unexhausted administrative remedies,

the failure to exhaust was innocent (as where prison officials prevent a

prisoner from exhausting his remedies), and so he must be given another

chance to exhaust (provided that there exist remedies that he will be

permitted by the prison authorities to exhaust, so that he’s not just being

given a runaround); or (c) the failure to exhaust was the prisoner’s fault, in

which event the case is over. (3) If and when the judge determines that the

prisoner has properly exhausted his administrative remedies, the case will

proceed to pretrial discovery, and if necessary a trial, on the merits; and if

there is a jury trial, the jury will make all necessary findings of fact without

being bound by (or even informed of) any of the findings made by the

district judge in determining that the prisoner had exhausted his

administrative remedies.

Pavey, 544 F.3d at 742.

As an inmate confined within the IDOC, Abdulla was required to follow the

regulations contained in the IDOC’s Grievance Procedures for Offenders (“grievance

procedures”) to exhaust his claims properly. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. The

grievance procedures first require inmates to file their grievance with the counselor

within 60 days of the discovery of an incident. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a). The

grievance form must:

contain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint,

including what happened, when, where, and the name of each person who

is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint. This

provision does not preclude an offender from filing a grievance when the

names of individuals are not known, but the offender must include as much

descriptive information about the individual as possible.

20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(c). Grievances that are unable to be resolved through

routine channels are then sent to the grievance officer. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE

§ 504.820(a). The grievance officer will review the grievance and provide a written

response to the inmate. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(a). “The Grievance Officer shall

consider the grievance and report his or her findings and recommendations in writing to

the Chief Administrative Officer within two months after receipt of the grievance, when

reasonably feasible under the circumstances.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(e). “The

Chief Administrative Officer shall review the findings and recommendation and advise

the offender of his or her decision in writing.” Id.

If the inmate is not satisfied with the response of the CAO, he or she can file an

appeal with the Director through the ARB. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(a). The

grievance procedures specifically state, “[i]f, after receiving the response of the Chief

Administrative Officer, the offender still believes that the problem, complaint or

grievance has not been resolved to his or her satisfaction, he or she may appeal in writing

to the Director. The appeal must be received by the Administrative Review Board within

30 days after the date of the decision.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(a). The inmate shall

attach copies of the Grievance Officer’s report and the CAO’s decision to his appeal. Id.

“The Administrative Review Board shall submit to the Director a written report of its

findings and recommendations.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(d). “The Director shall

review the findings and recommendations of the Board and make a final determination

of the grievance within six months after receipt of the appealed grievance, when

reasonably feasible under the circumstances. The offender shall be sent a copy of the

Director’s decision.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(e).

The grievance procedures also allow an inmate to file an emergency grievance. See

20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.840. In order to file an emergency grievance, the inmate must

forward the grievance directly to the CAO who may “[determine that] there is a

substantial risk of imminent personal injury or other serious or irreparable harm to the

offender [such that] the grievance [should] be handled on an emergency basis.” 20 ILL.

ADMIN. CODE § 504.840(a). If the CAO determines the grievance should be handled on an

emergency basis, then the CAO “shall expedite processing of the grievance and respond

to the offender indicating what action shall be or has been taken.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE

§ 504.840(b). If the CAO determines the grievances “should not be handled on an

emergency basis, the offender shall be notified in writing that he or she may resubmit the

grievance as non-emergent, in accordance with the standard grievance process.” 20 ILL.

ADMIN. CODE § 504.840(c). When an inmate appeals a grievance deemed by the CAO to

be an emergency, “the Administrative Review Board shall expedite processing of the

grievance.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(f).

If an inmate submits a grievance but never receives a response, then his attempts

at exhaustion will be deemed thwarted, and he will be allowed to proceed with his

lawsuit. See, e.g., Walker v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 973, 979 (7th Cir. 2008)(noting that an inmate

is not required to appeal his grievance if he submits the grievance to the proper

authorities but never receives a response); Dole, 438 F.3d at 809 (indicating that a remedy

can be unavailable to a prisoner if the prison does not respond to the grievance or uses

misconduct to prevent a prisoner from exhausting his remedies).

ANALYSIS

Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment as Abdulla did

not exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing his complaint as to any of his

claims against Defendant Brumleve and as to his claims in Count 2 and 3 against

Defendant Campbell. Abdulla counters that he submitted three to five grievances

regarding the incidents in the complaint and that he did not get a response because his

grievances were either destroyed or not processed.

First, the Court addresses grievance # 359-3-18 dated on March 19, 2018. As to this

grievance, Defendants maintain that it did not mention or describe Defendant Brumleve

nor did it allege that Defendant Campbell denied Abdulla medical care. It also did not

contain any allegations regarding the conditions of Abdulla’s cell. As noted by

Defendants, this grievance did allege that Defendant Campbell used excessive force

against Abdulla on February 8, 2018. The grievance also alleged that Abdulla had not

received appropriate medical care for 41 days. However, a thorough review of the

grievances reveals that Abdulla specifically named Defendant Brumleve in the text of his

grievance stating: “immediate firing of Officer Campbell Officer & Bromlee those were

the leaders of the Police Beating that happened on 2/08/2018.” Further, his request for

relief in this grievance states: “I need and request medical attention for the incident on

2/8/2018 by Officer Campbell and Officer Bromlee.” (Doc. 56-2, p. 62-65). Clearly, this

mirrors the conduct alleged regarding Abdulla’s claims of excessive force. Thus,

construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Abdulla, the Court finds that

grievance # 359-3-18, did exhaust administrative remedies for his claim of excessive force

against Defendant Brumleve in Count 1.

However, the Court finds that this grievance cannot serve to exhaust

administrative remedies regarding the claims against Defendants in Counts 2 and 3.

While the grievance did allege a lack of medical care, it did not state that Defendants

Campbell and Brumleve were the individuals that denied him such care. In fact, the

grievance specifically reads: “I need emergency intensive care but this facility never

treated me and is waiting for the injuries to disappear.” (Doc. 56-2, p. 64-65). Based on

this grievance, it appears that Abdulla’s complaint was with medical staff and not with

the officers who had allegedly assaulted him. Likewise, this grievance did not contain

allegations of the conditions of his cell on February 8, 2018.

Next, the Court addresses grievance # 490-3-18 dated March 27, 2018, in which

Abdulla complained about the conditions of his confinement. (Doc. 56-2, p. 68-71). This

grievance did not mention the conduct of Defendant Campbell and Defendant Brumleve,

and it did not describe either Defendant Campbell or Defendant Brumleve. Instead, the

grievance states that he was denied assistance by his gallery officer Corrections Officer

Taylor. Specifically, the grievance states: “[e]ven though I did ask my gallery officer C/O

Taylor, I was promised, but lies. I was ignored to . . . .” Id. at p. 70-71. Clearly, this

grievance did not exhaust Abdulla’s administrative remedies as to the claims against

these Defendants in Count 3. Assuming arguendo that this grievance did include conduct

or allegations regarding the Defendants, this grievance still would not have exhausted

his administrative remedies regarding the claims in Count 3 because the ARB did not

address the merits of this grievance as it was untimely received. Id. at p. 68.

Lastly, the Court address grievance 396-3-18(1) and (2) in which Abdulla grieved

excessive force against the Defendants on February 8, 2018 and the lack of medical

treatment. But, these grievances never mentioned conditions of confinement. And, as

stated previously, Abdulla’s complaints about the lack of medical treatment were not

directed towards the Defendants. Thus, these grievances cannot serve to exhaust his

administrative remedies as to the medical claims in Count 2 against the Defendants.

Additionally, these grievances cannot serve to exhaust the administrative remedies as to

the conditions of confinement claims in Count 3 against the Defendants. While the

grievances did reference the allegations of excessive force against these Defendants, the

ARB did not rule on the merits of these grievances, and it cannot serve to exhaust

administrative remedies as to the excessive force claims in Count 1.

Moreover, as to Abdulla’s assertions that his three to five grievances were

destroyed or not processed, the Court finds his testimony to be unpersuasive in this

regard. First, Abdulla could not describe in any detail any of the grievances that he

claimed were lost or destroyed. For example, Abdulla could not identify the date of the

grievances or the individuals to whom he had submitted the grievances. And, when

pressed further, Abdulla could not even describe the individuals to whom he had

submitted the grievances. Second, Abdulla does not have copies of the grievances that he

claims were destroyed or not processed. In other cases decided by this Court,

handwritten copies of relevant grievances have served to corroborate a plaintiff’s

assertions. Nevertheless, Abdulla has no evidence whatsoever to support his assertions,

other than his own self-serving testimony that the grievances were destroyed or refused

to be processed. Furthermore, it seems implausible that the grievances filed by Abdulla

were destroyed or that he was prevented from filing the grievances when so many of his

other grievances were received and answered. The record is replete with instances where

Abdulla was able to use the grievance process as to issues in this case and as to other

issues not relevant to this case. And, even if there were grievances that were not

processed, the evidence shows that Abdulla did not follow the required procedures for

filing the grievances. Abdulla testified that he would give the grievances to an officer to

put in the institution mail, give the grievances to a worker or give the grievances to

another inmate to put in the lock box. This is not consistent with the procedure

established at Menard for inmates to place the grievances directly in the lockbox. Thus,

the Court does not find Abdulla credible regarding the alleged destruction of his

grievances and his inability to file grievances, as the record clearly indicates otherwise.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ summary judgment motion as to exhaustion

of administrative remedies is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. The Court

DENIES the motion as to the claim against Defendant Brumleve in Count 1 and

GRANTS the motion as to the claims against Defendants in Counts 2 and 3. Thus, the

Court DISMISSES without prejudice claims against Defendants Campbell and

Brumleve in Counts 2 and 3 and DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment at

the end of the case. The case is proceeding as to the claims for excessive force against

Defendants Campbell and Brumleve in Count 1.

ITI .

5 SO ORDERED Digitally signed by

i Judge Sison 2

DATED: May 24, 2022. :

ay Sloat 0. Dedne Date: 2022.05.24

11:59:58 -05'00'

GILBERT C. SISON

United States Magistrate Judge

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