Tapp v. Pritzker

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

BRIAN A. TAPP, #K03142, )

)

Plaintiff, )

vs. ) Case No. 21-0396-SPM

)

ROB JEFFREYS, )

SARAH BROWN-FOLES, )

JESSICA D. STOVER, )

HEATHER WRIGHT, )

LORINDA LAMPKIN, )

MARIA GRAY, and )

J.B. PRITZKER, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

McGLYNN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Brian A. Tapp brought this action while he was incarcerated at the Big Muddy

River Correctional Center (“BMRCC”) of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”). (Doc.

1). Plaintiff has since been released from custody. (Doc. 8). He brings this civil action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his constitutional rights during his confinement as a

civilly committed Sexually Dangerous Person (“SDP”). He asserts violations of the First, Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendments because he was granted conditional release from the SDP treatment

program but was kept in prison because of Defendants’ failure to assist him in obtaining acceptable

housing and support resources in the community. He seeks injunctive relief. (Doc. 1, pp. 24-27).

This Complaint is now before the Court for preliminary review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,

which requires the Court to screen prisoner Complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of the Complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state

a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be dismissed.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se Complaint are to be

liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint (Doc. 1): Plaintiff was granted

conditional release on March 5, 2021 by the Sangamon County, Illinois, court that committed him

as an SDP, but is still being “punished” by remaining in custody because he has been given no

assistance to secure proper housing in the community. (Doc. 1, pp. 2, 4, 9-11, 27). He seeks

conditions of release that are rehabilitative rather than punitive, pursuant to the Illinois Sexually

Dangerous Persons Act (“SDPA”), 725 ILCS 205/1.01, et seq., and asserts he should not be subject

to the same requirements imposed on convicted sex offenders. (Doc 1, pp. 2-4, 8-10). He also

claims the SDP treatment program is out of compliance with treatment standards and violates the

Constitution. (Doc. 1, pp. 7-8). Nonetheless, Plaintiff has successfully completed all phases of the

treatment offered at BMRCC. (Doc. 1, p. 12). He complains that the IDOC Director (Jeffreys) has

no facilities or programs in place to continue to treat SDPs once they are released into the

community, nor do Defendants offer any assistance with job training or employment. Id.

Plaintiff brings his claims against Rob Jeffreys, IDOC Director and Plaintiff’s guardian

while he is confined as an SDP; Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker, who supervises Jeffreys; Sarah

Brown-Foles, Coordinator of the Sex Offender Service Unit at BMRCC; Jessica Stover, a BMRCC

treatment provider; Heather Wright, Director of the BMRCC Sex Offender Program and a

treatment provider; Lorinda Lampkin, and Maria Gray, both attorneys involved in Plaintiff’s

recovery and conditional release court proceedings in Sangamon County. (Doc. 1, pp. 4-6).

Plaintiff sues each Defendant in his or her individual and official capacities. (Doc. 1, p. 7).

Plaintiff organizes his Complaint into four counts: Count 1 for failure to adequately treat

mentally ill or disordered persons (Doc. 1, pp. 14-16); Count 2 for failure to supervise, direct, and

train employees (Doc. 1, pp. 16-18); Count 3 for imposing a punitive environment at BMRCC and

denying approval of a site for Plaintiff’s release (Doc. 1, pp. 18-20); and Count 4 for imposition

of punitive conditions of release and failure to provide adequate care and treatment upon

conditional release. (Doc. 1, pp. 21-24).

Plaintiff seeks relief including an injunction to stop Defendants from enforcing their

unconstitutional policies, require them to cease housing SDP detainees with general population

inmates, train staff and parole agents on Plaintiff’s rights as a psychiatric patient, require IDOC to

provide community treatment for released SDPs, order IDOC to assist Plaintiff in finding housing

and stop denying him housing for reasons that are not required by law, and order IDOC to pay all

his housing, treatment, and other expenses upon his release. (Doc. 1, pp. 24-27).

DISCUSSION

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following claims in

this pro se action, corresponding with Plaintiff’s articulation of his claims:

Count 1: Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for Defendants’ failure

to adequately treat Plaintiff’s mental illness/disorder as a sexually

dangerous person, resulting in his prolonged confinement and

mental suffering.

Count 2: Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for Defendants’ failure

to supervise, direct, and train employees, including parole agents,

on the adequate care and treatment of SDPs with serious mental

illnesses, which causes Plaintiff to suffer physical, psychological,

and emotional injuries.

Count 3: Fourteenth Amendment due process claim for confining Plaintiff in

the punitive environment of the SDP program with general

population inmates, and denying his prospective host sites for

conditional release, causing Plaintiff significant mental distress.

Count 4: Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for the IDOC Director’s

and the committing court’s imposition of punitive conditions of

release, IDOC’s continued confinement of Plaintiff past his

conditional release date, and IDOC’s failure to provide him with

adequate care, treatment, and financial assistance following his

release.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless

otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is mentioned in the

Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed without prejudice

as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading standard.1

PRELIMINARY DISMISSALS

Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks only prospective relief, in the form of a declaratory judgment

and injunction. He makes no request for money damages for the constitutional violations he

asserts. The case thus consists entirely of official capacity claims. Therefore, all claims against the

Defendants in their individual capacities are DISMISSED without prejudice.

Individuals who are civilly committed under the SDPA are considered pretrial detainees.

See Smego v. Mitchell, 723 F.3d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 2013). A pretrial detainee’s claim related to

unconstitutional conditions of confinement is considered under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment. A standard of objective

reasonableness, rather than deliberate indifference, governs claims for inadequate care under the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. McCann v. Ogle Cnty., Illinois, 909 F.3d 881, 886

(7th Cir. 2018) (citing Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018)). Accordingly, the

Court will analyze Plaintiff’s constitutional claims pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and his

Eighth Amendment claims are DISMISSED.

Plaintiff alleges that the current Governor of Illinois, J.B. Pritzker, is the “head executive”

1 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face.”).

of Illinois and is the supervisor of IDOC Director Jeffreys. (Doc. 1, p. 5). He does not allege,

however, that the Governor is the final policymaker on the conditions and treatment of SDPs at

BMRCC. See Dixon v. Cnty. of Cook, 819 F.3d 343, 348 (7th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, Governor

Pritzker is DISMISSED as a Defendant without prejudice.

The two attorneys involved in prosecuting Plaintiff’s Sangamon County SDP case, Lorinda

Lampkin and Maria Gray, are also DISMISSED without prejudice. Prosecutors who are

performing their duties in the judicial process are shielded by absolute immunity from suit. Polzin

v. Gage, 636 F.3d 834, 838 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-29

(1976) (holding prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for activities that are “intimately associated”

with the judicial process)).

Count 1

In Count 1, Plaintiff focuses on the alleged inadequacy of his mental health treatment

during his custody as a civilly committed SDP. He claims that the poor treatment program put him

at risk of prolonged confinement by preventing him from meeting the conditions to be

conditionally released to the community. (Doc. 1, pp. 14-16). While Plaintiff does not request the

Court to order his release from custody (which is not an available remedy in a § 1983 case but

must be sought via a petition for writ of habeas corpus), he asks for an order requiring Defendants

to provide treatment at BMRCC that will enable him to be released.

Count 1 would state a claim sufficient to warrant further consideration – however, it

appears to have become moot since Plaintiff was released from BMRCC into the community on

June 7, 2021 and is no longer incarcerated. (Doc. 8). Because Plaintiff is no longer an inmate at

BMRCC, his prayer for injunctive relief relative to treatment while confined there is moot unless

he can show “a realistic possibility that he will again be incarcerated in the same state facility and

therefore be subject to the actions of which he complains here.” Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709,

716 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2009)). For this reason,

Count 1 for inadequate mental health treatment in BMRCC in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment will be dismissed without prejudice.

Count 2

The failure to supervise and train BMRCC staff on providing adequate care and treatment

for SDPs with serious mental illnesses during their custody (Doc. 1, pp. 16-18) would also state a

viable claim – if Plaintiff were still incarcerated at BMRCC. See Lanigan v. Village of East Hazel

Crest, Ill., 110 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 1997) (failure to supervise claim can arise “if the supervisor,

with knowledge of the subordinate’s conduct, approves of the conduct and the basis for it”).

Because Plaintiff is now on conditional release and living in the community, this claim also appears

to have become moot insofar as it relates to the supervision/training of BMRCC treating staff.

However, Plaintiff also states that “parole agents” who would supervise his conditional

release and recovery have also not been adequately trained on proper treatment of SDPs. (Doc. 1,

p. 17). To the extent that Plaintiff must interact with those agents during his conditional release,

and if those agents are under the supervision of the IDOC Director, Count 2 may still state a viable

claim. At this early stage, Count 2 will be permitted to proceed against IDOC Director Jeffreys

only.

Count 3

This claim asserts due process violations for confining Plaintiff in punitive conditions with

general population inmates at BMRCC and for extending his confinement by denying his

prospective host sites. (Doc. 1, pp. 18-20). Plaintiff’s release appears to have rendered this claim

moot as well, for the reasons explained under Count 1. Therefore, Count 3 will be dismissed

without prejudice.

Count 4

This count challenges the conditions of release imposed on Plaintiff by the IDOC and the

committing court. (Doc. 1, pp. 21-24). Plaintiff asserts that the IDOC Director is obligated under

the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (“SDPA”) to provide Plaintiff with care and treatment after

he has been released from BMRCC in order to assist him in transitioning into the community.

(Doc. 1, p. 22). He claims this assistance includes payment for his transitional housing and basic

living expenses. Id. Because such assistance has not been provided, Plaintiff has continued to be

held in prison past his conditional release date. (Doc. 1, p. 24).

The Court has been unable to find any provision in the SDPA that requires the IDOC to

provide financial assistance for housing, living expenses, or the like to a civilly committed SDP

upon the person’s conditional release into the community. See 725 ILCS 205/0.01, et seq. To the

extent that Plaintiff was seeking such assistance in order to gain release from custody, his actual

release demonstrates that he was successful in meeting the requirements of his conditional release

without the need for injunctive relief from this Court. As such, it appears that this claim for

injunctive relief to enable Plaintiff to gain release from BMRCC has become moot as well.

This claim also encompasses a challenge to the conditions of release set by the state court

that ordered Plaintiff’s civil commitment. The fact that Plaintiff was granted conditional release,

rather than a complete discharge from his commitment (see 725 ILCS 205/9(e)), indicates that he

continues to be under the jurisdiction of the Sangamon County Circuit Court regarding the

conditions of his release.2 That court would also determine whether Plaintiff may eventually

2 The online docket of Plaintiff’s case in the Sangamon County Circuit Court, Case No. 1997-CF-401,

demonstrates that the court recently considered at least one motion filed by Plaintiff directed at the

qualify for discharge from those conditions and from his SDP commitment. Under the abstention

doctrine outlined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), a federal court should not interfere

with pending state judicial proceedings unless “special circumstances” exist. Braden v. 30th

Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973); Sweeney v. Bartow, 612 F.3d 571 (7th

Cir. 2010); Brunken v. Lance, 807 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics

Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982)); Neville v. Cavanaugh, 611 F.2d

673, 675 (7th Cir. 1979). Such special circumstances are generally limited to issues of double

jeopardy and speedy trial. Braden, 410 U.S. at 489-92; Sweeney, 612 F.3d at 573.

No special circumstances are apparent here that would justify this Court’s interference in

the pending state proceeding to examine the conditions of Plaintiff’s release. Any action this Court

might take with regard to Plaintiff’s conditional release status would necessarily undermine his

ongoing state SDP proceeding and would run afoul of the Younger doctrine.

In a case where a civil rights action involves money damages and Younger is implicated, a

federal court would ordinarily stay the claim until the state case concludes (through all stages of

state appeal) rather than dismiss it, so the claim would not become time-barred. See Gakuba v.

O’Brien, 711 F.3d 751, 753 (7th Cir. 2013). In Plaintiff’s case, however, he is not seeking money

damages that could be time-barred if this claim were dismissed. Because Plaintiff has the

opportunity in his pending state SDP case to challenge the conditions of his release, the Court finds

no reason to stay this claim. Count 4 will be dismissed without prejudice.

conditions of his release. Https://records.sangamoncountycircuitclerk.org/sccc/DisplayDocket.sc (last

visited April 25, 2022). Court documents, including electronic docket information, are public records of

which the Court can take judicial notice. See Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir.

1994); Bova v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 446 F. Supp. 2d 926, 930 n.2 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (a court may judicially notice

public records available on government websites) (collecting cases).

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Because Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated, any prospective relief he may obtain with

regard to Count 2 would not be directed to employees at BMRCC who are responsible for treatment

of inmates rather than released individuals. In the event that the allegedly inadequately trained

IDOC parole agents have authority over Plaintiff’s compliance with his conditions of release, it

appears that IDOC Director Jeffreys is the only named Defendant who could carry out an order for

injunctive relief, if such order is entered. Jeffreys will therefore remain in the action for that

purpose, in his official capacity. See Gonzales v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011).

DISPOSITION

The Complaint states a claim in Count 2 that survives review under § 1915A against IDOC

Director Jeffreys, in his official capacity. The claims in Counts 1, 3, and 4 are DISMISSED

without prejudice. Defendants Brown-Foles, Stover, Wright, Lampkin, Gray, and Pritzker are

DISMISSED from the action without prejudice.

The Clerk shall prepare for Rob Jeffreys (official capacity only): (1) Form 5 (Notice of a

Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of

Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this

Memorandum and Order to Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If

Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within

30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal

service on the Defendant, and the Court will require the Defendant to pay the full costs of formal

service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall

furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s

last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above

or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the

Clerk and shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the

Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant to

Administrative Order No. 244, Defendant need only respond to the issues stated in this Merit

Review Order.

Plaintiff is ADVISED that if judgment is rendered against him and the judgment includes

the payment of costs under 28 U.S.C. §1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the

costs, even though his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(f)(2)(A).

Plaintiff is further ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of

Court and the opposing parties informed of any change in his address; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days

after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a

delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of

prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

Finally, based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to

ENTER the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 25, 2022

s/ Stephen P. McGlynn_____

STEPHEN P. McGLYNN

United States District Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your lawsuit

and serve them with a copy of your Complaint. After service has been achieved, the defendants

will enter an appearance and file an Answer to your Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days

from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will

take 90 days or more. When all the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a

Scheduling Order containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures.

Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions,

to give the defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before

defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need

not submit any evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically directed to do so.