The relevant inquiry is whether defendants “actually knew about [Plaintiff’s] condition, not whether a reasonable official should have known.”
How later courts described this case
- The relevant inquiry is whether defendants “actually knew about [Plaintiff’s] condition, not whether a reasonable official should have known.”
- “A plaintiff cannot state a claim against a defendant by including the defendant’s name in the caption.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FOR THE SOUTHERN D ISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EVARISTO SANTAMARIA,
#Y35813,
Plaintiff, Case No. 21-cv-01539-SPM
v.
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,
WARDEN WILLIS,
ROB JEFFREYS,
DR. SIDDIQUI,
ANGELA CRAIN,
DR. CALDWELL,
JOHN DOE,
C/O LAWSON, and
YVETTE BAKER,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MCGLYNN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Evaristo Santamaria, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections, filed the
instant lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights at
Menard Correctional Center. This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the
Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Any portion of the Complaint that is legally frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant
must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
COMPLAINT
Santamaria alleges the following: Because of deteriorating prison conditions at Menard, on
July 30, 2020, Santamaria’s bunk bed collapsed while he was on the top bunk and his cellmate
was laying in the bottom bunk. (Doc. 1). When the bunk broke, Santamaria was ejected to the
concrete floor. He sustained injuries to his right knee and shoulder. Santamaria and his cellmate
and ignored the requests for medical assistance. John Doe and Lawson placed Santamaria and his
cellmate in handcuffs and treated them as if they had done something wrong.
Santamaria continued to request medical help for his injuries, but he was denied medical
care. He states that Wexford deliberately understaffs the healthcare unit resulting in the denial of
care and treatment for his medical needs. Santamaria continues to suffer from pain.
PRELIMINARY DISMISSALS
Santamaria lists Dr. Caldwell and Yvette Baker as defendants but does not assert any
allegations against them in the body of the Complaint. Thus, the Court is unable to ascertain what
claims, if any, Santamaria has against these Defendants, and they are dismissed without prejudice.
See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff cannot state a claim against
a defendant by including the defendant’s name in the caption.”).
DISCUSSION
Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following counts:
Count 1: Eighth Amendment claim against Willis, Jeffreys, Siddiqui, and
Crain for housing Santamaria in unconstitutional conditions of
confinement.
Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against John Doe
and Lawson for denying Santamaria medical care.
Count 3: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Wexford
for maintaining policies that resulted in Santamaria being denied
medical care for his knee and shoulder injuries.
The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,
unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is mentioned
in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed without
prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly1 pleading standard.
1 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (7th Cir. 2007).
Santamaria claims that Menard is overcrowded, dilapidated, and deteriorating. The walls
are cracked and covered with holes, and there is also no ventilation system. Because of these poor
conditions, the chain securing the bunk bed in his cell broke causing him injuries. Santamaria
alleges that Warden Willis, Director Jeffreys, Dr. Siddiqui, and Nurse Supervisor Crain are
supposed to collaborate together and make a regular scheduled inspection of the cell houses. A
report is to be written each month about the cell conditions.
The Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment extends to
conditions of confinement that pose a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner’s health and
safety. See Estate of Miller, ex rel. Bertram v. Tobiasz, 680 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 2012). Prison
officials “violate the Eighth Amendment if they are deliberately indifferent adverse conditions that
deny ‘the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities[.]’” Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 842
(7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). To establish a
constitutional violation, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that his living conditions were sufficiently
serious; and (2) that defendant acted with deliberate indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
Santamaria has failed to state a deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Willis,
Jeffreys, Siddiqui, and Crain. Although he describes a number of conditions he faced at Menard,
including his broken bunk, he fails to allege that Defendants were aware of the particular condition
in his cell. Santamaria must allege that they had knowledge of the conditions and disregarded them.
Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 955 (7th Cir. 1999) (The relevant inquiry is whether defendants
“actually knew about [Plaintiff’s] condition, not whether a reasonable official should have
known.”). Further, he fails to allege that he informed any Defendant about the specific conditions
that he faced. Accordingly, Count 1 is dismissed without prejudice.
Count 2
At this stage, Santamaria has sufficiently stated a claim against John Doe and Lawrence
Ghosh, 718 F. App’x 413, 419 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 865-66 (7th
Cir. 2012)).
Count 3
Count 3 will proceed against Wexford to the extent Santamaria is claiming that a policy of
understaffing the healthcare unit has resulted in the denial of treatment for his injuries. See
Woodward v. Corr. Med. Serv. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004).
The Court dismisses Count 3 to the extent Santamaria claims that medical providers only
prescribe over the counter medication to treat pain pursuant to a Wexford policy, even when the
medicine is not helping with pain management. Santamaria does not include any factual allegations
regarding how this policy has resulted in constitutionally inadequate care being provided to him
personally. Therefore, claims regarding a Wexford pain medication policy are dismissed without
prejudice.
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Santamaria has filed a motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 6). As a litigant in a civil
case, Santamaria has no right to counsel. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 649 (7th Cir. 2007).
However, a District Court “may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford
counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(1) (emphasis added). Santamaria has not submitted any
documentation to demonstrate to the Court that he is indigent. As he has paid the filing fee in full
and is not proceeding in forma pauperis in this case, the Court has no basis for concluding that he
is unable to afford counsel as is required by Section 1915(e). Thus, motion is denied without
prejudice.
Santamaria may refile his motion but he should provide the Court an affidavit of financial
status and supporting documentation such as a copy of his prisoner trust fund account. See
Amendments to the Local Rules 83.9(a). To assist him in complying with this Order, the Clerk of
DISPOSITION
For the reasons provided above, the Complaint survives preliminary review pursuant to
Section 1915A. COUNT 1 is DISMISSED without prejudice. COUNT 2 will proceed against
John Doe and Lawson. COUNT 3 is DISMISSED in part without prejudice and will proceed
in part against Wexford regarding Wexford’s policy of understaffing the healthcare unit. Because
there are no surviving claims against Jeffreys, Siddiqui, Crain, Caldwell, and Baker, these
Defendants are DISMISSED without prejudice. There are also no surviving claims against
Warden Willis. However, in order to help identify the John Doe Defendant, Warden Willis will
remain in the case (in his official capacity only) to respond to discovery aimed at identifying the
unknown defendant.
Because Santamaria’s claims involve his medical care, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED
to ENTER the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act.
The Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 6) is DENIED.
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants Lawson, John Doe (once identified), and
Warden Willis (official capacity only): (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive
Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is
DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to
the defendants’ place of employment as identified by Santamaria. If a defendant fails to sign and
return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the
forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that defendant,
and the Court will require that defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent
authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If a defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided by Santamaria, the
defendant's last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as
directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be
retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file or
disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1997e(g). Pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues stated in this
Merit Review Order. Because Warden Willis is only in the case for purposes of identifying the
John Doe Defendant, he need not file a responsive pleading.
The parties will be provided with further instructions regarding limited discovery related
to identifying the John Doe Defendant at a later date.
Finally, Santamaria is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days
after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a
delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of
prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 19, 2022
s/ Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN
United States District Judge
N P
The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your lawsuit and
serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved, the defendants will
enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from
the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers, but it is entirely possible that it will take
90 days or more. When all of the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling
Order containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is
advised to wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the
defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’
counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit
any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.