“We will enforce a plea agreement’s appellate waiver if its terms are clear and unambiguous and the record shows that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into the agreement.”
How later courts described this case
- “We will enforce a plea agreement’s appellate waiver if its terms are clear and unambiguous and the record shows that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into the agreement.”
- relying on United States v. Blinn, 490 F.3d 586, 587–88 (7th Cir. 2007) (“We will enforce a plea agreement’s appellate waiver if its terms are clear and unambiguous and the record shows that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into the agreement.”
- stating that “‘[i]nadequate or ineffective’ means that ‘a legal theory that could not have been presented under § 2255 establishes the petitioner’s actual innocence.’”
- relying on United States v. Blinn, 490 F.3d 586, 587–88 (7th Cir. 2007
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JAMMY DERONE LEGETTE,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 21-cv-01768-SPM
WARDEN, FCI-GREENVILLE,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
McGLYNN, District Judge:
Petitioner Jammy D. Legette, who is currently incarcerated in the Federal
Correctional Institution in Greenville, Illinois (“FCI-Greenville”), filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1). Relying on the decision
in United States v. Green, 996 F.3d 176 (4th Cir. 2021), Legette challenges his
conviction and the sentence he received in United States v. Legette, 04-cr-00795-TLW-
1 (D.S.C. 2005) (“Criminal Case”).
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in United States District Courts
provides that upon preliminary consideration by the district court judge, “[i]f it
plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct
the clerk to notify the petitioner.” Rule 1(b) gives this Court the authority to apply
the Rules to other habeas corpus cases.
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Legette was indicted in a three-count Superseding Indictment on March 2,
2005 (Criminal Case, Doc. 44). Count One was a robbery charge under the Hobbs Act
(18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)(1) and (b)(1)); Count Two was a possession of a firearm charge
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) and 2; and Count Three was a felon in
possession of a firearm charge in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and
924(3) (Doc. 1, p. 7). Legette pled guilty to Counts One and Two on August 29, 2005
(Criminal Case, Doc. 111). Once it was determined that Legette was a career offender,
on December 20, 2005, he was sentenced to 240 months confinement on Count One
and 312 months on Count Two (to be served concurrently), along with three (3) years
of supervised release on Count One and five (5) years on Count Two (to be served
concurrently) (Criminal Case, Doc. 129).
Legette first filed a direct appeal to the Fourth Circuit on December 27, 2005
(Criminal Case, Doc. 123) which was dismissed on September 14, 2006. United States
v. Legette, No. 06-4009 (4th Cir. 2006) (Criminal Case, Doc. 139). He then filed a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea on December 1, 2010 (Criminal Case, Doc. 168)
which was denied by the District Court nine (9) days later on December 10, 2010
(Criminal Case, Doc. 169). The Fourth Circuit affirmed this denial on May 23, 2011
(Criminal Case, Doc. 196). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Legette filed his first post-
conviction appeal on May 2, 2016 (Criminal Case, Doc. 263). His court-appointed
public defender amended it on June 20, 2016 (Criminal Case, Doc. 265).1 Legette
advanced two separate issues in that § 2255 appeal: (1) that he is no longer a career
offender and (2) that robbery under the Hobbs Act is not a valid § 924(c) predicate
1 The Amended Motion misspells Legette’s name as “Leggette” throughout. Nevertheless, it is the correct document
in this case (See Criminal Case, Doc. 265).
conviction, meaning that he was convicted of a non-offense over which the District
Court did not have jurisdiction (Criminal Case, Doc. 265, see Doc. 1, p. 8). The District
Court denied the § 2255 motion under Supreme Court precedent in Beckles v. United
States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 895 (2017), which held that “the advisory Sentencing
Guidelines are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause
and that Section 4B1.2(a)’s residual clause is not void for vagueness.” (Criminal Case,
Doc. 275, pp. 1–2). The District Court also held that Hobbs Act robbery qualified as a
crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A) (Criminal Case, Doc. 275, pp. 2–3). Legette’s
Certificate of Appeal was dismissed on December 9, 2019. United States v. Legette,
No. 19-6790 (4th. Cir. 2019) (Criminal Case, Doc. 291). Legette’s motion for
permission to file a second or successive § 2255 motion was filed on June 25, 2020
(Doc. 1, p. 8) and denied on July 21, 2020. In re: Jammy Derone Legette, No. 20-353
(4th Cir. 2020) (Criminal Case, Doc. 301). Legette now files the instant petition under
§ 2241 before the Court.
As Legette was convicted and sentenced in the District Court for the District
of South Carolina, it was appropriate for him to file his § 2255 motion in the district
court there. However, § 2241 petitions must be filed “in the district where the prisoner
is confined . . . .” U.S. Dep’t of Just. Manual, Rule 9-37.000 (Jan. 2020). Thus, venue
is appropriate in the Seventh Circuit and in this Court due to Legette’s incarceration
at FCI-Greenville (Doc. 1, pp. 1–2).
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
Generally, petitions for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 may not
be used to raise claims of legal error in conviction or sentencing but are instead
limited to challenges regarding the execution of a sentence. See Valona v. United
States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1998). Thus, aside from the direct appeal process,
a prisoner who has been convicted in federal court is generally limited to challenging
his or her conviction and sentence by bringing a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255
in the court which sentenced him or her. A § 2255 motion is ordinarily the “exclusive
means for a federal prisoner to attack his [or her] conviction.” Kramer v. Olson, 347
F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 2003). A prisoner is also normally limited to only one challenge
of his or her conviction and sentence under § 2255. He or she may not file a “second
or successive” § 2255 motion unless a panel of the appropriate court of appeals
certifies that such motion contains either (1) newly discovered evidence “sufficient to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have
found the movant guilty of the offense,” or (2) “a new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299–301 (1989).
Under very limited circumstances, however, it is possible for a prisoner to
challenge his or her federal conviction or sentence under § 2241. Specifically, §
2255(e) contains a “savings clause” which authorizes a federal prisoner to file a § 2241
petition where the remedy under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his [or her] detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). See Hill v. Werlinger, 695 F.3d
644, 648 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that “‘[i]nadequate or ineffective’ means that ‘a legal
theory that could not have been presented under § 2255 establishes the petitioner’s
actual innocence.’”) (citing Taylor v. Gilkey, 314 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 2002)); United
States v. Prevatte, 300 F.3d 792, 798–99 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that “savings clause”
of § 2255 applies to “a narrow class of cases” where the 2255 remedy “‘is inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] detention.’”) (citing Garza v.
Lappin, 253 F.3d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 2001)). The Seventh Circuit construed the savings
clause in In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998) and stated: “[a] procedure for
postconviction relief can be fairly termed inadequate when it is so configured as to
deny a convicted defendant any opportunity for judicial rectification of so
fundamental a defect in his [or her] conviction as having been imprisoned for a
nonexistent offense.” Id. at 611. In other words, “there must be some kind of
structural problem with section 2255 before section 2241 becomes available.” Webster
v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2015).
ANALYSIS
First, Legette claims that he is “actually innocent of his career offender
sentences,” as Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence (Doc. 1, p. 16). Legette
cites United States v. Green, 996 F.3d 176, 179 (4th Cir. 2021) for the contention that
Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under § 4B1.2 of the Sentencing
Guidelines. (Doc. 1, pp. 6–7, 13). Including the Fourth Circuit in Green, five other
circuits (including the Seventh Circuit in Bridges v. United States, 991 F.3d 793, 802–
03 (7th Cir. 2021)) have agreed that “functionally identical state robbery statutes do
not qualify as crimes of violence . . . .” Green, 996 F.3d at 179. See United States v.
O’Connor, 874 F.3d 1147, 1158 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. Camp, 903 F.3d 594,
604 (6th Cir. 2018); United States v. Rodriguez, 770 F. App’x 18, 21 (3d Cir. 2019);
United States v. Eason, 953 F.3d 1184, 1195 (11th Cir. 2020).
Second, Legette claims that he is “actually innocent” of violating § 924(c)(1)(A)
since Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence. (Doc. 1, p. 7). He cites United States
v. Chea, No. 98-cr-20005-1 CW, 2019 WL 5061085 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2019) for this
proposition. The District Court for the Northern District of California granted Chea’s
§ 2255 petition for post-conviction relief on the grounds that Hobbs Act robbery was
not a crime of violence. Id.
Preliminarily, the Court notes that it does not need to consider the merits of
this case because Legette explicitly waived his right to bring this challenge in his plea
agreement. (Criminal Case, Doc. 105, ¶ 13). In that agreement, Legette agreed to
waive “the right to contest either the conviction or the sentence in any direct appeal
or other post-conviction action, including any proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.”
(Id.). Where a guilty plea is entered knowingly and voluntarily, appeal waivers are
enforceable to preclude challenges falling within their scope. See Garza v. Idaho, 139
S. Ct. 738, 745 (2019); United States v. Worden, 646 F.3d 499, 502–03 (7th Cir. 2011)
(relying on United States v. Blinn, 490 F.3d 586, 587–88 (7th Cir. 2007) (“We will
enforce a plea agreement’s appellate waiver if its terms are clear and unambiguous
and the record shows that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into the
agreement.”). Further, a subsequent change in the law does not make an appeal
waiver involuntary. See United States v. Carson, 855 F.3d 828, 829–31 (7th Cir. 2017);
United States v. Vela, 740 F.3d 1150, 1151 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970). It is worth mentioning that Legette does not claim
that his plea or appeal and collateral attack waivers were involuntary or invalid.
Legette also does not appear to have raised such an issue in his previous § 2255
motion. Regardless, a § 2241 petition is not a viable route for Legette’s argument
because he expressly waived his right to bring a collateral attack.
Nevertheless, even if Legette had not waived his right to bring this collateral
attack, his petition still fails because Legette could have raised the issue in a § 2255
motion or on a direct appeal. Because Legette had “a reasonable opportunity to obtain
a reliable judicial determination of the fundamental legality of his conviction and
sentence,” In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 609, he cannot now seek relief under § 2241
on that basis.
Regarding Legette’s argument employing United States v. Green, 996 F.3d 176,
179 (4th Cir. 2021) and Bridges v. United States, 991 F.3d 793, 802–03 (7th Cir. 2021),
even though myriad circuit courts have ruled that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime
of violence, these do not represent retroactive changes in statutory interpretation
that would be applicable to Legette’s conviction. The Supreme Court clearly
established in Teague v. Lane that the Court will determine whether decisions apply
retroactively at the time the decision is rendered. 489 U.S. 288, 299–301 (1989)
(“Retroactivity is properly treated as a threshold question, for, once a new rule is
applied to the defendant in the case announcing the rule, evenhanded justice requires
that it be applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated.”).
Legette’s second argument employing United States v. Chea, No. 98-cr-20005-
1 CW, 2019 WL 5061085 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2019) also fails to pass muster. The District
of South Carolina previously established in its denial of Legette’s § 2255 petition that
most circuit courts have determined that Hobbs Act robbery is a valid § 924(c)
predicate under the force clause, including in the Seventh Circuit. See United States
v. Rivera, 847 F.3d 847, 849 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2228 (2017). (“Because
one cannot commit Hobbs Act robbery without using or threatening physical force,
we held that Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a predicate for a crime-of-violence
conviction.”) (citing United States v. Anglin, 846 F.3d 954, 965 (7th Cir. 2017), vacated
on other grounds, 138 S. Ct. 126 (2019) (Criminal Case, Doc. 275, pp. 2–3).2
Additionally, the District of South Carolina cited the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 353 (2019), which held that “[r]obbery thus
has always been within the ‘category of violent, active crimes’ that Congress included
in ACCA.” (citing Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010)).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner Jammy D. Legette’s Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) is DENIED. This action is
DISMISSED with prejudice, and the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter
judgment accordingly.
If Petitioner wishes to appeal the dismissal of this action, his notice of appeal
must be filed with this Court within sixty (60) days of the entry of judgment. See FED.
2 The Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Davis, 129 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) was
unconstitutionally vague. This does not affect Legette’s conviction, as he was convicted using § 924(c)(3)(A) (See
Criminal Case, Doc. 275, pp. 2–3).
R. APP. PROC. 4(a)(1)(B). A motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis (“IFP”) must
set forth the issues Petitioner plans to present on appeal. See FED. R. APP. PROC.
24(a)(1)(C). If Petitioner does choose to appeal and is allowed to proceed IFP, he will
be liable for a portion of the $505.00 appellate filing fee (the amount to be determined
based on his prison trust fund account records for the past six (6) months) irrespective
of the outcome of the appeal. See FED. R. APP. PROC. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2);
Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725–26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d
857, 858–59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998). A
proper and timely motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may
toll the sixty (60)-day appeal deadline. See FED. R. APP. PROC. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e)
motion must be filed no more than twenty-eight (28) days after the entry of the
judgment, and this twenty-eight (28)-day deadline cannot be extended. Other
motions, including a Rule 60 motion for relief from a final judgment, do not toll the
deadline for an appeal.
It is not necessary for Petitioner to obtain a certificate of appealability from
this disposition of his § 2241 Petition. See Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 638 (7th
Cir. 2000).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 19, 2022
s/ Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. McGLYNN
U.S. District Judge