Boclair v. Jeffreys

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

STANLEY BOCLAIR, #A60451, )

)

Plaintiff, )

vs. ) Case No. 21-0022-SPM

)

ROB JEFFREYS, ROBERT MUELLER, )

FRANK LAWRENCE, LLOYD HANNA, )

REVA ENGALAGE, )

JANE/JOHN DOE (Chief Engineer), and )

JANE/JOHN DOE (Maintenance )

Supervisor), )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

McGLYNN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Stanley Boclair, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”)

who is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”), brings this civil action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his constitutional rights. (Doc. 1). He asserts

violations of the First and Eighth Amendments and seeks monetary damages.

This Complaint is now before the Court for preliminary review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,

which requires the Court to screen prisoner Complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of the Complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state

a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be dismissed.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se Complaint are to be

liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint (Doc. 1): In May, June, and July

2019, parts of Menard were flooded by high waters in the Mississippi River. Precautions were

taken in the last weeks of April 2019 including sandbagging and deployment of pumps. (Doc. 1,

p. 10). Plaintiff asserts these steps demonstrate Defendants’ awareness that the prison was in

danger of flooding, which is a recurring seasonal event. Id.

By June 3, 2019, the prison’s drinking water was discolored and had a “strong odor.” The

basement of Plaintiff’s cellhouse was underwater and the lower gallery inmates were moved, but

nothing was done about the drinking water. Id. By June 5, 2019, the “entire prison proper” was

flooded and employees had to enter the prison on foot paths through a partially removed fence.

(Doc. 1, p. 11).

Between June 3 and July 8, 2019, Dietary Manager Hanna and then-Warden Lawrence

served Plaintiff rancid milk, green moldy bread, and hard boiled eggs for most meals, on trays

contaminated with old food residue. (Doc. 1, p. 11).

On June 5, 2019, Plaintiff began vomiting and ran a mild fever. That same day, Defendants

Jeffreys (IDOC Director), Mueller (IDOC Deputy Director), and Lawrence toured Plaintiff’s

cellblock; they rebuffed his attempt to complain about the water, inadequate food, and his

symptoms. Id.

Plaintiff’s symptoms, including high fever, blood in his stool, diarrhea, stomach cramps,

and inability to keep down any liquids, continued until about July 3, 2019. He made repeated

attempts to seek medical care from Nurse Engalage, submitting sick call slips and speaking to her

personally, between June 10 and June 19, 2019. However, Engalage did nothing to get medical

treatment for Plaintiff, in retaliation against him for having previously filed grievances against her.

(Doc. 1, pp. 11-13). Plaintiff never received any medical attention for his illness.

Jeffreys, Mueller, and Lawrence toured the cellblock again on June 11, 2019. Plaintiff tried

to tell them about his physical symptoms and the denial of medical care, but Jeffreys cut him off,

and the Defendants complained to Plaintiff about his cell being out of compliance. (Doc. 1, p. 12).

Plaintiff asserts the flooding and contaminated water exposed him to contagious

noroviruses. (Doc. 1, p. 13). He claims that the John/Jane Doe Chief Engineer and the John/Jane

Doe Maintenance Supervisor had “personal first hand knowledge” that Plaintiff’s drinking water

was compromised by the flooding but did nothing to “shore up typical deficient levels of fluoride”

in the prison water supply to meet health standards.1 (Doc. 1, pp. 13-14).

DISCUSSION

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following claims in

this pro se action:

Count 1: First Amendment retaliation claim against Engalage, for denying

Plaintiff medical care between June 10-July 3, 2019, in retaliation

for Plaintiff having filed grievances against her.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs

claim against Engalage, Jeffreys, Mueller, and Lawrence for failing

to obtain medical care for Plaintiff’s gastrointestinal symptoms

between June 5-July 3, 2019.

Count 3: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Jeffreys,

Mueller, Lawrence, Hanna, and the John/Jane Does for serving

Plaintiff tainted food and failing to provide him with safe drinking

water between June 3 and July 8, 2019.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless

otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is mentioned in the

Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed without prejudice

as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading standard.2

1 The Court notes that fluoride is added to water supplies for the purpose of protecting against tooth decay,

not for disinfecting against pathogens. See https://www.cdc.gov/fluoridation/basics/index.htm; U.S.

National Center for Biotechnology Information, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK234590/ (last

visited April 13, 2022).

2 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face.”).

Count 1

Prison officials may not retaliate against inmates for filing grievances, lawsuits, or

otherwise complaining about their conditions of confinement. See, e.g., Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d

859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012); Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2002); DeWalt v. Carter,

224 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2000); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 1996); Cain v. Lane, 857

F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1988). The issue in a retaliation claim is whether the plaintiff experienced an

adverse action that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future, and if the First

Amendment activity was “at least a motivating factor” in the defendants’ decision to take the

retaliatory action. See McKinley v. Schoenbeck, 731 F. App’x 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting

Surita v. Hyde, 665 F.3d 860, 878-79 (7th Cir. 2011)); Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 551 (7th

Cir. 2009). “A complaint states a claim for retaliation when it sets forth ‘a chronology of events

from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred.’” Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 573 (7th

Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that he had filed grievances against Engalage in the past, and

she refused to get medical care for his vomiting, fever, and other symptoms in June 2019 in

retaliation for those grievances. Count 1 survives review under § 1915A and will proceed for

further consideration.

Count 2

Prison officials and medical staff violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel

and unusual punishment when they act with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical

needs. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 475 (7th Cir. 2017). To state such a claim, a prisoner must

plead facts and allegations suggesting that (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical

condition, and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Id.

“[D]eliberate indifference may be found where an official knows about unconstitutional conduct

and facilitates, approves, condones, or turns a blind eye to it.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768,

781 (7th Cir. 2015).

Plaintiff’s persistent gastrointestinal symptoms are indicative of an objectively serious

medical condition. His allegations that he informed Engalage, Jeffreys, Mueller, and Lawrence of

his condition but they failed to secure any medical treatment for him are sufficient for Plaintiff to

proceed on the deliberate indifference claim in Count 2 against these four Defendants.

Count 3

As with the medical deliberate indifference claim in Count 2, two elements are required to

establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishments clause in a case

involving conditions of confinement in a prison. First, an objective element requires a showing

that the conditions deny the inmate “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” creating

an excessive risk to the inmate’s health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

Prison conditions that deprive inmates of basic human needs – food, medical care, sanitation, or

physical safety – may violate the Eighth Amendment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346

(1981).

The second requirement is a subjective element – establishing a defendant’s culpable state

of mind, which is deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate from

those conditions. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 842. This standard is satisfied if the plaintiff shows that

the prison official acted or failed to act despite the official’s knowledge of a substantial risk of

serious harm from the conditions. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. It is well settled that mere negligence

does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344,

347-48 (1986).

Plaintiff alleges that he complained to Jeffreys, Mueller, and Lawrence about the tainted

food and discolored, bad-smelling water, but they took no action. It is not clear whether Plaintiff

brought the problem of spoiled food and unsanitary food trays to the attention of Dietary Manager

Hanna at a time when Hanna might have rectified the situation. At this early stage, however, Count

3 will proceed against Jeffreys, Mueller, Lawrence, and Hanna.

Plaintiff’s allegations against the John/Jane Doe Chief Engineer and Maintenance

Supervisor do not support a deliberate indifference claim against these individuals. Plaintiff states

these Defendants were responsible for maintenance and day to day operations at Menard and they

“did nothing about the drinking water.” (Doc. 1, pp. 3, 10). However, he does not allege that he

complained to the John/Jane Does or otherwise made them aware of the condition of the water in

his cell and presents no facts from which the Court may conclude that they possessed knowledge

of a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff from the allegedly contaminated water. Plaintiff

essentially claims that the John/Jane Does failed to do their jobs – which at most would constitute

negligence. As noted above, negligence does not amount to deliberate indifference. See Gayton v.

McCoy, 593 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 2010); Pinkston v. Madry, 440 F.3d 879, 889 (7th Cir. 2006).

Accordingly, the John/Jane Doe Chief Engineer and Maintenance Supervisor will be dismissed

from Count 3 and from the action because the Complaint fails to state a claim against them.

PENDING MOTIONS

Plaintiff’s Motion to Correct the Record (Doc 17) states that he was not seeking

information on the status of his case in a previous motion (Doc. 15) but was requesting the court

to conduct a merit review. This motion is GRANTED insofar as this Order completes the merit

review of the case.

Plaintiff's Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 18) is DENIED at this time without

prejudice. There is no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in federal civil cases. Romanelli

v. Suliene, 615 F.3d 847, 851 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1006

(7th Cir. 2006). In determining whether to recruit counsel, the Court considers two factors. See

Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff’s motion indicates that he may have

satisfied the first element of making a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel; he wrote to several

attorneys, but prison officials destroyed his copies of the letters requesting representation. (Doc.

18, pp. 1, 4, 6, 19). Looking at the second factor, however, it appears that Plaintiff is competent to

litigate the case himself at this early stage. See Navejar v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013);

Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 761 (7th Cir. 2010). He completed his GED, and his Complaint

is well-organized, concise, and competently articulates his legal claims. Although the motion is

denied at this juncture, Plaintiff may renew his request for counsel if necessary, as the case

progresses.

DISPOSITION

The Complaint states colorable claims in Count 1 against Engalage; in Count 2 against

Engalage, Jeffreys, Mueller, and Lawrence; and in Count 3 against Jeffreys, Mueller, Lawrence,

and Hanna. These claims will proceed.

Defendants John/Jane Doe Chief Engineer and John/Jane Doe Maintenance Supervisor are

DISMISSED without prejudice from Count 3 and from the action.

The Clerk shall prepare for Defendants Engalage, Jeffreys, Mueller, Lawrence, and Hanna:

(1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6

(Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the

Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as

identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons

(Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take

appropriate steps to effect formal service on the Defendant, and the Court will require the

Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer

shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the

Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as

directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be

retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the

Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant to

Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues stated in this

Merit Review Order.

Plaintiff is ADVISED that if judgment is rendered against him and the judgment includes

the payment of costs under 28 U.S.C. §1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the

costs.

Plaintiff is further ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of

Court and the opposing parties informed of any change in his address; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days

after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a

delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of

prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

Finally, based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to

ENTER the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 14, 2022

s/ Stephen P. McGlynn_____

STEPHEN P. McGLYNN

United States District Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your lawsuit

and serve them with a copy of your Complaint. After service has been achieved, the defendants

will enter an appearance and file an Answer to your Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days

from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will

take 90 days or more. When all the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a

Scheduling Order containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures.

Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions,

to give the defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before

defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need

not submit any evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically directed to do so.