Opinion

Love v. Meyers

Court
District Court, S.D. Illinois
Filed
Mar 29, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 21.3%

“[T]he alleged mishandling of [a prisoner’s] grievance by persons who otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying conduct states no claim.”

How later courts described this case

  • “[T]he alleged mishandling of [a prisoner’s] grievance by persons who otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying conduct states no claim.”
  • “a guard who rejects an administrative complaint about a completed act of misconduct does not” violate the Constitution
  • non-medical officials who relied on medical official’s judgment and did not investigate further than the medical records were not deliberately indifferent nor had an obligation to investigate further than the records
  • failure to investigate further after receiving reviews from treating medical personnel was, at worst, negligence and not deliberate indifference

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ABDUL LOVE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 18-cv-2000-NJR

PERCY MYERS, LARUE LOVE,

CHRISTOPHER THOMPSON,

CHRISTINE BROWN, ROB JEFFREYS,

and WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:

Plaintiff Abdul Love, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”)

who at all times relevant to this case was incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center

(“Pinckneyville”), seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief for deprivations of his

constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the Complaint, Love alleges that

Defendants Percy Myers, Christine Brown, Larue Love, Christopher Thompson, and

Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (hereinafter “Wexford”) were deliberately indifferent in

treating his Crohn’s disease; he asserts claims against them under the Eighth Amendment.

The case is now before the Court on summary judgment motions filed by Percy Myers

and Wexford (Docs. 128, 129) and Christine Brown, Rob Jeffreys, Larue Love, and

Christopher Thompson (Docs. 140, 141, 143). Love filed responses to the motions (Docs. 135,

136, 137, 144, respectively).

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 19, 2018, Love filed his Complaint alleging deliberate indifference in the

treatment of his Crohn’s disease (Docs. 1 and 8). He later amended his Complaint to add

additional defendants (Doc. 64). Two claims were allowed to proceed:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Dr.

Percy Myers, Larue Love, Christopher Thompson (in his

individual and official capacities) and Christine Brown for

failing to adequately treat Love’s Crohn’s disease.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Wexford Health Sources, Inc. for hiring underqualified

physicians.

(Doc. 63, pp. 3-4; Doc. 64).

Love was also allowed to proceed against both Christopher Thompson, in his official

capacity as warden of Pinckneyville, and John Baldwin, in his official capacity as IDOC

Director, for purposes of implementing any injunctive relief awarded in the case (Doc. 8, p. 6;

Doc. 63, p. 4). Both individuals are no longer employed at IDOC. On August 17, 2020, Rob

Jeffreys (in his official capacity only) was substituted in place of John Baldwin (Doc. 122, p. 1

n. 1). Because Christopher Thompson is no longer the warden of Pinckneyville and Jeffreys

has the authority to ensure Love receives any medical care awarded in this case, the official

capacity claim against Christopher Thompson is DISMISSED (Doc. 141, p. 1 n. 1).

A. Medical Care

On May 18, 2018, Love transferred to Pinckneyville (Doc. 129-1, p. 6). He was first

diagnosed with Crohn’s disease (hereinafter “Crohn’s”) in 2010 while at Menard Correctional

Center (Id. at p. 15). According to Dr. Percy Myers, Crohn’s is an inflammatory bowel disease

which currently has no cure (Doc. 129-2, p. 1). Patients with the disease are prescribed pain

and symptom management plans to reduce flare-ups and keep the condition in remission

(Id.). Love acknowledged that, because of his disease, he would experience times where he

would have symptoms and that some medications may work at times and sometimes those

medications will not work (Doc. 129-1, p. 41).

Love previously saw a gastroenterologist prior to his transfer to Pinckneyville. In July

2017, he saw Dr. John Bozdech at Sarah D. Culbertson Hospital in Rushville, Illinois

(Docs. 129-1, p. 16; 129-2, p. 1-2). At that time, Dr. Bozdech noted his last colonoscopy on

April 21, 2017, showed a short segment of active colitis (Doc. 129-3, p. 53). Love was

previously placed on mesalamine enemas, and Dr. Bozdech noted that he continued on

mesalamine and budesonide with no symptoms (Id.). Dr. Bozdech’s plan in the event of a

future flare-up was to continue with mesalamine enemas (Id.). If the treatment was not

effective, Dr. Bozdech noted that Love “may” need to be prescribed “something like

azathioprine” (with the brand name of Imuran), an oral immunosuppressant (Id.; Doc. 129-1,

p. 16). Dr. Myers testified in his affidavit that a typical mesalamine enema course lasts 4-5

weeks (Doc. 129-2, p. 2).

While at Danville Correctional Center, Love began experiencing flare-ups (Doc. 129-

1, p. 16, 27). Love testified that he started another round of mesalamine enemas and

budesonide and it worked well (Id. at p. 27). In December 2017 or January 2018, the enemas

were discontinued, and he continued on the budesonide to keep his Crohn’s in remission

(Id.). On just the budesonide, Love testified that his symptoms began to reappear (Id. at p. 28).

He began discussing with the medical director about implementing the immunosuppressant

therapy Dr. Bozdech previously discussed, but after his blood work came back within normal

parameters, the medical director decided not to start the Imuran (Id. at pp. 16, 28). To combat

his continuing symptoms of blood, constipation, cramps, and diarrhea, in March or April

2018, Love was again prescribed mesalamine enemas and prednisone, an oral steroid (Id. at

pp. 28-29; Doc. 129-3, p. 54). The prescription for the melamine enemas was for eight weeks

(Doc. 129-3, p. 54). Prior to his transfer to Pinckneyville, Love testified that the regimen was

not helping his Crohn’s symptoms (Id. at p. 29).

Upon transferring to Pinckneyville, he met with Dr. Myers in June 2018 and informed

him that prior rounds of the mesalamine enemas had not worked, and Dr. Bozdech’s

recommendation was to order a stronger immunosuppressant (Id. at p. 17). At the time, Love

was still experiencing symptoms including bloody stool, painful cramps, episodes of

diarrhea and constipation, as well as fecal incontinence (Id.). He explained his prior treatment

history as well as his current condition (Id. at pp. 17-18, 29). Love testified that Dr. Myers

wanted to continue with the mesalamine enemas until he could send Love to a specialist

(Id. at p. 18).

From June until August 2018, Love experienced increasing symptoms. He testified to

14 or 15 bloody bowel movements a day as well as stomach cramps, bouts of constipation

and/or diarrhea, and rectal burning (Doc. 129-1, p. 30). Love reported his increasing

symptoms to Dr. Myers and his belief that his Crohn’s was becoming uncontrolled (Doc. 129-

2, p. 2). Dr. Myers referred Love to collegial review for a follow-up with a gastroenterologist

(Id.). On August 23 and 25, 2018, Love refused his daily enemas (Doc. 129-3, pp. 64, 66).

On August 28, 2017, Love reported 15-20 bloody stools a day; the nurse practitioner

ordered labs which would show evidence of his flare-ups, including decreased hemoglobin

and hematocrit (Doc. 129-2, p. 2). According to Dr. Myers, a patient experiencing a flare-up

would see a rise in the white blood cell count, sedimentation rate, and C-Reactive Protein

numbers due to the triggered inflammatory process (Id.). But Love’s labs were all normal (Id.;

Doc. 129-3, p. 61-63).

As a result of the normal tests, Love was placed in the infirmary to monitor his

symptoms (Doc. 129-2, p. 2; Doc. 129-1, p. 31). His bowel movements were monitored by

nursing staff (Id.; Doc. 129-1, pp. 32-33). Love testified that he did not believe the tests were

accurate as nurses sometimes would not come back to check on his movements for up to an

hour, and the blood would dissipate (Doc. 129-1, p. 33). He also believed that he should have

been allowed to use a bedpan instead of the toilet to document his movements (Id. at p. 33,

46). Love testified that he believed some of the nurses did not properly document his

movements or show up at all when he called (Id. at p. 35). Dr. Myers testified that no more

than two bowel movements per day with very minimal blood were documented during

Love’s stay in the infirmary (Doc. 129-2, p. 3). Nursing staff also reported that Love flushed

his mesalamine enemas rather than taking them as directed (Id.; Doc. 129-3, pp. 2-24). Love

denies that he flushed the enemas (See Doc. 137, p. 13; Doc. 129-1, p. 37-39). He testified that

nursing staff saw him taking the enemas and observed multiple bloody bowel movements a

day (Doc. 129-1, p. 40).

Based on Love’s lab results and the nurses’ observations, Dr. Myers determined that

he had no verification of Love’s symptoms and no indicated need for a review by a

gastroenterologist (Doc. 129-2, p. 3). He informed Love he needed to be compliant with his

daily mesalamine enemas (Id.).

Love next reported a flare-up with his Crohn’s on January 11, 2019 (Doc. 129-2, p. 3).

He reported four to five bloody stools a day (Id.). Dr. Myers again admitted Love to the

infirmary for monitoring (Id.; Doc. 129-3, pp. 35-36). Dr. Myers testified that Love was not

compliant with his daily enemas and declared a hunger strike for several days (Doc. 129-2,

p. 3; Doc. 129-3, pp. 37-42). Love started complying with the treatment plan on January 18,

2019, and he remained in the infirmary for observation until February 15, 2019 (Doc. 129-2,

p. 3; Doc. 129-3, pp. 41-44). Dr. Myers testified that Love did not have four to five bowel

movements per day, and his blood tests were normal. Once Love was compliant, Dr. Myers

testified that there was minimal blood in his stool, and Love reported that he felt better

(Doc. 129-2, p. 3; 129-3, p. 42).

On February 15, 2019, Love was released from the infirmary and prescribed

prednisone, a steroid, with the daily mesalamine enemas (Doc. 129-2, p. 3; 129-3, p. 44).

Dr. Myers testified he made the determination to prescribe prednisone based on past

successes Love had with the drug and the American Academy of Gastroenterologists

recommendation of its use to address the type of Crohn’s that Love has been diagnosed with

(Id. at pp. 3-4; Doc. 129-3, pp. 44-45). Love refused the medication (Id. at p. 4; Doc. 129-1,

p. 44). Love testified that he took prednisone five years prior; it did not work and also caused

him to gain fifty to sixty pounds (Doc. 129-1, p. 45). Love admitted that he refused the

medication (Id.). He did not believe that the mesalamine enemas and prednisone were

working (Id. at p. 47). In March 2019, Love was prescribed Fiberlax tabs but he refused to take

the medication (Doc. 129-3, p. 25). In April 2019, Love indicated he did not want prednisone

or another medication because it would not work (Doc. 129-3, pp. 27-28). Love requested to

take Imurin, the brand name for azathioprine, which was recommended by Dr. Bozdech if

the enemas were not successful (Id. at p. 29; 129-2, p. 4). Dr. Myers prescribed Imuran for

Love, which he is currently taking (Id.; Doc. 129-1, p. 45).

B. IDOC Defendants

As to the IDOC Defendants, Larue Love was Assistant Warden of Operations and was

not over the healthcare unit (Doc. 141-2, p. 1). Love testified that he wrote letters to Warden

Love about his healthcare (Doc. 129-1, p. 68). He also testified that he spoke with Warden

Love about his healthcare needs (Id. at p. 69).

Love wrote a letter to Warden Love on June 17, 2018, which indicated that due to his

transfer he was unable to take care of himself (Doc. 1-1, p. 4). Warden Love responded asking

for clarification as to why Love was unable to care for himself and questioned whether he

had been seen by the healthcare unit (Id.). Love acknowledged that the response indicated

Warden Love was not familiar with Crohn’s and was not a medical professional (Doc. 129-1,

p. 78). He also acknowledged that Warden Love’s position was not responsible for providing

medical treatment (Id.). Love further testified that he believed as Assistant Warden, Warden

Love was in charge of the healthcare unit and had the power to direct Dr. Myers in providing

treatment (Id. at pp. 78-83). He also believed Warden Love was Dr. Myers’s immediate

supervisor (Id. at p. 85). Warden Love testified that he was not a medical professional, could

not order medical care, and relied on the medical staff’s medical judgment (Doc. 141-2, p. 1).

In addition to responding to Love’s letter, Warden Love also reviewed a grievance

date July 30, 2018 (Doc. 141-2, p. 2; 141-4, pp. 1-2; 141-5, pp. 22-23). The grievance was deemed

an emergency grievance and expedited for review (Id.). In reviewing the grievance, the

grievance officer contacted Christine Brown about the treatment of Love’s Crohn’s (Doc. 141-

4, pp. 1-2). Brown responded that Love was being treating according to the specialist’s

recommendations (Id.). She also noted in her response that he was scheduled for a follow-up

with the doctor (Id.). During the relevant time period, Brown was the Healthcare Unit

Administrator (Doc. 141-3, p. 1). Although a registered nurse, Brown does not provide

medical care to inmates (Id.; Doc. 129, pp. 90-91).

Love testified that he wrote a letter to Brown about his healthcare on October 5, 2018

(Doc. 129-1, pp. 89-90; Doc. 1-1, p. 26). Love did not receive a response to his letter (Id. at

p. 93). Brown does not recall receiving a letter from Love (Doc. 141-3, p. 1). Brown did

respond to a number of grievances from Love about his medical care (Docs. 129-1, p. 93; 141-

4; 141-5). She reviewed Love’s medical records and responded with appointment dates and

notes from the records (Doc. 141-3, p. 1).

Christopher Thompson was the Clinical Services Supervisor at Pinckneyville from

January 2017 to April 2017, Assistant Warden of Programs from April 2017 to June 2018, and

Acting Warden from June 2018 to February 2020 (Doc. 143). During the relevant time period,

Love believed he was the acting warden (Doc. 129-1, p. 71). Love testified that he wrote a

letter to Thompson in June 2018 about his medical condition and had a face-to-face

conversation in July 2018 (Id.). Love’s cumulative counseling summary indicated that on July

16, 2018, Thompson received a request about Love’s condition (Doc. 144, p. 93). Thompson

informed Love that his condition was being treated by the medical staff (Id.). In November

2018, Love testified he spoke to Thompson in the cafeteria about his medical condition

(Doc. 129-1, p. 89). Thompson inquired about his Crohn’s and Love responded, “it is what it

is.” (Id.). Thompson also reviewed a number of Love’s grievances and expedited them as

emergencies (Docs. 143, p. 1; 141-5).

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment. Summary

judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Archdiocese of

Milwaukee v. Doe, 743 F.3d 1101, 1105 (7th Cir. 2014), citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Accord

Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2012). A genuine issue of material fact remains

“if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Accord Bunn v. Khoury Enter.,

Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 681-82 (7th Cir. 2014).

In assessing a summary judgment motion, a district court views the facts in the light

most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party.

Anderson, 699 F.3d at 994; Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011). As the

Seventh Circuit has explained, as required by Rule 56(a), “we set forth the facts by examining

the evidence in the light reasonably most favorable to the non-moving party, giving [him]

the benefit of reasonable, favorable inferences and resolving conflicts in the evidence in [his]

favor.” Spaine v. Community Contacts, Inc., 756 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2014).

B. Deliberate Indifference

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against “cruel and

unusual punishments” if they display deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical

needs. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 652–53 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97, 104 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accord Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance

Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 828 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of

a prisoner constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain forbidden by the

Constitution.”). A prisoner is entitled to reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of

serious harm — not to demand specific care. Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997).

To prevail, a prisoner who brings an Eighth Amendment challenge of constitutionally-

deficient medical care must satisfy a two-part test. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 750 (7th

Cir. 2011) (citing Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 584 (7th Cir. 2006)). The first prong that must

be satisfied is whether the prisoner has shown he has an objectively serious medical need.

Arnett, 658 F.3d at 750. Accord Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653. A medical condition need not be life-

threatening to be serious; rather, it could be a condition that would result in further

significant injury or unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain if not treated. Gayton v. McCoy,

593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010). Accord Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994) (violating

the Eighth Amendment requires “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious

harm.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Prevailing on the subjective prong requires a prisoner to show that a prison official

has subjective knowledge of—and then disregards—an excessive risk to inmate health.

Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653. A plaintiff need not show the individual literally ignored his

complaint, just that the individual was aware of the serious medical condition and either

intentionally or recklessly disregarded it. Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 524 (7th Cir. 2008).

ANALYSIS

A. Dr. Myers

Love argues that Dr. Myers was deliberately indifferent in treating his Crohn’s by

continuing with mesalamine enemas, delaying prescribing Imuran, and cancelling a follow-

up appointment with a gastroenterologist. Simply put, there are genuine issues of material

fact as to whether Dr. Myers was deliberately indifferent in treating Love’s Crohn’s disease.

Although Dr. Myers argues that he referred Love to collegial review for a gastroenterologist

consult, the medical records indicate he was approved for the consult and then Dr. Myers

cancelled the follow-up. Dr. Myers testified that he did this, in part, because nursing staff

documented lesser bowel movements during Love’s infirmary stay than what Love had

previously complained about, and because Love was not compliant with the enemas

(Doc. 129-2, p. 3; Doc. 137, p. 80-81). But Love testified that his bowel movements were not

properly documented, and he denied that he was not compliant with the treatment (Doc. 129-

1, pp. 37-40). If a jury finds that Love was compliant with his treatment plan yet had

continued symptoms, then Dr. Myers’s decision to cancel the appointment with the specialist

could amount to deliberate indifference.

Further, Dr. Myers testified that a course of mesalamine enemas was typically 4-5

weeks and that Dr. Bozdech’s recommendation called for Love to take mesalamine enemas

first and then a different medication if the enemas did not put him into remission (Doc. 129-

2, p. 2; 129-3, p. 53). But Dr. Myers initially prescribed the enemas for Love for six months

(Doc. 129-3, p. 60). Love also testified that he had already taken a course of mesalamine

enemas at Danville and the regimen was not controlling his Crohn’s. Love continued with

the enemas. He was not prescribed Imuran until April 19, 2019. This delay in prescribing

Imuran and the continued treatment of Love’s Crohn’s with enemas, if found to be ineffective

in treating his Crohn’s, could amount to deliberate indifference. Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d

859, 865 (7th Cir. 2012) (delay in treatment may constitute deliberate indifference if it

“exacerbated the injury or unnecessarily prolonged an inmate’s pain”); Greeno, 414 F.3d 655

(continuing with treatment known to be ineffective violates the Eighth Amendment). As

such, the Court finds that Dr. Myers is not entitled to summary judgment.

B. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.

As to Love’s claims against Wexford, his Complaint alleged that Wexford had a policy

of hiring unqualified physicians. Wexford, a private medical corporation acting under color

of state law, is treated like a municipal entity and may only be held liable under Section 1983

for constitutional violations caused by its own policies or customs. Whiting v. Wexford Health

Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 664 (7th Cir. 2016). In order for Wexford to be liable for the

treatment of Love’s Crohn’s, Love must establish a “policy or custom” by pointing to: (1) an

express policy that, when enforced, caused a constitutional deprivation; (2) a widespread

practice that, although not authorized by written law or express policy, is so permanent and

well-settled as to amount to a custom or usage that has the force of law; or (3) an allegation

that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policymaking authority. See

Quinn v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 8 F.4th 557, 568 (7th Cir. 2021); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); Glisson v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir.

2017) (en banc); Shields v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 796 (7th Cir. 2014).

Although Love argues that Wexford hires unqualified or underqualified doctors, he

offers no evidence to support his claims. He merely offers his own belief and opinions based

on his prior experience and prior cases he has brought against Wexford doctors. But although

he alleges he has successfully brought four previous cases against Wexford doctors, he

doesn’t point to those cases or their results.1 The mere fact that Love filed a complaint

regarding his medical care does not make it successful, nor does it evidence that a doctor

employed by Wexford was unqualified or underqualified. Dr. Myers is a qualified medical

professional. He graduated from medical school and is currently licensed to practice

medicine in Illinois (Doc. 129-2, p. 1). Joe Ebbitt, the Director of Risk Management, HIPAA

Compliance, and Legal Affairs for Wexford testified that the company only hires physicians

“who have received medical appropriate training and are licensed to practice medicine.”

(Doc. 129-4, p. 2). Love fails to offer any evidence suggesting that Dr. Myers or any other

1 Love has filed one other case in this district, Love v. Godinez, et al., Case No. 12-cv-117-GPM, which

was dismissed at screening (See Doc. 24).

employee of Wexford is not a qualified medical doctor.

To support his claim, Love also points to a document entitled “Staff Position

Requirements and Job Descriptions.”2 The staff requirements document states that an on-site

medical director shall be licensed in the State of Illinois to practice medicine, have a current

DEA number, and be CPR certified (Doc. 136, p. 46). Love does not dispute that Dr. Myers

meets those qualifications. Instead, Love argues that the requirements are generic and

because the document states licensed to “practice medicine,” that a veterinarian could hold

the position. Love fails to point to any veterinarians that are currently employed as medical

directors for Wexford, and Love’s characterization of the document is unfounded and not

supported by the evidence. The requirements for medical director clearly state that the

individual be a licensed medical doctor (not a veterinarian) and one, preferably, with family

or internal medicine experience, completion of a residency training program, and board

certified or eligible (Id.). Love fails to point to any evidence suggesting that Wexford has a

policy or practice of hiring unqualified or underqualified doctors. Thus, Wexford is entitled

to summary judgment.

C. IDOC Defendants

Defendants Brown, Thompson, and Warden Love argue that they are entitled to

summary judgment because they were not personally involved in Love’s care, and they did

not act with deliberate indifference towards his need for medical care. Love argues that these

defendants turned a blind eye to his written requests and grievances. But none of these

2 It is not clear what document this Job Descriptions page, labeled Exhibit III to another document,

was originally attached to; Love merely states that he received it in discovery. It appears to be an

Exhibit to Wexford’s contract with IDOC which Love attaches to one of his other responsive

documents (See Doc. 137, pp. 27-63).

defendants provided Love with medical care, nor were any of them in a supervisory position

to direct the medical care provided by Dr. Myers (Docs. 141-2, 141-3, and 143).

Love makes much of the fact that Defendants reviewed his grievances but didn’t

exercise their authority to obtain additional medical care for him. He relies heavily on the

Seventh Circuit’s decision in Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2015). In that case, the

Seventh Circuit has held that “[a]n inmate’s correspondence to a prison administrator

may…establish a basis for personal liability under [Section] 1983 where that correspondence

provides sufficient knowledge of a constitutional deprivation” and the official then refuses

to “exercise the authority of his or her office” to address the issue. Perez, 792 F.3d at 781-82

(internal quotations omitted) (citing Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 992-93 (7th Cir. 1996)). But in

Perez, the Seventh Circuit was analyzing the district court’s screening of the inmate’s

complaint, noting that discovery would shed light on whether the officials took actions to

investigate the grievances and reasonably relied on medical professionals’ judgment. Id. at

782.

At this stage, there is no evidence to suggest that Defendants were deliberately

indifferent to Love’s medical needs. As to Thompson and Warden Love, they reviewed and

responded to his grievances. Warden Love also responded to Love’s correspondence with

additional questions about his care (Doc. 1-1, p. 4). Similarly, Thompson responded to a

request regarding Love’s medical condition by advising him that he was being treated by

healthcare staff (Doc. 144, p. 93). They did not ignore his complaints about his medical care

but instead reviewed the claims and responded to his concerns.

Love argues that none of the IDOC Defendants exercised authority, investigated his

claims, or ensured he was provided with adequate medical care in response to his grievances.

He points to a grievance dated September 28, 2018, which he alleges provided ample

information about the inadequacies of the care being provided, and he did not receive the

response he wanted from the grievance. But the grievance was expedited by Thompson as

an emergency (Doc. 141-5, pp. 12-14). Further, the grievance was reviewed and denied

because Love was being treated by the healthcare staff (Id. at p. 11). Other grievances

regarding Love’s care were also expedited as emergencies by both Thompson and Warden

Love, and his medical care was reviewed (Doc. 141-5, pp. 1-6, 16-23).3 Although the

grievances were ultimately denied, the denial of a grievance by individuals who did not

participate in the underlying conduct does not amount to deliberate indifference. See Owens

v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he alleged mishandling of [a prisoner’s]

grievance by persons who otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying conduct

states no claim.”); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir. 2007) (“a guard who rejects

an administrative complaint about a completed act of misconduct does not” violate the

Constitution).

Further, as non-medical officials, they were allowed to defer to the judgment of

medical professionals regarding Love’s treatment. See Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1049

(7th Cir. 2019). The Seventh Circuit has held that if an inmate is under the care of medical

personnel, “non-medical prison official[s] [are generally] justified in believing the prisoner is

in capable hands.” Id. (quoting Greeno, 414 F.3d at 656). See also Hayes, 546 F.3d at 526-28. The

grievance responses indicate that officials inquired into the care he was receiving (Doc. 141-

5, pp. 4, 11, 16, 21). The responses indicate that he was receiving care according to the

3 Although Love’s July 30, 2018 grievance was marked by S. Thompson as an emergency, Warden

Love testified that he expedited the grievance when he was covering for Thompson (Doc. 141-2, p. 2).

specialist’s plan and he was non-compliant with the treatment plan (Id.). Although Love

disputes that he was non-compliant, nothing in the response hinted that the specialist’s plan

was not being followed, and the non-medical officials were allowed to rely on the judgment

of the medical professionals and not investigate further than the records. Hayes, 546 F.3d at

527-28 (non-medical officials who relied on medical official’s judgment and did not

investigate further than the medical records were not deliberately indifferent nor had an

obligation to investigate further than the records). Because Defendants Warden Love and

Thompson responded to Love’s grievances and letters and referred him to medical staff, there

is no evidence that they acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs.

Similarly, there is no evidence that Brown acted with deliberate indifference. Love

argues that Brown lied in response to his grievances because she stated that Love was being

treated according to the specialist, and he was non-compliant with the mesalamine enemas

(Doc. 144, p. 37). But Brown relied on the medical records and the fact that Love was receiving

care (Doc. 141-3, p. 1). While Brown was the healthcare unit administrator, she was not Love’s

direct treatment provider and could only advise him to see medical staff for his medical needs

(Id. at pp. 1-2). Love argues that in reviewing the medical records, Brown should have looked

deeper into the records and determined that Love had already been through the required

rounds of mesalamine enemas as suggested by Dr. Bozdech and was ready for a different

medication. But the fact that she did not draw those conclusions from the review of medical

records is, at most, negligence and not deliberate indifference. See Hayes, 546 F.3d at 527

(failure to investigate further after receiving reviews from treating medical personnel was, at

worst, negligence and not deliberate indifference). There is no evidence that she lied in

responding to the grievances as Love suggests or that she acted with deliberate indifference.

Thus, Brown, Warden Love, and Thompson are entitled to summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, summary judgment is GRANTED as to Christine

Brown, Warden Larue Love, and Christopher Thompson (Docs. 140, 141, 143). Summary

judgment is also GRANTED as to Wexford Health Sources, Inc., but is DENIED as to

Dr. Percy Myers (Docs. 128, 129). Because Love still seeks injunctive relief as to his medical

care, Rob Jeffreys (in his official capacity only) will also remain in the case for purposes of

implementing any injunctive relief awarded.

This case is now ready for trial. Love last requested the recruitment of counsel during

the discovery phase (Doc. 124). At the time, the Court found that Love was capable of

proceeding with discovery without the assistance of counsel (Doc. 126). Now that the case is

ready for trial, Love, if he so chooses, may renew his request for counsel in order to assist

him with trial matters.

The Court will set a status conference by separate notice to discuss a trial date.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 29, 2022

mefgl austen

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

Chief U.S. District Judge

Page 17 of 17

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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