Black v. Jeffreys

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

RODNEY BLACK, )

B86195, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 21-cv-1118-DWD

)

ROB JEFFREYS, )

ANTHONY WILLS, )

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCE, INC., )

DR. SIDDIQUI, )

N.P.A. DEARMOND, )

ANGELA CRAIN. )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Rodney Black, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)

currently detained at Menard Correctional Center (Menard), brings this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights. (Doc.

1). Plaintiff claims the defendants violated his rights by taking his continuous positive

airway pressure machine (CPAP machine) from September of 2020 through May of 2021.

He seeks monetary relief.

Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is now before the Court for preliminary review

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen

prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b).

Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law

is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture,

the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v.

Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

The Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that on about September 20, 2020, an individual from the

healthcare general warehouse came to his cell and retrieved his CPAP machine. (Doc. 1

at 7). He alleges that he used the machine for sleep apnea and chronic obstructive

pulmonary disease (COPD). Plaintiff alleges that he filed grievances, and nurse sick call

slips to address the issue. He was informed that his CPAP machine was taken because

the CDC recommended that the machines not be used in open-air cells. He alleges that

Defendant Dearmond told him on December 18, 2020, that if he was willing to move to a

cell with a solid door, he could have his CPAP machine back. He alleges that on January

6, 2021, he filed a grievance to seek such a transfer, or to seek alternative treatments for

his sleep apnea. Without his CPAP machine, Plaintiff alleges that he woke up gagging,

with an elevated heart rate, struggling to breath. He alleges that he has underlying health

problems, blockage in his heart, high blood pressure, diabetes, COPD and sleep apnea,

so the defendants should not have taken his CPAP machine during the pandemic.

In closing, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Jeffreys and Wills violated his Eighth

Amendment rights by having actual knowledge that his CPAP machine was taken and

that he was not given other medical care. (Doc. 1 at 8). As to Wexford, Plaintiff alleges

that Wexford violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to ensure that the

treatment of inmates and provision of care was properly implemented. Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant Dearmond violated his rights by failing to assign him to a closed-door cell

so that he could get his CPAP machine back. Finally, as to Defendant Crain, Plaintiff

claims that Crain violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to ensure that he got

appropriate care.

In support of his complaint, Plaintiff attached two grievances. The first, dated

October 20, 2020, indicates that Dr. Siddiqui and Defendant Dearmond diagnosed him

with sleep apnea and COPD, but his CPAP machine was taken from his cell. (Doc. 1 at

27). He claimed he had been struggling to breath, and that he had filed multiple nurse

sick call slips to no avail. He sought to see a nurse, a nurse practitioner, a doctor, and

then a pulmonologist as Wexford’s procedures required. A responsive memorandum to

the grievance signed by Defendants Siddiqui and Crain confirmed that the CPAP

machine was taken per CDC guidelines, and it indicated Plaintiff should use nurse sick

call slips if he had issues. (Doc. 1 at 28). Based on the memorandum, both the counselor

and the grievance officer concluded that the grievance was appropriately addressed by

healthcare and was moot. (Doc. 1 at 27, 33).

In the second grievance, dated January 6, 2021, Plaintiff alleged that on December

18, 2020, he spoke with Defendant Dearmond about his CPAP machine and she told him

he could have the machine back if he agreed to housing behind a closed door (not bars).

(Doc. 1 at 30). Plaintiff alleges that he told her he would agree to any circumstances

because without the machine he was waking up in the middle of the night choking. (Id.

at 31). Defendants Siddiqui and Crain drafted a second responsive memorandum to this

grievance. (Doc. 1 at 32). In the memorandum, Crain alleges that Plaintiff did not speak

with Dearmond about his CPAP in December of 2020, but he saw Siddiqui at COPD

chronic clinic on February 1, 2021, and Siddiqui concluded that his COPD was stable.

Crain alleged that Plaintiff had not submitted a medical permit for housing in a closed-

door cell to allow his CPAP machine, but Crain scheduled him for the medical line to be

evaluated for said placement. It was also noted that Plaintiff should use the nurse sick

call line for further issues. Based on the memorandum, the counselor and grievance

officer again declared Plaintiff’s grievance moot. (Doc. 1 at 29, 30).

The court designates the following Claims, based on the Amended Complaint:

Claim 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Defendant Dearmond regarding Plaintiff’s CPAP machine;

Claim 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Defendant Crain regarding the handling of Plaintiff’s

grievances about his need for his CPAP machine.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned

in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without

prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does

not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”).

Preliminary Dismissals

In the master caption of his Complaint, Plaintiff listed Dr. Siddiqui as a defendant

and crossed him out, but on page 3 he listed Siddiqui again. (Doc. 1 at 1, 3). Regardless

of whether or not Plaintiff intended to state a claim against Siddiqui, his complaint has

failed to state an adequate claim because he did not identify personal actions Siddiqui

took that caused him harm. See Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017)

(“individual liability under § 1983…requires personal involvement in the alleged

constitutional deprivation”). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Siddiqui without

prejudice because Plaintiff failed to state an adequate claim against him.

Likewise, the Court will dismiss the claims against Defendants Jeffreys and Wills

because the claims are overly generic. Without discussing either defendant in the factual

narrative, Plaintiff concludes in the legal allegation section that these two defendants had

“actual knowledge that [his] CPAP machine was taken and nothing was given in

replacement.” To hold a prison supervisor liable for a medical condition, a plaintiff is

required to establish that the defendant had actual knowledge of the medical condition

and the inadequate medical care through detailed grievances or correspondence, and that

the official failed to exercise his or her authority to rectify the situation. See e.g. Perez v.

Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 782 (7th Cir. 2015). Bare legal assertions without factual elaboration

are not sufficient to state a claim. See e.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Here, Plaintiff made

the bare allegation that Jeffreys and Wills had actual knowledge of his medical need, but

he does not support this with an explanation of what gave them knowledge, nor does he

allege how they personally failed to exert their authority to remedy the situation.

Plaintiff’s complaint is insufficient as to Jeffreys and Wills, so they will be dismissed

without prejudice.

The Court will also dismiss Defendant Wexford Health Source, Inc., because

Plaintiff’s claim that Wexford failed to provide adequate care is generic and is not

specifically connected to his personal allegations. Wexford, a private corporation, cannot

be held liable under § 1983 unless the constitutional violation was caused by an

unconstitutional policy or custom of the corporation itself. Shields v. Illinois Dept. of

Corrections, 746 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Monell v. Department of Social Services

of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Thus, under Monell, for Plaintiff to recover from

Wexford, he must show that the alleged constitutional violation was caused by: (1) an

express policy that caused a constitutional deprivation when enforced; (2) a widespread

practice that was so permanent and well-settled that it constituted a custom or practice;

or (3) a person with final policymaking authority. Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18

F.4th 214, 235 (7th Cir. 2021). In other words, a plaintiff must show that “systematic and

gross deficiencies in …[IDOC’s] medical care system,” caused his injury, and also that “a

policymaker or official knew about these deficiencies and failed to correct them.” Daniel

v. Cook Cty., 833 F.3d 728, 735 (7th Cir. 2016). Alternatively, a plaintiff must show that

“the unlawful practice was so pervasive that acquiescence on the part of policymakers

was apparent and amounted to a policy decision.” Dixon v. Cty. Of Cook, 819 F.3d 343,

348 (7th Cir. 2016). Here, Plaintiff has no factual allegations concerning a violative policy

or custom. In the complete absence of specific allegations, Plaintiff has failed to state a

valid claim.

Analysis

Claim 1 is sufficient to proceed against Defendant Dearmond for the alleged

failure to assist Plaintiff in securing his CPAP machine after complaints that he could not

sleep and awoke struggling to breath at night.

Claim 2 is also sufficient to proceed against Defendant Crain for her role in

reviewing and responding to Plaintiff’s healthcare needs. Defendant Crain is the

Healthcare Unit Supervisor. Although prison supervisors are not responsible for the

misdeeds of their employees, a defendant can state a claim against a supervisor for his or

her own role in facilitating, approving, condoning, or turning a blind eye to

unconstitutional conduct. Plaintiff alleges that Crain was aware of his health needs and

she failed to act. His grievances and supporting documents show Crain’s involvement

in his care. This is enough to proceed beyond initial review. Accordingly, Claim 2 shall

proceed against Defendant Crain.

Disposition

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Claim 1 of the Complaint (Doc. 1) survives

initial screening as described above against Defendant Dearmond. Claim 2 survives

screening as to Defendant Crain. All claims against Defendants Jeffreys, Wills, Wexford

Health Source, Inc. and Siddiqui are insufficient, so the Clerk is DIRECTED to

TERMINATE these parties.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to prepare for Defendants Dearmond and Crain:

(1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2)

Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a

copy of the Complaint (Doc. 1), and this Memorandum and Order to Defendants’ place

of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver

of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were

sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the

Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent

authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for

sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation

of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be

maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues

stated in this Merits Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to inform the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party of any address changes; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later

than 7 days after a transfer or other change of address occurs. Failure to comply with this

order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in

dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to

enter the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability

and Accountability Act.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Lip be

Dated: March 25, 2022 dm C)

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge

Notice to Plaintiff

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your

lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved,

the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will

likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers,

but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the defendants

have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important

information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until

counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not

submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

The Court wishes to remind the Plaintiff that litigation is often viewed a series of hurdles

that the Plaintiff must clear to get to another hurdle. Initial screening is such a hurdle, but

it is a very low one for the Plaintiff to clear. As noted above, surviving initial screening

only requires the bare statement of a claim that, if proven, could entitle Plaintiff to some

relief. At trial, he will need to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the facts alleged

actually occurred and that those facts satisfy the legal requirements for recovery. Trial is

the highest and most difficult of hurdles for any Plaintiff to clear.