“a state and its agencies are not suable ‘persons’ within the meaning of section 1983”
How later courts described this case
- “a state and its agencies are not suable ‘persons’ within the meaning of section 1983”
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The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JESSE C. GARMON,
#B23470,
Plaintiff, Case No. 21-cv-00027-SPM
v.
IDOC,
WARDEN, Centralia CC,
WARDEN, Shawnee CC,
COUNSELOR, Centralia CC,
COUNSELOR, Shawnee CC,
RECORDS OFFICE, Centralia CC,
RECORDS OFFICE, Shawnee CC,
INMATES ISSUES, Springfield IL,
PAROLE BOARD,
DONALD DUNN,
GRIEVANCE OFFICERS, Centralia CC,
GRIEVANCE OFFICERS, Shawnee CC,
and
SPRINGFIELD GRIEVANCE ISSUES
BOARD,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MCGLYNN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Jesse Garmon, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections who is
currently incarcerated at Danville Correctional Center, brings this civil action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights. Garmon claims that he was not credited
for time served while incarcerated and so his release date of January 22, 2019 was calculated
incorrectly. He seeks monetary damages and good conduct credits.
The Complaint is now before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A. Under Section 1915A, any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or requests money damages from a defendant
who by law is immune from such relief must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this
juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v.
Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
THE COMPLAINT
Garmon alleges he was arrested on July 14, 2012, and was later sentenced to 6 years
imprisonment and 4 year mandatory supervised release (“MSR”). (Case citation provided 12-CF-
141). On August 18, 2015, he received a second amended sentence for 3 ½ years imprisonment
with 4 years of MSR and credit for time served. After his sentence was recalculated, his projected
release day was June 26, 2015, which had already passed. He was immediately released a few days
later on August 21, 2015. (Doc. 16, p. 31).
After his release, Garmon was arrested again October 8, 2015. He was sentenced to 30 days
in the Sangamon County Jail. Garmon went before the Parole Review Board, which included
member Donald Dunn, at Centralia Correctional Center on March 2, 2016. It was determined that
he violated the conditions of his MSR. He remained in custody, and his release date was wrongly
calculated as January 22, 2019. Garmon claims he did not receive credit for the 2 months and 9
days served from June 16, 2015 through August 21, 2015. He alleges that he over served his
sentence as calculated in case 12-CF-141 when he was incarcerated from October 8, 2015 to
January 22, 2019.
DISCUSSION
The Complaint does not survive preliminary review pursuant to Section 1915A and will be
dismissed. First, Garmon lists as Defendants several entities that cannot be sued under Section
1983. IDOC, the Records Offices of Centralia and Shawnee Correctional Centers, Inmates Issues,
the Parole Board, and the Springfield Grievance Issues Board are not “persons” subject to suit for
money damages under Section 1983. Thomas v. Ill., 697 F. 3d 612, 613 (7th Cir. 2012) (“a state
and its agencies are not suable ‘persons’ within the meaning of section 1983”).
Second, Garmon has not asserted any allegations against the remaining individual
Defendants – the Wardens, Counselors, and Grievance Officers of Centralia and Shawnee
Correctional Centers, and Donald Dunn, a member of the Parole Review Board. With the exclusion
of Donald Dunn, none of these Defendants are mentioned in the statement of claim. Plaintiffs are
required to associate specific defendants with specific claims, so that defendants are put on notice
of the claims brought against them and so they can properly answer the complaint. See Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Where a plaintiff has not
included a defendant in his statement of the claim, the defendant cannot be said to be adequately
put on notice of which claims in the complaint, if any, are directed against him. Furthermore,
merely invoking the name of a potential defendant is not sufficient to state a claim against that
individual. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998). Because Garmon does not
mention the Wardens, Counselors, and Grievance Officers elsewhere in the Complaint, the claims
against them are dismissed.
As for Donald Dunn, all Garmon states is that Dunn was on the Parole Review Board when
the determination was made that he had violated his supervised release. He does not include any
allegations regarding Dunn’s involvement in his sentence recalculation. Therefore, these factual
allegations are not sufficient to state a claim against Dunn. See Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d
724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (“a defendant must be personally responsible for the deprivation of a
constitutional right”).
For these reasons, the Court finds that Garmon has failed to state a claim against any of the
listed Defendants, and the Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Garmon will be given,
however, an opportunity to replead his claims in an amended complaint.
MOTION TO AMEND
After filing the Complaint, Garmon filed a Motion for 2nd Amended Civil Rights
Complaint. (Doc. 16). He asks to amend the Complaint to provide the names and professional titles
of Defendants and to add exhibits.
The motion is denied. Garmon may not amend the Complaint in this type of piecemeal
fashion. An amended complaint generally supersedes and replaces the original complaint,
rendering the original complaint void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d
632, 638 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2004). As such, an amended complaint must stand on its own without
reference to any other pleading and must include all claims against all defendants and all
supporting exhibits.
MOTION FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE
The Court recognizes that because Garmon is incarcerated he may have difficulty
effectuating service within the 90 day time limit imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).
Therefore, the Motion for Service of Process at Government Expense (Doc. 15) is granted. If
Garmon files an amended complaint in accordance with the instructions set forth in this Order and
successfully pleads a claim against a defendant, then the Court will conduct service on his behalf.
MOTION FOR RECRUITMENT OF COUNSEL
Garmon has filed a motion asking the Court to recruit counsel on his behalf. (Doc. 14).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), the Court “may request an attorney to represent any person
unable to afford counsel.” When faced with a motion for recruitment of counsel the Court applies
a two part test: “(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been
effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff
appear competent to litigate it himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007).
Garmon does not provide any information regarding what attempts he has made to recruit
counsel before seeking assistance from the Court. He only states he “never receive[d] a response
from the parties.” (Doc. 14). This statement, without more details, such as names, addresses, or
copies of letters, is not sufficient information for the Court to determine if he has made a reasonable
effort to obtain counsel on his own. Thus, Garmon has failed to meet his threshold burden of
making a “reasonable attempt” to secure counsel. See Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 760 (7th
Cir. 2010). Accordingly, the motion is denied. Should he choose to move for recruitment of
counsel at a later date, the Court directs Garmon to include in the motion the names and address
of at least three attorneys he has contacted, and if available, attach the letters from the attorneys
who declined representation.
DISPOSITION
For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Motion for Recruitment of Counsel is DENIED. (Doc. 14). The Motion for Service of
Process at Government Expense is GRANTED. (Doc. 15). The Motion to Amend is DENIED.
(Doc. 16).
Garmon is GRANTED leave to file a “First Amended Complaint” on or before April 18,
2022. If Garmon fails to file a First Amended Complaint within the allotted time or consistent with
the instructions in this Order, the entire case shall be dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply
with a court order and/or for failure to prosecute his claims. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b); Ladien v.
Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051 (7th Cir. 1997); Johnson v. Kamminga, 34 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 1994); 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The dismissal shall also count as one of his three allotted “strikes” under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g).
It is strongly recommended that Garmon use the civil rights complaint form designed for
use in this District. He should label the form, “First Amended Complaint,” and he should use the
case number for this action (No. 21-cv-00027-SPM). To enable him to comply with this Order, the
CLERK is DIRECTED to mail Garmon a blank civil rights complaint form. The Court reminds
Garmon that a successful complaint generally alleges “the who, what, when, where, and how....”
See DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990). Thus, the First Amended
Complaint should identify who violated his constitutional rights by name, if known, or using
generic designations (e.g., “John Doe”), if the name is unknown, in the case caption. Garmon
should also include a description of how each Defendant violated his rights in the body of the
amended complaint.
As mentioned above, an amended complaint generally supersedes and replaces the original
complaint, rendering the original complaint void. See Flannery, 354 F.3d at 638 n. 1. The First
Amended Complaint must stand on its own without reference to any previous pleading. Garmon
must re-file any exhibits he wishes the Court to consider. The First Amended Complaint is also
subject to review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Finally, Garmon is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days
after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this Order will cause a
delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of
prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 21, 2022
s/Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN
United States District Judge