Gaddis v. DeMattei

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DONALD GADDIS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:21-CV-179-MAB

)

BRYAN DEMATTEI, SAM WARD, )

WILLIAM LANNOM, )

LOGAN SPINKA, TOM STEARNS, )

WILLIAM OGLESBY, )

JOHN FLEMING, ANDREW WILSON, )

BETTY CARAWAY, JENNIFER PAGE, )

JESSE THOMPSON, JUSTIN DWYER, )

BRANDON ZANOTTI, )

WILLIAM HUDDLESTON, )

MARY GRIFFITH, )

DOROTHY MCCOMBS, and )

BRENDA GRANT, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:

This matter is currently before the Court on ten motions to dismiss filed by thirteen

of the seventeen named Defendants (Docs. 95, 97, 98, 100, 102, 104, 106, 108, 110, and 112)

and a motion to stay filed by Defendants (Doc. 131; see also Doc. 134).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Donald Gaddis is/was a resident of the city of Marion, Illinois, which lies

in Williamson County. Over the course of the last four or so years, he has filed numerous

lawsuits in federal and state courts challenging his treatment by the police, elected and

appointed government officials, local government employees, and his neighbors. This

case is his latest challenge. In Count 1 of the four-count complaint, Gaddis alleges that he

was the victim of a vast conspiracy by 17 named Defendants and an array of non-

Defendants, dating back to November 2017 and continuing to the present day, to retaliate

against him for speaking out about corruption in the Williamson County “power

structure” (Doc. 1). Many of the incidents that Gaddis alleges were part of the conspiracy

have been or currently are the subject of criminal proceedings and/or Gaddis’s many

civil suits. As Defendants said, this new lawsuit appears to be “an effort to consolidate

the sprawling web of litigation that he has initiated” (Doc. 103, p. 1). Aside from the

conspiracy claim, Gaddis also brings claims for false arrest in Counts 2, 3, and 4 (Doc. 1).

Thirteen of the seventeen Defendants—Betty Caraway (Doc. 95), Mary Griffith

(Doc. 97), Logan Spinka (Docs. 98, 99), Tom Stearns (Docs. 100, 101), Bryan DeMattei

(Docs. 102, 103), Sam Ward (Docs. 104, 105), William Lannom (Docs. 106, 107), Justin

Dwyer and Jesse Thompson (Docs. 108, 109), William Huddleston (Docs. 110, 111), and

Jennifer Page, Andrew Wilson, and Brandon Zanotti (Docs. 112, 113)—filed motions to

dismiss.1 Gaddis filed responses in opposition to each motion (Docs. 114 through 121,

123), with the exception of the motion filed by Page, Wilson, and Zanotti.

After all of the motions to dismiss were filed, the Court held a status conference to

discuss scheduling issues and the utility of a stay pending resolution of the motions

(Docs. 122, 128). At the hearing, the Court determined that written briefing was required

(Doc. 128). Accordingly, Defendants filed a motion to stay the proceedings (Doc. 131), to

1 Defendants John Fleming, Brenda Grant, Dorothy McCombs, and Craig Oglesby did not file motions to

dismiss.

which Gaddis filed a response in opposition (Doc. 132), and Defendants filed a reply

(Doc. 133).

The motion to stay was granted to the extent that it requested this matter not

proceed with discovery until the pending motions to dismiss were ruled on (Doc. 134). It

was taken under advisement as to all other arguments (e.g., duplicative litigation,

improper claim splitting, res judicata, Younger abstention), which the Court said would

be considered in conjunction with the motions to dismiss (Id.).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

For purposes of deciding the motions to dismiss that are before the Court, the

Court considers the facts alleged in the complaint, which are assumed to be true for

purposes of this Order with exceptions explained when needed. The Court also considers

additional facts presented by Gaddis in his response briefs that are consistent with the

complaint and information that is subject to proper judicial notice. E.g., Geinosky v. City

of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2012).

Gaddis alleges that beginning on October 24, 2017, he had “a series of interactions”

(described below) with personnel from the Marion City Police Department, the

Williamson County Sheriff’s Department, the Williamson County State’s Attorney’s

Office, and the Williamson County Courthouse, which led him to believe “the power

structure in Williamson County was corrupt and required change” (Doc. 1, ¶¶27, 28). On

October 28, 2017, Gaddis began “to exercise his constitutional rights” by, amongst other

things, filing complaints with the Marion Police; posting signs in his yard and hanging

signs throughout the County, some of which criticized the police, judges, and the State’s

Attorney; and demonstrating outside the County courthouse (Id. at ¶29).

Gaddis alleges that “on or about November 1, 2017,” all of the Defendants became

aware of his “constitutionally protected activities,” (Doc. 1, ¶30), which the Court

assumes to mean his public criticisms of government officials. He claims he was then

frequently mentioned by the police and court personnel as someone whose actions

should be closely monitored, and by the prosecutor’s office as someone who should be

vigorously prosecuted (Id. at ¶¶30–33). Gaddis further alleges that Judge Brad Bleyer

(who is not a Defendant), State’s Attorney (and Defendant) Brandon Zanotti, and court

reporter (and Defendant) Jennifer Page, were outspoken in their belief that Gaddis was

mentally unbalanced (Id. at ¶34). He claims the gossip reached a point that a flyer was

circulated in the Williamson County Courthouse warning that he was dangerous (Id. at

¶34). He also believes that “all other named Defendants” participated in the rumors and

gossip about him and shared the belief that he was mentally unwell (Id. at ¶35).

Finally, Gaddis alleges that Defendants “reached an agreement that a plan should

be put in place to retaliate against [him] because of his decision to exercise his

constitutional rights” (Doc. 1, ¶¶30, 37). He claims the retaliation came about in a series

of “tortious acts” over the course of approximately two and a half years, where “he was

arrested and/or prosecuted by Defendants without probable cause or justification” (Doc.

117, pp. 3–4; see also Doc. 1, pp. 6–21). The Court will summarize each of the alleged

retaliatory acts below and any related litigation.

• October 24, 2017 (Doc. 1, ¶¶38–44): The allegations regarding this

particular incident are murky, making it difficult to determine a chronology of events

based on the complaint alone. However, the complaint in conjunction with facts

appropriate for judicial notice tell the following story. On October 20, 2017, there was

some sort of incident between Gaddis and his neighbors, including Defendant Dorothy

McCombs, and the police were called. See SDIL Case No. 18-1729-SMY, Doc. 1 (Gaddis’s

complaint alleging that he was arrested on Oct. 20, 2017); see also id. at Doc. 58-1 (police

report indicating Gaddis was arrested on Oct. 20, 2017, for disorderly conduct). Gaddis

was arrested for disorderly conduct by Marion police officers and Defendants Bryan

DeMattei, William Lannom, and Logan Spinka (Doc. 1, ¶41). On October 24th, Dorothy

McCombs applied for and was granted an emergency no stalking, no contact order

(hereinafter referred to as an “order of protection” or “protective order,” for the sake of

ease) against Gaddis (Doc. 1, ¶38). Gaddis alleges that McCombs applied for the order of

protection at the “urging” of Marion police officer and Defendant Mary Griffith (Doc. 1,

¶¶42, 43). Gaddis claims the order of protection violated his free speech rights in that it

prohibited him from communicating to or about McCombs (Doc. 1, ¶39).

• Related Criminal Case: There is no indication that charges were ever brought

against Gaddis following his arrest.

• Related Civil Case #1: Circuit Court of Williamson County, Case No. 2017-OP-

3862

The Court takes judicial notice of Dorothy McCombs’ order of protection case.

The docket shows that an emergency order of protection was issued on October

24, 2017, and a plenary order was issued on November 8, 2017. McCombs

voluntarily dismissed the case in February 2018.

• Related Civil Case #2: SDIL Case No. 18-cv-1729-SMY

The Court takes judicial notice that Gaddis sued a number of individuals,

including Officers DeMattei, Lannom, and Spinka, and his neighbors,

including McCombs, for false arrest stemming from his arrest on October 20,

2017. Summary judgment was granted to Defendants on July 27, 2020. Id. at

Doc. 69. Gaddis appealed, and the appeal remains pending. Seventh Circuit

Case No. 20-2424.

• March 25, 2018 (Doc. 1, ¶¶45–57): The complaint alleges that on this date,

Defendants Bryan DeMattei and Sam Ward, both of whom were Marion police officers,

were standing outside of DeMattei’s house while both were off duty (Doc. 1, ¶45). Gaddis

drove up to DeMattei’s home, parked in the driveway, got out of his car, and approached

the two men (Id.). Gaddis alleges he planned to talk to DeMattei about a false statement

DeMattei allegedly made about Gaddis (Id. at ¶46). Ward took Gaddis to the ground and

restrained him, and then Ward and DeMattei called the police (Id. at ¶47). Williamson

2 The dockets for all of Gaddis’s state court civil and criminal cases can be viewed on Judici.com by going

to https://www.judici.com/courts/cases/case_search.jsp?court=IL100025J, typing “Gaddis, Donald” into

the “name” field, clicking “search,” and then clicking on the relevant case number.

County deputy sheriff and Defendant Craig Oglesby (mistakenly named as William

Oglesby in the complaint) responded and arrested Gaddis (see id. at ¶49). Gaddis was

charged with felony trespass.

Gaddis alleges that Oglesby let DeMattei search his vehicle. DeMattei read the

contents of a notebook in the car and then relayed information to Officer and Defendant

William Lannom. Both DeMattei and Lannom applied for and were granted emergency

orders of protection against Gaddis. Gaddis claims both orders violated his free speech

rights in that they prohibited him from communicating to or about Lannom and

DeMattei. Gaddis further alleges that at his preliminary hearing, Oglesby made false

statements that Gaddis’s car was not searched and no materials in the car were read.

• Related Criminal Case: Circuit Court of Williamson County, Case No. 2018-

CF-178

The Court takes judicial notices that the felony trespass charges against Gaddis

remain pending and the case is set for trial on March 21, 2022.

• Related Civil Case #1: Circuit Court of Williamson County, Case No. 2018-OP-

108

The Court takes judicial notice that Lannom applied for and was granted an

emergency order of protection against Gaddis on March 28, 2018. Gaddis

alleges that the petition was dismissed at the plenary hearing for insufficient

evidence (Doc. 1, ¶52). The state court docket, however, indicates the case was

withdrawn on a motion by Lannom.

• Related Civil Case #2: Circuit Court of Williamson County, Case No. 2018-OP-

109

The Court takes judicial notice that DeMattei applied for and was granted an

emergency order of protection against Gaddis on March 28, 2018. Following a

hearing on April 18th, a plenary order was denied.

• Related Civil Case #3: Circuit Court of Williamson County, Case No. 2018-L-

112; Illinois App. Ct., Fifth District, Case No. 05-20-0327

The parties represent that Gaddis filed suit against Lannom in June 2018 for

malicious prosecution related to the order of protection that he took out (Doc.

106-1; Doc. 106-2; Doc. 131-7). Summary judgment was entered in favor of

Lannom on September 16, 2020 (Doc. 131-8). Gaddis appealed, and the

judgment was affirmed on appeal (Doc. 131, p. 4). Specifically, the appellate

court held that Gaddis could not demonstrate that Lannom lacked probable

cause to file the underlying petition for an order of protection against him.

Gaddis v. Lannom, 2021 WL 3033333 (July 19, 2021).

• Related Civil Case #4: SDIL Case No. 18-cv-1464-DWD

The Court takes judicial notices that in August 2018, Gaddis sued DeMattei,

Ward, Oglesby, and Jeffrey Moore (who is not a Defendant in the instant case)

for illegal search and seizure of his car and trespass. Id. at Doc. 1. The

proceedings were stayed pending the resolution of the state court criminal case

against Gaddis. Id. at Doc. 36. They remain stayed. See id. at Doc. 73.

• Related Civil Case #5: Circuit Court of Williamson County, Case No. 2020-L-

36

The parties represent that in March 2020, Gaddis filed a second lawsuit in

Williamson County Court against DeMattei and Ward for battery and public

disclosure of private facts related to the March 2018 incident (Doc. 131-5; Doc.

132, p. 5). The state court docket indicates the case was stayed in September

2020 pending resolution of Gaddis’s civil suit in federal court, and it appears

that the case remains stayed at this time.

• June 29, 2018 Incident One (Doc. 1, ¶¶107–111, 116):3 Gaddis’s neighbors

(and Defendants), Dorothy McCombs and Brenda Grant, called the police on Gaddis after

a verbal altercation with him. He was arrested by Marion police officers (and Defendants)

Tom Stearns and Logan Spinka for violating an order of protection, despite his

protestations there was no such order in place. It was later learned that the police

computer system (“LEADS”) did not reflect the dismissal of the order of protection (Doc.

132, p. 7). See also SDIL Case No. 18-cv-1437-SMY, Doc. 86. Gaddis was held for three

hours and then released after it was determined that there was no order of protection in

place (Doc. 1, ¶¶107–111, 116). Gaddis alleges that he would not have been arrested but

for his criticisms of Williamson County officials.

• Related Civil Case #1: SDIL Case No. 18-cv-1437-SMY

The Court takes judicial notice that Gaddis filed suit in July 2018, in pertinent

part, against Tom Stearns, Logan Spinka, Dorothy McCombs, and Brenda

Grant for false arrest. Id. at Docs. 1, 20. Summary judgment was granted for

Defendants on January 27, 2020. Id. at Doc. 86. Specifically, the judge

determined that Stearns had probable cause to arrest Gaddis and McCombs

and Grant could not be held liable for false arrest. Id. at Doc. 86, pp. 4–5. And

Gaddis conceded that Spinka should be dismissed. Id. Gaddis did not appeal.

See id.

• Related Civil Case #2: SDIL Case No. 19-cv-652 consolidated with SDIL Case

No. 20-cv-639

The Court takes judicial notice that Gaddis filed suit against Williamson

County and a number of individuals, alleging they failed to properly document

3 In the complaint, Gaddis gives two different dates for this incident: June 29, 2018 and June 29, 2019 (Doc.

1, p. 16). Subsequent allegations regarding a state court criminal case (Doc. 1, ¶112), as well as, documents

filed in related civil litigation demonstrate the incident occurred in 2018. See SDIL Case No. 18-cv-1437-

SMY, Doc. 1 (case filed on July 24, 2018, alleging that Plaintiff was falsely arrested on June 29, 2018); SDIL

Case No. 19-cv-653-SMY, Doc. 8 (amended complaint alleging Gaddis was arrested on June 29, 2018).

the dismissal of an order of protection, which directly resulted in Gaddis’s false

arrest. SDIL Case No. 19-cv-652, Docs. 1, 16, 29. Gaddis later filed another suit

based on the same events, SDIL Case No. 20-cv-639, Doc. 1. The two cases were

consolidated and then voluntarily dismissed in December 2020 at Gaddis’s

request. SDIL Case No. 19-cv-652, Docs. 41, 46.

• June 29, 2018 Incident Two (Doc. 1, ¶¶112–116):4 Gaddis was arrested a

second time on June 29, 2018 by Marion police officer Jason Watts after he blocked the

exit of a person who was parked in his driveway.5 Gaddis was charged with a felony. He

contends that Watts did not have probable cause to believe he had committed a felony.

Gaddis alleges that he would not have been arrested but for his criticisms of Williamson

County officials.

• Related Criminal Case: Circuit Court of Williamson County, Case No. 2018-

CF-383

The state court docket indicates that Gaddis was charged with felony unlawful

restraint and misdemeanor disorderly conduct. It appears from the docket that

the felony unlawful restraint charge was dismissed in August 2018, which is

also what Gaddis claims (Doc. 132, p. 10). See also SDIL Case No. 19-cv-653-

SMY, Doc. 8, ¶¶26–27; SDIL Case No. 19-cv-781-DWD, Doc. 1, ¶15. Gaddis also

claims the misdemeanor disorderly conduct charge is based upon entirely

different but event with a different victim but does not provide any further

explanation or identify the event or the victim (Doc. 132, p. 10). A review of the

state court docket shows the case is currently set for trial in April 2022.

• Related Civil Case #1: SDIL Case No. 19-cv-653-SMY

Gaddis filed suit against Officer Jason Watts, Kevin Hall (the man who parked

in Gaddis’s driveway), and his neighbors, Dorothy McCombs and Charles

Winstead for false arrest. Id. at Doc. 8. Officer Watts moved to stay the case

pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), while the state criminal case

against Gaddis remained pending. Id. at Doc. 66. The motion was denied and

he filed an interlocutory appeal. Id. at Doc. 72, 73. Seventh Circuit Case No. 20-

2723. The appeal remains pending, as does the civil case in the district court.

• Related Civil Case #2: SDIL Case No. 19-cv-781-DWD

Gaddis filed a four-count complaint against Williamson County State’s

Attorney and Defendant Brandon Zanotti. Id. at Docs. 1, 37. In Count 1, Gaddis

4 As with Incident One, it is clear that Incident Two occurred on June 29, 2018, not 2019.

5 In the body of the complaint, Plaintiff refers to Jason Watts as a Defendant (Doc. 1, ¶¶112, 114). However,

Watts is not listed as a Defendant in the caption of the complaint, (see Doc. 1, p. 1), nor is he listed in the

section of the complaint titled “The Parties,” (see Doc. 1, pp. 2–4), no summons was ever issued for him (see

Docs. 23, 61, 62), and he was never served and has never appeared in this case. To be clear, Watts is not

currently a Defendant in this case.

alleges when he was arrested on June 29, 2018 and November 30, 2018, his right

to bail was conditioned on submitting to a mental health evaluation. Id. In

Count 2, Gaddis alleges that Zanotti or members of his office retaliated against

him for criticizing local government officials by filing approximately ten

criminal or traffic cases against him, requesting bench warrants for his arrest,

and assisting individuals in filing for orders of protection against him. Id. In

Count 3, Gaddis alleges he was denied his constitutional right to bail when he

was arrested twice on the same misdemeanor warrant in April 2019. Id. In

Count 4, Gaddis alleges that Zanotti has an ongoing conflict of interest with

respect to criminal cases against him and asks the Court to issue an injunction

barring Zanotti from participating in any manner in the prosecution of Gaddis

in any alleged crimes in the future.

The action was stayed in its entirety, pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37

(1971), pending the outcome of various state criminal charges against Gaddis.

Id. at Doc. 37. Additionally, Gaddis’s request to consolidate case 19-cv-781 with

the instant case was denied. Id. at Doc. 47.

• November 20, 2018 (Doc. 1, ¶¶58–68): Gaddis was involved in a verbal

altercation at Casey’s General Store with Defendant John Fleming, a Marion police officer

who was off-duty at the time. Following the incident, Fleming went to the Johnston City

Police Department (presumably to file a police report) and “caused Gaddis to be arrested

for aggravated assault.” Gaddis was charged with a felony in Williamson County Court.

Gaddis alleges that at the preliminary hearing in the criminal case, Fleming made false

statements. He further alleges that at the request of the deputy state’s attorney at the bond

hearing, Judge Lewis conditioned his release on bond on Gaddis submitting to a mental

evaluation. The criminal charges were dismissed on September 22, 2020. Gaddis alleges

that he would not have been arrested and prosecuted but for his criticisms of Williamson

County officials.

• Related Criminal Case: Circuit Court of Williamson County, Case No. 2018-

CF-685

The state court docket indicates that Gaddis was charged with felony

aggravated assault on a peace officer. The charges were dismissed on

September 22, 2020.

• Related Civil Case #1: Circuit Court of Williamson County, Case No. 2020-L-

159

Gaddis indicates that he filed suit against Fleming, but do not describe the

nature of the claims (Doc. 132, pp. 7–8). The case was stayed at Gaddis’s request

because he has other cases pending in federal court and he anticipates

voluntarily dismissing the state case (Id.).

• Related Civil Case #2: SDIL Case No. 19-cv-781-DWD. See supra pp. 8–9.

• February 14, 2019 (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 69–76, 145–54): Plain-clothes officer and

Defendant Justin Dwyer “chased [Gaddis] into his garage” and then Officer and

Defendant Jesse Thompson pulled Gaddis out of his vehicle and took him to the ground.

Officer Dwyer said Gaddis failed to use his turn signal as the grounds for pursuing him.

Gaddis was charged with an unspecified misdemeanor. Gaddis alleges that he would not

have been arrested and prosecuted but for his criticisms of Williamson County officials.

• Related Criminal Case: Circuit Court of Williamson County, Case No. 2019-

CM-62

It is not entirely clear what charge(s) Gaddis is facing in this case. The

complaint indicates Gaddis was charged with an unspecified misdemeanor

(Doc. 1, ¶¶70, 146). In his brief in response to one of the motions to dismiss,

Gaddis says “the charge was failure to signal” (Doc. 118, p. 4). But then in his

brief in response to the motion to stay, Gaddis said he was charged with a

misdemeanor for eluding a police officer (Doc. 132, p. 9). He then said that

charge was dismissed and he was charged with resisting arrest (Id.; see also Doc.

1, ¶149). Based on the Court’s review of the state court records, it appears the

case is proceeding on one count of resisting a peace officer. There is also no

indication from the state court records that Gaddis was ever ticketed for failure

to use his turn signal. Whatever the charge is, the case is still pending and is

set for trial in April 2022.

• Related Civil Case #1: SDIL Case No. 19-cv-781-DWD.

Gaddis alleges that the above-mentioned criminal case was one of Brandon

Zanotti’s acts of retaliation against Gaddis for criticizing government officials

SDIL Case No. 19-cv-781-DWD, Doc. 1, p. 10; see also supra pp. 8–9.

• Count 2: Gaddis brings a claim for false arrest against Officers Dwyer and

Thompson related to this incident.

• March 13, 2019 (Doc. 1, ¶¶77–81): Gaddis called the police because someone

threw nails on his driveway. His neighbors Dorothy McCombs and Charles Winstead

came out of their houses to watch Gaddis’s interaction with the police. Gaddis asked them

if they threw the nails. He was then arrested for talking to McCombs in violation of the

order of protection against him. (He does not identify the arresting officer.) State’s

Attorney and Defendant Brandon Zanotti filed criminal charges against Gaddis. Gaddis

alleges that he would not have been arrested and prosecuted but for his criticisms of

Williamson County officials.

• Related Criminal Case: Circuit Court of Williamson County, Case No. 2019-

CM-96

The state court docket indicates Gaddis was charged with violating an order of

protection. Gaddis represents that his motion to dismiss the charges was

denied and he was granted the right to assert as an affirmative defense that the

charges violate his constitutional rights (Doc. 132, p. 10). The docket shows this

case is currently set for trial in April 2022.

• Related Civil Case #1: SDIL Case No. 19-cv-781-DWD

Gaddis alleges that the above-mentioned prosecution was one of Brandon

Zanotti’s acts of retaliation against Gaddis for criticizing government officials.

See supra pp. 8–9.

• April 9–10, 2019 (Doc. 1, ¶¶82–93): Gaddis was arrested on April 9th for

violating an order of protection. He was held for two hours and then released after

posting bond. The following day, he was re-arrested a second time for the same thing by

Officer William Huddleston. Gaddis alleges that Huddleston knew Gaddis was being

arrested for a second time but that the supporting documentation for his first arrest had

not been entered into the LEADS system. Gaddis alleges that he was held for four hours,

aggressively searched, and subjected to a variety of other objectionable conditions.

Gaddis alleges that he would not have been arrested but for his criticisms of Williamson

County officials.

• Related Criminal Case: The parties do not indicate that any criminal charges

were ever filed against Gaddis. The Court’s own review of the Williamson

County Court records reveals a criminal case that might correspond with this

incident. In 2019-CM-128, Gaddis was charged with violating an order of

protection on April 9, 2019, amongst other things. The docket indicates this case

is currently set for trial in April 2022.

• Related Civil Case: SDIL Case No. 19-cv-781-DWD

This incident was the subject of Count 3 in this case against Brandon Zanotti,

which was dismissed as barred by the Eleventh Amendment and by

prosecutorial immunity. Id. at Doc. 37. See also supra pp. 8–9.

• June 7, 2019 (Doc. 1, ¶¶94–100): Gaddis alleges that a complaint was filed

against him for violating city ordinance by placing signs on utility poles. He further

alleges that other individuals regularly used utility poles to post signs. Gaddis believes

he is the only individual who has been prosecuted for posting signs on utility poles. He

alleges that the complaint would not have been filed had the posted signs not criticized

Williamson County officials. The complaint was dismissed after Gaddis retained an

attorney and filed an answer.

• The parties do not indicate that there are any related proceedings pending.

However, the Court’s own review of the Williamson County Court records

reveals a pending case that might correspond with this incident. In 2019-OV-

76, Gaddis was charged with an ordinance violation for posting signs to a

utility pole. It appears the city’s motion to dismiss the case nolle prosequi in

July 2020 was granted.

• June 18, 2019 (Doc. 1, ¶¶101–106): Gaddis was arrested by Officer and

Defendant John Fleming and Officer Bennie Vick while parked near the courthouse.

Gaddis alleges that he would not have been arrested but for his criticisms of Williamson

County officials. Gaddis asserts that he did not violate any ordinance, rule, or regulation

in parking where he did and that no charges were ever filed against him stemming from

this arrest (Doc. 132, p. 11).

• Count 3 – Gaddis brings a false arrest claim against Fleming related to this

incident (Doc. 1, p. 24).6

• July 9, 2019 (Doc. 1, ¶¶117–125): Williamson County Judge, Brad Bleyer

(who is not a Defendant in this case), entered an administrative order prohibiting Gaddis

from parking within 300 feet of the Williamson County Courthouse.7 Gaddis alleges the

order was entered without prior notice to him or a hearing. As a result of the order, his

car was seized and impounded. Gaddis further alleges that three months prior, he had a

verbal exchange with Judge Bleyer while he was demonstrating across from the

courthouse and Bleyer said he should cross the street and “kick [Gaddis’s] ass.” Gaddis

alleges that Judge Bleyer would not have threatened him or issued the administrative

order but for his criticisms of Williamson County officials.

• Related Civil Case: SDIL Case No. 19-cv-1334-SPM

Gaddis brought due process claims against Judge Bleyer related to the entry of

the administrative order and the impoundment of his car. Id. at Doc. 1. Judge

Bleyer’s motion to dismiss was granted and Gaddis’s claims were dismissed

with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Id. at Doc. 29. Gaddis did not appeal.

• January 9, 2020 (Doc. 1, ¶¶126–129): Felony charges were filed against

Gaddis for assaulting a courthouse deputy on January 9, 2020. Gaddis alleges that during

the preliminary hearing on the charges, Officer and Defendant John Fleming falsely

testified he saw Gaddis engage in a threatening gesture. Gaddis further alleges that after

video of the event was played, Fleming had to recant his testimony. Gaddis alleges he

would not have been arrested but for his criticisms of Williamson County officials.

• Related Criminal Case: Circuit Court of Williamson County, Case No. 2020-

CF-23

6 The complaint indicates that Count 3 is against Fleming and Vick (Doc. 1, p. 24). However, Vick is not

listed as a Defendant in the caption of the complaint, (see Doc. 1, p. 1), nor is he listed in the section of the

complaint titled “The Parties,” (see Doc. 1, pp. 2–4), no summons was ever issued for him (see Docs. 23, 61,

62), and he was never served and has never appeared in this case. To be clear, Vick is not currently a

Defendant in this case.

7 The administrative order can be found at Doc. 1-1 in SDIL Case No. 19-cv-1334-SPM.

Despite Gaddis’s allegations that Fleming had to recant his testimony (Doc. 1,

¶128), the docket in the criminal case indicates that probable cause was

nevertheless found and the charges were allowed to move forward. But the

charges were then dismissed in September 2020 because the prosecutor failed

to comply with Illinois law as to the appointment of a special prosecutor (see

also Doc. 1, ¶163).

• Count 4 – Gaddis asserts a false arrest claim against Officer Fleming related to

this incident.

• May 5, 2020 (Doc. 1, ¶¶130–142): Circuit Clerk and Defendant Andrew

Wilson issued a summons and served Gaddis with an order of protection pertaining to

Defendant Jennifer Page, a court reporter at the Williamson County courthouse. Gaddis

alleges that State’s Attorney and Defendant Brandon Zanotti and Defendant Betty

Caraway helped procure the Order by getting the forms from Wilson’s office and helping

Page fill them out. (See also Doc. 132-2—the petition for Stalking No Contact Order).

Gaddis claims the order of protection violated his free speech rights in that it prohibited

him from communicating to or about Page. He further claims he would not have been

required to respond to the order of protection proceedings but for his criticisms of

Williamson County officials.

• Related Civil Case #1: Circuit Court of Williamson County, Case No. 2020-OP-

140; Illinois App. Ct., Fifth District, Case No. 5-20-0231

The court issued an emergency order of protection on May 5, 2020. The court

later agreed with Gaddis that any portion of the emergency order which

enjoined him from “communicating to or about” the petitioner would be void

and should be vacated as to those words only, but all other terms of the

emergency order remained valid. Additionally, a two-year plenary order of

protection was issued after the judge found at least two incidents of Gaddis

stalking Page. Gaddis appealed the order. Illinois App. Ct., Fifth District, Case

No. 5-20-0231 (see Doc. 113, pp 3–4 n.1). After the parties’ briefing was

submitted in instant case, the Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the

issuance of the order of protection. Page v. Gaddis, 2021 WL 5881906 (Dec. 10,

2021).

• Related Civil Case #2: Circuit Court of Williamson County, Case No. 2020-L-

73; Illinois Appellate case number 5-21-0139

Gaddis sued Brandon Zanotti and Andrew Wilson because they used forms

that the Illinois legislature and Illinois courts have previously determined

contained unconstitutional language (Doc. 1, ¶143; Doc. 113-4; Doc. 131-28;

Doc. 132, p. 8). The claims were dismissed (Doc. 113-3). Gaddis appealed and

the appeal apparently remains pending (see Doc. 113, p. 18 n.3).

• Related Criminal Case: Circuit Court of Williamson County, Case No. 2021-

CM-266

Gaddis was charged with violating the order of protection after having contact

with Jennifer Page (Doc. 131; Doc. 131-24). The state court docket indicates that

Gaddis’s initial appearance has been continued to April 2022.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) addresses the legal sufficiency of the

plaintiff’s claim for relief, not the merits of the case or whether the plaintiff will ultimately

prevail. Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014); Gibson v.

City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the

court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the

plaintiff’s favor. E.g., Dix v. Edelman Fin. Servs., LLC, 978 F.3d 507, 512–13 (7th Cir. 2020).

However, “legal conclusions and conclusory allegations . . . are not entitled to this

presumption of truth.” Dix, 978 F.3d at 513 (quoting McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d

611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S, 555, 557 (2007)). “[W]hile a complaint does not need

‘detailed factual allegations’ to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, it must allege

sufficient facts ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Dix, 978 F.3d at 512–

13 (quoting League of Women Voters of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 757 F.3d 722, 724 (7th Cir.

2014)). Making the determination of plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 679 (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

The Court first looks at Defendants Dwyer and Thompson’s motion to dismiss the

false arrest claim in Count 2 and then turns to the arguments made by Defendants as to

the conspiracy claim in Count 1.

I. COUNT 2 – FALSE ARREST

Count 2 is a claim for false arrest arising out of the February 14, 2019, incident

where Officers Jesse Thompson and Justin Dwyer arrested Gaddis in his garage (Doc. 1,

¶¶69–76, 145–154; see supra p. 10). Defendants argue the complaint does not contain facts

sufficient to state a plausible claim because Gaddis makes the unadorned assertion that

they “did not have probable cause to arrest him” but he did not specify what specific

offense he was charged with, let alone describe the surrounding facts and circumstances

(Doc. 109, p. 8).

“To prevail on a false-arrest claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that there

was no probable cause for his arrest. Neita v. City of Chi., 830 F.3d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 2016)

(citing Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 246 (7th Cir. 2012)). The question for the Court

therefore is whether Gaddis has adequately pleaded a lack of probable cause. Neita, 830

F.3d at 497. “An officer has probable cause to arrest if at the time of the arrest, the facts

and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge . . . are sufficient to warrant a prudent

person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the

suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Neita, 830 F.3d

at 497 (citation omitted). Abbott v. Sangamon Cty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 714 (7th Cir. 2013)

(“Determining whether an officer had probable cause to arrest entails a purely objective

inquiry; the officer's subjective state of mind and beliefs are irrelevant.”). A police officer's

probable cause determination “depends on the elements of the underlying criminal

offense.” Neita, 830 F.3d at 497 (citation omitted). “[P]robable cause to believe that a

person has committed any crime will preclude a false arrest claim, even if the person was

arrested on additional or different charges for which there was no probable

cause.” Holmes v. Vill. of Hoffman Estate, 511 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2007).

At this point, the Court agrees that Gaddis has failed to adequately plead a lack of

probable cause, primarily because it is not clear what the underlying criminal offense was

or what the facts and circumstances of the arrest were. Gaddis alleges that he was driving

in his neighborhood when Officer Dwyer chased him into his garage (Doc. 1, ¶¶69–71,

145–47). Officer Thompson then entered the garage, pulled Gaddis out of his vehicle, took

him to the ground, and arrested him (Id.). Gaddis argues he was charged with failure to

signal, and this type of minor traffic violation is not the type of offense that should ever

give rise to an arrest, even if probable cause is present (Doc. 118, p. 4; see also Doc. 1, ¶¶70,

146 (alleging Officer Dwyer told him the police were pursuing him because he failed to

use his turn signal)). Gaddis further argues that the arrest was made inside his “living

area” because his “garage also serves as his dwelling,” and therefore a warrantless entry

and arrest requires exigent circumstances and none existed (Doc. 118, pp. 4–5).

Elsewhere, however, Gaddis provides additional information about the incident.

He says the police were annoyed that he drove his car through their parking lot, so Officer

Dwyer attempted to pull him over for failing to use his turn signal (Doc. 132, p. 9).

According to Gaddis, he was arrested for eluding a law enforcement officer, (Id.), not just

failing to use his turn signal, as he previously claimed. Gaddis further claims the charge

for eluding a law enforcement officer was dismissed and new charges for resisting arrest

were filed (Id.). It appears from the state court docket that the case is proceeding on one

count of resisting a peace officer.

As previously mentioned, Gaddis makes the bald assertion that Officers Dwyer

and Thompson “did not have probable cause to arrest him” (Doc. 1, ¶152). The federal

pleadings standard, however, demands more than “legal conclusions” and “naked

assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” to state a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678 (2009). Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v.

Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept

as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”)). Taken together, all of the

information suggests that Officer Dwyer pursued Gaddis with the intent to pull him over

for failing to use his turn signal, but Gaddis did not pull over and Officer Dwyer followed

him all the way to his house and into his garage, where he arrested him (see Doc. 1, ¶¶69–

76, 145–154). It seems as though Officers Dwyer and Thompson did have probable cause

to arrest Gaddis for evading an officer and/or resisting arrest. He says nothing that

would allow the Court to reach the opposite conclusion. For example, he makes no

allegations about the facts and circumstances known to Officers Dwyer and Thompson

at the time they arrested him and omits any details that would allow the Court to infer

that he did not fail to use his turn signal or fail to pull over (see Doc. 1).

Consequently, Count 2 for false arrest is dismissed for failure to properly plead

lack of probable case. The dismissal is without prejudice and Gaddis will be given an

opportunity to amend his complaint. However, the Court notes that even if Gaddis

successfully repleads this claim, the Court will likely stay litigation of the claim pursuant

to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) in order to avoid interfering with the state court

criminal proceedings. Under Younger, federal courts are required to abstain from taking

jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims when “there is an ongoing state proceeding

that is judicial in nature, involves important state interests, provides the plaintiff an

adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims, and no exceptional circumstances exist.”

Ewell v. Toney, 853 F.3d 911, 916 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Martinez, 505

F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2007)). Specifically, the Younger abstention doctrine, requires

federal courts to refrain from “intru[ding] into ongoing state criminal prosecutions.”

Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78 (2013) (citation omitted).

In Count 2, Gaddis is attacking the legality of his arrest on February 14, 2019,

asserting the police had no probable cause to arrest him. This is a constitutional issue that

may also be litigated in the underlying state court criminal case. (In fact, the Court

suspects that it has been litigated given that the state court docket reflects that Gaddis

filed a motion to quash and a number of motions to dismiss.). A finding in the present

case that Gaddis’s arrest was unconstitutional would necessarily interfere with the state

criminal proceedings. Younger abstention is therefore appropriate while the criminal case

works its way through the state courts. In this instance, because Gaddis is seeking

monetary damages for Count 2—relief that is unavailable from his pending state court

criminal proceedings—the claim would be stayed rather than dismissed. Simpson v.

Rowan, 73 F.3d 134, 138 (7th Cir. 1995).

II. COUNT 1 – CIVIL CONSPIRACY

“A civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons acting in concert to

commit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means.” Beaman v.

Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotations marks

omitted). “[T]he conspirators must act with a single plan, the general nature and scope of

which is known to each would-be conspirator.” Hernandez v. Joliet Police Dept., 197 F.3d

256, 263 (7th Cir. 1999). To prevail on a § 1983 conspiracy claim, the plaintiff must show

that “(1) the individuals reached an agreement to deprive him of his constitutional rights,

and (2) overt acts in furtherance actually deprived him of those rights.” Daugherty v. Page,

906 F.3d 606, 612 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Beaman, 776 F.3d at 510). In other words, the

plaintiff “must ‘show an underlying constitutional violation’ and ‘demonstrate that the

defendants agreed to inflict the constitutional harm.’” Daugherty, 906 F.3d at 612 (citing

Hurt v. Wise, 880 F.3d 831, 842 (7th Cir. 2018)). See also Bank of Am., N.A. v. Knight, 725 F.3d

815, 818 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[I]t remains essential to show that a particular defendant joined

the conspiracy and knew of its scope.”)

As Defendants note (e.g., Doc. 99, p. 2), Gaddis’s allegations as to the nature of the

underlying constitutional violation are somewhat confusing. On the one hand, Gaddis

asserts that the underlying constitutional violation was First Amendment retaliation. He

specifically alleged that the Defendants “reached an agreement . . . to retaliate against

[him] because of his decision to exercise [h]is constitutional rights,” meaning his decision

to speak out about the perceived corruption of local government officials (Doc. 1, ¶37).

The retaliation took the form of a number of “tortious acts,” (Doc. 1, pp. 6–21), in which

Gaddis claims he was arrested and/or prosecuted by Defendants without probable cause

or justification, (e.g., Doc. 115, pp. 3–4).

On the other hand, Gaddis includes allegations suggesting that some of the

“tortious acts” violated his constitutional rights for other reasons independent of

retaliation. For example, he alleges that the orders of protection obtained against him

violated his right to freedom of speech in that they prohibited him from communicating

to or about the petitioners (Doc. 1, ¶¶39, 53, 135). It is not clear if Gaddis is attempting to

allege that the orders of protection were sought not only as part of the conspiracy to

retaliate against him for criticizing local government officials, but also as part of a

separate conspiracy to violate his free speech rights. In other words, a conspiracy

amongst a few individuals within the larger, overarching conspiracy amongst all

Defendants to retaliate. The Court notes that Gaddis was represented by counsel when

he filed his complaint and is therefore not entitled to the same generous interpretation

afforded to pro se litigants. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011) (pro se

complaints are construed “liberally” and held “to a less stringent standard than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.”). For that reason, the Court will rely on Gaddis’s explicit

allegations and will not attempt to read between the lines. The Court thus understands

Gaddis’s claim in Count 1 to be that Defendants conspired to retaliate against him

because he criticized local government officials, meaning the underlying constitutional

violation was First Amendment retaliation. To the extent Gaddis claims the “tortious

acts” violated his constitutional rights for reasons independent of retaliation, (e.g., the

orders of protection violated his right to free speech), the Court views those allegations

as an effort by Gaddis to demonstrate that he “suffered a deprivation that would likely

deter First Amendment activity in the future” (see Doc. 1, ¶144). Douglas v. Reeves, 964

F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2020).

In order to show that he was subject to retaliation in violation of his First

Amendment rights, Gaddis must allege facts suggesting that: “(1) he engaged in activity

protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter

First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was at least

a motivating factor in the defendants’ decision to take the retaliatory action.” Douglas v.

Reeves, 964 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th

Cir. 2009)).

A. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

The moving Defendants all argue that, generally speaking, Gaddis failed to state

a claim for conspiracy to retaliate against him (Docs. 95, 97, 99, 101, 103, 105, 107, 109, 111,

113). Some Defendants also make more specific arguments that Gaddis failed to state a

claim as to them individually in regard to particular incidents. The Court believes it

makes the most sense to first address the general argument and then look at the more

specific arguments, as necessary.

Defendants contend that Gaddis failed to state a claim because none of the

“tortious acts” outlined in the complaint are related in any kind of logical way that

plausibly suggests they were the product of a conspiracy (e.g., Doc. 99, pp. 4–7). Rather,

the events that comprised the purported conspiracy were disconnected, distinct incidents

involving different parties (e.g., id.). The Court agrees that Gaddis’s allegations do not

plausibly suggest a conspiracy. Gaddis has baldly alleged a wide-ranging conspiracy

against various categories of unrelated defendants for purported wrongs that do not

appear to be connected.

In pleading a conspiracy claim under § 1983, the plaintiff is not required to detail

the specifics of the agreement among the alleged conspirators. In fact, that is not the kind

of information that a plaintiff can be expected to have at the time they file their complaint.

However, the complaint must include more than a generalized, conclusory allegation of

conspiracy. See Redd v. Nolan, 663 F.3d 287, 292 (7th Cir. 2011); Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d

967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009) (Neither “a bare allegation of conspiracy,” nor “mere suspicion

that persons adverse to the plaintiff had joined a conspiracy against him or her” is enough

to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim). The complaint must allege facts

that collectively give rise to a “plausible account of conspiracy” or reasonable inference

of “improper complicity” by the defendants. Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 749

(7th Cir. 2012); Redd, 663 F.3d at 292. The question is “[s]tripped of legal conclusions, does

the complaint contain “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an

agreement” to retaliate against Gaddis was made. Alarm Detection Sys., Inc. v. Vill. of

Schaumburg, 930 F.3d 812, 827 (7th Cir. 2019) (parenthetical in original).

Here, the answer is no. Although Gaddis has identified a basic time frame and a

conspiratorial purpose, his allegations do not establish a pattern of clearly related

conduct that suggests the existence of an agreement or understanding between the

Defendants to deny him his constitutional rights. To begin with, there were various

categories of people—both private citizens and public officials—allegedly involved in the

purported conspiracy. Gaddis asserts that some of his neighbors, Marion police,

Williamson County sheriff’s deputies, state court judges, the elected Circuit Clerk, the

elected State’s Attorney and a victim advocate from his office, and other courthouse

employees, including a court reporter, were all in cahoots together. There is no obvious

connection between many of these people. And it is also not apparent why some of them

would have any interest at all in retaliating against Gaddis for criticizing public officials.

Additionally, not all of the conduct at issue is clearly related or clearly aimed at

achieving a collective and illegal goal. In fact, there appears to be a reasonable

explanation for many of the incidents Gaddis labels as “tortious acts.” For example, it has

already been adjudicated that a number of his arrests were legitimate and probable cause

existed for the arrests. As additional examples, Dorothy McCombs sought an order of

protection against Plaintiff in October 2017 following a dispute with him. And Bryan

DeMattei called the police on Plaintiff in March 2018 after Plaintiff randomly showed up

at his home to confront him. These two events, which occurred five months apart, have

no obvious connection to one another. Rather, it appears McCombs’s actions and

DeMattei’s actions were taken completely independently of one another and had nothing

to do with Gaddis’s criticism of public officials but rather were based on Gaddis’s

purportedly threatening behavior toward each of them. But see Geinosky v. City of Chicago,

675 F.3d 743, 749 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding it “a challenge to imagine a scenario” in which

the harassment the plaintiff faced “would not have been the product of a conspiracy”

where the plaintiff alleged that officers from the same police unit wrote him 24 bogus

parking tickets over the course of fourteen months).

Simply put, Gaddis is trying to lump together the actions of everyone he feels has

wronged him. But his complaint contains nothing more than his own vague and

conclusory, if not paranoid, allegations that a conspiracy existed. There is no sufficient

factual development to create plausibility consistent with “judicial experience and

common sense” that dozens of individuals, many with no apparent connection to one

another, were leagued in a conspiracy over the course of several years to get back at

Gaddis for speaking out against government officials. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

For these reasons, Gaddis’s conspiracy claim (Count 1) is dismissed for failure to

state a claim as to all Defendants. Ordinarily, such a dismissal would be without

prejudice and with leave to amend. Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co., 937 F.3d 998, 1008 (7th Cir.

2019) (citation omitted). However, there are alternative reasons that the dismissal should

be with prejudice as to some Defendants, which are discussed below.

B. OCTOBER 24, 2017 INCIDENT (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 38–44)

To recap, on October 20, 2017, Gaddis was involved in a dispute with his

neighbors, including Defendant Dorothy McCombs. The police were called and Gaddis

was arrested for disorderly conduct by Defendants Bryan DeMattei, William Lannom,

and Logan Spinka. On October 24th, at the urging of Defendant Mary Griffith, McCombs

applied for and was granted an order of protection against Gaddis.

There are multiple reasons that dismissal of Gaddis’s claim based on the above

incident is warranted. First, it is barred by the statute of limitations (see Docs. 99, 103,

107). While the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that cannot normally be

decided on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint is nevertheless subject to

dismissal for failure to state a claim when the allegations of the complaint reveal that the

claim is “indisputably time-barred.” Rosado v. Gonzalez, 832 F.3d 714, 716 (7th Cir. 2016);

Logan v. Wilkins, 644 F.3d 577, 582 (7th Cir. 2011). “[T]he limitations period applicable

to all § 1983 claims brought in Illinois is two years.” Woods v. Illinois Dep’t of Child. & Fam.

Servs., 710 F.3d 762, 768 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743,

749 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying a two-year statute of limitations to §1983 conspiracy claim).

For a conspiracy claim, the statute of limitations begins to run from each overt act that is

alleged to cause damage to the plaintiff, as opposed to commencing as to the entire

conspiracy upon the occurrence of the last act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Scherer v.

Balkema, 840 F.2d 437, 439–40 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334,

1340 (9th Cir. 1986)). Consequently, a plaintiff can only recover damages for overt acts

alleged to have occurred within the applicable limitations period. Geinosky, 675 F.3d at

749; Scherer, 840 F.2d at 440.

Here, Gaddis filed this lawsuit on February 13, 2021 (Doc. 1). Therefore, he cannot

recover damages for any overt acts that occurred prior to February 13, 2019. That means

any claim for damages stemming from his arrest on October 20, 2017 and subsequent

related conduct by Defendants must be dismissed as time-barred.

Second, Gaddis’s allegations affirmatively demonstrate this incident was not part

of the purported conspiracy. In particular, Gaddis does not specifically allege that

Defendants’ conduct was retaliatory, or that he would not have been arrested or subjected

to the order of protection proceedings but for his speech criticizing Williamson County

officials that was the impetus for the conspiracy (see Doc. 1). Nor could he because his

speech did not occur until after Defendants’ alleged conduct. Gaddis explicitly alleged

that he began speaking out about Williamson County officials on October 28th (Doc. 1,

¶29). But his arrest, Officer Griffith’s conduct, and McCombs’s application for an order

of protection all occurred prior to that. Given the timing of the events, the Court cannot

plausibly infer that Gaddis’s speech motivated any of the Defendants’ actions because his

speech had not yet occurred.

Additionally, Gaddis specifically alleged Defendants did not become aware of his

“constitutionally protected activities” until November 1, 2017, and the conspiracy began

sometime thereafter (Doc. 1, ¶¶30, 37). He later reiterated this timeline in his briefing (e.g.,

Doc. 123, p. 5). The Court therefore cannot plausibly infer that any of the Defendants’

actions were taken in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy at hand because the

conspiracy had not yet begun.

For these reasons, the dismissal of Count 1 with respect to this incident is with

prejudice. Because this is the only incident in which Officer Griffith was involved (see

Doc. 1), she is therefore entitled to outright dismissal with prejudice from this action.

C. MARCH 25, 2018 INCIDENT (Doc. 1, ¶¶45–57)

According to the complaint, Gaddis stopped at Bryan DeMattei’s house, and

DeMattei and Sam Ward called the police. Gaddis was arrested by deputy sheriff Craig

Oglesby and charged with felony trespass. DeMattei then searched Gaddis’s car, and

based on what he found, he and William Lannom applied for orders of protection against

Gaddis. During the preliminary hearing on the criminal charges, Deputy Oglesby

allegedly made a number of false statements.

The Court first notes Defendants did not argue that Gaddis’s claim based on this

incident was time-barred (see Doc. 103, 105, 107). Therefore, the Court will not address the

issue. Rather, Defendants say that Gaddis’s claims against them should be dismissed

because they are duplicative of a prior suit and/or constitute improper claim-splitting

(Id.).

The rule against duplicative litigation, the rule against claim splitting, and res

judicata are distinct, yet related and overlapping doctrines. See Scholz v. United States, 18

F.4th 941, 951 (7th Cir. Nov. 23, 2021) (“‘Claim splitting in duplicative lawsuits’ is a subset

of the res judicata doctrine.” (quoting Palka v. City of Chicago, 662 F.3d 428, 437 (7th Cir.

2011))); Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The rule against

duplicative litigation is distinct from but related to the doctrine of claim preclusion or res

judicata.”). While res judicata was not argued by DeMattei, Ward, and Lannom with

respect to this incident (see Doc. 103, 105, 107), the Court believes it is applicable at least

as to Lannom, and it also comes into play with respect to later incidents. It therefore

makes sense to discuss it now in combination with duplicative litigation and claim

splitting.

As a general rule, “a district court has ‘significant latitude’ and ‘broad discretion

to dismiss a complaint for reasons of wise judicial administration . . . whenever it is

duplicative of a parallel action already pending in another federal court.’” Scholz, 18 F.4th

at 951 (quoting McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 694 F.3d 873, 888 (7th Cir. 2012)). Curtis,

226 F.3d at 138 (citing Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817 (“As between federal district courts,

. . . though no precise rule has evolved, the general principle is to avoid duplicative

litigation.”)). “A suit is duplicative if the ‘claims, parties, and available relief do not

significantly differ between the two actions.’” Scholz, 18 F.4th at 951 (quoting McReynolds,

694 F.3d at 889).

Similarly, “[t]he rule against claim splitting prohibits a plaintiff from prosecuting

its case piecemeal and requires that all claims arising out of a single wrong be presented

in one action.” Lee v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 802 F.3d 626, 635 (4th Cir. 2015) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). See also Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 34

(2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Plaintiffs generally must bring all claims arising out of a

common set of facts in a single lawsuit, and federal district courts have discretion to

enforce that requirement as necessary ‘to avoid duplicative litigation.’” (citation

omitted)). Simply put, “plaintiffs have no right to maintain two actions on the same

subject in the same court, against the same defendant at the same time.” Curtis, 226 F.3d

at 139. Claim-splitting occurs when a plaintiff brings a suit “arising from the same

transaction or events underlying a previous suit, simply by a change of legal theory[.]”

Scholz, 18 F.4th at 951 (quoting Carr v. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909, 913 (7th Cir. 2010)).

Res judicata is a broad term that encompasses both claim preclusion (sometimes

itself called res judicata) and issue preclusion (sometimes called collateral estoppel).

Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1589, 1594 (2020) (citing

18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4402 (3d ed.

2016)). “A fundamental precept of common-law adjudication . . . is that a ‘right, question

or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction

. . . cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies . . .

.’” Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (quoting Southern Pacific R. Co. v.

United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897)).

It is important to note that the rules against duplicative litigation and claim

splitting are typically invoked in instances where the first suit is still proceeding when

the second suit is filed, while res judicata can apply only after a judgment has been

entered in the first suit. See, e.g., Scholz, 18 F.4th at 952.

1. Bryan DeMattei (Docs. 102, 103; see also Doc. 116)

Gaddis previously sued DeMattei, along with Officers Ward, Oglesby, and Jeffrey

Moore (who is not a Defendant in the instant case), for illegal search and seizure of his

car and trespass. SDIL Case No. 18-cv-1464-DWD, Doc. 1. The proceedings were stayed

pending the resolution of the criminal charges against Gaddis in state court. Id. at Doc.

36.8 Because the previous federal suit remains pending, the rules against duplicative

litigation and claim splitting, not res judicata, are the appropriate doctrines to consider.

Claim splitting blocks a second lawsuit if there is an identity of the parties in the

8 Plaintiff also filed a second suit against Ward and DeMattei in state court for battery in taking him to the

ground and public disclosure of private facts for reading his notebook and sharing its content with Officer

William Lannom (Doc. 131-5; Doc. 132, p. 5). See Circuit Court of Williamson Count, Illinois Case No. 2020-

L-36. The second case was also stayed. The Court does not consider the effect of this case because the rules

against duplicative litigation and claim splitting apply only as to cases proceeding concurrently in federal

court. Whether a federal court case should proceed in light of an earlier filed state court case is an issue of

abstention. See 17A FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 4247 (3d ed.); Freed v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 756 F.3d

1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2014) (discussing Colorado River abstention). Because neither party discussed whether

abstention was appropriate, (see Docs. 103, 105, 107; Docs. 116, 119, 121), the Court declines to address the

issue.

two suits and an identity of the causes of action. Scholz, 18 F.4th at 951. Here, it is

indisputable that an identity of the parties exists between the first federal suit and this

suit— Gaddis sued Bryan DeMattei as a Defendant in both cases. The question is whether

there is an identity between the causes of action in the two suits. Generally, there is an

identity between causes of action if “the claims arise out of the same set of operative facts

or the same transaction.” Scholz, 18 F.4th at 952 (citing Matrix IV, Inc. v. Am. Nat. Bank &

Tr. Co. of Chicago, 649 F.3d 539, 547 (7th Cir. 2011)). “This ‘transactional’ inquiry focuses

on whether the claims comprise the same core of operative facts that give rise to a

remedy.” Matrix IV, 649 F.3d at 547 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

“Even if the two claims are based on different legal theories, the two claims are one for

purposes of res judicata if they are based on the same, or nearly the same, factual

allegations.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accord Scholz, 18 F.4th at

952 (“[T]he legal theories for the claims in each case need not be the same provided they

are based on the same, or nearly the same, factual allegations.”); United States ex rel.

Conner v. Mahajan, 877 F.3d 264, 271 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Two causes of action are identical if

each claim is supported by the same factual allegations, and the judgment in each case

would be based on the same evidence.”) (citations omitted).

Officer DeMattei argues that the allegations against him in the previous case and

the present case all arise out of the March 25, 2018 incident where Gaddis trespassed on

DeMattei’s property and was subsequently arrested, and therefore the suits are

duplicative (Doc. 103, pp. 8–10). DeMattei argues that Gaddis has to assert all of his claims

based on these events against DeMattei in a single cause of action (Id.). Therefore, if

Gaddis wants to bring another claim against DeMattei based on a new legal theory, he

should amend his complaint in the first suit (Id.). DeMattei believes Gaddis instead chose

to file a new lawsuit and attack DeMattei’s actions as part of a conspiracy in an effort to

avoid the stay in his earlier federal suit (Id.).

Gaddis contends, however, that his claims in this case are not duplicative of those

in the previous suit (Doc. 116, pp. 4–6). He acknowledges there are shared facts between

the two suits, but asserts those facts are alleged here “simply to show acts in furtherance

of the conspiracy and to demonstrate the conspiracy itself” (Id.). He argues the conspiracy

claim is distinct and, in fact, he did not know of any conspiracy in 2018 when he filed the

previous suit or have reason to believe one existed (Id.).

Gaddis’s arguments are unavailing. The claims against DeMattei in the first

federal suit and in the present suit both arise out of Gaddis’s arrest on March 25, 2018 and

subsequent related events. In the first case, Gaddis asserts that DeMattei acted illegally

that day by searching his car without a warrant or probable cause to do so. SDIL Case

No. 18-cv-1464-DWD, Doc. 1. Here, Gaddis once again takes issue with the search, and

seemingly with the fact that DeMattei called the police on Gaddis, shared information

about what he found in Gaddis’s car with William Lannom, and filed for a protective

order against Gaddis (see Doc 1). Regardless, the underlying transaction that gave rise to

all of the claims in both of Gaddis’s suits was his detention and arrest on March 25, 2018.

See, e.g., Wheeler v. Dayton Police Dep’t, 807 F.3d 764, 766 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that claim

preclusion applied because the plaintiff’s allegations in prior lawsuit that officers

conducted an illegal search and used excessive force during his 2009 arrest and his

allegations in present lawsuit that officers planted evidence and falsified a citation “arose

out of the same transaction”—his 2009 arrest). Gaddis “was obliged to . . . raise all claims

that stem from the same transaction or series of related transactions” against DeMattei in

the first lawsuit. Scholz, 18 F.4th at 953 (citation omitted). His attempt to now bring claims

resting on the same event and same conduct in the present case is “a quintessential

example of claim splitting in duplicative lawsuits.” Id.

Furthermore, at the time Gaddis filed the present suit in February 2021, it is clear

that he could not have brought a stand-alone claim for retaliation against DeMattei. Not

only would such a claim have been time-barred, but it would have indisputably violated

the rule against claim splitting. That is, Gaddis would be trying to maintain two federal

lawsuits against DeMattei based on the exact same series of events that began with his

detention and arrest on March 25, 2018, by simply asserting a right to relief based on

different legal theories. The fact that Gaddis did not assert a stand-alone claim for

retaliation but instead cast his claim against DeMattei as part of a continuing civil

conspiracy should not result in a different outcome. Rosado v. Gonzalez, 832 F.3d 714, 718

(7th Cir. 2016) (“[A] plaintiff cannot use a theory of a continuing civil conspiracy to

recover for individual overt acts that would themselves be time-barred . . . .”) (citing

Scherer v. Balkema, 840 F.2d 437, 440 (7th Cir. 1988)).

In conclusion, Gaddis’s allegations concerning this incident with respect to Bryan

DeMattei are barred by the rule against claim-splitting. Because neither of the incidents

involving DeMattei—the October 24, 2017 incident and the March 25, 2018 incident—can

serve as a basis for Gaddis’s conspiracy claim, DeMattei is entitled to outright dismissal

with prejudice from this action.

2. Sam Ward (Docs. 104, 105; see also Doc. 121)

For the same reasons discussed above with respect to Officer DeMattei, Gaddis’s

claim against Officer Ward is blocked by the rule against claim splitting. In short, Gaddis

previously filed a federal suit against Ward based on Ward’s involvement in the events

of March 25, 2018. See SDIL Case No. 18-cv-1464-DWD. Gaddis cannot maintain a second,

overlapping suit against Ward based on the same incident by simply asserting a right to

relief under a different legal theory.

Because this is the only incident in which Officer Ward was involved (see Doc. 1),

he is therefore entitled to outright dismissal with prejudice from this action.

3. Craig Oglesby

Although Craig Oglesby did not file a motion to dismiss, it is clear the same claim-

splitting analysis applies to his conduct on March 25, 2018. Gaddis previously filed a

federal suit against Oglesby based on Oglesby’s involvement in the events of March 25,

2018. See SDIL Case No. 18-cv-1464-DWD. Gaddis cannot maintain a second, overlapping

suit against Oglesby based on that same conduct. It is less clear, however, whether Gaddis

should also be barred from challenging Oglesby’s purported false testimony months later

at the preliminary hearing on the trespass charges. Because the parties have not briefed

this specific issue, the Court will allow Plaintiff to reassert this aspect of his claim against

Oglesby if he chooses to file an amended complaint.

4. William Lannom (Docs. 106, 107; see also 119)

Officer Lannom argues that Gaddis’s claim is duplicative of a prior suit and/or

constitutes improper claim-splitting (Doc. 107, pp. 7–9). Specifically, Gaddis previously

sued Lannom in Williamson County Court for malicious prosecution related to the order

of protection (Doc. 131-7). See Circuit Court of Williamson County, Case No. 2018-L-112.

Final judgment on the merits was entered in the first suit in September 2020, and the

present suit was not filed until February 2021 (Doc. 1). Because the first suit was not still

pending at the time the instant case was filed, the Court believes the appropriate doctrine

is actually res judicata. The parties’ arguments made regarding claim splitting suffice to

evaluate whether Gaddis’s claim against Officer Lannom is barred by res judicata. See

Scholz v. United States, 18 F.4th 941, 951 (7th Cir. Nov. 23, 2021) (“‘Claim splitting in

duplicative lawsuits’ is a subset of the res judicata doctrine.” (quoting Palka v. City of

Chicago, 662 F.3d 428, 437 (7th Cir. 2011))).

“District courts ordinarily should not dismiss a complaint based on an affirmative

defense such as res judicata.” Parungao v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 858 F.3d 452, 457 (7th Cir.

2017) (citations omitted). “But when it is clear from the face of the complaint, and matters

of which the court may take judicial notice, that the plaintiff’s claims are barred as a

matter of law, dismissal is appropriate.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted).

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, “refers to the effect of a prior judgment in

foreclosing successive litigation of the very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the

claim raises the same issues as the earlier suit.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748

(2001). In other words, claim preclusion “prevents the relitigation of claims already

litigated as well as those that could have been litigated but were not.” Palka v. City of

Chicago, 662 F.3d 428, 437 (7th Cir. 2011). Id. The preclusive effect of the previous

judgment, which was issued by an Illinois court, is determined by Illinois law. Arlin-Golf,

LLC v. Vill. Of Arlington Heights, 631 F.3d 818, 821 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Hicks v. Midwest

Transit, Inc., 479 F.3d 468, 471 (7th Cir. 2007)). The doctrine of res judicata under Illinois

law has three requirements: (1) a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of

competent jurisdiction; (2) an identity of the causes of action; and (3) an identity of the

parties or their privies. Parungao, 858 F.3d at 457; Arlin-Golf, 631 F.3d at 471.

Once the above elements are met, res judicata generally bars claims as of the time

the first lawsuit was filed, but not those that accrue later. Lucky Brand, 140 S. Ct. at 1596

(“Claim preclusion generally does not bar claims that are predicated on events that

postdate the filing of the initial complaint . . . [because] [e]vents that occur after the

plaintiff files suit often give rise to new material operative facts that “in themselves, or

taken in conjunction with the antecedent facts, create a new claim to relief.”) (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted); Ellis v. CCA of Tenn. LLC, 650 F.3d 640, 652 (7th

Cir. 2011); Smith v. Potter, 513 F.3d 781, 783 (7th Cir. 2008).

There is no dispute that a final judgment on the merits was issued in the state suit

or that an identity of the parties exists between the state suit and the present suit. The

only issue is whether an identity of the causes of action exists. “Illinois employs a

‘transactional test’ to decide whether complaints allege the same cause of action.”

Parungao, 858 F.3d at 457 (citation omitted). “Under this test, separate claims will be

considered the same cause of action for purposes of res judicata if they arise from a single

group of operative facts, regardless of whether they assert different theories of relief.” Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

In the first suit in state court, Gaddis sued Officer Lannom for malicious

prosecution, alleging that Lannom did not have probable cause to initiate the proceeding

and did so only out of malice and with the intent to harm Gaddis (Doc. 106-1). The state

court granted summary judgment to Lannom in September 2020, finding that he did have

probable cause to pursue an order of protection (Doc. 106-2).

Gaddis is now alleging in the present suit that Officer Lannom pursued the order

of protection against him for retaliatory purposes and it was just one in a series of events

that constituted a vast conspiracy to retaliate against him. It is clear that Gaddis is trying

to rope Officer Lannom into the conspiracy in the present suit based on the same

underlying event that his first state suit was based on. Gaddis has already had a full and

fair opportunity to litigate the propriety of the order of protection that Lannom sought

against him, and he should not be allowed to recontest the matter and potentially

undermine the judgment in the first suit. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008); Palka,

662 F.3d at 437. Therefore, Gaddis’s claim against Officer Lannom in this case stemming

from the March 25, 2018 incident is barred by res judicata.

Having found that the only two events Officer William Lannom is associated with

in the complaint—the October 20, 2017 arrest and the order of protection proceedings

initiated in March 2018 —cannot serve as a basis for Gaddis’s conspiracy claim, Lannom

is entitled to outright dismissal with prejudice from this action.

D. JUNE 29, 2018 FIRST ARREST (Doc. 1, ¶¶107–110)

On June 29, 2018, Dorothy McCombs and Brenda Grant called the police and

Gaddis was arrested by Marion police officers and Defendants Tom Stearns and Logan

Spinka for violating an order of protection. He was then released a few hours later after

it was determined there was no order of protection in place. Gaddis alleges that his arrest

on June 29, 2018 was in retaliation for his criticisms of Williamson County officials.

Officers Stearns and Spinka argue that Gaddis cannot include this incident in his

conspiracy claim because it is duplicative of a prior suit, it constitutes improper claim-

splitting, or it is precluded based on his previous suit against them for false arrest (Doc.

99, pp. 7–10; Doc. 101, pp. 7–10). Because Gaddis’s first suit—SDIL Case No. 18-cv-1437-

SMY—was not pending at the time the instant case was filed,9 the proper doctrine to

analyze is claim preclusion.

The preclusive effect of the previous judgment, which was issued by a federal

court, is determined by federal common law. Taylor, 553 U.S. at; Palka, 662 F.3d at 437

(when the issue is “whether an earlier federal judgment has preclusive effect on a

subsequent federal claim,” then federal res judicata principles apply). Like Illinois law,

claim preclusion under federal law has three requirements: (1) identity of parties in the

two suits, (2) identity of claims, and (3) a final judgment on the merits in the first suit.

Scholz, 18 F.4th at 952.

There is no dispute that, between the previous suit and the present suit, the first

and third elements of res judicata are satisfied (Doc. 99, p. 10; Doc. 115, p. 7). The only

9 Final judgment on the merits was entered in the first suit on July 27, 2020, SDIL Case No. 18-1729-SMY,

Doc. 70,9 and the present suit was not filed until over six months later in February 2021 (Doc. 1).

dispute is whether there is an identity between the causes of action in the two suits. As

mentioned, federal law uses a “transactional” inquiry similar to Illinois law to decide

whether an identity of claims exists. See Matrix IV, Inc. v. Am. Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. of

Chicago, 649 F.3d 539, 547 (7th Cir. 2011). Federal law provides that there is an identity

between claims if they “arise out of the same set of operative facts or the same

transaction.” Id. “This ‘transactional’ inquiry focuses on whether the claims comprise the

same core of operative facts that give rise to a remedy.” Id. (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). “Even if the two claims are based on different legal theories, the two

claims are one for purposes of res judicata if they are based on the same, or nearly the

same, factual allegations.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accord

Scholz, 18 F.4th at 952 (“[T]he legal theories for the claims in each case need not be the

same provided they are based on the same, or nearly the same, factual allegations.”);

United States ex rel. Conner v. Mahajan, 877 F.3d 264, 271 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Two causes of

action are identical if each claim is supported by the same factual allegations, and the

judgment in each case would be based on the same evidence.”) (citations omitted).

In the previous federal suit, Gaddis sued Officers Spinka and Stearns, claiming his

arrest on June 29, 2018 constituted false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

SDIL Case No. 18-cv-1437-SMY, Docs. 1, 20. Here, he alleges his arrest was in retaliation

for his criticisms of local officials. Officers Spinka and Stearns argue that the allegations

against them in the previous case and in this one “all arise out of” Gaddis’s arrest on June

29, 2018 and in both cases he says the arrest was improper, albeit for different reasons

(Doc. 99, p. 10; Doc. 101, pp. 9–10). As a result, Spinka and Stearns say this case involves

the same cause of action as the first case and is barred by res judicata (Doc. 99, p. 10; Doc.

101, pp. 9–10). Gaddis argues, however, that the First Amendment conspiracy claim in

this case is distinct from the Fourth Amendment false arrest claim in the first suit (Doc.

115, p. 7; Doc. 120, p. 7). Gaddis once again asserts that the prior suit did not allege any

form of conspiracy because he had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed at that

time, and therefore his cause of action in the present case did not exist at the time of the

prior litigation (Doc. 115, pp. 5, 6, 7; Doc. 120, pp. 5, 6, 7).

The Court understands the argument that Gaddis is making and agrees with him

to the extent he is arguing that claim preclusion does not bar him from bringing his

conspiracy claim altogether. The conspiracy includes events which had not even occurred

by the time the previous case was filed. Therefore, the judgment in the previous case

“cannot be given the effect of extinguishing claims which did not even then exist and

which could not possibly have been sued upon in the previous case.” Lawlor v. National

Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 328 (1955). While claim preclusion does not bar Gaddis’s

entire conspiracy claim, it does, in the Court’s view, bar Gaddis from including the June

2018 arrest in his conspiracy claim and seeking to recover damages from the Officers who

effectuated the arrest.

In his first suit, Gaddis challenged the validity of the arrest as a violation of the

Fourth Amendment, and he lost. SDIL Case No. 18-cv-1437-SMY, Doc. 86. The judge

ruled on summary judgment that probable cause existed for the arrest and the arrest was

not unconstitutional. Id. In the instant suit, Gaddis is now claiming the arrest was part of

a conspiracy to retaliate against him. It is clear that claim preclusion would bar Gaddis

from bringing a stand-alone claim that the June 2018 arrest was retaliatory and violated

the First Amendment. Such a claim would arise out of the same event that was the subject

matter of his first lawsuit—his first arrest on June 29, 2018. Ross ex rel. Ross v. Bd. Of Educ.

Of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 211, 486 F.3d 279, 283 (7th Cir. 2007) (res judicata “require[s] the

joinder of all legal challenges to a wrong, and all claims for relief arising out of those

events . . . .” (quoting Perkins v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 116 F.3d 235, 236–

37 (7th Cir. 1997))). And its resolution would revolve around the same issue of whether

probable cause existed for the arrest. Lucky Brand, 140 S. Ct. at 1597 (“If . . . a different

outcome in the second action ‘would nullify the initial judgment or would impair rights

established in the initial action,’ preclusion principles would be at play.”

(quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 22(b), at 185)). See also Lund v. City of

Rockford, Illinois, 956 F.3d 938, 945 (7th Cir. 2020) (“The plaintiff pressing a retaliatory

arrest claim must plead and prove the absence of probable cause for the arrest. . . .

[P]robable cause defeats a claim of retaliatory arrest.” (quoting Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S.

Ct. 1715, 1724 (2019))).10

10 The Nieves court carved out a very narrow exception, explaining that “Although probable cause should

generally defeat a retaliatory arrest claim, a narrow qualification is warranted for circumstances where

officers have probable cause to make arrests, but typically exercise their discretion not to do so.” As an

example, the Nieves majority described a hypothetical in which a police officer uses a jaywalking arrest to

retaliate against an individual who has been vocally complaining about police conduct, when other

jaywalkers are almost never subject to arrest. Lund, 956 F.3d at 945 (citing Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1727). Here,

Gaddis does not allege that he fits into the Nieves exception, and he made no attempt to allege that police

officers rarely make arrests in similar situations, or that other similarly situated persons were not arrested

(see Doc. 1, ¶¶ 38–44).

If a stand-alone claim for retaliation would be precluded, then a claim for

conspiracy to retaliate, in which Gaddis’s arrest is recast as one of the retaliatory events

in the conspiracy, is also foreclosed. In other words, Gaddis cannot circumvent the effect

of claim preclusion by recasting his arrest as part of a conspiracy. That is because Gaddis

is ultimately just trying to reframe and relitigate the validity of the arrest and bypass the

judgment against him in the first suit. A win for Gaddis here would contradict the initial

judgment that probable cause for the arrest existed. Therefore, claim preclusion bars

Gaddis from claiming the first arrest on June 29, 2018 was part of the purported

conspiracy.11

Having found that the only two events Officer Logan Spinka is associated with in

the complaint—the October 20, 2017 arrest and the first arrest on June 29, 2018— cannot

serve as a basis for Gaddis’s conspiracy claim, Spinka is entitled to outright dismissal

with prejudice from this action. Tom Stearns is likewise entitled to dismissal with

prejudice because the first arrest on June 29, 2018 is the only incident he was associated

with.

11See Washington v. Baugh, No. 17-CV-1162-NJR, 2018 WL 637719, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2018) (“The doctrine

of res judicata applies even when a plaintiff attempts to re-plead conduct as a continuing violation that was

previously brought as claims regarding discrete events.”) (citing Jordan v. O’Neil, 28 Fed.Appx. 548, 552-53

(7th Cir. 2002)); Robinson v. Allstate, 706 F. Supp. 2d 320, 327 (W.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d 508 Fed. Appx. 7 (2d

Cir. 2013) (holding res judicata barred conspiracy claim where plaintiff took “the same allegations that

formed the nucleus” of his previous suit, added additional defendants and a few other allegations based

on conduct that occurred after the first suit was filed; “Plaintiff cannot escape the effects of the prior adverse

judgment simply by casting his net a bit wider.”); Dantzler v. Pope, No. CIV.A. 08–3777, 2009 WL 959505, at

*3 (E.D.La. Apr. 3, 2009) (“The fact that Dantzler re-characterized his claims to allege a conspiracy does not

change the fact that his claims arose out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter

of his state court petition”); Goodwin v. Home Buying Inv. Co., 352 F. Supp. 413, 415–16 (D.D.C. 1973) (“An

allegation of conspiracy could not create a cause of action if the acts allegedly conspired in had been

determined in a prior action not to be wrongful.”).

The Court further notes that although Dorothy McCombs and Brenda Grant did

not move for dismissal, this res judicata analysis applies equally to them given that

Gaddis asserted claims against them for false arrest in his prior suit and judgment was

entered in their favor. Consequently, the first arrest on June 29, 2018 cannot be included

as part of Gaddis’s conspiracy claim.

E. DEFENDANT BRANDON ZANOTTI (Docs. 112, 113)12

Brandon Zanotti was the State’s Attorney in Williamson County (Doc. 1, ¶16). In

the complaint, Gaddis alleges that:

• Zanotti “[was] outspoken in [his] claimed belief” that Gaddis was “mentally

unbalanced” (Doc. 1, ¶34);

• After he was arrested on November 30, 2018 for aggravated assault, “Zanotti’s

deputy” argued that Gaddis should not be permitted to be released on bond

unless he submitted to a mental evaluation (Doc. 1, ¶64);

• Zanotti elected to file criminal charges against Gaddis for speaking to

Defendant Dorothy McCombs on March 13, 2019 in violation of an order of

protection, even though Gaddis claims his statement to McCombs was

“protected by the First Amendment” (Doc. 1, ¶79); and

• Zanotti, “by and through an employee in his office, Betty Caraway,” helped

Jennifer Page procure an emergency order of protection against Gaddis in that

Caraway obtained the necessary form from the circuit clerk’s office and helped

Page fill it out (Doc. 1, ¶133).

As a threshold issue, there is no basis for holding Zanotti liable for some of the

conduct alleged by Gaddis because, according to the complaint, Zanotti was not directly

or personally involved in the incidents. Specifically, the complaint claims it was

“Zanotti’s deputy,” not Zanotti himself, who argued that Gaddis should have to submit

12 Plaintiff did not file a response to the motion to dismiss filed jointly by Defendants Page, Wilson, and

Zanotti (Doc. 113).

to a mental evaluation. And it was Zanotti’s employee, Betty Caraway, who helped

Jennifer Page apply for an order of protection. Zanotti cannot be liable under § 1983 for

the purported misconduct of his subordinates or his employees simply because he was

in charge. E.g., Taylor v. Ways, 999 F.3d 478, 493 (7th Cir. 2021) (“There is no such thing

as respondeat superior liability for government officials under § 1983.”) (citation omitted);

Lennon v. City of Carmel, Indiana, 865 F.3d 503, 507–08 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[T]here is

no vicarious liability in a suit under section 1983.”). And Gaddis has not alleged that

Zanotti knew of and facilitated, approved, condoned, or turned a blind eye to his

subordinate’s unconstitutional actions (see Doc. 1). Taylor, 999 F.3d at 493–94, 495. See also

Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[P]ersonal-involvement requirement

is satisfied if the constitutional violation occurs at a defendant's direction or with her

knowledge or consent.”).

To the extent Zanotti was responsible for arguing that Gaddis should have to

submit to a mental evaluation as a condition of his bond, this claim is barred by the

doctrine of claim-splitting. Gaddis has already made the claim in a previously-filed, still-

pending federal case that Zanotti requested a mental evaluation as a condition of bond

related to his November 2018 arrest in order to retaliate against Gaddis for criticizing

local government officials. SDIL Case No. 19-cv-781-DWD, Doc. 1; Doc. 37, p. 3. He

cannot bring this same claim in a second suit by recasting it as part of a continuing civil

conspiracy.

Additionally, as Zanotti points out, Gaddis is only seeking monetary damages

against him, but the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages against state

officials acting in their official capacities. E.g., Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th

Cir. 2001); Garcia v. City of Chicago, Ill., 24 F.3d 966, 969 (7th Cir. 1994). And in Illinois, the

state’s attorney is a state official. Hernandez v. Joliet Police Dep’t, 197 F.3d 256, 265 (7th Cir.

1999) (citing Garcia, 24 F.3d at 969); Ingemunson v. Hedges, 549 N.E.2d 1269, 1272 (Ill. 1990).

Gaddis did not file a response to Zanotti’s motion to dismiss and therefore does not

dispute Zanotti’s claim that Gaddis “clearly is suing [him] in his official capacity as the

State’s Attorney of Williamson County” (Doc. 113, pp. 9–10).

But in the event that Gaddis is alleging that Zanotti was acting in his individual

capacity, rather than his official capacity, at least part of his claim is barred by

prosecutorial immunity (Doc. 113, pp. 12–14). Prosecutors are absolutely immune from

liability for damages under § 1983 “for all actions and decisions undertaken in

furtherance of his prosecutorial duties.” Fields v. Wharrie, 672 F.3d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 2012)

(citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410 (1976)). “This immunity is understood to

broadly cover all conduct associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”

Bianchi v. McQueen, 818 F.3d 309, 316 (7th Cir. 2016). In contrast, prosecutors acting in an

administrative or investigative capacity are only entitled to qualified immunity. Jones v.

Cummings, 998 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). Zanotti’s actions in

arguing for particular conditions for bond and bringing charges against Gaddis and

initiating a prosecution are clearly prosecutorial in nature and entitled to absolute

immunity. Lewis v. Mills, 677 F.3d 324, 330 (7th Cir. 2012).

That leaves only the allegations that Zanotti was outspoken in his belief that

Gaddis was unbalanced. Gaddis does not include facts as to the nature of Zanotti’s

statements, when and where they occurred, who the audience was, etc. (see Doc. 1). To

the extent Zanotti’s statements were made in court in connection with one of Gaddis’s

criminal cases, it seems that Zanotti would be protected by absolute immunity. On the

other hand, if Zanotti’s statements were made outside of court, it is not clear how the

statements were possibly in furtherance of the conspiracy or contributed in any way to

the deprivation of his constitutional rights. Simply put, this allegation is too vague to

plausibly suggest that Zanotti was involved in some purported conspiracy to deny

Gaddis his constitutional rights.

In sum, Gaddis’s claims that Zanotti retaliated against him by requesting a mental

evaluation as a condition of bond and pursuing criminal charges against him are

dismissed with prejudice. His other claims against Zanotti are dismissed without

prejudice and he can attempt to remedy the problems with those claims in an amended

complaint if he so chooses.

F. DEFENDANT ANDREW WILSON (Docs. 112, 113)

Andrew Wilson was the Clerk of the Williamson County Circuit Court during a

portion of the events at issue (Doc. 1, ¶11). The complaint alleges only that Mr. Wilson

was involved in the purported conspiracy as it related to the order of protection that

Jennifer Page obtained against Gaddis in May 2020. Specifically, Gaddis alleges:

• Wilson’s office provided forms to litigants, including petitions for no stalking,

no contact orders, and Betty Caraway obtained such a form and helped Jennifer

Page fill it out (Doc. 1, ¶133; see also Doc. 132-2 (Page’s petition)).

• Wilson, “by and through his employees, procured the entry of said order in

that his employees delivered the form order to [State’s Attorney] Zanotti’s

employees and agents” (Doc. 1, ¶134).

• Wilson’s office then issued a summons to be served on him with the emergency

order (Doc. 1, ¶130).

In other words, Gaddis is claiming that Wilson was in on the conspiracy because

his office provided the forms that were used in issuing the emergency order, which

contained unconstitutional language, and then Wilson’s office recorded the order and

issued process for the order.

As a threshold issue, there is no basis for holding Defendant Wilson liable for some

of the conduct alleged by Gaddis because, according to the complaint, Wilson was not

directly or personally involved in the incidents; it was his employees. As explained above

with respect to Brandon Zanotti, Wilson cannot be liable for the conduct of his

subordinates or his employees simply because he was in charge, and Gaddis has not

alleged that any purported constitutional violation by Wilson’s subordinates occurred at

his direction or with his knowledge or consent (see Doc. 1).

Additionally, Wilson enjoys absolute quasi-judicial immunity. The absolute

immunity afforded to judges has been extended to auxiliary judicial personnel, such as

clerks, when they perform judicial or quasi-judicial functions integral to the judicial

process (such as issuance of an arrest warrant), administrative functions pursuant to the

explicit direction of a judicial officer or court order, or duties that are a “basic and integral

part of the judicial process” (such as filing a complaint). Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 601

(7th Cir. 1992). The extension of immunity is justified “because, just as judges should not

be subjected to lawsuits from disappointed litigants, neither should someone who acts as

a judicial agent become a “lightning rod for harassing litigation.” Schneider v. Cty. of Will,

366 Fed.Appx. 683, 685 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474, 476 (7th

Cir. 1980)).

Here, Wilson was required by law to provide forms for filling out a petition for an

order of protection to any person not represented by counsel, like Jennifer Page. 740 ILL.

COMP. STAT. 21/20(d). Therefore, by providing the form to Page, Wilson was simply

doing his job. And Page’s petition itself shows that it was a form “approved by the

Conference of Chief Circuit Judges” and was required to be used (see Doc. 132-2, p. 1). As

for the allegation that Wilson’s “employees” “procured the entry of said order” by

“deliver[ing] the form order to Zanotti’s employees and agents” (Doc. 1, ¶134), the Court

is not quite sure what Gaddis is saying the employees did. He certainly does not allege

they were doing anything outside of their job duties as required by statute, court order,

or a judge’s directions. Finally, with respect to recording the order and issuing process

on it, Wilson was obligated by statute to do both. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/12, 105/13,

105/14; People ex rel. Pardridge v. Windes, 113 N.E. 949 (Ill. 1916) (holding that circuit clerk’s

entry of the court’s orders “is subject to judicial control” and the clerk “is not privileged

to enter orders as he sees fit, contrary to the direction of the court”). This is clearly a

function of Wilson’s job that is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.

For these reasons, Gaddis’s claims against Andrew Wilson must be dismissed with

prejudice.

G. DEFENDANT JENNIFER PAGE (Docs. 112, 113)

Jennifer Page is a court reporter at the Williamson County courthouse. Gaddis

contends that Page was outspoken in her belief that he was mentally unbalanced, and

Page had numerous discussions with personnel working in the courthouse about his

mental condition (Doc. 1, ¶ 34). Gaddis further contends that Page took out an order of

protection against him in May 2020 (see Doc. 1, ¶¶130–142). During the order of

protection proceedings, Page introduced evidence of the signs Gaddis had posted and

argued his taking her picture constituted stalking (Doc. 1, ¶¶139, 140). Gaddis alleges

that “he would not have been required to respond to the proceedings,” which the Court

takes to mean that an emergency protective order would not have issued, had he not been

vocal in his criticism of public officials (Doc. 1, ¶142).

Page argues that Gaddis’s claims against her are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment and qualified immunity (Doc. 113, pp. 11–12, 15–17). To the extent that she

is a state official, it does not appear that Gaddis is suing her for actions taken in her official

capacity as a court reporter. Rather, his allegations against her seem to be unrelated to

any official function as a court reporter. Therefore, neither the Eleventh Amendment nor

qualified immunity are applicable.

Page also argues that Gaddis’s claims against her are barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine because his claim is inextricably intertwined with the Williamson County Circuit

Court’s rulings in the order of protection proceedings (Williamson County Case No. 20-

OP-140) (Doc. 113, pp. 21–23). However, Rooker-Feldman does not bar the claims of

federal-court plaintiffs who, like Gaddis, file a federal suit when a state-court appeal is

pending. Parker v. Lyons, 757 F.3d 701, 705–06 (7th Cir. 2014).

That leaves Page’s argument that Gaddis failed to allege facts sufficient to state a

claim against her (Doc. 113, pp. 7–8). The Court agrees with the arguments Page made,

however, that does not entitle her to dismissal with prejudice. Gaddis can attempt to

remedy the problems with his claim against Page in an amended complaint if he so

chooses.

H. DEFENDANT BETTY CARAWAY (Doc. 95; see also Docs. 117, 126)

Betty Caraway is the Assistant Juvenile Advocate and Witness Coordinator at the

Williamson County State’s Attorney’s Office (Doc. 1, ¶12; Doc. 95, p. 1).13 The only

allegation concerning her in the complaint is that she “helped” Jennifer Page “to procure”

a temporary order of protection in May 2020 (Doc. 1, ¶¶130–133). More specifically,

Gaddis alleges that Caraway obtained the necessary form from the Clerk of Court’s office,

assisted Page in filling it out, and “further assisted” in the procurement of the temporary

order (but Plaintiff did not specify how) (Id.).

Gaddis’s allegations are insufficient for the Court to plausibly infer that Ms.

Caraway was part of any purported conspiracy. The simple fact that Caraway allegedly

helped Jennifer Page fill out her petition for an order of protection does not justify the

inference that Caraway was acting pursuant to some unlawful plan to retaliate against

Gaddis. The Illinois Stalking No Contact Order Act specifically provides that victim

advocates are allowed to assist victims of stalking in the preparation of petitions for

13 According to the Williamson County website, the victim/witness coordinator position at the State’s

Attorney’s Officer was formed in 1985 through the Office of the Illinois Attorney General to serve the needs

of victims and witnesses of violent crimes. The primary function is to provide information, referrals, and

professional support during the criminal justice process. There is also a victim/witness coordinator

dedicated to juvenile crimes, whose job it is to serve juvenile victims and adult witnesses and victims of

juvenile crimes. State’s Attorney, WILLIAMSON COUNTY GOVT., https://williamsoncountyil.gov/states-

attorney/ (last visited March 4, 2022).

stalking no contact orders. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 21/30(b). Thus, by helping Ms. Page apply

for an order of protection against Gaddis, Betty Caraway was, by all appearances, simply

doing her job. There are no allegations, for example, that suggest Ms. Caraway’s actions

were outside the regular course of her job-related activities (see Doc. 1). There are also no

allegations that suggest Ms. Caraway performed this function selectively or that there

were other victims whom Ms. Caraway treated differently, i.e., that she only helped

people seeking an order of protection against Gaddis but not people seeking an order of

protection against someone other than Gaddis (see Doc. 1). Accordingly, Gaddis has failed

to allege facts from which the Court can plausibly infer that Betty Caraway was acting in

furtherance of the purported conspiracy.

The Court wonders whether Caraway would be entitled to Eleventh Amendment

immunity or quasi-judicial immunity like Andrew Wilson. But these arguments were not

made and the Court will not attempt to answer those questions for Caraway in the

absence of briefing on the matter. Consequently, the only basis for dismissing the claim

against her is failure to state a claim. Caraway, like Jennifer Page, is dismissed without

prejudice and Gaddis can attempt to remedy the problems with his claim against

Caraway in an amended complaint if he so chooses.

I. DEFENDANT WILLIAM HUDDLESTON (Doc. 111; see also Doc. 114)

Defeendant William Huddleston was a Marion police officer (Doc. 1, ¶17). In the

complaint, Gaddis alleges that Huddleston was involved in only one of the tortious acts:

he re-arrested Plaintiff on April 10, 2019 for the second time on the same warrant he was

arrested on the day before (Id. at ¶¶ 82–93). Huddleston argues that Gaddis failed to

plausibly allege that he committed an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy because his

actions, even as alleged by Gaddis, have a reasonable explanation: the LEADS system did

not reflect that Gaddis had already been arrested when Huddleston arrested him on April

10, 2019 (Doc. 111, p. 7; see also Doc. 1, ¶86). However, Gaddis also says that Huddleston

acknowledged that he knew Gaddis had been arrested the previous day and he knew he

was arresting Gaddis on the same charge for a second time, but he nevertheless

proceeded with the arrest (Doc. 1, ¶85). Gaddis alleges he would not have been arrested

but for his criticisms of local government officials (Id. at ¶93). The Court believes these

allegations are sufficient to give rise to the inference that Officer Huddleston had a choice

whether or not to re-arrest Gaddis on April 10th. He could have opted to confirm

Gaddis’s arrest the day prior and work to update the LEADS system to reflect that arrest.

But instead he opted to re-arrest Gaddis for a second time in order to retaliate against

him.

That being said, the fact remains that Gaddis has failed to plead facts sufficient to

tie this event into a larger conspiracy. See supra pp. 22–24. For that reason, Officer

Huddleston remains entitled to dismissal without prejudice.

J. MOTION TO STAY (Doc. 131) & COURSE OF LITIGATION

The motion to stay was previously granted to the extent that it requested this

matter not proceed with discovery until the pending motions to dismiss were ruled on

(Doc. 134). The motion to stay was taken under advisement as to all other arguments (e.g.,

duplicative litigation, improper claim splitting, res judicata, Younger abstention) (Id.).

The Court believes all of those substantive arguments have been appropriately addressed

above in the body of this Order.

At this point, Gaddis will be given leave to file an amended complaint consistent

with the rulings in this Order. The Court will not move forward with a scheduling

conference and discovery until the claims and Defendants in this case are firmly

established. If he opts not to file an amended complaint, this case will move forward only

as to Count 3 and 4 for false arrest against John Fleming.

CONCLUSION

The motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Betty Caraway (Doc. 95), Mary Griffith

(Doc. 97), Logan Spinka (Doc. 98), Tom Stearns (Doc. 100), Bryan DeMattei (Doc. 102),

Sam Ward (Doc. 104), William Lannom (Doc. 106), Justin Dwyer and Jesse Thompson

(Doc. 108), William Huddleston (Doc. 110), and Jennifer Page, Andrew Wilson, and

Brandon Zanotti (Doc. 112) are GRANTED.

Count 1 is DISMISSED without prejudice as to John Fleming, Brenda Grant,

Dorothy McCombs, Justin Dwyer, Jesse Thompson, Jennifer Page, Betty Caraway, and

William Huddleston. It is DISMISSED without prejudice in part and with prejudice in

part as to Craig Oglesby and Brandon Zanotti. It is DISMISSED with prejudice as to

Mary Griffith, Bryan DeMattei, Sam Ward, William Lannom, Logan Spinka, Tom Stearns,

and Andrew Wilson.

Count 2 is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Gaddis shall have until April 6, 2022 to file a First Amended Complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 7, 2022

s/Mark A. Beatty

MARK A. BEATTY

United States Magistrate Judge