The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
COREY EGNER, #S14263, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 19-cv-1213-RJD
)
JEFFREY DENNISON, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
ORDER
DALY, Magistrate Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and for
Leave to Amend his Complaint (Docs. 57 and 58). Defendant Bettis (previously dismissed
without prejudice) filed a Response (Doc. 64) and Plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. 65). As explained
further, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED. This matter also comes before the Court on Defendant
Bettis’ “Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Letter Brief” (Doc. 66) which is DENIED.
Background
Plaintiff Egner, an inmate within the Illinois Department of Corrections, originally filed
suit along with two other inmates in SDIL Case No. 19-cv-482 on April 30, 2019.1 In their
Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that inmates placed on crisis watch at Shawnee Correctional Center
(“Shawnee”) suffered unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The windows were broken in
the crisis watch cells, causing extreme hot/cold temperatures. The lights in their cells were never
turned off. There was human excrement on the walls, mattresses, and floors. The Complaint
1 Plaintiffs first filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois, and the Court transferred their suit to this Court.
Page 1 of 7
further alleged that Plaintiff Egner qualified for the designation of “SMI” (serious mental illness)
from 2016-2018, and mental health professionals improperly determined he no longer qualified
for the SMI designation in 2019 (SDIL Case No. 19-cv-482, Doc. 1, p. 5, 8). Plaintiffs also
alleged that inmates on crisis watch at Shawnee received inadequate mental health treatment due
to understaffing issues. Plaintiffs sued employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC) and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (a private contractor that provides healthcare to
inmates within IDOC).
On May 10, 2019, the Court issued an Order warning the three plaintiffs of potential
negative consequences related to group litigation (SDIL Case No. 19-cv-482, Doc. 10). The
Court gave the three plaintiffs the opportunity to withdraw from the case (or have their claims
severed) without having to pay a filing fee for Case No. 19-cv-482 (Id.). Plaintiff Egner submitted
a pleading to the Court on May 28, 2019 that stated he wished to remain as a plaintiff in the group
lawsuit (SDIL Case No. 19-cv-482, Doc. 23). Also on May 28, 2019, Plaintiff Egner filed a
notice informing the Court that he had transferred from Shawnee Correctional Center to
Pinckneyville Correctional Center (SDIL Case No. 19-cv-482, Doc. 22).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A, the Court conducted a threshold review of the Complaint
in Case No. 19-cv-482 and determined Plaintiffs failed to plead a cognizable claim (SDIL Case
No. 19-cv-482, Doc. 37). Plaintiffs were granted leave to file an amended complaint. (Id.). On
September 19, 2019, Plaintiff Egner filed a motion to sever his claims (SDIL Case No. 19-cv-482,
Doc. 39). On that same date he also filed his First Amended Complaint, naming Defendant Bettis
as a mental health professional who authorized his placement in an unsanitary and unsafe crisis
watch cell (SDIL Case No. 19-cv-482, Doc. 40, p. 6). He further alleged that Defendant Bettis
falsified his records to make it appear as though he was receiving appropriate mental health
Page 2 of 7
treatment, but she spent less than five minutes at a time with him (Id., pp. 6, 8). He alleged that
Defendant Bettis improperly changed his SMI designation in 2019 (Id., p. 6). The Court granted
Plaintiff’s motion to sever and he proceeded as the sole Plaintiff in this case (SDIL Case No. 19-
cv-482, Doc. 41). Two of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Bettis in the First Amended
Complaint survived a threshold review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A:
Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim for subjecting
Plaintiff to unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s
serious mental health needs.
(Doc. 11). The Court found that Plaintiff’s allegation against Defendant Bettis regarding the SMI
designation did not sufficiently state a cognizable claim (Id.).
Defendant Bettis filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, contending that Plaintiff failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Defendant pointed to Plaintiff’s
Grievance #2019-04-128 that Plaintiff submitted at Shawnee on April 15, 2019 and then appealed
to the Administrative Review Board (Doc. 32-5). The Administrative Review Board (“ARB”)
issued a decision on Grievance #2019-04-128 on August 6, 2019-more than three months after
Plaintiff filed suit in SDIL Case No. 19-cv-482, but approximately six weeks before he filed his
First Amended Complaint that identified Defendant Bettis by name. The undersigned granted
summary judgment in favor of Defendant Bettis, finding that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies against her prior to filing suit (Doc. 50).
Motion to Reconsider
Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider its dismissal without prejudice of his claims against
Defendant Bettis. A motion to reconsider may be granted where the Court made “manifest errors
of fact or law” or where there is “newly discovered evidence.” Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal
Page 3 of 7
& Co., 827 F.2d 246, 251 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting Keene Corp. v. Intl. Fidelity Ins., 561 F. Supp.
656 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff’d, 736 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1982)); Patrick v. City of Chicago, 103 F.
Supp.3d 907, 911-12 (N.D. Ill. 2015). Plaintiff’s motion suggests that he believes the Court made
a manifest error of law (Doc. 57, p. 1) while his supporting memorandum suggests he is relying
upon newly discovered evidence as the basis for reconsideration (Doc. 58, p. 1, 4). However,
In any event, Plaintiff’s arguments lack merit. Plaintiff’s memorandum does not identify
any “newly discovered evidence.” Plaintiff contends that he was “hamstrung in defending against
the exhaustion argument because he lacked counsel and access to his master file” and his
“administrative remedies had in truth been exhausted against Defendant Bettis” via Grievance
#2019-04-128.2 Of course, the Court acknowledged that Plaintiff took all steps necessary to
exhaust his administrative remedies against Defendant Bettis via Grievance #2019-04-128 (Doc.
50, p. 3,4,8). The Court granted Defendant Bettis’ motion because Grievance #2019-04-128 was
fully exhausted after Defendant filed suit against Defendant Bettis, explaining that the allegations
in Plaintiff’s original complaint in Case No. 19-cv-482 against Defendant Bettis were the same
allegations he made against her in the First Amended Complaint. Defendant Bettis was simply a
“Jane Doe” defendant in the original complaint, identified only as a “Wexford medical provider.”
She was identified by name in the First Amended Complaint, but Plaintiff’s allegations against her
were not new.
Plaintiff then points to the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Chambers v. Sood where the Court
reiterated that prisoners suing under §1983 cannot file their lawsuit before they exhaust their
administrative remedies. 956 F.3d 979, 984 (7th Cir. 2020). However, the Seventh Circuit further
2 Plaintiff was not represented while the Motion for Summary Judgment was pending. He has
since been appointed counsel.
Page 4 of 7
explained that when an inmate files an amended complaint that raises a new claim against a new
defendant, the inmate may proceed if he exhausted his administrative remedies after filing his
original complaint, but before he filed the amended complaint. Id. In granting summary
judgment to Defendant Bettis, the undersigned also cited the Chambers opinion and explained that
is not the case here:
Plaintiffs’ original complaint in Case No. 19-cv-482 alleged that
IDOC and Wexford employees subjected inmates on crisis watch at
Shawnee to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Plaintiff
further alleged that inmates on crisis watch received inadequate
mental health treatment. Plaintiff makes those same allegations
against Defendant Bettis in the First Amended Complaint. 3
Plaintiff’s alleged interactions with Defendant Bettis occurred prior
to April 30, 2019 (the date Plaintiffs filed the original Complaint),
as evidenced by the allegations in the original Complaint and
Grievance No. 2019-04-128 (submitted by Plaintiff on April 15,
2019).4 Consequently, the PLRA required Plaintiff to exhaust his
administrative remedies against Defendant Bettis on or before April
30, 2019.
(Doc. 50, pp. 7-8). Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint
Plaintiff asks the Court for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint that contains claims
against Defendant Bettis and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (her employer). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a) provides that a party may amend a pleading and that leave to amend should be
freely given "when justice so requires." The Seventh Circuit recognizes that "the complaint
merely serves to put the defendant on notice and is to be freely amended or constructively amended
as the case develops, as long as amendments do not unfairly surprise or prejudice the defendant."
Toth v. USX Corp., 883 F.2d 1297, 1298 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Winger v. Winger, 82 F.3d 140,
3 Cf. Doc. 5, p. 6, ¶2 to Doc. 1 p. 5 in SDIL Case No. 19-cv-482.
Page 5 of 7
144 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 1985)) ("The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create [a system] in which the complaint does not fix the
plaintiff's rights but may be amended at any time to conform to the evidence."). However, the
Court may deny leave where there is undue delay or the amendment would be futile. Gonzalez-
Koeneke v. West, 791 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2015). As explained above, Defendant Bettis was
dismissed without prejudice from this matter and the Court will not grant Plaintiff leave to renew
his claims against her. Accordingly, at least some of the claims in Plaintiff’s proposed second
amended complaint are futile and therefore the Motion for Leave to Amend is DENIED.
The Court notes that Defendant Bettis argues on behalf of her employer that Plaintiff
should not be granted leave to bring claims against Wexford because Plaintiff did not exhaust his
administrative remedies against Wexford. Defendant Bettis also filed a “Motion for Leave to File
a Supplemental Letter Brief” to argue that Plaintiff’s claims against Wexford in the proposed
second amended complaint are barred by the statute of limitations. Defendant’s Motion is
DENIED, as this Court does not accept letters written to the Clerk of Court in lieu of arguments
properly raised in accordance with the local rules. Moreover, affirmative defenses like the statute
of limitations normally do not have to be addressed by the allegations in the Complaint. Barry
Aviation Inc. v. Land O’Lakes Mun. Airport Com’n, 377 F.3d 682, 688 (7th Cir. 2004). However,
Plaintiff is cautioned to take note of these issues when deciding whether to file a renewed motion
for leave to bring claims against Wexford. Given the age of this case, the Court will not be
inclined to unduly delay this matter by adding claims that will be immediately subject to
dispositive motions. See Gonzalez-Koeneke, 791 F.3d at 807.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and for Leave to Amend his Complaint (Docs. 57
Page 6 of 7
and 58) is DENIED. Defendant Bettis’ “Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Letter Brief”
(Doc. 66) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 24, 2022
s/ Reona J. Daly
Hon. Reona J. Daly
United States Magistrate Judge
Page 7 of 7