clarifying that “the former approach-that, no matter what their substance, all post- judgment motions filed within [28] days of judgment would be considered as Rule 59(e) motions – no longer applies”
How later courts described this case
- clarifying that “the former approach-that, no matter what their substance, all post- judgment motions filed within [28] days of judgment would be considered as Rule 59(e) motions – no longer applies”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
REGINALD JONES,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 20-cv-1128-NJR
ANTHONY WILLS, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
This matter is before the Court on several motions filed by Plaintiff Reginald Jones.
Jones filed two motions to reconsider the Court’s recent Order regarding his request for
subpoenas (Docs. 173 and 175). He also filed a motion for clarification regarding the
Court’s Order (Doc. 174). Jones also filed another motion for subpoena, this time seeking
the testimony of Defendants Anthony Wills and Krista Allsup at the upcoming
evidentiary hearing—scheduled on January 5, 2022 (Doc. 176).
A. Motions to Reconsider and Clarification (Docs. 173, 174, and 175)
On November 22, 2021, the Court entered an Order (Doc. 172) granting in part and
denying in part three motions for subpoenas filed by Jones. Jones sought the testimony
of Travis Bayler and Sandra Quick, as well as copies of his 12/23/2015 and 3/15/2017
grievances on the issue of protective custody. The Court found that Jones’s 2015 and 2016
grievances, and any witness testimony related to those grievances, were irrelevant to his
current claims. Jones’s request for witnesses was also denied in part, but the Court
directed Defendants to provide at least one witness who could testify on the issue of
whether Jones’s grievances were sent to the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) and
the requirements of 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 501.320 (Doc. 172, pp. 1-2).
Jones now requests that the Court reconsider its Order. Although Jones fails to
indicate which Federal Rule of Civil Procedure he brings his motion under, the motion
will automatically be considered as having been filed pursuant to Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures. See, e.g., Mares v. Busby, 34 F.3d 533, 535 (7th Cir.
1994). “[W]hether a motion filed within [28] days of the entry of judgment should be
analyzed under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) depends on the substance of the motion, not on
the timing or label affixed to it.” Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 2008)
(emphasis in the original) (citing Borrero v. City of Chicago, 456 F.3d 698, 701-02 (7th Cir.
2006) (clarifying that “the former approach-that, no matter what their substance, all post-
judgment motions filed within [28] days of judgment would be considered as Rule 59(e)
motions – no longer applies”)). Nevertheless, a motion to reconsider filed more than 28
days after entry of the challenged order “automatically becomes a Rule 60(b) motion.”
Hope v. United States, 43 F.3d 1140, 1143 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Deutsch,
981 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1992)); see also Talano v. N.W. Med. Faculty Found., Inc., 273 F.3d
757, 762 (7th Cir. 2001).
A motion to alter or amend judgment filed pursuant to Rule 59(e) may only be
granted if a movant shows there was a mistake of law or fact, or presents newly
discovered evidence that could not have been discovered previously. Matter of Prince,
85 F.3d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1996), reh’g and suggestion for reh’g en blanc denied, cert. denied 519
U.S. 1040; Deutsch v. Burlington N. R. Co., 983 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1993). “‘[M]anifest error’
is not demonstrated by the disappointment of the losing party. It is the wholesale
disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent.” Oto v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). A
movant may not use a Rule 59(e) motion to present evidence that could have been
submitted before entry of the judgment. Obriecht, 517 F.3d at 494 (citing Sigsworth v. City
of Aurora, Ill., 487 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 2007)).
Rule 60(b) provides for relief from judgment for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Rule 60(b) relief is an extraordinary remedy
and is granted only in exceptional circumstances. McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d
319, 327 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Dickerson v. Board of Educ., 32 F.3d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir. 1994)).
Rule 60(b) allows a court “to address mistakes attributable to special circumstances and
not merely to erroneous applications of law.” Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors
Corp., 51 F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1995). It is also not an appropriate vehicle for rehashing
old arguments or for presenting arguments that should have been raised before the court
made its decision. Russell, 51 F.3d at 749; Rutledge v. United States, 230 F.3d 1041, 1052 (7th
Cir. 2000).
1. Testimony of Travis Bayler
Jones asks that the Court reconsider the portion of its Order directing Defendants
to provide one witness who could testify about ARB matters. Jones notes that Bayler
submitted Jones’s IGRV Grievance History as part of Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment and only he can testify as to whether Defendant Wills submitted Jones’s
grievances to the ARB. In the alternative, he asks that the Court clarify that the witness
should be an ARB representative.
Jones argues that Bayler’s testimony is necessary because he can speak to the
obligations of the warden in the appeal of a Protective Custody (“PC”) grievance and he
can answer questions regarding the IGRV Grievance History. But any ARB official could
testify as to these matters. Thus, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the
motion to reconsider. The Court CLARIFIES that the witness Defendants were
previously Ordered to present should be an official with the ARB. But the Court DENIES
Jones’s request for Bayler specifically. The defense is, of course, free to call Bayler as the
ARB witness, but the Court will also accept any ARB official with knowledge of the PC
grievance appeals process. Defendants are further DIRECTED to identify the witness in
a written notice on the docket seven days prior to the hearing. Accordingly, Jones’s
motion for clarification as to the identity of the witness is DENIED as moot.
2. Sandra Quick
Jones also asks that the Court reconsider its denial of his request for the testimony
of Sandra Quick. In the Order, the Court noted that Jones failed to explain his need for
Quick’s testimony. Instead, he only stated Quick could testify as to “events prior to
5/7/2020.” Jones now argues that Quick wrote a note in the cumulative counseling
summary and only she can attest to that response, which will be part of his narrative as
to steps he took trying to exhaust his administrative remedies. But Jones already has the
communication as he is in possession of the cumulative counseling summary. He can
point to that entry during his own testimony. It is unclear what testimony Quick could
offer other than acknowledging that she made the entry in the summary. Jones can testify
as to the steps he took himself. Accordingly, his request to reconsider as to Quick is
DENIED.
3. 2015 and 2017 Grievances and Testimony
Jones also asks the Court to reconsider its Order denying his request for copies of
his December 23, 2015 and March 15, 2017 grievances, as well as his request for John D.
Peterson, the Danville correctional counselor, to testify as to those grievances (Doc. 175).
Jones argues that he relies on the return of December 2015 grievance on March 1, 2016
(Doc. 142, p. 14) to support his argument regarding the two different appeals processes
in Section 501 and Section 504. But again, Jones has a copy of the cumulative counseling
summary and the notation that a grievance was returned to him. He fails to offer any new
arguments to demonstrate that the grievances and testimony are relevant to the question
of whether Jones exhausted grievances for his current claims. To the extent Jones wants
to argue that there is a failure to follow proper procedures as it relates to protective
custody grievances, he can certainly testify at the hearing himself and point to the
counseling summary as an example. His request for the prior grievances and testimony
regarding those grievances is DENIED.
B. Motion for Subpoena (Doc. 176).
In addition to his motions to reconsider, Jones has also filed another motion
seeking testimony of additional witnesses at the evidentiary hearing. Specifically, he
seeks the testimony of Anthony Wills and Krista Allsup.
As to Anthony Wills, Jones argues that Wills has knowledge of the correspondence
and emergency grievances Jones filed. He also has knowledge of whether he forwarded
the PC denial to the ARB as Jones contends is required under Section 501. Wills is a
defendant in this case and his testimony is directly relevant to the issues to be addressed
at the evidentiary hearing, namely, whether the protective custody denial was sent to the
ARB and how the appeal requirements of 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 501.320 affect the
grievance process. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Jones’s motion and DIRECTS
Defendant Anthony Wills to appear at the January 5, 2022 evidentiary hearing.
As to Defendant Krista Allsup, Jones argues that he needs her testimony to
acknowledge whether she received his correspondence regarding protective custody
issues or whether she was unable to receive institutional mail during the relevant time
period. The Court finds that these issues are not relevant to the issue of whether Jones
filed grievances regarding his protective custody placement or whether his protective
custody denial should have been appealed to the ARB. As such, the Court DENIES his
request to call Allsup as a witness.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 17, 2021
neff Ulan
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL |
Chief U.S. District Judge
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