The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JANE DOE 5,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 19-CV-00934-SPM
SOUTHERN ILLINOIS
UNIVERSITY, d/b/a SOUTHERN
ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY AT
CARBONDALE, DR. KAREN
RENZAGLIA, and JON L.
SHAFFER,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
McGLYNN, District Judge:
In their new Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 78), Defendants bring up three issues.
The Court will briefly address the issues in turn.
I. REPLEADING OF PREVIOUSLY DISMISSED COUNT I
The Court previously dismissed Count I with prejudice (Doc. 55). Afterwards,
despite its dismissal, Plaintiff Jane Doe included the count in her amended complaint
for appeal purposes. There is no value in repleading claims that the Court has
previously rejected. Any notion that including the claim anew preserves the
dismissed claim for appeal seems to suppose that learned judges of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit are incapable of finding previous complaints,
motions, and orders in the record to determine where the case is procedurally and
substantively. While granting dismissal again here would be superfluous, the Court
finds it necessary to make it abundantly clear to Doe that she should not have
included this count in the operative Complaint and counsel should refrain from doing
this again in future cases in this Court.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIM UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 AGAINST DEFENDANT JON
L. SHAFFER IN COUNT II
Doe has alleged that Defendant Shaffer was an employee of Southern Illinois
University and, as the Director of University Housing, “was responsible for
determining whether dangerous persons were allowed to be present in certain
buildings on campus in this matter” (Doc. 77, p. 3). Doe states that the SIU Student
Rights and Responsibilities Office issued a notice suspending Nicholas Flowers from
university property and events (Id. at 11). Doe states she heard the next day that
Flowers was allowed into the Life Sciences Building where she worked because the
notice suspending him was a mistake (Id.). Doe then claims that Shaffer rescinded
the suspension, said it was in error, and removed the suspension from campus (Id.).
Doe alleges that an order of protection she obtained from the Circuit Court in Jackson
County, Illinois still stated that Flowers was not allowed to be in the Life Sciences
building if she was present (Id. at 10-11). Does states that Flowers maintained a key
to her workplace (Id. at 11-12).
Does later states that Shaffer put her in danger after she reported her abuse
despite the order of protection (Doc. 77, p. 17). Does claims that Flowers was
permitted to attend classes, enter the laboratory, and be around her without
oversight, supervision, or restrictions despite Shaffer’s knowledge of the risk of harm
to her (Id.). Doe alleges that she suffered emotional distress and psychological
damage because of Shaffer’s actions (Id. at 18).
To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must state sufficient “facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In other words, the plaintiff must provide enough “factual
enhancement” to “[nudge] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible .
. . .” Id. at 547. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
When applying this standard, the court must “accept as true all factual
allegations in the amended complaint and draw all permissible inferences in [the non-
moving plaintiff’s] favor.” Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 799 F.3d 633, 639
(7th Cir. 2015). In fact, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a
savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very
remote and unlikely.” Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 2013),
quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. However, allegations that merely state “legal
conclusions” or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action” are not
entitled to this assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 678.
To state a Section 1983 claim against Shaffer in his individual capacity, Doe
must allege that he caused or personally participated in the statutory or
constitutional violation. Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir.1995).
Here, Doe properly stated an equal protection claim pursuant to Section 1983
against Shaffer in his individual capacity. Doe alleged facts that, if accepted as true,
establish that Shaffer permitted Flowers to enter the building where she worked on
campus without any parameters after a court-issued order of protection banned him
from the building while she was there. Defendant attempts to add context and
extraneous facts to counter the claim, but those addenda are not proper at the motion
to dismiss stage.
Shaffer is also not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity at this stage.
Under this defense, a government official is shielded from liability for performing
discretionary functions “insofar as [the] conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Lanigan v. Village of East Hazel Crest, Ill., 110 F.3d 467, 471–72 (7th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Sexual harassment has long
been recognized as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See Bohen v. E. Chi.,
799 F.2d 1180, 1185 (7th Cir. 1986).
Here, the qualified immunity defense fails because Doe alleged that Shaffer
disregarded a court order of protection and failed to create parameters that prevented
contact to prevent future harassment or the threat thereof. Accordingly, the Court
DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count II with respect to Shaffer in his
individual capacity.
III. RELITIGATING THE PREVIOUSLY DENIED MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OF
DEFENDANT DR. KAREN RENZAGLIA IN COUNT II
Defendants apparently forgot about the previous Court Order as well. In the
Motion (Doc. 78), they relitigate the argument in their previous motion to dismiss
(Doc. 55) asking this Court to dismiss Renzaglia from Count II of the complaint based
on qualified immunity. Because the previous Order already rejected Defendants’
qualified immunity argument and denied dismissal of Renzaglia, the Court FINDS
that the issue is MOOT and DENIES dismissal.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 30, 2021
s/ Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. McGLYNN
U.S. District Judge