holding that multiple prior convictions involving sentences for multiple years each constituted “strong circumstantial evidence that [the defendant] knew he was a felon”
How later courts described this case
- holding that multiple prior convictions involving sentences for multiple years each constituted “strong circumstantial evidence that [the defendant] knew he was a felon”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MARK A. PATTERSON, )
Petitioner,
vs. Case No. 3:20-cv-634-DWD
JASON TERRIS,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
Petitioner Mark A. Patterson was convicted for being a felon in possession of a
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢). He now collaterally attacks that conviction with
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1) Patterson
argues that prosecutors failed to prove all the elements of § 922(g) as construed by the
Supreme Court in Relaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019). He is correct that
prosecutors did not prove all the elements, but he fails to show that he is actually innocent
of violating § 922(g). A showing of actual innocence is a prerequisite for relief under
§ 2241 in Patterson’s case, as argued by Respondent and Patterson’s counsel, who has
filed a motion to withdraw stating that he can find no non-frivolous basis for relief for
this reason. (Doc. 13) Therefore, Patterson’s petition is due to be denied.
Prior to his § 922(g) conviction, Patterson had been convicted for multiple crimes
of violence. At the age of 15, Patterson plead guilty to robbery and was sentenced to three
years in juvenile prison. (Doc. 25 at 24) He was in prison from October 1983 to March
1985 when he was given supervised release. (Doc. 25 at 25) His supervised release was
revoked, and he was returned to custody in June 1985. (Doc. 25 at 25) He was discharged
in May 1986. (Doc. 25 at 25)
In March 1987, Patterson plead guilty to three separate felony offenses and was
sentenced to four years of imprisonment on each offense. (Doc. 25 at 25-26) In February
1989, Patterson plead guilty to armed robbery and was sentenced to six years in prison.
(Doc. 25 at 28) In May 1989, Patterson plead guilty to another armed robbery and was
sentenced to six more years in prison. (Doc. 25 at 27) Patterson served time from March
1989 until he was paroled in March 1992. (Doc. 25 at 28)
Generally, § 2241 petitions may not be used to raise claims of legal error in a
conviction or at sentencing and are limited to challenges regarding the execution of a
sentence. See Kramer v. Olson, 347 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 2003). A prisoner who has been
convicted in federal court typically must bring challenges to his conviction and sentence
by bringing a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the sentencing court. A prisoner is
limited to bringing only one motion under § 2255, however, unless a panel of the
appropriate court of appeals authorizes the filing of a second or successive motion after
certifying that the motion will involve either newly discovered evidence “sufficient to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have
found the movant guilty” or a “new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases
on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(h).
Under very limited circumstances, a prisoner may employ § 2241 to challenge his
federal conviction or sentence. Section 2255(e) contains a “savings clause” that authorizes
a federal prisoner to file a § 2241 petition where the remedy under § 2255 is “inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” The Seventh Circuit has explained that
a “procedure for postconviction relief can be fairly termed inadequate when it is so
configured as to deny a convicted defendant any opportunity for judicial rectification of
so fundamental a defect in his conviction as having been imprisoned for a nonexistent
offense.” In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998).
In the wake of Davenport, a petitioner must meet three conditions to trigger the
savings clause. First, he must show that he relies on a new statutory interpretation case
rather than on a constitutional case. Second, he must show that he relies on a decision
that he could not have invoked in his first § 2255 motion and that the decision applies
retroactively. Finally, he must demonstrate that there has been a “fundamental defect” in
his conviction or sentence that is so grave that it is deemed a miscarriage of justice, such
as “a conviction for a crime of which he was innocent.” Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640
(7th Cir. 2012); see also Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013).
Respondent concedes that Patterson has met the first two elements required to
trigger the savings clause under current Seventh Circuit precedent. (Doc. 23 at 16)
However, Respondent argues that Patterson has not shown that he is actually innocent
and thus that his conviction was a miscarriage of justice. (Doc. 23 at 18) The actual-
innocence standard requires the petitioner to show “that it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Perrone v.
United States, 889 F.3d 898, 906 (7th Cir. 2018). “It is important to note in this regard that
‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency. In other words,
the Government is not limited to the existing record to rebut any showing that petitioner
might make. Rather, on remand, the Government should be permitted to present any
admissible evidence of petitioner's guilt... .” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623-
24 (1998).
Patterson has made no attempt to show that he is actually innocent of violating
§ 922(¢). His petition simply asserts that his conviction was improper because the United
States did not prove that he knew he was a felon at the time of his arrest. (Doc. 1 at 2) The
United States, however, has pointed to ample evidence that Patterson did know he was
a felon at the time of his arrest. He received six felony convictions, in each of which he
was sentenced to a term of imprisonment greater than one year, and he actually served
more than a year of prison time on multiple convictions. These prior convictions and
imprisonment provide ample circumstantial evidence that Patterson knew he was a felon
at the time of his arrest. See United States v. Pulliam, 973 F.3d 775, 781-82 (7th Cir. 2020)
(holding that multiple prior convictions involving sentences for multiple years each
constituted “strong circumstantial evidence that [the defendant] knew he was a felon”);
Morris v. Williams, No. 19-cv-1329-JPG, 2021 WL 3164267, at *3 (S.D. Ill. July 27, 2021)
(finding that prior conviction for the same crime and imprisonment for over a year should
have alerted petitioner to his status as a felon).
Patterson has failed to meet his burden to show that it is more likely than not that
no reasonable juror would find beyond a reasonable doubt that he had knowledge of his
status as a felon when he was arrested. And Respondent has provided evidence showing
that a reasonable juror could make such a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore,
Patterson has not met the third prong required by § 2255’s savings clause and is not
entitled to relief under § 2241. For all these reasons, Patterson’s counsel’s motion to
withdraw (Doc. 13) is GRANTED, and the petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241 is DENIED. This action is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of
Court shall enter judgment reflecting the dismissal and shall close this case.
It is not necessary for Petitioner to obtain a certificate of appealability should he
choose to appeal this Order denying his § 2241 Petition. Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626,
638 (7th Cir. 2000). Petitioner may appeal by filing a notice of appeal, which typically
must be filed within 30 days of the entry of judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 9, 2021 Ul. □□ i i nae
2d
DAVIDW.DUGAN
United States District Judge