Santiago v. Bradley

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

FABIAN SANTIAGO,

#B79716,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 17-cv-989-SPM

TYLER A. BRADLEY, et al.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:

Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by

defendants Tyler A. Bradley (“Bradley”), Rob Jeffries (“Jeffries”)1, Lyle Hawkinson

(“Hawkinson”) and Lt. Martin Matherly (“Matherly”) (Doc. 194). Pursuant to the

motion and supporting memorandum of law, defendants seek judgment as a matter

of law on all of Santiago’s claims (Docs. 194, 195). Alternatively, defendants seek

dismissal of this action under the doctrine of qualified immunity (Id.). Additionally,

defendants claim the action is barred against defendant Jeffreys and seek his

dismissal under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. For the following reasons, the

Court grants the Motion for Summary Judgment.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 14, 2017, plaintiff Fabian Santiago (“Santiago”) commenced this

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights

1 Rob Jeffries was appointed Acting Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections and substituted the previous

Acting Director, John Baldwin as a defendant herein.

1915A, the Court issued an Order allowing plaintiff to proceed with the following

claim:,

Count 1: First Amendment claim against Bradley for confiscating

Plaintiff’s “prison legal news” publication without

reasonable justification and against Baldwin, the Director

of the Illinois Department of Corrections, in his official

capacity only. (Doc. 6).

On December 19, 2017, Santiago filed an amended complaint; however, it had

not yet gone through preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (Doc. 18). On

April 4, 2018, Magistrate Judge Donald Wilkerson issued a Report and

Recommendation regarding merit review of the amended complaint (Doc. 40).

On October 1, 2018, following a series of motions, objections, and rebuttals, an

Order was entered adopting in part and rejecting in part the Report and

Recommendation previously filed on April 4, 2018 (Doc. 73). At that time, the Court

added Lyle Hawkinson as a defendant for a separate incident and indicated the

following claim would proceed:

Count 1: “First Amendment claim against Bradley and

Hawkinson for confiscating Santiago’s “prison legal news”

publication without reasonable justification and against

the Illinois Department of Corrections Director

Baldwin in his official capacity for implementing a

policy and/or practice of confiscating inmate’s

publications.” (Id.).

On October 12, 2018, Santiago sought leave to file second amended complaint

(Doc. 80). On June 3, 2019, following preliminary review, an Order was entered

granting in part and denying in part Santiago’s second amended complaint (Doc. 113).

Specifically, Lt. Martin Matherly was added as a defendant as was the following

Count 2: First Amendment claim against Hawkinson and Matherly

for confiscating Plaintiff’s Abolitionist publication without

reasonable justification and against the Illinois

Department of Corrections Director Baldwin in his official

capacity for implementing a policy and/or practice of

confiscating inmate’s publications (Id.).

As such, Santiago’s claims increased from one count to two; however, those

counts can be broken into five separate First Amendment allegations that various

IDOC personnel wrongfully denied him access to publications he ordered (Id.). First,

that Bradley confiscated Santiago’s November 2016 PLN while he was incarcerated

at Menard. Second, that Hawkinson confiscated the August 2017 PLN while he was

incarcerated at Hill. Third, that Hawkinson confiscated the winter 2018 Abolitionist

while he was incarcerated at Hill. Fourth, that Matherly confiscated the winter 2018

Abolitionist while he was incarcerated at Hill. Finally, Santiago claims Jeffreys, as

Acting Director of IDOC, implemented the policy/procedure for confiscating inmate

publications.

On February 22, 2021, defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on

the merits of Santiago’s claims, along with supporting memorandum of law (Docs.

194-195). On April 13, 2021, Santiago filed his response in opposition to motion for

summary judgment (Doc. 201). On May 17, 2021, this matter was transferred to this

Court (Doc. 205).

STATEMENT OF FACTS2

Fabian Santiago (“Santiago”) is an inmate in the Illinois Department of

2 In an effort to exclude immaterial and irrelevant facts, this Court has prepared its own Statement of Facts based

upon the briefs provided by the parties herein.

Santiago was at Menard prior to being transferred to Hill in July 2017 (Id.).

Bradley has worked at Menard for 24 years in various capacities, including

publications review officer at Menard from November of 2015 until April of 2017 (Doc.

201-9, pp. 35-36). In that capacity, Bradley preliminarily reviewed Santiago’s

November 2016 issue of PLN and completed the Publication Receipt and Course of

Action Form on December 2, 2016, also known as the 211, advising Santiago that the

publication was subject to review because it appears to: Encourage or instruct in the

commission of criminal activity; Be otherwise detrimental to security, good order,

rehabilitation, or discipline or it might facilitate criminal activity; Other – Safety and

security (Doc. 195-2).

It is undisputed that the 211 Form was forwarded to Santiago, who had the

option of requesting additional review or not (Id.). There is a 30-day stay on

destruction of publications in case there is a delay in returning the document, which

is supposed to happen within 7-days (Id., p. 75). Santiago claims he filled out the form

that very night and requested return of the PLN (Doc. 195-1, pp. 94-95). He testified

that he placed the form on the cell bars forwarding it to the Publication Review

Committee/person (Id., p. 101). Santiago cannot verify whether the form was received

or destroyed (Id). Santiago also filed a formal grievance regarding the publication on

December 7, 2016 (Doc. 201-2). Bradley claims the form was never returned, so

further review was not conducted (Doc. 201-9, p. 114). If the inmate does not tell the

publication review committee what to do, at the end of the 30 days, the publication is

destroyed, which is what happened to the November 2016 edition of PLN (Id., p. 115).

2019 (Doc. 196-1, p. 13). Since 2014 or 2015 until his retirement, Hawkinson

functioned as publication review chairperson at Hill (Id., pp. 28-29). Santiago was

transferred to Hill in July 2017 and filed a grievance on August 29, 2017 claiming

that he did not receive his August 2017 issue of PLN (Doc. 195-1, p. 195; Doc. 201-3).

The counselor’s response to that grievance dated August 30, 2017 indicated that the

publication review committee was currently reviewing the publication (Doc. 201-3).

Santiago never received a 211 on the August 2017 PLN, and the only connections he

could make to Hawkinson were the grievance response and a hearsay conversation

another inmate, Ron Kliner, claimed to have with Hawkinson (Doc. 195-1, pp. 197-

199). Hawkinson was not involved in the decision to review the August 2017 PLN for

Santiago (Doc. 196-1, p. 81-83)

Hawkinson was involved in the review of Santiago’s 2018 issue of the

Abolitionist (Id., p. 28). Hawkinson recalled checking the PUBS list, filling out the

211, that Santiago wanted to file a grievance almost initially, and that Santiago was

concerned the publication remain intact (Id., p. 84). Hawkinson generated a hall pass

for Santiago and met with him on March 9th to process the publication (Id., pp. 85-

86). Hawkinson noted on the form that Santiago would grieve the issue (Id., p. 87).

Following the meeting, Hawkinson submitted the Form 212 and his decision

to conditionally approve the publication with the removal of certain pages was upheld

by the chief administrative officer or warden (Id., p. 88; Doc. 195-3). On October 11th,

Hawkinson met with Santiago following the 212 review (Id., p. 88).

Matherly began working at Hill in 2009 (Doc. 196-2, p. 16). At one time, he

p. 39). Matherly has no recollection of meeting or interacting with Santiago (Id., p.

100). Matherly also had no recollection of any involvement with any of Santiago’s

publications in this complaint (Id., p. 189). Although named in the lawsuit, Matherly

does not recall being involved in any of Santiago’s grievance processes (Id., p. 193).

Santiago claims that Matherly “red-flagged” the Winter 2018 Abolitionist

publication and indicates it was in the Grievance Officer’s Report (Doc. 195-1, pp.

164-165). Santiago infers this because the Publication Review Committee consisted

of Hawkinson and Matherly, so Matherly had to be the staff member who raised the

concern to Hawkinson (Id., p. 166). Santiago never had a conversation with Matherly

anout the Winter 2018 issue of the Abolitionist (Id., pp. 174).

APPLICABLE LAW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that “[t]he court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV.

P. 56(a). Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)

(citation omitted). “A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if the evidence is

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Kvapil

v. Chippewa Cty., 752 F.3d 708, 712 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). In deciding whether a dispute exists, the Court must “construe all

Nat'l Am. Ins. Co. v. Artisan & Truckers Cas. Co., 796 F.3d 717, 723 (7th Cir. 2015)

(citation omitted).

Under Rule 56, the movant has the initial burden of establishing that a trial is

not necessary. Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 770 F.3d 618, 627 (7th Cir.

2014). “That burden may be discharged by showing ... that there is an absence of

evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Id. (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). If the movant carries this burden, the nonmovant “must make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's

case.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The nonmovant “must go

beyond the pleadings (e.g., produce affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

or admissions on file) to demonstrate that there is evidence upon which a jury could

properly proceed to find a verdict in [their] favor.” Id. (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). “The existence of a mere scintilla of evidence, however, is insufficient

to fulfill this requirement.” Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).

“[S]peculation and conjecture” cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment. Cooney

v. Casady, 735 F.3d 514, 519 (7th Cir. 2013). In addition, not all factual disputes will

preclude the entry of summary judgment, only those that “could affect the outcome of

the suit under governing law.” Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir. 2001)

(citation omitted).

In deciding the motion, the Court cannot weigh conflicting evidence, assess the

credibility of the witnesses, choose between competing inferences or determine the

ultimate truth of the matter, as these are functions of the jury.

2019). Instead, the Court's sole function is “to determine whether there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014). It must view all the

evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve

all factual disputes in favor of the non-moving party. McCottrell, 933 F.3d at 658.

ANALYSIS

Santiago claims that his First Amendment rights were violated when IDOC

personnel denied him access to three separate publications: (1) the November 2016

issue of Prison Legal News; (2) the August 2017 issue of Prison Legal News; and, (3)

the winter 2018 issue of the Abolitionist (Doc. 113). Santiago also claims that the

Illinois Department of Corrections violated his rights by implementing the

policy/procedure for confiscating inmate publications (Id).

“[C]onvicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of

their conviction and confinement in prison.” (1979). Inmates clearly retain protections

afforded by the First Amendment. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)

However, lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation

of many privileges and rights. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).

The limitations on the exercise of constitutional rights arise both from the fact of

incarceration and from valid penological objectives—including deterrence of crime,

rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at

822–823.

inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). To

determine if the regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests

four factors must be examined: (1) whether a valid, rational connection exists between

the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify

it exists, (2) whether there are alternative methods of exercising the right that remain

open to the inmate, (3) the impact of accommodating the right on staff, other inmates,

and on the allocation of prison resources generally, and (4) the existence of

alternatives suggesting that the prison exaggerates its concerns. Id. at 89-91.

The Seventh Circuit has noted that “Prisons have great latitude in limiting the

reading material of prisoners.” Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2009).

However, “the arbitrary denial of access to published materials violates an inmates

First Amendment rights”. Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1433 (7th Cir. 1996)

(quoting Martin v. Tyson, 845 F.2d 1451, 1454 (7th Cir.) (per curium), cert. denied,

488 U.S. 863 (1988)). In assessing the reasonableness of a prison restriction, courts

“must accord substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison

administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals

of a corrections system and for determining the most appropriate means to

accomplish them.” Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing

Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003)). The inmate challenging the

reasonableness of a prison restriction ultimately bears the burden of disproving its

validity. Singer, 593 F.3d at 534 (citing Overton, 539 U.S. 132).

When filling out the Form 211 entitled Publication Receipt and Course of

Action, Bradley checked that the publication appears to: (1) Encourage or instruct in

the commission of criminal activity; (2) Be otherwise detrimental to security, good

order, rehabilitation, or discipline or it might facilitate criminal activity or be

detrimental to mental health; or, (3) Other – Safety and Security (Doc. 195-2).

Specifically, Bradley referenced the article on pages 26-27 that advocate[s] and

encourage[s] hunger strike by prison inmates (Id.).

Considering the four elements of Turner, Bradley’s preliminary assessment

appears to invoke legitimate penological reasons. Additionally, Bradley testified in

his deposition that approximately 200 inmates at Menard received the PLN, and if

100 to 200 of them participated in hunger strikes or encouraged others to participate,

it would disrupt the institution, cause havoc, and could cause mental health problems

as other inmates consider whether or not they should participate (Doc. 201-9, p. 109).

As such, Bradley also thought the article was a safety and security concern (Id.).

Although Santiago claims he returned the form and requested a review of the

publication, there is no evidence that Bradley ever received the form. To the contrary,

Bradley testified that he never received the form (Id., p. 115). Additionally, although

Santiago filed a grievance about this matter, Bradley was not aware of it and did not

look for a grievance as it was submitted prematurely (Id., p. 116).

Finally, although Bradley admittedly performed a preliminary review of the

publication, he did not conduct a full review as he testified that he did not receive the

who has the final decision-making authority, to withhold the November 2016 PLN.

For summary judgment, “[i]nferences and opinions must be grounded on more

than flights of fancy, speculation, hunches, intuitions, or rumors.” Bennington v.

Caterpillar Inc., 275 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2001). “[A] complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all

other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

In this case, Santiago has not provided any proof that Bradley received the

returned Form 211 that requested review. Moveover, Santiago has not, and cannot,

establish that the November 2016 PLN was withheld for any non-penological

interest. Bradley testified regarding his thought-process and Santiago has not

produced any evidence that his First Amendment rights were unconstitutionally

limited or denied.

II. August 2017 Prison Legal News

Santiago alleges that Hawkinson wrongfully denied him his copy of the August

2017 PLN. In July 2017, Santiago was transferred to Hill from Menard. Following

his transfer, he learned (after speaking with another inmate) that the August 2017

PLN was under review. Santiago never received a Form 211 about his own PLN, he

just claims that his copy was confiscated for several months without any notification

and that he received it in either October or November 2017 (Doc. 195-1, pp. 186-187).

On August 29, 2017, Santiago filed a grievance, stating that he had not

received his copy of August 2017 PLN, but was aware that another inmate’s issue

was under review by the publications review committee (Doc. 201-3). The counselor’s

currently review[ing] this publication” (Id.).

Santiago inferred the grievance response to be an admission and/or

acknowledgement that his publication was under review (Doc. 195-1, p. 194).

Furthermore, another inmate told him that he just come from the PRC and had

spoken with Hawkinson about the August 2017 PLN, so Santiago assumed that

Hawkinson was responsible for his missing issue. However, Hawkinson denied

having any involvement whatsoever with Santiago’s August 2017 PLN. Furthermore,

there were no documents by Hawkinson reflecting any involvement with said issue.

A defendant that is not personally responsible for any deprivation of an alleged

constitutional right cannot be liable under § 1983. Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824,

833 (7th Cir.2010). Indeed, “only persons who cause or participate in the violations

are responsible.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir.2007). Because there is

no definitive link between Hawkinson and Santiago’s August 2017 PLN, a cause of

action cannot be sustained.

III. Winter 2018 The Abolitionist

Santiago next claims that Hawkinson and Matherly were involved in the

review of his winter 2018 issue of the The Abolitionist. On March 9, 2018, Hawkinson

met with Santiago regarding The Abolitionist. Hawkinson testified that the

publication had been received by the PRC, so he sent a pass to Santiago for a meeting

to process Form 211, which was his general procedure (Doc. 196-1, pp. 20-21).

The Publication Receipt and Course of Action (Form 211) prepared by

Hawkinson on March 9, 2018 for The Abolitionist – Winter 2018 indicated it was

advised that he would grieve the issue (Id.). Although Santiago did not check the box

requesting review, Hawkinson prepared a Form 212, noting that the issue was on

PUBS and that it was conditionally approved with the removal of pages 1, 2, 12 (Id.).

On October 10, 2018, the Chief Administrative Officer, or warden, concurred in

Hawkinson’s conditional approval (Id.; Doc. 196-1, p. 88).

On October 11, 2017, Hawkinson had a second meeting with Santiago to

discuss the review upholding the conditional approval of The Abolitionist (Doc. 196-

1, p. 89). On June 27, 2019, after Hawkinson’s retirement, Santiago filled out the

bottom part requesting that the publication be sent to an address in Galesburg (Id.,

pp.90-91).

Admittedly, Hawkinson conditionally approved the Winter 2018 issue of the

Abolitionist, with the removal of pages 1, 2, 12. Hawkinson testified that this

document was on the PUBS list, which at the time was a database of publications

with decisions of review by wardens of the office of inmate issues and the central

publication review committee (Id., p. 55). Hawkinson always checked if a document

was on the PUBS list as it abbreviated the review since someone else has already

made a decision (Id., pp. 110-112).

Hawkinson recalled having a general discussion with Matherly about the

Winter Abolitionist Publication being conditionally approved with the removal of

certain pages for the safety and security of the institution (Id., p. 114). Matherly does

not recall ever directing Hawkinson to review a publication and stated that

Hawkinson conducted the majority of the reviews as he was the chairman (Doc. 196-

publication review and his signature was not on the Form 211 or Form 212 for the

Winter 2018 Abolitionist (Id., pp. 188-189).

As hereinbefore mentioned, a defendant that is not personally responsible for

any deprivation of an alleged constitutional right cannot be liable under § 1983.

Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 833 (7th Cir.2010). Indeed, “only persons who cause

or participate in the violations are responsible.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609

(7th Cir.2007). Because there is no definitive link between Matherly and Santiago’s

Winter 2018 Abolitionist, cause of action against Matherly cannot be sustained.

Additionally, Hawkinson preliminarily reviewed the publication and advised

Santiago that it was on the PUBS list and was conditionally approved. The warden

made the ultimate decision when he concurred with Hawkinson’s determination.

IV. Qualified Immunity

Although this Court feels that summary judgment is appropriate on other

grounds, the defense has also asserted qualified immunity (Doc. 194-195). The

doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil

damages when their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009); see also Ulichny

v. Merton Cmty. Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 686, 706 (7th Cir. 2001). It is a defense available

to officials with discretionary or policymaking authority when sued in their

individual capacities under § 1983. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics

Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 766 (7th Cir. 2000).

The qualified immunity defense consists of two prongs, both of which Santiago

must overcome to defeat a qualified immunity defense: 1) whether a constitutional

right would have been violated on the facts alleged; and 2) whether the constitutional

right was “clearly established” at the time of the official's alleged misconduct. See,

e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011); Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 678,

691 (7th Cir. 2008). This is, in almost every case, a high evidentiary bar. Under

current Supreme Court precedent, “[c]ourts may decide qualified immunity cases on

the ground that a defendant's action did not violate a clearly established right without

reaching the question of whether a constitutional right was violated at all.” Pearson,

555 U.S. at 226.

In order to prevail, Santiago must demonstrate a violation of his clearly

established rights under the First Amendment in order to defeat the

qualified immunity defense. Purvis v. Oest, 614 F.3d 713, 717 (7th Cir. 2010). “To be

clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable official

would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Al–Kidd, 563 U.S.

at 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct.

3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)); see also Volkman v. Ryker, 736 F.3d 1084, 1090 (7th

Cir. 2013) (cautioning that rights should not be defined in a highly general fashion).

Santiago could demonstrate that his rights are “clearly established” by presenting a

sufficiently analogous case which establishes that Bradley’s, Hawkinson’s and

Matherly’s conduct was unconstitutional, or by presenting evidence—even in the

constitutional right that a reasonable official would know without guidance from a

court. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739–40 (2002); Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648

(7th Cir. 2001). He has done neither. Santiago has not shown that his rights were

violated by these defendants, who were not shown to be involved in any review of one

publication, who did not have the final decision-making ability of any publication,

and who posited legitimate penological concerns and rationale for preliminary

assessments. The first amendment right to publications for inmate is not absolute.

V. Sovereign Immunity

Santiago’s final claim is against Jeffreys “in his official capacity for

implementing a policy and/or practice of confiscating inmate’s publications.” Rob

Jeffreys is the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections. As such, Santiago

is precluded from asserting a claim against Jeffreys in his official capacity, as he is a

state official who cannot be sued for money damages. See Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S.

464, 469 (1985). Agencies of the state of Illinois, including the departments of

corrections, enjoy Illinois’ Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. See Wittmer v.

Peters, 904 F.Supp. 845, 855 (C.D.Ill. 1995), aff’d, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996)

(applying Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity to dismiss claims for money

damages against warden in his official capacity). In other words, the Eleventh

Amendment expressly recognizes the limitations on the jurisdiction of the federal

courts imposed by the sovereignty of the States; therefore, a non-consenting State is

immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens

of another state. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).

and declaratory relief against Jeffreys for his promulgating and enforcing the

publication review process at Hill and Menard (Doc. 201, p. 24). The Eleventh

Amendment does not prohibit a federal court from granting prospective injunctive

relief to prevent a [state official’s] continuing violation of federal law. Ex Parte Young,

209 U.S. 123 (1908). However, for this exception to apply, there must be a connection

between the alleged unconstitutional conduct and the state official’s exercise of his

official authority. Young, 209 U.S. at 157. Sovereign immunity will prohibit relief

against a state official when he or she is only a nominal defendant and the state is

the real, substantial party in interest. Id.

Rob Jeffreys was appointed Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections

in May 2019, well after all of these alleged incidents occurred.3 Santiago did not

submit any evidence as to how Jeffreys engaged in an unconstitutional act. As such,

Jeffries is entitled to sovereign immunity.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Summary

Judgment in its entirety. This action is DISMISSED with prejudice and the Clerk

of Court is DIRECTED to close the case and enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: __________________________________

/s/ Stephen P. McGlynn_

STEPHEN P. McGLYNN

U.S. District Judge

3 See www.illinois.gov/news/press-release.200.30.html