The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
AARON L. SMITH, #48412, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 21-cv-00068-JPG
)
PONTOON BEACH POLICE )
DEPARTMENT, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff Aaron Smith, a detainee at Madison County Jail (“Jail”), brings this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims that he was wrongfully arrested
for an offense related to a motor vehicle (a Class 2 felony) in February 2019. (Doc. 1). A former
cohabitant (complainant) allegedly abandoned her vehicle at Plaintiff’s residence and filed a
complaint against him for stealing it. (Doc. 1, pp. 6-7, 9-13). The charges against him were later
dropped when the complainant filed an affidavit stating that Plaintiff was not involved in the
matter. (Id.). Plaintiff now brings claims against the police department for an unlawful arrest,
unlawful seizure, false imprisonment, slander, deprivation of liberty, and deliberate indifference
in violation of the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Twelfth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
(Id.). He seeks money damages. (Id. at 8).
This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to
filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of a complaint that is
legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for
money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief must be dismissed.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The allegations are liberally construed in favor of the pro se plaintiff at
this stage. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Discussion
The Complaint does not survive preliminary review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff
has not named any individual officers in connection with his claims under the First, Second, Fifth,
Sixth, Eighth, Twelfth, or Fourteenth Amendments. He names Pontoon Beach, Illinois / Police
Department, and he seeks to hold the municipality liable for his constitutional injuries.
Municipalities “do not face respondeat superior liability under Section 1983 for the misdeeds of
employees or other agents. Only actions of the entity will suffice.” Flores v. City of South Bend,
997 F.3d 725, 731 (7th Cir. 2021). Municipal liability typically arises from the execution of a
government policy or custom that causes a constitutional violation. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690, 694 (1978). Plaintiff identifies no policy or custom that is
attributable to Pontoon Beach or that caused his injuries.
He instead refers to the police department’s failure to train its officers. (Doc. 1, p. 6).
Inadequate training may result in municipal liability under Section 1983, where the municipality’s
failure to train its employees amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of its inhabitants. City
of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390-91 (1989). Liability for inadequate training arises
where a municipality follows a training program “that they know or should know has failed to
prevent tortious conduct by employees” thereby demonstrating deliberate indifference to a known
risk. Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997). What
separates this from respondeat superior liability is a “known pattern of tortious conduct
demonstrating the need for additional training, ‘rather than a one-time negligen[ce].’” Flores, 997
F.3d at 731 (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 407-08)).
Plaintiff maintains that the municipality’s inadequate training caused his constitutional
injuries. (Doc. 1, p. 6). However, his reference to this theory of liability is vague at best. Plaintiff
simply writes “failure to train employees” in the margins of the Complaint. (Id.). He offers no
indication of what training was required, needed, and absent. He does not describe a pattern of
constitutional deprivations by Pontoon Beach or a single constitutional deprivation that was at risk
of recurring without additional training by the municipality. The allegations are thus insufficient
to support a failure-to-train claim against Pontoon Beach, Illinois / Police Department.
The Complaint shall be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff
will have an opportunity to file a First Amended Complaint, if he wishes to pursue his claims in
this action. The Court reminds Plaintiff that a successful complaint generally alleges “the who,
what, when, where, and how. . . .” See DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990).
Therefore, if he chooses to re-plead his claims, Plaintiff should identify who violated his
constitutional rights by name, if known, and include a description of how his rights were violated.
If Plaintiff does not know the names of certain individuals, he can refer to them by Doe designation
(e.g., Officer John/Jane Doe). Additionally, Plaintiff must name each defendant in the case caption
and reference him/her in the body of the amended complaint. If he re-pleads a claim against the
municipality, Plaintiff should state what specific policy, custom, or practice caused a violation of
his rights.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file a First Amended Complaint on or before
August 31, 2021. Should Plaintiff fail to file his First Amended Complaint within the allotted
time or consistent with the instructions set forth in this Order, the entire case shall be dismissed
with prejudice for failure to comply with a court order and/or for failure to prosecute his claims.
FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). See generally Ladien v. Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051 (7th Cir. 1997); Johnson
v. Kamminga, 34 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The dismissal shall count as
one of Plaintiff’s three allotted “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
An amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original complaint, rendering it void.
See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n.1 (7th Cir. 2004). The Court
will not accept piecemeal amendments to the original Complaint. Thus, the First Amended
Complaint must stand on its own, without reference to any previous pleading, and Plaintiff must
re-file any exhibits he wishes the Court to consider along with the First Amended Complaint. He
should also list this case number on the first page (i.e., Case No. 21-cv-0068-JPG). The
First Amended Complaint is also subject to review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Plaintiff is further ADVISED that his obligation to pay the filing fee for this action was
incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee remains due and payable, regardless of
whether Plaintiff elects to file a First Amended Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); Lucien v.
Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days
after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this Order will cause a
delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of
prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form for use in
preparing the First Amended Complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 8/2/2021
s/J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
United States District Judge