“[i]f a defendant consciously chose to disregard a nurse or doctor's directions in the face of medical risks, then he may well have exhibited the necessary deliberate indifference”
How later courts described this case
- “[i]f a defendant consciously chose to disregard a nurse or doctor's directions in the face of medical risks, then he may well have exhibited the necessary deliberate indifference”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CARL ALPHONSO MACK,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 18-cv-506-NJR
ZACH LOVE and JON WINTERS,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
Pending before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants
Zach Love and Jon Winters. (Doc. 104). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is
granted in part and denied in part.
FACTS
The following facts are not genuinely disputed for purposes of summary
judgment. Plaintiff Carl Mack, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”) previously housed at Shawnee Correctional Center (“Shawnee”), filed this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Mack alleges that Defendants Love and
Winters violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution when they
acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs when they refused to place him
in a low bunk. (Doc. 62).
Mack entered IDOC custody on August 10, 2017, at the Statesville Northern
Reception and Classification Center (“NRC”). (Doc. 106, p. 2). While at NRC, Mack was
given a special needs permit for a “low bunk, low galley,” with the order set to expire in
30 days. (Id.). Mack received a low bunk permit because of his diabetes, repeated
hypoglycemic attacks, and additional medical conditions (Doc. 105-12, p. 8, Doc. 106,
p. 4).
Mack was scheduled to be transferred from the NRC to Shawnee on August 29,
2017. (Doc. 106, p. 2). A day before the transfer, Defendant Winters was assigned to
Shawnee’s Assignment Office; he provided a list of all inmates transferring into Shawnee.
(Doc. 105-11, p. 26). Defendant Winters then entered the name and number of each inmate
into a program called Offender 360. (Doc. 105-11, p. 27). Defendant Winters did not have
access to mental or medical health records, and he was not able to edit or change
information in the Offender 360 special requirement report. (Doc. 105-9, pp. 18-19).1
Notably, on August 29, 2017, Mack did not have a low bunk or low gallery
accommodation on his Offender 360 special requirement report. (Doc. 105-11, p. 26).
On August 30, 2017, at 3:30 a.m., a nurse at Shawnee examined Mack and reviewed
his Offender Health Status Transfer Summary. (Doc. 105-1, p. 16; Doc. 105-12, p. 3;). On
Mack’s Health Status Transfer Summary, the section on physical disabilities and
limitations listed “low bunk low gallery.” (Doc. 105-3, p. 5). During this exam, Mack
alleges that he informed the nurse that he had a low bunk/low gallery permit, but the
nurse informed him that she could not put him on a low bunk/low gallery. (Doc. 105-1,
p. 16).
Four hours or so later, Defendant Winters started his shift in the Assignment
1 Defendant Winters had access to some medical records because he would know whether an inmate had
epilepsy. (Doc. 105-9, p. 20).
Office. (Doc. 105-8, pp. 72, 91). Defendant Winters did not receive any emails from the
Health Care Unit (“HCU”) that day. (Doc. 105-11). Defendant Winters, however, sent out
an email of the daily cell changes around 2:30 p.m. (Doc. 105-11, p. 22). The daily cell
changes noted that Mack was assigned a top bunk in Housing Unit 1, A-wing, cell 60. (Doc.
105-11, p. 23).
Later that afternoon, Mack received a low bunk/low gallery permit. (Doc. 105-13,
p. 1). Mack’s medical records also confirm that the HCU provided notification that
evening. (Doc. 105-3, p. 7). Yet, Mack slept in the top bunk the night of August 30, 2017.
On August 31, 2017, Defendant Love was working at the Assignment Office.
(Doc. 105-8, p. 61). Defendant Love’s shift started at 7:00 a.m. and ended at 3:00 p.m. (Id.
at p. 92). Despite the permit and the HCU notification, there is no record of Defendant
Love sending out an email of the daily cell changes, and Mack slept in the top bunk the
night of August 31, 2017.
In the early morning, on September 1, 2017, Mack rolled off the top bunk and hit
the area around his left shoulder, but did not lose consciousness. (Doc. 105-3, p. 9).
Though Defendant Love never received an email from the HCU, around noon on
September 1, 2017, Defendant Love reassigned Mack to a low bunk. (Doc. 105-11, pp. 19-
20).2
2 According to Defendants’ interrogatories, “[t]he Assignments Office only assigns offenders with low
bunks if they are notified by the Health Care Unit (HCU) or emailed by HCU informing them that a specific
offender requires such accommodation.” (Doc. 105-8, p. 64, 75). Here, there is no email from the HCU
notifying Defendant Love.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is only appropriate if the movant “shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting FED.
R. CIV. P. 56(a)). Once the moving party sets forth the basis for summary judgment, the
burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who must go beyond mere allegations and
offer specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. FED. R. CIV. P.
56(e); see Celotex Corp. v. Catlett, 477 U.S. 317, 232-24 (1986). The nonmoving party must
offer more than “[c]onclusory allegations, unsupported by specific facts,” to establish a
genuine issue of material fact. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing
Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)).
In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the Court must view the
evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion.
Bennington v. Caterpillar Inc., 275 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[i]nferences that rely upon speculation or
conjecture are insufficient.” Armato v. Grounds, 766 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cir. 2014). “Where
the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-
moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. Count I – Deliberate Indifference
Mack brings an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Winters
and Love because they allegedly refused to place him in a low bunk. Defendants Winter
and Love do not refute Mack’s serious medical condition, but argue they were not
deliberately indifferent to Mack because they were “never subjectively aware of those
needs.” (Doc. 105, p. 7).
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishments and deliberate
indifference to the “serious medical needs of a prisoner constitutes the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain forbidden by the Constitution.” Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance
Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 828 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner is entitled to “reasonable measures to
meet a substantial risk of serious harm”—not to demand specific care. Forbes v. Edgar, 112
F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997).
To succeed on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff
must show: (1) that he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition; and (2) that
the individual defendant was deliberately indifferent to that condition. Berry v. Peterman,
604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010); Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing
Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 584 (7th Cir. 2006)). A medical condition is objectively
serious if “a physician has diagnosed it as requiring treatment, or the need for treatment
would be obvious to a layperson.” Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014)).
Prevailing on the second prong requires a prisoner to show that a prison official
has subjective knowledge of—and then disregards—an excessive risk to inmate health.
Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 653 (7th Cir. 2010). The plaintiff need not show the
individual “literally ignored” his complaint, but that the individual was aware of the
condition and either knowingly or recklessly disregarded it. Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516,
524 (7th Cir. 2008). Deliberate indifference involves “intentional or reckless conduct, not
mere negligence.” Berry, 604 F.3d at 440 (citing Gayton, 593 F.3d at 620).
There is nothing to suggest that Defendant Winters was aware of the low bunk
permit, Mack’s medical condition, or any other details as to Mack’s situation. At best,
Mack claims he “talked to everybody[,] [ ] [l]ike, every officer, everybody [he] [had]
seen.” (Doc. 105-1, p. 19). Mack never met Defendant Winters. (Id. at p. 22). Mack never
provided Winters with the low gallery permit from NRC. (Id.). Mack never tried to
communicate with Winters through a request slip or letter. (Id.).
At the same time, there is evidence when construed in the light most favorable to
Mack that suggests that Defendant Love was aware of the low bunk permit. Mack’s
medical records confirm that the HCU provided notification on the evening of August
30, 2017 (Doc. 105-3, p. 7). Unlike Winters, where Winters’s shift had ended around 3:00
p.m., Love’s shift in the Assignment Office began the very next day at 7:00 a.m. (Doc. 105-
11, p. 92).
Counsel for Love points out there is no evidence of Love receiving an email from
the HCU regarding Mack’s low bunk permit. Love’s counsel relies on the lack of an email
from the HCU, and argues that “Defendant Love always received an email from the HCU
if an inmate had a low bunk/low gallery permit written by the HCU medical staff and
needed a new cell assignment” (Doc. 105, p. 12). The problem is Defendant Love still
assigned Mack to a low bunk on September 1, 2017 after Mack fell from the top bunk, and
neither Defendant Love nor his counsel have been able to “explain how or when [Love]
received notice that [ ] Mack required this assignment change” (Doc. 106, p. 10). Since
there is evidence that the HCU provided notification of Mack’s low bunk permit on the
evening of August 30, 2017 – and Defendant Love was the next officer to work in the
Assignment Office on August 31, 2017, a reasonable jury could find that Defendant Love
was personally involved and acted with deliberate indifference to Mack’s serious medical
needs.
II. Qualified Immunity
Simply put, Defendant Love is not entitled to qualified immunity. “Generally,
qualified immunity protects government agents from liability when their actions do not
violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.’” Hernandez v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Off., 634 F.3d 906, 914 (7th Cir. 2011)
(citing Purvis v. Oest, 614 F.3d 713, 720 (7th Cir. 2010)). “It protects ‘all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Burritt v. Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239,
249 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). In determining
whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must ask two
questions: “(1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to [ ] [Mack], show that
the defendant[s] violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that constitutional right
was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Hernandez, 634 F.3d at 914
(quoting Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 639 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted)).
Defendant Love argues that “the facts alleged cannot demonstrate the Defendants
were ever subjectively aware of Plaintiff’s medical permits” (Doc. 105, p. 14). At the risk
of being redundant, this Court disagrees, and the constitutional violations turn on the
same genuine issues of material fact discussed above. Further, it is clearly established
from pre-existing law that ignoring directives of medical professionals may violate an
inmate’s constitutional rights. See Zentmyer v. Kendall Cty., Ill., 220 F.3d 805, 812 (7th Cir.
2000) (“[i]f a defendant consciously chose to disregard a nurse or doctor's directions in
the face of medical risks, then he may well have exhibited the necessary deliberate
indifference”). Accordingly, Defendant Love is not entitled to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 104) is GRANTED as to Defendant Winters. The motion is DENIED as to
Defendant Love.
This case shall proceed to trial on the issue of Defendant Love’s deliberate
indifference to Plaintiff Carl Alphonso Mack. A status conference will be set by separate
order to establish final pretrial conference and trial dates.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 18, 2021 Tl
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge
Page 8 of 8