Young v. State of Illinois

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CHARLIE K. YOUNG, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 21-cv-32-DWD

)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF )

ILLINOIS, )

)

Respondent}. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

On January 12, 2021, Petitioner Charlie K. Young, an inmate of the Illinois

Department of Corrections, currently incarcerated at Shawnee Correctional Center in

Vienna, Illinois, filed his pro se Petition for “National and World Habeas Corpus

Proclamation of Jurisdiction” (Doc. 1), which the Court construes as a petition for writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.2. This case is now before the Court for a

preliminary review of the Petition pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases in United States District Courts. Rule 4 provides that upon preliminary

consideration by the district court judge, “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any

attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge

Petitioner has named the wrong respondent. Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires that

a petitioner name as respondent the state officer that has current custody over him. See Hogan v. Hanks, 97

F.3d 189, 190 (7th Cir. 1996).

Petitioner seeks his immediate release from custody pursuant to the judgment of an Illinois state court

(Doc. 1); therefore, his Petition is properly addressed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Graham v. Broglin, 922 F.2d

379, 381 (7th Cir. 1991).

must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” After carefully

reviewing the Petition, the Court concludes that this action must be dismissed.

Young’s Petition provides few specifics regarding his current term of

imprisonment. However, the Judgment and Sentence attached to Young’s Petition

reveals that a guilty verdict was entered against Young in Jackson County, Illinois on

October 16, 1979. Young was adjudged guilty on six counts: (I)-(IID) armed robbery; (IV)

rape; (V) deviate sexual assault, and (VI) aggravated kidnapping. Young was sentenced

to 25 years for counts I and II, 60 years for counts IIL, IV, and V, and 30 years for count

VI. According to the information currently available from the Illinois Department of

Corrections, Young’s projected parole date is January 19, 2033, with a projected discharge

date of January 19, 2036.°

The presently available electronic docket in Young’s Criminal Case, People of the

State of Illinois v. Charles King Young, Case No. 79-CF-73 (1st Cir., Jackson County,

Illinois)*, also indicates that Young has actively engaged in post-judgment proceedings

since his conviction. While there appears to be a gap in available records from May 4,

1979 to August 10, 1983, the docket information reveals that Young has challenged his

judgment and sentence before the Illinois courts. See Criminal Case, Docket Entry dated

August 30, 2017 (“The body of the defendant is held by the State of Illinois pursuant to

the judgment entered in this case and respectively reviewed and affirmed by the Courts

of this State!”).

5 See https://www2. illinois. gov/idoc/ Offender/ pages /inmatesearch.aspx (last visited May 26, 2021).

4 See https:/ /www.judici.com/courts/cases/case_search.jsp?court=IL039015] (last visited May 26, 2021).

Because a review of the merits of Young’s Petition requires dismissal, the Court

finds it unnecessary to determine whether Young’s Petition is timely or whether Young

has property exhausted his state court remedies. Turning to the merits, the Court has

made every effort to liberally construe the Petition and discern the relevant facts from

within it. Young’s Petition, however, is unclear and convoluted. It includes a number of

seemingly unrelated arguments favored by the sovereign citizens movement that courts

routinely deem frivolous. In short, Young challenges the legitimacy of the United States

government, the Illinois State government, and the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of

Williamson County, Illinois over him because of his alleged status as a sovereign citizen.

As a sovereign citizen, Young claims he is immune to prosecution, and cites a variety of

irrelevant legal citations in support.

Sovereign citizen claims are summarily rejected because it has been clearly

established that the laws of the United States apply to all persons within its borders,

including the Petitioner. United States v Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011)

(“Regardless of an individual's claimed status of descent, be it as a ‘sovereign citizen,”. .

. that person is not beyond the jurisdiction of the courts.”); see also United States v. Phillips,

326 Fed.Appx. 400, 400 (7th Cir. 2009) (relying on United States v. Burke, 425 F.3d 400, 408

(7th Cir. 2005) to explain that a defendant's presence in the territory of the United States

supplies personal jurisdiction). Accordingly, Young’s arguments are without merit and

provide no grounds for this Court to interfere with his criminal conviction. Benabe, 654

F.3d at 757 (collecting cases) (The Seventh Circuit repeatedly rejects “theories of

individual sovereignty, immunity from prosecution, and their ilk.”); United States v.

Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990) (explaining that “sovereign citizen”

arguments have “no conceivable validity in American law). Petitioner’s sovereign

immunity claims therefore fail, and his Petition must be dismissed.

Disposition

For the above stated reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition (Doc. 1)

is DISMISSED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment

accordingly.

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings requires a district

court entering a final order adverse to a petitioner to issue or deny a certificate of

appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) states that a certificate of appealability may issue

“only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.” This standard requires the petitioner to demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could

debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in

a different manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement

to proceed further.”” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); United States v. Fleming,

676 F.3d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 2012). The undersigned concludes that Young has not satisfied

his burden of showing that was entitled to relief on the merits of his petition. Reasonable

jurists would not find this conclusion debatable. Accordingly, the Court DECLINES to

issue a certificate of appealability.

SO ORDERED. LD

Dated: May 26, 2021

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge