Owens v. Tripp

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

BRANDON OWENS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 17-cv-1336-DWD

)

BRANDY TRIPP,1 )

TARA CHADDERTON, )

CHAD FRIERDICH, )

JOHN TROST, and )

ANGELA WALTER, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

On December 24, 2016, Plaintiff Brandon Owens was sent from Menard

Correctional Center to Chester Memorial Hospital where he was diagnosed with a

ruptured appendix and had an emergency appendectomy. Owens first reported having

abdominal pain to medical staff at Menard on December 22, 2016, and he alleges that

Defendants Brandy Tripp, Tara Chadderton, Chad Frierdich, John Trost, and Angela

Walter were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. On March 18, 2020,

Defendants Tripp and Trost moved for summary judgment, and Defendants Chadderton,

Frierdich, and Walter filed a motion for summary judgment on June 19, 2020. This action

was reassigned to the undersigned on May 18, 2021. For the reasons delineated below,

1 The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to correct the spelling of the names of Defendants Tripp and Walter on

the docket sheet.

Defendants’ motions are granted in part and denied in part.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

At all times relevant to his complaint, Plaintiff Brandon Owens was incarcerated

at Menard Correctional Center. Defendant John Trost was employed by Wexford Health

Sources, Inc. as the medical director at Menard, and Wexford employed Defendant

Brandy Tripp as a registered nurse at Menard. Defendants Tara Chadderton, Chad

Frierdich, and Angela Walter worked for the Illinois Department of Corrections as

registered nurses at Menard. Each defendant played a role in the events that led to Owens

being rushed to the hospital and receiving emergency surgery for a ruptured appendix

in December 2016.

On December 22, 2016, Owens began experiencing severe abdominal pain. He

flagged down a correctional officer because he felt like his pain was a medical emergency.

The officer told Owens that he would contact a nurse and returned to tell Owens that the

nurse wanted to see him. Owens was taken to see Defendant Tripp. His medical records

reflect that Tripp evaluated Owens for constipation. Tripp and Owens disagree as to who

first mentioned constipation. Tripp testified at her deposition that Owens reported being

constipated, but Owens testified that Tripp suggested it to him as a possible cause of his

discomfort. (Doc. 95-2, p. 16; Doc. 95-1, p. 10). He maintains that he only reported having

stomach pain and that he felt a stabbing pain. (Doc. 95-1, p. 10, 11).

Medical records reflect that Tripp noted that Owens’s last bowel movement was

two days earlier and that he had abdominal pain and a temperature of 99.8 degrees. The

form for constipation protocol assessments directs that separate, appropriate protocols

and assessments should be performed if a patient reports nausea, vomiting, or abdominal

pain. With Owens reporting that he was experiencing nausea, vomiting, and abdominal

pain, Tripp opted to provide Owens with milk of magnesia and a stool softener. She did

not perform any additional assessment protocols for his complaints, though she did note

that he reported abdominal pain. (Doc. 95-4, p. 2).

Owens next was seen by Defendant Chadderton between 11:00 p.m. on December

22 on 7:00 a.m. on December 23, 2016. According to Owens’ deposition testimony, he told

Chadderton that he had a stabbing pain and explained that he was sweating. She assessed

him using the constipation protocol and noted in his medical records that he complained

of lower left quadrant pain. She did not perform an additional abdominal pain protocol.

Chadderton noted that Owens had tenderness, though his bowel sounds were normal.

Chadderton continued Owens on the milk of magnesia and scheduled him for the

medical doctor call line. (Doc. 95-4, p. 1). A non-party nurse noted around 12:00 p.m. on

December 23 that Owens was not seen through the doctor call line due to an institutional

lockdown. (Doc. 95-4, p. 3).

Defendant Frierdich examined Owens at 10:00 a.m. on December 24, 2016. He

followed the abdominal pain protocol and noted that Owens had reported two days of

stabbing abdominal pain and a liquid bowel movement that was brown with some red

the night before. Frierdich also noted abdominal guarding and rebound tenderness.

Owens had a temperature of 100 degrees and an elevated pules. Frierdich reported to Dr.

Trost because Owens had a pulse over 100, and Dr. Trost ordered that Owens be placed

on 23-hour observation in the healthcare unit. Dr. Trost also ordered a saline IV, clear

liquid diet, Tylenol for pain, and regular vital sign checks. (Doc. 95-4, p. 4-5).

Defendant Walter was the next healthcare unit worker to examine Owens, and she

did so shortly before noon on December 24, 2016. She noted that Owens had a fever of

101.4 degrees and that his IV was infusing with difficulty. Owens described his pain as a

7 or 8 out of 10. He also self-reported painful urination, so Walter gave him a cup for

urine sample. Walter next saw Owens at 12:30 p.m., and he told her, “It hurts so bad!”

He described the pain as radiating to his scrotum. Walter notified Dr. Trost, and Dr. Trost

gave orders via telephone for Owens to be transferred to Chester Memorial Hospital. In

the emergency room, Owens was diagnosed with a ruptured appendix and sent for an

emergency appendectomy.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See

Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Doe, 743 F.3d 1101, 1105 (7th Cir. 2014)(citing FED. R. CIV. PROC.

56(a)). Accord Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2012). A genuine issue of

material fact remains “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Accord

Bunn v. Khoury Enterpr., Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 681-682 (7th Cir. 2014).

In assessing a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the

light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving

party. See Anderson, 699 F.3d at 994; Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011).

As the Seventh Circuit has explained, as required by Rule 56(a), “we set forth the facts by

examining the evidence in the light reasonably most favorable to the non-moving party,

giving [him] the benefit of reasonable, favorable inferences and resolving conflicts in the

evidence in [his] favor.” Spaine v. Community Contacts, Inc., 756 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir.

2014).

The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishments, and the

deliberate indifference to the “serious medical needs of a prisoner constitutes the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain forbidden by the Constitution.” Rodriguez v.

Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 828 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner is entitled to

“reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm”—not to demand specific

care. Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997). A prisoner’s dissatisfaction with a

medical professional’s prescribed course of treatment does not give rise to a successful

deliberate indifference claim unless the treatment is so “blatantly inappropriate as to

evidence intentional mistreatment likely to seriously aggravate the prisoner’s condition.”

Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1996)(citation omitted).

In order to prevail on a claim of deliberate indifference, a prisoner who brings an

Eighth Amendment challenge of constitutionally deficient medical care must satisfy a

two-part test. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 2011)(citation omitted). The

first consideration is whether the prisoner has an “objectively serious medical condition.”

Arnett, 658 F.3d at 750. Accord Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). “A medical

condition is objectively serious if a physician has diagnosed it as requiring treatment, or

the need for treatment would be obvious to a layperson.” Hammond v. Rector, 123 F. Supp.

3d 1076, 1084 (S.D. Ill. 2015)(citing Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir.2014)). It is not

necessary for such a medical condition to “be life-threatening to be serious; rather, it

could be a condition that would result in further significant injury or unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain if not treated.” Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010).

Accord Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828 (violating the Eighth Amendment requires “deliberate

indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm”)(internal quotation marks omitted)

(emphasis added).

Prevailing on the subjective prong requires a prisoner to show that a prison official

has subjective knowledge of—and then disregards—an excessive risk to inmate health.

See Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653. The plaintiff need not show the individual “literally ignored”

his complaint, but that the individual was aware of the condition and either knowingly

or recklessly disregarded it. Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 524 (7th Cir. 2008). “Something

more than negligence or even malpractice is required” to prove deliberate indifference.

Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014). See also Hammond, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 1086

(stating that “isolated occurrences of deficient medical treatment are generally

insufficient to establish . . . deliberate indifference”). Deliberate indifference involves

“intentional or reckless conduct, not mere negligence.” Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435,

440 (7th Cir. 2010)(citing Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010).

Assessing the subjective prong is more difficult in cases alleging inadequate care

as opposed to a lack of care. Without more, a “mistake in professional judgment cannot

be deliberate indifference.” Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th

Cir. 2016). The Seventh Circuit has explained:

By definition a treatment decision that’s based on professional judgment

cannot evince deliberate indifference because professional judgment

implies a choice of what the defendant believed to be the best course of

treatment. A doctor who claims to have exercised professional judgment is

effectively asserting that he lacked a sufficiently culpable mental state, and

if no reasonable jury could discredit that claim, the doctor is entitled to

summary judgment.

Id. (citing Zaya v. Sood, 836 F.3d 800, 805-806 (7th Cir. 2016)). This is in contrast to a case

“where evidence exists that the defendant [ ] knew better than to make the medical

decision[ ] that [he] did,” Id. (quoting Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 731 (7th Cir.

2016))(alterations in original). A medical professional’s choice of an easier, less efficacious

treatment can rise to the level of violating the Eighth Amendment, however, where the

treatment is known to be ineffective but is chosen anyway. See Berry, 604 F.3d at 441.

ANALYSIS

I. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

The record clearly establishes that Owens had a serious medical condition. He

reported several days of abdominal pain before ultimately being diagnosed with a

ruptured appendix. Defendants do not raise a developed challenge regarding the

seriousness of Owens’s medical needs, and the Court finds that a reasonable juror would

conclude that there is sufficient evidence to establish that Owens had an objectively

serious medical need. Defendants instead argue that their medical treatment was not

constitutionally deficient.

Defendant Tripp argues that her treatment of Owens did not rise to the level of

deliberate indifference. There is a dispute of facts as to whether Owens reported that he

was constipated or whether Tripp suggested that he was, and there is sufficient evidence

that could allow a reasonable juror crediting Owens’s testimony to find that Tripp

displayed deliberate indifference. She noted that he had abdominal pain, but the medical

records indicated that she did not follow the separate protocol for abdominal pain as

recommended on the constipation protocol form. Owens described going to the

healthcare unit due to severe, stabbing abdominal pain. A reasonable juror could

conclude that Tripp recklessly or intentionally disregarded his reports pain and settled

on constipation without fully weighing Owens’s symptoms. In doing so, such a juror

could conclude that Tripp failed to address Owens medical needs in the constitutionally

required manner, and, as a result, she is not entitled to summary judgment.

Defendant Chadderton followed a similar course of treatment when she examined

Owens. Owens testified that he described having a stabbing pain and that he was bent

over and sweating due to his pain. Like Tripp, Chadderton only completed the protocol

for constipation and continued Owens on treatment for that condition. According to the

medical records, Chadderton did not perform the abdominal pain protocol, and she did

not raise any issues to a physician, instead scheduling Owens for a medical call in the

future. A reasonable juror who credits Owens’s description of his pain and symptoms at

the time he was examined by Chadderton could conclude that she displayed deliberate

indifference to his medical needs.

Further, to the extent that Defendants suggest that their approach was reasonable

under the circumstances, their actions contributed in a delay in Owens’s treatment for

appendicitis, and such a delay can rise to the level of deliberate indifference if the delay

“exacerbated the inmate’s injury or unnecessarily prolonged his pain.” Perez v. Fenoglio,

792 F.3d 768, 777-78 (7th Cir. 2015)(citing McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir.

2010) and Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 831 (7th Cir. 2007)). “Whether the length of

delay is tolerable depends upon the seriousness of the condition and the ease of providing

treatment.” Id. (citing McGowan, 612 F.3d at 640). Where a plaintiff complains that

treatment was delayed, as opposed to denied, the Seventh Circuit “require[s] that the

plaintiff present ‘verifying medical evidence’ that the delay, and not the underlying

condition, caused some harm.” Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 964

(7th Cir. 2019)(quoting Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2013)(citing reference

omitted)). Here, Owens’s appendix was rupturing as he was being examined at the

hospital, which is sufficient medical evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether the

delays he faced between December 22 and December 24, 2016, exacerbated his injury and

unnecessarily prolonged his pain.

As to the remaining defendants, Defendant Frierdich examined Owens for the first

time at 10:00 a.m. on December 24, 2016. He performed the abdominal pain protocol and

immediately reached out to Dr. Trost regarding Owens’s pain, high pulse rate, and

continued symptoms. Dr. Trost provided instructions to address Owens’s complaints,

including fluids and pain medication. When Defendant Walter examined Owens two

hours later around noon, she recognized he was having continued issues, performed an

examination and testing, and returned to check on him at 12:30 p.m. When Owens

reported serious pain at that time, she called Dr. Trost who ordered that Owens be taken

to the emergency room.

No reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant Frierdich was deliberately

indifferent to Owens’s medical needs. He performed a thorough assessment, including

the protocol for abdominal pain, and recognized that he needed to contact a physician for

treatment orders. Those orders were then implemented, and Frierdich had no additional

contact with Owens. Similarly, Defendant Walter checked on Owens approximately two

hours later, recognized that Owens was in pain and having trouble, and contacted Dr.

Trost.

As to Dr. Trost, he was informed of Owens’s condition at 10:00 a.m. and

recommended a course of treatment that addressed complaints of pain and included

regular monitoring. When he was informed 2.5 hours later that Owens was not

improving and was still in distress, he promptly ordered that Owens be transferred to

the emergency room. These actions by these defendants demonstrate that they took

Owens’s medical needs seriously, worked to address them appropriately and without

delay, and did not knowingly or recklessly disregard his need for treatment. No

reasonable juror could conclude otherwise, and Defendants Frierdich, Walter, and Trost

are entitled to summary judgment.

II. Qualified Immunity

Defendants Chadderton, Frierdich, and Walter also argue that they are entitled to

qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields “government officials from liability for

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). The doctrine “balances two important interests – the

need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the

need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform

their duties reasonably.” Id. It protects an official from suit “when she makes a decision

that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the

circumstances she confronted.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).

The qualified immunity test has two prongs: (1) whether the facts shown, taken in

the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, demonstrate that the officer’s

conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right at issue was clearly

established at the time of the alleged misconduct. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. See also

Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 197; Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). To be “’clearly

established’ a right must be defined so clearly that every reasonable official would have

understood that what he was doing violated that right.” Dibble v. Quinn, 793 F.3d 803, 808

(7th Cir. 2015)(citing Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). There need not be a case

directly on point, but “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional

question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). The right must be

established “not as a broad general proposition.” Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664. Instead, it must

be “particularized” such that the “contours” of it are clear to a reasonable official. Id. That

is, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond

debate.” Carroll v. Carmen, 135 S.Ct. 348, 350 (2014).

Here, no reasonable juror could conclude that Defendants Frierdich and Walter

were deliberately indifferent to Owens’s serious medical needs. In the absence of a

constitutional violation, they are entitled to summary judgment. When the facts are taken

in the light most favorable to Owens, they demonstrate that Defendant Chadderton’s

conduct may have violated his constitutional rights. As such, she is not entitled to

qualified immunity.

CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, Defendants’ motions for summary judgment (Docs.

94, 105) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motions are granted as to

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Frierdich, Walter, and Trost. Plaintiff’s claims

against Defendants Tara Chadderton (Count IV) and Brandy Tripp (Count V) remain

pending. By separate order, the Court will set a status conference to discuss scheduling

matters. The parties shall be prepared to discuss trial dates and whether a settlement

conference would be fruitful.

The Court wishes to remind the Plaintiff that litigation is often viewed a series of

hurdles that the Plaintiff must clear to get to another hurdle. Summary Judgment is such

a hurdle, but it is a very low one for the Plaintiff to clear. Clearing the Summary Judgment

hurdle does not mean that the Plaintiff has won his case nor does it mean that he is

entitled to damages or other relief. As noted above, clearing the summary judgment

hurdle only requires the existence of a disputed fact material to the Plaintiff’s claim. At

trial, he will need to prove that the disputed fact did, in fact, occur as the Plaintiff says it

occurred. Trial is the highest and most difficult of hurdles for any Plaintiff to clear.

The Clerk of Court shall correct the spellings of Defendants’ Tripp’s and Walter’s

names as directed in footnote 1. At the close of the case, the Clerk of Court shall enter

judgment in favor of Defendants Chad Frierdich, Angela Walter, and John Trost and

against Plaintiff Brandon Owens.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 9, 2021

DAVIDW.DUGAN

United States District Judge