A “procedural shortcoming like failing to follow the prison’s 11 time deadlines amounts to a failure to exhaust only if prion administrators explicitly relied on that shortcoming.”
How later courts described this case
- A “procedural shortcoming like failing to follow the prison’s 11 time deadlines amounts to a failure to exhaust only if prion administrators explicitly relied on that shortcoming.”
- no Pavey hearing is required when purely legal issues and undisputed facts control the administrative remedies issue
- once an inmate receives all remedies ‘available’ he need not continue to exhaust administrative remedies
- “[W]hen a state treats a filing as timely and resolves it on the merits, the federal judiciary will not second-guess that action, for the grievance has served its function of alerting the state and inviting corrective action.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CALEB CHARLESTON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 19-cv-764-DWD
)
ALEX JONES, )
JOSHUA SCHOENBECK, )
PAMELA WESTERMAN, )
SARAH WOOLEY, )
JOHN MCCALEB, )
CHASE CARON, )
JEFFREY GARDINER, )
SHAUN GEE, )
HEATHER MCGHEE, )
PATRICK TROKEY, )
CALE YOUNG, )
JORDAN REES, and )
TANGELA OLIVER, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Caleb Charleston, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”), brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Defendants following injuries
Plaintiff sustained at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”) in 2017. As narrowed by
the Court’s threshold order (Doc. 10), Plaintiff proceeds on the following counts:
Count 1: Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Jones and
correction officers Trokey, Young, and Rees.
Count 2: Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Jones, Schoenbeck,
and Westerman for handcuffing plaintiff after he received injuries to
his arm.
Count 3: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to a serious medical need
claim against Jones, Westerman, Schoenbeck, Oliver Wooley,
McCaleb, Caron, Gardiner, Gee and McGhee for failing to provide
plaintiff with adequate medical treatment following his attack.
Now before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 54) on the issue
of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and memorandum in support (Doc. 55)
filed by Defendants Caron, Gardiner, Gee, Jones, McCaleb, McGhee, Rees, Schoenbeck,
Trokey, Westerman, Wooley, and Young. Defendant Oliver did not participate in the
Motion. Plaintiff filed a response opposing the Motion (Doc. 58). For the reasons set
forth below, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 54) will be DENIED, in
part, only as to Count 3 of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Defendants’ Motion is taken under
further advisement as to Counts 1 and 2. A motion hearing pursuant to Pavey v. Conley,
544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008) will be set by further court order. The Parties are advised that
the hearing will be limited solely to the issue of exhaustion as to Counts 1 and 2 of
Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1; Doc. 10).
Background
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following: On September 6, 2017, Plaintiff
was stabbed in his arm by other inmates in the prison yard at Menard (Doc. 1; Doc. 10).
Before the attack, Plaintiff expressed concerns for his physical safety to Jones, Rees,
Trokey, and Young, but they laughed at Plaintiff and did not permit him to leave the yard
(Doc. 10, p. 2). Various officers, including Jones, watched as Plaintiff was stabbed (Id.).
Following the attack, and despite explaining to Jones, Schoenbeck, and Westerman, that
he was injured, Schoenbeck (as instructed by Jones) handcuffed Plaintiff extra tight,
causing him additional pain (/d.). Plaintiff was later treated by McGhee, who cleaned
and bandaged Plaintiff's wound, although it continued to bleed through the bandage (Id.)
Plaintiff did not see a doctor and was not given medicine for his pain (Id.). Plaintiff was
told by Wooley that it was not her job to provide Plaintiff with medical treatment (Id.).
Throughout the week following his injury, Plaintiff asked Wooley, Gardiner, Gee,
McCaleb, Caron, and Oliver for medical attention, but was denied each time (Id.).
On September 15, 2017, Plaintiff transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center
(“Pontiac”) (Doc. 55-1). While at Pontiac, Plaintiff drafted at least two grievances relevant
to this matter (Doc. 1, pp. 24-33; Doc. 55-4; Doc. 55-5; Doc. 55-9; Doc. 58, pp. 16-17, 20-24).
The Grievances are dated September 29, 2017 and October 8, 2017 (Id.).
A. 9-29-17 Grievance
Plaintiff's 9-29-17 Grievance, in relevant part, provides: On September 6, 2017, at
Menard, Plaintiff was stabbed in his arm by an inmate while “Gym L.T. (John Doe and 3
C/O’s (All John Does)” watched (Doc. 1, pp. 24-25). Plaintiff was placed in segregation
after the attack and stayed in segregation from September 7, 2017 through September 15,
2017 (Doc. 1, p. 25). Plaintiff requested medical treatment from McCaleb, Caron,
Gardiner, Jane Doe Mental Health worker, along with every correctional officer and Jane
Doe nurse working in the “2 Gallery/In Seg” on September 7, 2017 but was denied each
time (/d.). Plaintiff did not receive any medical treatment for his arm (/d.). Plaintiff
requested “further action at a later day” and to have the evidence related to his injuries
preserved (Id.).
The 9-29-17 Grievance was not reviewed by any official at Pontiac.! Plaintiff did,
however, mail the 9-29-17 Grievance directly to the Administrative Review Board
(“ARB”) while at Pontiac (Doc. 1, p. 24; Doc. 55, p. 2). The ARB received the 9-29-17
grievance on October 10, 2017 and returned the grievance to Plaintiff on October 16, 2017
stating that Plaintiff's medical issues “are to be reviewed at your current facility prior to
review by the Administrative Review Board.” (Doc. 1, pp. 24, 26; Doc. 55, p. 2; Doc. 55-4,
p. 1). On March 15, 2018, Plaintiff transferred to Stateville Correctional Center
(“Stateville”) (Doc. 55-1). While at Stateville, Plaintiff submitted the 9-29-17 Grievance
for review (Doc. 1 p. 24; Doc. 55-5, p. 2). Stateville received the 9-29-17 Grievance on June
1, 2018 (Id.). On December 3, 2018, the grievance was denied as moot because Plaintiff
had received adequate medical treatment for his arm and could request further treatment
as needed (Doc. 1, pp. 24, 27; Doc. 55-5, pp. 1-2). The correctional officer also stated that
Stateville could not address any of the specific issues related to preservation of evidence
because the incident occurred at Menard (Id.). Plaintiff did not appeal this decision to the
ARB (Doc. 55-3; Doc. 58).
B. 10-8-17 Grievance
In Plaintiff's 10-8-17 Grievance, he restates the narrative in the 9-28-17 Grievance,
and further complained of John Does 8-10’s failure to protect Plaintiff by not allowing
Plaintiff to leave the yard and then by failing to help Plaintiff while he was attacked (Doc.
1 The records attached to Defendant’s Motion do not show that Pontiac received the 9-29-17
Grievance, and Plaintiff does not dispute this fact; instead Plaintiff argues that he was prevented
from submitting the 9-29-17 Grievance while at Pontiac because unidentified prison officials
refused him access to the grievance lockbox (Doc. 55-10; Doc. 58, p. 9).
1, pp. 28-32; Doc. 55-9, pp. 6-8, 14-15). Plaintiff further grieved the use of excessive force
by Westerman following the attack, which Plaintiff claimed was done at the instruction
of Jones and Schoenbeck so Plaintiff “could learn his lesson” and to further aggravate his
injury ([d.). Plaintiff further described not receiving medical care at Menard, despite
requesting medical attention from Westerman, Johns, Schoenbeck, McGhee, Wooley,
McCaleb, Caron, Jane Doe mental health worker, Garner, Gee, and Wooley (Id.).
Plaintiff maintains that he submitted the 10-8-17 Grievance for review while at
Pontiac by mailing it to his counselor and to the ARB (Doc. 58, p. 11; 58-1, pp. 2-3). In
support, Plaintiff provides a statement and his legal mail card showing multiple letters
sent to the ARB in 2017 (Doc. 58-1, pp. 2-3, 9). Defendants disagree, arguing that the ARB
did not receive the 10-8-17 Grievance in 2017 because it does not appear in Plaintiff's
Cumulative Counseling Summary or ARB records (Doc. 55-2). However, it is
undisputed, that Plaintiff submitted the 10-8-17 Grievance for review on June 1, 2018,
after transferring to Stateville (Doc. 1, p. 28; Doc. 55-9, p. 14). Stateville denied the 10-8-
17 grievance as untimely on August 7, 2018? (Doc. 1, p. 33; Doc. 55-9, p. 5).
On October 20, 2018, Plaintiff mailed a letter to then Illinois Governor Bruce
Rauner, complaining that Stateville wrongly denied his 10-8-17 Grievance as untimely
Doc. 1, pp. 35-38; Doc. 1-1). Plaintiff asked the Governor to investigate why the ARB and
Pontiac failed to respond to 10-8-17 Grievance in October 2017 (Id.). Plaintiff also sent a
new grievance, dated October 20, 2018, to the Governor (Id.) The 10-20-18 Grievance
2 The returned grievance incorrectly states that the grievance was returned on August 7, 2017.
(Doc. 1, p. 33; Doc. 55-9, p. 5).
alleged that the ARB failed to timely respond to Plaintiff's 10-8-17 Grievance, even
though the 10-8-17 Grievance raised issues related to staff conduct that Plaintiff was
required to submit directly to the ARB for review (Doc. 1-1); see 20 Ill. Admin. Code §
504.870(a)(4) (“Offenders shall submit grievances directly to the Administrative Review
Board when grieving: 4) other issues that pertain to a facility other than the facility where
the offender is currently assigned, excluding personal property and medical issues.”).
The ARB received a copy of Plaintiff's October 20, 2018 letter on November 15,
2018 (Doc. 55-9). The ARB denied the new 10-20-18 grievance finding it untimely and
improperly submitted (Doc. 55-9, p. 2). The ARB also informed Plaintiff that it had never
received his 10-8-17 Grievance:
ARB has received grievances from Offender dated 9/29/17, 10/12/17,
10/15/17 and 10/19/17 and all have been responded to by the ARB. The
grievance in question was sent in by an outside source (Governor's Office).
Offender failed to follow DR504F in filing grievances. The grievance dated
10/8/17 was never received by the ARB and is now 60 days past the time
frame for a review.
(Id.).
Legal Standard
Defendants seek summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, arguing that
Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this action. Summary
judgment is “ proper only if the pleadings, discovery materials, disclosures, and affidavits
demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact such that [Defendants are] entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Wragg v. Village of Thornton, 604 F.3d
464, 467 (7th Cir. 2010). A genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Defendants bear the initial burden of demonstrating
a lack of genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
The Court considers the facts in a light most favorable to the non-movant, here Plaintiff.
Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 948 (7th Cir. 2009).
Courts generally cannot resolve factual disputes on a motion for summary
judgment. E.g., Nat’l Athletic Sportswear, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 528 F.3d 508, 512 (7th
Cir. 2008). However, when the motion for summary judgment pertains to a prisoner's
failure to exhaust, the Seventh Circuit has instructed courts to conduct an evidentiary
hearing and resolve contested issues of fact regarding a prisoner's efforts to exhaust.
Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 588-90 (7th Cir. 2015); see Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739
(7th Cir. 2008). A hearing is not necessary, however, when exhaustion, or the lack of
exhaustion, is apparent. Wagoner, 778 F.3d at 588; see also Doss v. Gilkey, 649 F.Supp.2d
905, 912 (S.D. III. 2009) (no Pavey hearing is required when purely legal issues and
undisputed facts control the administrative remedies issue).
Lawsuits filed by inmates are governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”). The PLRA provides, in relevant part, that “no action shall be brought with
respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by
a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The purpose of the PLRA
is to “afford corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally
before allowing the initiation of a federal case.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006).
The Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to the PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement. Reid v. Balota, 962 F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 2020); Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d
804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). An inmate must take all the steps required by the prison’s
grievance system to properly exhaust his administrative remedies. Ford v. Johnson, 362
F.3d 395, 397 (7th Cir. 2004); Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002).
However, an inmate is only required to exhaust those administrative remedies that are
available to him. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Reid, 962 F.3d at 329. Administrative remedies
become “unavailable” to prisoners when prison officials fail to respond to a properly filed
grievance. See e.g. Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2002). Further, an
inmate is not required to continue their grievance efforts once it is determined that they
have received all requested relief and no further remedies are available. Thornton v.
Snyder, 428 F.3d 690, 694-97 (7th Cir. 2005).
As an inmate in the IDOC, Plaintiff was required to follow the three-step grievance
process outlined in the Illinois Administrative Code. See 20 III. Admin. Code § 504.800,
et seg (detailing grievance procedure). In short, if a prisoner has a grievance, he must first
seek the assistance of an inmate counselor. Id. at § 504.810. If the counselor is unable to
resolve the grievance, it is sent to the grievance officer, who submits a recommendation
to the chief administrative officer (usually the warden). Id. at §§ 504.810; 504.830. If the
warden denies the prisoner’s grievance, the prisoner has 30 days in which to appeal the
decision to the IDOC Director by sending the grievance to the ARB. Id. at § 504.850. The
Illinois Administrative Code also requires certain grievances to be filed directly with the
ARB. See 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.870(a)(4) (“Offenders shall submit grievances directly
to the Administrative Review Board when grieving: 4) other issues that pertain to a
facility other than the facility where the offender is currently assigned, excluding
personal property and medical issues.”).
Discussion
Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative
remedies by improperly grieving the claims relevant to this dispute. Specifically, as to
the 9-29-17 Grievance, Defendants claim that the grievance fails to raise any allegations
as to Plaintiff's Count 1 (failure to protect) and Count 2 (excessive force); and even if it
does provide notice of Count 3 (inadequate medical care), it lacks sufficient specificity
concerning the identities of the defendants in violation of 20 Ill. Admin Code § 504.810(c)
(Doc. 55, p. 9). Section 504.810(c) requires a grievant to provide “as much descriptive
information about the individual as possible” in the grievance. Defendants also argue
that by not appealing the denial of the 9-29-17 Grievance in December 2018, Plaintiff
failed to adequately complete the administrative remedy process (Id.).
As for the 10-8-17 Grievance, Defendants argue that Plaintiff never submitted the
grievance for review while at Pontiac, and therefore, it was rightly determined to be
untimely when Plaintiff later submitted it for review in June 2018, and then indirectly to
the ARB in October 2018 (Id. at pp. 11-12). In support, Defendants submit many
documents to show that Plaintiff did not submit the 10-8-17 Grievance to the ARB in
October 2017, including Plaintiff's Cumulative Counselling Summary, ARB records, and
the date stamps on Plaintiff's 10-8-17 Grievance and the October 2018 Governor letter
(Id.). Plaintiff responds, stating that he attempted to submit the 10-8-17 Grievance in
October 2017 multiple times, but that he was thwarted by various correctional officers at
Pontiac who refused to bring him the grievance box so Plaintiff could submit the
grievance (Doc. 58, pp. 11-12; Doc. 58-1, pp. 2-3). Plaintiff also maintains that he mailed
copies of the 10-8-17 Grievance to both the ARB and his Pontiac counselor, but received
no response from either (Id.). Accordingly, Plaintiff claims that he was unable to comply
with the available administrative remedies through no fault of his own.
At present there are factual disputes concerning the 10-8-17 Grievance, and the
alleged exhaustion of Plaintiff’s Counts 1 and 2 as presented in both the 9-29-17 Grievance
and 10-8-17 Grievance. These issues require an evidentiary hearing. Pavey v. Conley, 544
F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the Court will not reach a decision as to those issues
at this time. However, there is no factual dispute concerning Count 3 of Plaintiff's
Complaint as presented by Plaintiff in his 9-29-17 Grievance. Therefore, the Court can
resolve Defendants’ Motion as to Count 3 without a hearing. Wagoner, 778 F.3d at 588;
see also Doss v. Gilkey, 649 F.Supp.2d 905, 912 (S.D. III. 2009) (no Pavey hearing is required
when purely legal issues and undisputed facts control the administrative remedies issue).
The 9-29-17 Grievance clearly raises issues related to Plaintiff's medical treatment
at Menard following the incident on September 6, 2017, including that he requested
medical treatment from every correctional officer and nurse working in his segregation
unit on September 7, 2017 (Doc. 1, p. 25). While Defendants argue that the 9-29-17
Grievance lacks specificity concerning the identities of the Defendants in violation of 20
Ill. Admin Code § 504.810(c), the Court disagrees. A grievant is not required to know the
name of the prison employee whom he’s complaining about, and often will not know the
10
employee’s name before filing a grievance. See Roberts v. Neal, 745 F.3d 232, 235-36 (7th
Cir. 2014). The Court finds that Plaintiff's description of the Defendants’ specific titles
(correctional officers and nurses), location (the segregation unit Plaintiff was housed),
and date (September 7, 2017) provided adequate specificity to identify the persons at
subject in Plaintiff's 9-29-17 Grievance so to survive summary judgment. Therefore,
Defendants cannot meet their burden to show that the 9-29-17 Grievance was deficient
on that basis alone.
Furthermore, Plaintiff's failure to appeal the ultimate denial of his 9-29-17
Grievance to the ARB does not render his 9-29-17 Grievance unexhausted (at least as it
relates to his allegations of deficient medical treatment in Count 3 of his Complaint),
because there was no further relief that could be provided to Plaintiff in the grievance
process once the grievance was denied as moot. Although Plaintiff did not submit the 9-
29-17 Grievance to Stateville for review until June 2018, it is undisputed that the 9-29-17
Grievance was decided on the merits once received. Specifically, the medical issues
grieved by Plaintiff in the 9-29-17 Grievance were found to have been provided, and to
have been adequate; and that Plaintiff could request additional medical treatment as
needed. The 9-29-17 Grievance was therefore denied as moot, opposed to as untimely,
and the Court will not second-guess that decision. See Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521,
524 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen a state treats a filing as timely and resolves it on the merits,
the federal judiciary will not second-guess that action, for the grievance has served its
function of alerting the state and inviting corrective action.”); see also Maddox v. Love, 655
F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011) (A “procedural shortcoming like failing to follow the prison’s
11
time deadlines amounts to a failure to exhaust only if prion administrators explicitly
relied on that shortcoming.”); in accord Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004).
Moreover, in denying the 9-29-17 as moot, Stateville determined that Plaintiff had
received the available medical care he had requested in the grievance. Accordingly, there
was no further available remedy for Plaintiff to pursue from the ARB concerning his past
medical treatment. Thornton v. Snyder, 428 F.3d 690, 695 (7th Cir. 2005) (once an inmate
receives all remedies ‘available’ he need not continue to exhaust administrative
remedies). In Thornton, the Seventh Circuit provided the following example which is
analogous here:
It is possible to imagine cases in which the harm is done and no further
administrative action could supply any “remedy.” ... Suppose the prisoner
breaks his leg and claims delay in setting the bone is cruel and unusual
punishment. If the injury has healed by the time suit begins, nothing other
than damages could be a “remedy,” and if the administrative process
cannot provide compensation then there is no administrative remedy to
exhaust.
Id.
Likewise, here, Plaintiff is claiming insufficient medical treatment for his arm
injury. Although, Stateville determined that Plaintiff eventually received the requested
medical treatment, this does not prevent Plaintiff from arguing now that the care he
received directly following his injury in September 2017 was deficient, even if no further
treatment was presently needed in 2018 when Stateville denied the grievance as moot.
As such, there was no further relief that could be provided to Plaintiff in the grievance
process as it related to Count 3, and Plaintiff was not required to appeal the denial.
Accordingly, Defendants cannot meet their burden to show that Plaintiff failed to exhaust
12
his administrative remedies as to Count 3 of Plaintiff's Complaint, and Defendants’
Motion as it relates to Count 3 of Plaintiff's Complaint will be denied.
Disposition
For the above stated reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
54) as it relates to Count 3 of Plaintiff's Complaint is DENIED. The Court takes the
remaining exhaustion arguments related to Counts 1 and 2 of Plaintiff’s Complaint under
further advisement. A motion hearing pursuant to Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir.
2008) will be set by further Court Order. The Parties are advised that the hearing will be
limited solely to the issue of exhaustion as to Counts 1 and 2 of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc.
1, Doc. 10).
SO ORDERED. L i
Dated: March 17, 2021 Dent « W —
DAVIDW.DUGAN
United States District Judge
13