The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MAURICE JACKSON, R31861, )
Plaintiff,
vs. Case No. 3:20-CV-237-DWD
D. BROOKHART,
IDOC DIRECTOR, and )
T. ATKINS, )
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
This case is before the Court on Plaintiff Maurice Jackson’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction (Doc. 1), Motion to Stay Scheduling Order (Doc. 39) and Motion to Provide
Information (Doc. 43), the last of which is essentially a supplement to his Motion for
Preliminary Injunction Plaintiff is an inmate in the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”) housed at Lawrence Correctional Center (“Lawrence”). He alleges deprivation
of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seeks injunctive relief. The
Court held a hearing via Zoom on March 24, 2021. Plaintiff appeared and gave testimony
on his pending Motions. Defendants appeared through Counsel. For the reasons
detailed below, Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction will be denied without
prejudice.
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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
In his pleadings, Plaintiff makes the following allegations: on November 20, 2019,
Plaintiff was transferred directly into segregation at Lawrence, after he had been attacked
at Pinckneyville Correctional Center due to a gang “hit” that had been placed on him and
for talking to a transgendered inmate. (Doc. 1, p. 1). He requested protective custody
due to the gang hit on him and was informed that Lawrence does not have protective
custody. (id.). At previous institutions he had been given a single cell due to being
classified as “vulnerable,” but when he asked for a single cell at Lawrence, he was told
that no one gets a single cell. (Id., pp. 1-2). When he was placed in the general population,
Plaintiff's cellmate was a member of one of the gangs (the Black Stones) with a hit on him.
(Id., p. 2). Plaintiff asked for a crisis team and went on suicide watch. (/d.). He asked for
protective custody several more times and was denied. (Id.). Plaintiff spoke with Dr.
Pittman, who explained that if he was given a cellmate, it would be another vulnerable-
status inmate he found “compatible,” and that four people would vote on it (including a
final overriding vote by the warden). (Id.). Atkins, a placement officer, subsequently told
Plaintiff that “[iJf it’s left to me, you w[o]nt be safe nowhere.” (Id.). He ascribes this
hostility to Plaintiff “getting Springfield involved” by invoking his vulnerable status.
(Id.).
Plaintiff found a transgendered female inmate that he considered compatible, but
Atkins had the other inmate moved to another housing unit “out of retaliation[.]” (Id., p.
3). Plaintiff was subsequently told by other staff that Placement had prohibited him and
this other inmate from being housed together. (Id.). He ascribes a racial component to
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this decision—Plaintiff is black, and he cites two sets of white inmates whose
“relationships” are allowed. (Id.). Plaintiff subsequently renewed his request for
protective custody to Mental Health, alternatively asking for a transfer to Stateville
Correctional Center (which has protective custody) and that his proposed cellmate be
sent there as well. (/d., pp. 3-4). He did not receive a response. During this time he was
“threatened by inmates [with] bodily harm[.]” (/d., p. 4). Placement then moved Plaintiff
to a housing unit with gang members (including Black Stones) who were in Menard
Correctional Center with him when the hit was placed on him. (Id.).
Defendants filed responses to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 10 and
24). Included in the responses was an affidavit from Defendant Brookhart, stating that
she was informed that Plaintiff had been interviewed by the Investigations Unit on March
8, 2020, during which he stated that he did not know who had placed the hit on him, that
no one had made comments directly to him or threatened to harm him, that he felt safe
at the institution and that Plaintiff “ultimately desired to be housed with a specific
inmate.” (Doc. 24, pp. 5, 6). Plaintiff disputes the account of the interview. (Doc. 25).
Brookhart further stated that Plaintiff was not currently housed in a housing unit with
any members of an STG known to have a hit on him. (Doc. 24, p. 6). Plaintiff also disputes
that allegation. (Docs. 32 and 33).
In his latest supplement, Plaintiff alleges that “there is no safe haven here”, but
that he would be placed “in a safe environment for a couple months, until Placement and
the Warden decided I’ve been safe long enough, just to put [him] in danger again.” (Doc.
43, p. 1). He states he is currently in Cell 4 of the Lower Deck in 2 House of C Wing. (Id.,
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p. 2). Plaintiff alleges that “the Kings and Vice Lords [are] bothering me and threatening
me the most.” (Id., p. 1). He states that there are Vice Lords and Kings in a number of
other cells surrounding him, and that the individuals in Upper 13 and Upper 20 are
“bothering and threating [him].” (id., p. 2). He requested either a single cell on a top
deck or the 1 House of C Wing, but Brookhart refused. (Id., p. 1). Plaintiff's most recent
requested relief is that he be placed in protective custody or transferred to Stateville
Correctional Center for protective custody. (Doc. 43, p. 2). As Lawrence has no protective
custody section, Plaintiff is essentially asking for a transfer of prisons.
At the March 24, 2021 hearing, Plaintiff testified that he is now being housed ina
single cell at Lawrence and has been housed in a single cell for almost one year. He
further stated that he feels safe for now, and that he has not received any threats from
Defendants or other IDOC employees threatening to move Plaintiff out of his single cell.
Plaintiff testified that he continues to believe that there are threats against his safety from
nonparty gang members. He testified that he learned of these threats or “hits” from his
prior cell neighbor (who was an alleged member of one of these gangs) in or about 2014
when he was housed at Pontiac Correctional Center. However, Plaintiff confirmed that
now that he is in a single cell, he now feels safe. The Court finds that Plaintiff testified
credibly. The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff feels safe in his current single cell placement
and further finds that there is no present threat to Plaintiff's safety as it relates to his
current single cell placement at Lawrence.
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LEGAL STANDARD
Preliminary injunctions are extraordinary and drastic remedies that should not be
granted unless the movant makes a clear showing that it has carried its burden of
persuasion. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). Mandatory preliminary
injunctions, like the one requested here are “ordinarily cautiously viewed and sparingly
issued.” Graham v. Medical Mut. of Ohio, 130 F.3d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1997). Under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 65, the party moving for an injunction has the burden of showing
that 1. it has some likelihood of succeeding on the merits, 2. that no adequate remedy at
law exists, and 3. that it will suffer irreparable harm in the interim period prior to final
resolution of its claims. Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of U.S. of America,
Inc., 549 F.3d 1079, 1086 (7th Cir. 2008). If the movant establishes these elements, the
Court must then balance the potential harm to the movant if the preliminary injunction
were wrongfully denied, against the potential harm to the non-movant if the injunction
were wrongfully granted. Cooper v. Salazar, 196 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 1999). The Court
should also take into consideration the effect that granting or denying the injunction will
have on the public. Girl Scouts, 549 F.3d at 1086.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) adds an additional layer of restrictions
to injunctive requests by prisoners. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e & 18 U.S.C. § 3626. “The PLRA
states that no prospective relief shall issue with respect to prison conditions unless it is
narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of a federal
right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation.” Brown v. Plata,
563 U.S. 493, 530 (2011) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)). “When determining whether these
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requirements are met, courts must give substantial weight to any adverse impact on
public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system.” Id. (internal quotations
omitted).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff testified credibly at the March 24, 20201 hearing, that he presently feels
safe in his single cell placement. However, Plaintiff ultimately seeks a permanent
injunction requiring the IDOC Defendants to continue his single cell status indefinitely,
even though there is no constitutional right for a prisoner to be housed in a particular
institution or placement. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983) (Inmates have no
justifiable expectation to be incarcerated in any particular prison); Johnson v. Barry, 815
F.2d 1119, 1121 (7th Cir. 1987) (same). Nevertheless, as Plaintiff feels safe in his current
single cell placement, and there is no present threat of Defendants removing him from
his single cell status, Plaintiff's request for an injunctive relief must be denied because he
cannot meet his burden to show a likelihood of success on the merits or that he would
suffer irreparable harm.
Likelihood of Success on the Merits
To obtain a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of
success on the merits. A movant's showing of likelihood of success on the merits must
be “strong.” Tully v. Okeson, 977 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Hl. Republican Party
v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760, 762-63 (7th Cir. 2020)). This “does not mean proof by a
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preponderance .... [b]ut it normally includes a demonstration of how the applicant
proposes to prove the key elements of its case.” Id.1
Plaintiff's claim related to his housing is essentially an Eighth Amendment failure
to protect claim. To prevail on such a claim, a prisoner must show that he faces a
substantial risk of serious harm, and that the defendants knew of and disregarded that
risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 US. 825, 834, 837 (1994); Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 756
(7th Cir. 2010). However, a generalized risk of violence is not enough, for prisons are
inherently dangerous places. Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 909, 913 (7th Cir. 2005); Riccardo
v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir. 2004). A substantial risk of serious harm is one in
which the risk is “so great” that it is “almost certain to materialize if nothing is done.”
Brown, 398 F.3d at 911. “[T]he conditions presenting the risk must be ‘sure or very likely
to cause ... needless suffering,’ and give rise to ‘sufficiently imminent dangers.” Baze v.
Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) (quoting Helling v. McKinney,
509 USS. 25, 33, 34-35 (1993)).
Plaintiff's testimony that he feels safe in his current single cell placement negates
his claims that he currently faces a substantial risk of serious harm. Moreover, as there is
no present indication that Defendants plan to remove Plaintiff from his single cell status,
at this juncture, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his
1 How strong this likelihood must be is the subject of some uncertainty. The holding in Illinois
Republican Party specifically condemns the previously-applied standard of “better than negligible
chance of success” but offers little in the way of guidance other than “less than a preponderance
of evidence.” Further, the Seventh Circuit has said that the “sliding scale” approach still applies,
despite the recalibration of the standard. Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 822 (7th Cir. 2020). The Court
assumes that the low end of the sliding scale now starts at “strong” and becomes more
demanding from there.
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Eighth Amendment claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of
showing a likelihood of success on the merits so to sustain his request for injunctive relief.
Irreparable Harm
Plaintiff also cannot show irreparable harm. For preliminary relief to be granted,
the irreparable harm must also be likely. “That is, there must be more than a mere
possibility that the harm will come to pass, but the alleged harm need not be occurring
or be certain to occur before a court may grant relief.” Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 667 F.3d 765, 788-89 (7th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted). “[A] preliminary
injunction will not be issued simply to prevent the possibility of some remote future
injury. A presently existing actual threat must be shown. However, the injury need not
have been inflicted when application is made or be certain to occur.” Id. Again, as
Plaintiff testified credibly that he feels safe in his current single cell placement, the Court
finds that Plaintiff does not currently face certain or irreparable harm so to sustain his
request for an injunction.
PLRA Compliance
A further note is appropriate on the requested relief and its compliance with the
PLRA. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the
merits of a case can be resolved. Indiana Civ. Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766,
770 (7th Cir. 2001). The PLRA’s limitation of prospective relief to that which is “narrowly
drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of a federal right, and
is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation” further cabins what relief
the Court could afford Plaintiff even if it found he were entitled to a preliminary
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injunction on this issue. Plaintiff's testimony that he currently feels safe, in addition to
his prior written statements in his pleadings that he previously was held in other safe
parts of Lawrence of stretches of time, suggest that there are appropriate and safe areas
within Lawrence for Plaintiff to be housed. Accordingly, transfer to another facility
which has a protective custody area may be more than the minimum step required to
remove Plaintiff from any physical danger, should such physical danger credibly
materialize.
MOTION TO WITHDRAW RELIEF IN AMENDED COMPLAINT
Also, at the hearing on March 24, 2021, Plaintiff orally moved to withdraw his
requested relief No. 3 in is Amended Complaint (Doc. 23). Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to
waive any relief related to his request for a “permanent injunction, that allows inmates
who’s [sic] been sexually abused by cellmates, and as a result is labeled vulnerable status,
be allowed to cell with transgender’s, or those, who are also vulnerable status, that is
compatible because this will incentive good properly placement.” Defendants’ Counsel
had no objections to Plaintiff's request. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Withdraw
Requested Relief No. 3 from his Amended Complaint (Doc. 23) is GRANTED.
DISPOSITION
For the above stated reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Injunctive Relief (Doc. 1) is
DENIED, without prejudice. Plaintiff may seek further injunctive relief in the event his
cell status or circumstances change. Plaintiff's Motion to Stay Scheduling Order (Doc. 39)
is DENIED as moot. The Court will enter a new scheduling order by separate court
order. Plaintiff's Motion to Provide Information (Doc. 43) is GRANTED. The Court
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considered Plaintiff's allegations in the Motion to Provide Information when considering
Plaintiff's Motion for Injunctive Relief (Doc. 1). Finally, Plaintiff's Requested Relief No.
3 as pled in his Amended Complaint (Doc. 23) is hereby WITHDRAWN.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 25, 2021
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge
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