“Absolute immunity protects board members not only for the decision to revoke ... supervised release, but the board members' actions that are ‘part and parcel’ of the decision-making process.”
How later courts described this case
- “Absolute immunity protects board members not only for the decision to revoke ... supervised release, but the board members' actions that are ‘part and parcel’ of the decision-making process.”
- “[P]arole board members are absolutely immune from suit for their decision to grant, deny, or revoke parole.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MOSES M. BROWN )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 20-cv-435-SMY
)
)
STATE OF ILLINOIS,and )
IDOC PAROLE, )
)
Defendants. )
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Moses M. Brown, formerly an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”), brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 for alleged deprivations of his
constitutional rights. In September 2019, Plaintiff was returned to IDOC custody pursuant to a
warrant for parole violations and was eventually transferred to Vandalia Correctional Center
(“Vandalia”). Plaintiff contends officials at Vandalia held him beyond his release date.
Additionally, he appears to be asserting claims pertaining to his parole revocation and initial
detention at the arresting agency’s police station.
This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §1915A.1 Under Section1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to
filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). Any portion of a Complaint that is
1Plaintiff was incarcerated at the time of filing. (Doc. 1-1). Accordingly, his Complaint is subject to review pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for
money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28
U.S.C. §1915A(b).
The Complaint
Plaintiff makes the following allegationsin his Complaint: On September 9, 2019, Plaintiff
was arrested pursuant to a warrant for parole violations. Plaintiff was detained at “the police
station” where he was subjected to extremely cold temperatures without covers or bedding. On
September 24, 2019, Plaintiff was transferred to Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”).
While Plaintiff was in custody at Stateville, he was interviewed by members of the Illinois Prisoner
Review Board. The Prisoner Review Board representatives told Plaintiff they found no parole
violations and indicated he would be released. Instead of being released, Plaintiff was transferred
to Vandalia. Plaintiff informed officials at Vandalia that he was supposed to be released, but they
refused to assist him correct the mistake. In January of 2020, Plaintiff met with members of the
Prisoner Review Board and was given an “out” date of February 28, 2020.
Discussion
Plaintiff’s excessive incarceration claim is subject to dismissal because he has not named
a proper defendant. Plaintiff cannot bring a claim for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the State of Illinois. See Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 613 (7th Cir. 2012); Brown v.
Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 918 (7th Cir.2005). Instead, Plaintiff must pursue his claim against the prison
officials who caused the alleged constitutional violation, presumably officials at Vandalia. But
Plaintiff has not named any Vandalia officials as defendants. Accordingly, this claim will be
dismissed without prejudice.
Although not entirely clear, Plaintiff may also be attempting to bring claims relating to his
arrest, initial detention, and parole revocation. To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to assert
claims regarding these matters,they do not survive preliminary review. The allegations pertaining
to his arrest and initial detention at “the police station” are not associated with any particular
defendant and therefore must be dismissed. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Any claims pertaining to the decision to revoke Plaintiff’s
parole are subject to dismissal because parole board members are accorded absolute immunity for
these activities. See Walrath v. United States, 35 F.3d 277, 282 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[P]arole board
members are absolutely immune from suit for their decision to grant, deny, or revoke parole.”);
Wilson v. Kelkhoff, 86 F.3d 1438, 1445 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Absolute immunity protects board
members not only for the decision to revoke ... supervised release, but the board members' actions
that are ‘part and parcel’ of the decision-making process.”).
For these reasons, the Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice. However, Plaintiff
will be granted leave to amend his Complaint.
Disposition
Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice.
Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file a “First Amended Complaint” on or before [28 days
from date of filing]. Should Plaintiff fail to file his First Amended Complaint within the allotted
time or consistent with the instructions set forth in this Order, the entire case shall be dismissed
with prejudice for failure to comply with a court order and/or for failure to prosecute his claims.
Fed. R. App. P. 41(b). See generally Ladien v. Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051 (7th Cir. 1997); Johnson
v. Kamminga, 34 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
An amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original complaint, rendering the
original complaint void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n. 1
(7th Cir. 2004). The Court will not accept piecemeal amendments to the original Complaint. Thus,
the First Amended Complaint must stand on its own, without reference to any previous pleading,
and Plaintiff must re-file any exhibits he wishes the Court to consider along with the First Amended
Complaint. The First Amended Complaint is subject to review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Plaintiff is further ADVISED that his obligation to pay the filing fee for this action was
incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee remains due and payable, regardless of
whether Plaintiff elects to file a First Amended Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); Lucien v.
Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of
Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days
after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this Order will cause a
delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of
prosecution. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 13, 2021 A L J? Ls, we
David W.Dugan ts
United States District Judge