The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MARTIN ROMAN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
)
SHANE HILEMAN, )
JEFFERY M. DENNISON, )
LU WALKER, ) Case No. 18-cv-1288-DWD
BRETT NEIGHBORS, and )
MARK SCHUMAKE,1 )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
On June 18, 2018, Plaintiff Martin Roman, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois
Department of Corrections, filed suit alleging that Defendants Shane Hileman, Jeffery
Dennison, Lu Walker, Brett Neighbors, and Mark Schumake housed him in unsanitary
and unhealthy living conditions at Shawnee Correctional Center in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Now before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc.
70) on the merits of Roman’s claims. Roman filed a pro se response (Doc. 89) on November
6, 2020. For the reasons delineated below, Defendants’ motion is granted in part.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Martin Roman arrived at Shawnee Correctional Center (“Shawnee”) in
September 2017, and he alleges that he has been housed in unsanitary and hazardous
1 The Clerk of Court shall correct the name of Defendant L. Walker to Lu Walker on the docket sheet.
conditions since his arrival. At all times relevant to Roman’s complaint, Defendant Jeffrey
Dennison was the warden at Shawnee and Defendant Lu Walker was the assistant
warden. Defendant Brett Neighbors was the chief engineer, and Defendant Mark
Schumake was an assistant chief engineer. Defendant Shane Hileman was a correctional
officer who was responsible for providing Roman with clothing and bedding upon his
arrival at the facility.
Roman was held in a cell in receiving at Shawnee for approximately two weeks
beginning in mid-September 2017. At his deposition, Roman testified that the window in
his cell was broken, and, as a result, he was subjected to unconstitutionally cold
temperatures while he was held in receiving. (Doc. 71-2, p. 8). Historical weather data
submitted by Defendants disputes Roman’s claims, showing that high temperatures
ranged from 77 to 91 degrees and that lows only dipped below 60 degrees on four nights
during the weeks Roman was in a receiving cell. (Doc. 71-3). Roman told a correctional
officer about the issues with his window, but he did not tell anyone else. (Doc. 71-2, p. 9).
Defendant Hileman provided Roman with clothing and bedding for use at
Shawnee. Roman was provided with three new pairs of socks and three new pairs of
underwear. He was also given two sets of “state blues,” which consisted of a blue shirt
and blue pair of pants, and towels, a washcloth, and a bedding roll. Roman was supposed
to receive a bedroll of two sheets and a blanket, but he testified that one of his sheets was
torn in half and that his blanket was ripped. (Id. at 10). His state blues were torn with
holes that Roman described as big enough to stick his fingers through. Roman asked
Hileman for “something good and something reasonable,” but Hileman told him that
there no exchanges. (Id. at 5). According to interrogatory answers produced by Defendant
Dennison, however, Shawnee tried to create opportunities for clothing exchanges for all
inmates every six months, and there was a repair shop in the facility that could make
sewing repairs for inmates who requested them. (Doc. 71-5).
When Roman was transferred from receiving to his first cell at Shawnee, he was
given a mattress that had rust and urine stains on it, and he testified that he did not
believe mattresses were cleaned or sanitized between uses, though he never worked on
any sanitation or laundry crews responsible for such tasks. (Doc. 71-2, p. 6-7). Roman’s
second cell had a window that was sealed shut and covered with plastic, which he said
made his cell unbearably hot with no air circulation, though he did acknowledge that he
had a fan in his cell. (Id. at 15). Windows at Shawnee are sealed and covered with plastic
between November and March to keep out cold winter air, and windows in the cell block
are being replaced in phases as money becomes available for the project. (Doc. 71-5).
Roman also testified about having to deal with dirty, rusted air vents in his cell
and a screen over the window in his cell that was too dirty to allow proper air flow. (Doc.
71-2, p. 15). According to Defendant Dennison, inmates have access to cleaning supplies
on a daily basis and are responsible for cleaning their own cells. (Doc. 71-5). Roman also
complains that he has been subjected to mouse and spider infestations throughout the
institution, including seeing mice on a daily basis and finding mouse feces in his clothing.
He has never been bitten by a spider. (Doc. 71-2, p. 18-19). Pest control services treat
Shawnee on a monthly basis to prevent and address any infestations. (Doc. 71-5). Roman
also believes that there is lead paint and asbestos throughout the facility, but he
acknowledged that his beliefs are based upon how old the paint and other materials
appear. (Doc. 71-2, p. 20-21). Shawnee was built in the 1980s and does not have lead paint.
It has also been inspected for asbestos, and there is no asbestos in the prison. (Doc. 71-5).
According to Roman, he is forced to shower in moldy showers. He believes there
is mold because the showers appear to have black-colored mold on the floors and other
surfaces. (Doc. 71-2, p. 22-23). Defendants contend that the black discoloration is a result
of the type of cleaning products used and that it is not mold. The showers are cleaned
each morning before inmates use them, and they are undergoing renovations to address
the discoloration issues. (Doc. 71-5). Roman also claims that the prison is unsanitary
because there have been three sewage backups that caused flooding in the kitchen and
sometimes trays are not fully cleaned between uses. (Doc. 71-2, p. 24).
At his deposition, Roman acknowledged that he never spoke with Defendants
Dennison, Walker, Schumake, or Neighbors about his complaints and that he has no
evidence that they were aware of the conditions he faced other than their general
responsibility for knowing what was happening at Shawnee and for making needed
repairs. (Doc. 71-2, p. 22, 25). Roman alleges that Defendants Dennison and Walker were
deliberately indifferent to his health and safety needs because they allowed Roman to be
housed in unsanitary and hazardous conditions (Count 1). He also alleges that
Defendants Dennison, Walker, Neighbors, and Schumake implemented a policy of
sealing all inoperable windows, including the window in Roman’s cell, which
contributed to the intolerable living conditions (Count 2). Roman claims that Defendant
Hileman demonstrated deliberate indifference by providing him with unsanitary
clothing and bedding that were unsuitable for cold weather (Count 3).
LEGAL STANDARDS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Doe, 743 F.3d 1101, 1105 (7th Cir. 2014)(citing FED. R. CIV. PROC.
56(a)). Accord Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2012). A genuine issue of
material fact remains “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Accord
Bunn v. Khoury Enterpr., Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 681-682 (7th Cir. 2014).
In assessing a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the
light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving
party. See Anderson, 699 F.3d at 994; Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011).
As the Seventh Circuit has explained, as required by Rule 56(a), “we set forth the facts by
examining the evidence in the light reasonably most favorable to the non-moving party,
giving [him] the benefit of reasonable, favorable inferences and resolving conflicts in the
evidence in [his] favor.” Spaine v. Community Contacts, Inc., 756 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir.
2014).
The Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment forbids the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346
(1981)(citation omitted). To succeed on a claim related to conditions of confinement, a
plaintiff must establish both an objective and subjective element. See Grieveson v.
Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 775 (7th Cir. 2008). As to the objective element, a prisoner must
establish that the conditions deny him “the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities,” creating an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To do so, he must show that the conditions resulted in an
unquestioned and serious deprivation of basic human needs such as food, medical care,
sanitation, or physical safety. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. The Eighth Amendment “does
not require prisons to provide prisoners with more salubrious air, healthier food, or
cleaner water than are enjoyed by substantial numbers of free Americans.” Carroll v.
DeTella, 255 F.3d 470, 472 (7th Cir. 2001). Rather, “extreme deprivations are required to
make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Turner v. Miller, 301 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir.
2002)(citations and quotations omitted).
The subjective component of a claim for unconstitutional conditions of
confinement requires demonstrating that a defendant had a culpable state of mind by
showing that a defendant acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious
harm to the prisoner. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 842. While mere negligence does not
amount to a constitutional violation, a plaintiff satisfies the deliberate indifference
standard by showing that a prison official acted, or failed to act, despite the official’s
knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm from the alleged unconstitutional
conditions. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-348 (1986).
That is, prison officials must act to prevent “unreasonable peril” or to address
“preventable, observed hazards that pose a significant risk of severe harm to inmates.”
Anderson v. Morrison, 835 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 2016).
ANALYSIS
1. Count 1: Unconstitutional Conditions Claim Against Defendants Jeffery Dennison
and Lu Walker
Roman wishes t holds Defendants Dennison and Walker accountable for what he
describes as intolerable living conditions at Shawnee, but Defendants maintain that
Roman’s claims are either unsupported by evidence or related to trivial inconveniences.
While there may be evidentiary issues as to individual portions of Roman’s claims, when
the record is viewed as a whole, there is sufficient evidence that could allow a reasonable
juror to conclude that all of the alleged conditions, in combination, establish that Roman
faces an excessive risk to his health and safety. While it seems unlikely that Roman is
housed with lead and asbestos, there are genuine disputes of fact as to whether the
combination of dirty food trays, sewage backups in dining areas, mouse and spider
infestations, exposure to cold and to lack of ventilation, and, potentially, unremedied
mold in the showers deprived Roman of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
Roman testified that he never spoke with Defendant Dennison or Defendant
Walker about his issues and that he believes they are responsible based upon their roles
within the facility. The head of a facility, like Defendant Dennison, can be held
accountable for systematic unsanitary conditions. See Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1008-
09 (7th Cir. 2016)(citing Sanders v. Sheahan, 198 F.3d 626 629 (7th Cir. 1999)). Nothing
suggests that Defendant Walker bears that same responsibility. There is no evidence that
Walker knew of a risk to Roman’s health or safety and that she failed to act to remedy it.
Defendants suggest that the Court should rule in their favor because Roman’s
motion for preliminary injunction was denied after an evidentiary hearing focused on the
conditions Roman faced at that moment in time at Shawnee. (Docs. 27, 36). In ruling on
Roman’s motion for emergency relief, the Court, in making findings of fact, noted that
his likelihood of success on his claims of unconstitutional conditions was low, but the
inquiry, and the Court’s role in it, is different at summary judgment. Lack of sufficient
cause for emergency relief in the past does not mandate that Defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law at present. The question is whether the record demonstrates
there are genuine disputes of material fact that must be resolved by a trier of fact. As to
Roman’s claims against Dennison, the Court finds that there are. Accordingly, Defendant
Walker’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to Count 1, but Plaintiff’s claim
against Defendant Dennison shall proceed.
2. Count 2: Lack of Ventilation Claim Against Defendants Jeffery Dennison, Lu
Walker, Brett Neighbors, and Mark Schumake
In Count 2, Roman claims that Defendants Dennison, Walker, Neighbors, and
Schumake violated his constitutional rights by sealing his cell window, which resulted in
a lack of adequate ventilation and air circulation. Extreme temperatures that are
prolonged in duration and sufficiently severe can give rise to a constitutional claim, and
prisoners are entitled to adequate ventilation. See Sanders, 198 F.3d at 628 (citing Raine v.
Williford, 32 F.3d 1024, 1035 (7th Cir. 1994); Gray, 826 F.3d at 1006. Windows at Shawnee
are sealed from November until March to keep out the cold winter air. There is no
evidence that the temperature in Roman’s cells rose to an extreme temperature as a result
of the sealed window, and Roman testified that he had a fan, creating a means of
circulating air throughout his cell during winter months. Roman also had access to
cleaning products and was responsible for cleaning the vents in his cell to the extent that
they were too dirty to properly circulate air. Additionally, the door to his cell was not
solid and had a window, albeit one covered with either a screen or a plate with holes. No
reasonable juror could conclude that Roman was held in a cell that lacked appropriate
ventilation or airflow. There is not a triable question of fact as to whether the sealing of
windows in winter to prevent drafts and extreme cold posed an extreme deprivation, and
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count 2.
3. Count 3: Deliberate Indifference Claim Against Defendant Hileman
Roman’s testimony suggests that Defendant Hileman gave him torn clothing and
bedding that was covered in urine and rust stains and that Hileman refused to replace or
exchange the items when Roman asked for “something good and something reasonable.”
(Doc. 71-2, p. 5). Defendants’ interrogatory responses suggest that there were
opportunities at Shawnee for Roman to exchange his clothing items or to request repairs
if Roman believed his clothing was in an unreasonable condition. Defendants also
maintain that dirty and torn items were not distributed to new inmates, contradicting
Roman’s claim that he was only given half of a sheet in receiving. The record reflects that
Roman had access to laundry and repair services and was not forced to wear soiled
clothing. Stains and tears in clothing and bedding do not to rise to the level of being an
extreme deprivation, particularly where opportunities to repair and launder items
existed. Minor inconveniences and occasional lack of comforts while in confinement is to
be expected and are not actionable. Additionally, outside of one conversation during the
initial distribution of clothing, Hileman had no meaningful interaction with Roman, and
there is insufficient evidence that he failed to act to remedy a serious risk to Roman’s
health and safety. As such, Defendant Hileman is entitled to summary judgment.
4. Qualified Immunity
Defendants argue that they are shielded from liability by the doctrine of qualified
immunity. Qualified immunity shields “government officials from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). The doctrine “balances two important interests – the
need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the
need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform
their duties reasonably.” Id. It protects an official from suit “when she makes a decision
that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the
circumstances she confronted.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).
The qualified immunity test has two prongs: (1) whether the facts shown, taken in
the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, demonstrate that the officer’s
conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right at issue was clearly
established at the time of the alleged misconduct. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. See also
Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 197; Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). To be “’clearly
established’ a right must be defined so clearly that every reasonable official would have
understood that what he was doing violated that right.” Dibble v. Quinn, 793 F.3d 803, 808
(7th Cir. 2015)(citing Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). There need not be a case
directly on point, but “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional
question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). The right must be
established “not as a broad general proposition.” Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664. Instead, it must
be “particularized” such that the “contours” of it are clear to a reasonable official. Id. That
is, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate.” Carroll v. Carmen, 135 S.Ct. 348, 350 (2014).
As the Court found that there was no constitutional violation by Defendants
Hileman, Walker, Neighbors, and Schumake, they are entitled to qualified immunity.
Likewise, Defendant Dennison is entitled to qualified immunity on Count 2. The Court
did not find that there was no constitutional violation by Defendant Dennison in Count
1, and Defendants ask the Court to consider whether there was a clearly established right
in play at the time of Roman’s allegations. It is well-established, however, that a prisoner
has a right to adequate heat, ventilation, sanitation, and clothing to protect him from the
elements. As such, Defendant Dennison is not entitled to qualified immunity on Count 1.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc.
70) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendants’ motion is granted on
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Walker in Count 1, against Defendants Dennison,
Walker, Neighbors, and Schumake in Count 2, and against Defendant Hileman in Count
3. Defendants’ motion is denied as to Defendant Dennison in Count 1. At the close of the
case, the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment against Plaintiff Martin Roman and in favor
of Defendant Lu Walker on Count 1 and in favor of Defendants Shane Hileman, Jeffery
Dennison, Lu Walker, Brett Neighbors, and Mark Schumake on Counts 2 and 3. Only
Count 1 against Defendant Dennison remains pending.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 30, 2020 U LZ i
DAVIDW.DUGAN
United States District Judge