Opinion

Miller v. Rauner

Court: District Court, S.D. Illinois
Filed: Nov 30, 2020
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 21.2%

“]M]edical professionals may choose from a range of acceptable courses based on prevailing standards in the field.”

How later courts described this case

“]M]edical professionals may choose from a range of acceptable courses based on prevailing standards in the field.”
“[T]he alleged mishandling of . . . grievances by persons who otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying conduct states no claim.”
“[A]n inmate is not entitled to demand specific care and is not entitled to the best care possible . . . .”
approving of district judge’s refusal “to wade through the voluminous record to find evidence on a counseled plaintiff’s behalf.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JIMMIE DALE MILLER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:17-CV-859-MAB

)

JOHN BALDWIN, )

JACQUELINE LASHBROOK, )

KAREN JAIMET, LARUE LOVE, )

CHRISTOPHER SCOTT THOMPSON, )

RHONDA MCWILLIAMS, )

ROSE LOOS, DEREK FLATT, )

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., )

DR. LOUIS SHICKER, )

DR. STEVE MEEKS, ANGEL RECTOR, )

DR. ALBERTO BUTALID, )

DR. N. WALLABHANENI, )

CHRISTINE BROWN, and )

DR. MICHAEL SCOTT, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:

This matter is currently before the Court on the motions for summary judgment filed by all

Defendants (Docs. 264, 285). For the reasons explained in this Order, the motions will be granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jimmie Dale Miller filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging his

constitutional rights were violated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center. He is pursuing claims that

a number of medical providers, grievance officials, and prison administrators were deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical needs and took no action to address his concerns regarding his

hepatitis C, diabetes, lost eyeglasses, mental health, and pain near his left kidney (Doc. 183; Doc.

282, 296).

Defendants Dr. Alberto Butalid, Rose Loos, Angel Rector, Dr. Michael Scott, Dr.

Nageswararao Vallabhaneni, and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (the “Wexford Defendants”) filed

their motion for summary judgment on December 23, 2019 (Doc. 264). Plaintiff filed his response

in opposition on May 19, 2020 (Doc. 282). The Wexford Defendants filed a reply brief on June 2,

2020 (Doc. 290).

Defendants John Baldwin, Christine Brown, Derek Flatt, Karen Jaimet, Jacqueline

Lashbrook, Larue Love, Rhonda McWilliams, Dr. Steve Meeks, Dr. Louis Shicker, and

Christopher Scott Thompson (the “IDOC Defendants”) filed their motion for summary judgment

on May 26, 2020 (Docs. 285, 286, 287). Plaintiff filed his response in opposition on July 16, 2020

(Doc. 296). The IDOC Defendants filed a reply brief on July 23, 2020 (Doc. 299).

The materials submitted by the parties are voluminous and daunting—well over 100 pages

of briefing and nearly 3,500 pages of exhibits addressing sixteen separate Defendants, not to

mention the numerous secondary motions, responses, and replies (see Doc. 306). The Court’s

review of the parties' submissions is restricted to the portions of the record they cited, and the legal

arguments they expressly articulated. The Court did not comb through the record to find facts to

support vague allusions in the briefs.

FACTS

Plaintiff Jimmie Dale Miller is an inmate in the Illinois Department of Corrections. He was

incarcerated in June 2016 and assigned to Pinckneyville, where he arrived on September 1, 2016

(Doc. 265-1, p. 44; Doc. 265-2, pp. 14–15; Doc. 286-15, pp. 10, 11). He remained at Pinckneyville

until February 2019, except for brief furloughs to other facilities (see Doc. 286-15, pp. 2–11). In

February 2019, Plaintiff was transferred to Lawrence Correctional Center (Id. at p. 2). He was

released from prison in June 2020 (Doc. 296, p. 13). Prior to and during his incarceration,

Plaintiff had a number of physical and mental health issues, including hepatitis C (“HCV”), type

2 diabetes, undiagnosed pain in his left side, and bipolar disorder.

A. HEPATITIS C

Hepatitis C is a virus that spreads through blood-to-blood contact and infects and inflames

the liver.1 While some people infected with the virus are able to naturally clear it from their bodies,

most people develop chronic hepatitis C, which can lead to liver scarring (called fibrosis), cirrhosis

(severe and permanent scarring), liver cancer, liver failure, and even death. HCV can be treated,

and often cured, with antiviral medications. Id. (see also Doc. 282-1, pp. 12–13). Treatment,

however, is complicated and recommendations are constantly evolving (e.g., Doc. 282-1, pp. 35,

92; Doc. 286-2, p. 1).2 Treatment can take between two to six months and is costly (tens of

thousands of dollars per inmate) but has a success rate of over 90% (Doc. 282-1, pp. 13–14).3

The IDOC has partnered with the University of Illinois Chicago (“UIC”) to treat HCV-

positive inmates (Doc. 282-3, p. 2). Together they authored Guidelines for diagnosing, evaluating,

monitoring, and treating inmates with HCV (Doc. 282-3; see also Doc. 282-1, pp. 34, 90–91). The

Guidelines closely track the recommendations of national organizations, such as the American

Association for the Study of Liver Disease and the Infectious Disease Society of America (Doc.

282-3, p. 2; Doc. 282-1, pp. 90–91). Wexford Health Sources, Inc., which is a private corporation

1 Hepatitis C, NAT’L INST. OF DIABETES AND DIGESTIVE AND KIDNEY DISEASE, https://www.niddk.nih.gov/health-

information/liver-disease/viral-hepatitis/hepatitis-c (last visited November 27, 2020).

2 See also Monica K. Houston, Hepatitis C: There's a Cure, But Who Will Bail Out the Department of Corrections?,

11 HEALTH LAW AND POLICY BRIEF 27, 33–35 (2017), available at

https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1145&context=hlp.

3 See also Houston, supra note 2, at pp. 33–35, 36–37.

the IDOC contracts with to provide medical care to inmates in IDOC facilities, is required to adhere

to the IDOC's Guidelines (Doc. 282-1, p. 47). Wexford employs Dr. Dina Paul as the Chronic

Disease and Case Management Director (Id. at p. 3). In this position, she evaluates three to four

thousand patients with hepatitis C per year (Id.). She is an expert in managing and treating patients

with HCV (Id. at pp. 19–20; see also Doc. 282-4, p. 79).

National guidelines recommend anti-viral treatment for all patients infected with HCV

(Doc. 282-1, pp. 69–70). However, the national guidelines also recognize that due to the cost of

the medication, in some situations, treatment should be prioritized for patients with more advanced

liver disease (Id.). Prioritization is necessary for the IDOC given the high incidence of HCV in

prisons and the cost of treatment (Doc. 282-1, pp. 81–82; see also Doc. 282-3, p. 2).4 Priority goes

to inmates with more advanced liver disease while other inmates are monitored and evaluated

every six months at chronic care clinic visits and considered for HCV treatment as clinically

indicated (Doc. 282-2; Doc. 282-3, p. 2). Dr. Dina Paul agreed that it was appropriate to monitor

inmates whose condition was not advanced (Doc. 282-1, pp. 80–81).

The IDOC’s Hepatitis C Guidelines adopted in May 2014 (“2014 Guidelines”) dictated

that inmates entering IDOC custody were screened for HCV at the receiving and classification

facility (Doc. 282-3, p. 15). If the test was positive and the inmate wanted to be evaluated for

possible treatment, lab tests were then performed to confirm that the inmate had chronic HCV and

to determine the inmate’s APRI score (Doc. 282-3, p. 15). The APRI is a non-invasive, convenient,

and low-cost way to estimate fibrosis of the liver from routine blood tests (Doc. 282-1, pp. 50, 87–

4 Dr. Dina Paul testified that up to 25 to 30% of inmates in the IDOC have HCV (Doc. 282-1, pp. 81–82). See also

Houston, supra note 2, at p. 32.

88).5 IDOC physicians also evaluated the inmate for “absolute exclusion criteria” that precluded

the inmate from receiving treatment for HCV, which included amongst other things uncontrolled

diabetes (Doc. 282-3, p. 15; Doc. 282-1, p. 70).

Under the 2014 Guidelines, if the inmate’s APRI score was less than 0.5, they were not

eligible for HCV treatment and they were followed in the chronic care clinic every six months

(Doc. 282-3, pp. 10, 17).6 If the inmate’s APRI score was greater than 0.5 and they wished to be

considered for HCV therapy, then they received an “initial work up,” which included baseline

blood work, a FibroSpect/Sure (a specialized blood test used for measuring fibrosis), Hepatitis A

and B vaccinations, and Hepatitis C education and counseling (Doc. 282-3, pp. 10, 15–17; Doc.

282-1, pp. 36–37). And if the FibroSpect/Sure score was a Level 3 or 4, the patient was referred

to UIC (Doc. 282-3, pp. 10, 15–17).

Dr. Dina Paul testified that Defendant Dr. Louis Shicker, the IDOC Medical Director,

revised the HCV guidelines in early 2015, and those changes were discussed at a quarterly meeting

in June 2015 (Doc. 282-1, pp. 37–38). One of the changes was the discontinuation of

FibroSpect/Sure testing because “they didn’t think it was very accurate” (Id. at 37–40; see also

Doc. 282-3, pp. 9, 12–13). According to Dr. Paul, by the time Plaintiff was incarcerated at

Pinckneyville in September 2016, the FibroSpect/Sure testing had been replaced by a liver/spleen

5 APRI stands for AST to Platelet Ratio Index. It is based on the ratio of AST (which stands for aspartate

aminotransferase, an enzyme found primarily in the liver) to platelets in the patient’s body (Doc. 282-1, p. 56; Doc.

282-4, pp. 21–22). High levels of AST and low platelet counts are indicative of liver damage. What is the APRI Score?,

WEBMD, https://www.webmd.com/hepatitis/what-is-apri-score (last visited November 27, 2020). The APRI score

will get higher if the individual’s AST level increases or their platelet count decreases (Doc. 282-1, p. 56). The APRI

has good accuracy at predicting fibrosis at the two ends of the spectrum (Id. at pp. 49–50). In other words, a low APRI

score (less than 0.5), is a strong indicator that there is no significant fibrosis or cirrhosis while a high APRI score (over

1.5) is a strong indicator that there is significant fibrosis or cirrhosis. What is the APRI Score?, WEBMD. The mid-

range values are not as accurate at predicting the amount of fibrosis (Doc. 282-1, pp. 50, 97–98).

6 Dr. Paul testified that she thought the threshold APRI score was something over 1.0 (Doc. 282-1, p. 85).

ultrasound that was conducted if the APRI score was over 1.0 and the platelet count was under

200,000 (Doc. 282-1, pp. 40–42). Dr. Dina Paul testified that this policy was reasonable (Id.). Dr.

Paul testified that she was unsure whether the Guidelines—as in, the actual printed document—

were formally revised to reflect these changes (Id. at pp. 38–39). Plaintiff indicated that he was

not provided with a written version of the Guidelines as amended in 2015 (Doc. 282, p. 4 n.1).

The Guidelines were revised again in December 2017, and provided that inmates with an

APRI score over 1.0 (or between 0.7 and 1.0 with low platelet count, low albumin, or elevated

INR) were supposed to get a FibroScan (Doc. 282-3, p. 2). A FibroScan is a specialized ultrasound

of the liver that assesses how stiff or how flexible it is as a way to estimate the amount of fibrosis

(Doc. 282-1, pp. 33–34, 48, 88). The Guidelines were revised again in October 2018 to provide

that any inmate with HCV was supposed to get a Fibroscan, regardless of their APRI score, unless

they met one of the absolute exclusion criteria (Id. at pp. 35–36). The guidelines were revised

again in January 2019 (see Doc. 282-1, pp. 35, 53).

Plaintiff was diagnosed with hepatitis C in approximately 2014 (Doc. 265-1, p. 63; Doc.

283-2, p. 1). Plaintiff was subsequently incarcerated and transferred to Pinckneyville in September

2016 (Doc. 265-1, p. 44; Doc. 265-2, pp. 14–15). During his intake screening, Plaintiff informed

the nurse that he had HCV, and he was enrolled in the HCV chronic care clinic (Doc. 265-2, pp.

15, 16). Nurse Practitioner Angel Rector saw Plaintiff for the first and only time on September 21,

2016 at his first chronic care clinic (Doc. 265-2, pp. 99–101; Doc. 265-8).7 Plaintiff’s APRI score

was calculated as 0.71 (Doc. 265-2, pp. 99–101; Doc. 265-8). NP Rector testified via affidavit,

and the medical records indicate, that she spoke with Plaintiff about his hepatitis C status, including

7 Angel Rector was employed by Wexford as a Nurse Practitioner at Pinckneyville from January 2007 until January

2017 (Doc. 265-8).

discussing whether he would comply with treatment if he became eligible and whether he had any

unstable psychiatric issues (Doc. 265-2, p. 101; Doc. 265-8). Nurse Rector determined that “based

on the IDOC chronic clinic guideline, my assessment based on my education and experience,

[Plaintiff’s] presentation, and [Plaintiff’s] APRI score,” Plaintiff did not qualify for HCV treatment

(Doc. 265-8). She continued him in the HCV chronic clinic to monitor his condition (Doc. 265-8;

see also Doc. 262-3, p. 69).

At a follow-up appointment with the psychiatrist on August 7th, Plaintiff’s Abilify was

increased to 5mg (Doc. 283-1, pp. 95–97, 103–08; Doc. 262-3, p. 71). He continued taking Abilify

until January 18, 2018, when it was discontinued due his history of diabetes (Doc. 283-1, p. 119–

135, 145–150). He was then started on Haldol and Remeron (Id.).

E. FACTS RE: GRIEVANCES AND LETTERS REGARDING MEDICAL CARE

1. John Baldwin

John Baldwin was the Acting Director of the IDOC from August 2015 until May 23, 2019

(Doc. 286-1). Plaintiff claims his friend, Tanya Nguyen, sent a letter to Director Baldwin, amongst

others, on January 20, 2017 regarding the inadequate medical care he was receiving for his

diabetes, HCV, and vision issues (Doc. 296, p. 4; Doc. 1-2, pg. 29) Plaintiff has no evidence that

Director Baldwin ever received the letter, and he testified that he never got a response from

Baldwin (see Doc. 265-1, pp. 196–98, 209–10; Doc. 296, p. 4). For his part, Baldwin testified that

he has no personal recollection or record of receiving these letters or any other complaint from

Plaintiff regarding his medical treatment (Doc. 286-1; see also Doc. 225). He further testified that,

as Director, he was not involved in the day-to-day operations at Pinckneyville, including the

medical treatment of particular inmates (Id.).

On August 1, 2017, Plaintiff wrote a letter regarding inadequate medical treatment for his

HCV, diabetes, vision issues, and the pain he had in his left kidney area (Doc. 1-1, pp. 71-82). The

letter was addressed to a number of individuals and entities, including Baldwin (Id.). Plaintiff

testified that he received mail receipts demonstrating that the recipients received the letter, but he

misplaced them (Doc. 296, p. 14; Doc. 265-1, p. 198). There is no other evidence that any of the

recipients actually received the letter.

2. Dr. Louis Shicker

Defendant Louis Shicker was the IDOC’s Chief of Medical Services (also known as the

Medical Director) from November 2009 through June 2016 (Doc. 286-2). His job responsibilities

included overseeing all health-related services for the IDOC, monitoring contracted vendors, and

updating policies and procedures. Although he was a trained physician, he did not directly

participate in patient care in any of the prison settings.

Plaintiff sent Dr. Shicker a letter dated August 13, 2016 (which was before Plaintiff was

transferred to Pinckneyville) and complained about the improper medical care he was receiving

for his diabetes, HCV, mental health, vision, and pain near his left kidney (Doc. 265-1, p. 196;

Doc. 183; Doc. 1-1, pg. 2–4). Plaintiff admitted that he has no proof that Dr. Shicker received this

letter (Doc. 296, p. 15). The August 1, 2017 letter discussed above was also sent to Dr. Shicker

(Doc. 1-1, pp. 71-82).18 There is no evidence that Dr. Shicker ever received it. Notably, both letters

18 Plaintiff also claims he sent a letter to Dr. Shicker on January 23, 2017 (Doc. 296, pp. 4, 15, 16). However, the

document he cited to: Doc. 1-1, pp. 71–82, is the same document he cites to for the August 1, 2017 letter (see Doc.

296, pp. 3, 4, 7, 14, 15, 16). In other words, he claims the same letter was sent on two different dates. In looking at the

post-dated Dr. Shicker’s tenure as Medical Director.

3. Dr. Steve Meeks

Defendant Steve Meeks was the IDOC Medical Director from November 1, 2016 through

March 27, 2020 (Doc. 286-3). Plaintiff has never personally spoken to Dr. Meeks (Doc. 265-1, p.

210; Doc. 296, p. 18). Rather, the January 20, 2017 letter from Plaintiff’s friend, Tanya Nguyen,

was addressed to Dr. Meeks (Doc. 1-2, pg. 29). Dr. Meeks testified that he has no recollection or

record of receiving any letter in January 2017 (Doc. 286-3). Plaintiff has no evidence that Dr.

Meeks did, in fact, receive it (see Doc. 296).

On June 24, 2017, Plaintiff wrote a twenty-page letter to several individuals, including Dr.

Meeks, regarding his dissatisfaction with the medical care he was receiving (Doc. 1-2, pp. 2–26;

Doc. 265-1, p. 202). Dr. Meeks testified that he was never aware of the letter (Doc. 286-3). Plaintiff

does not have any documentation or evidence that Dr. Meeks received this letter (see Doc. 296).

Plaintiff’s friend, Tanya Nguyen, sent a letter on August 19, 2018 to Dr. Meeks and

Pinckneyville Healthcare Unit Administrator Christine Brown regarding the lack of medical care

for Plaintiff’s HCV and pain near his left kidney (Doc. 1-2, p. 29; Doc. 286-12). Ms. Brown then

wrote Dr. Meeks a memorandum dated September 7th, indicating that she had received a letter

from Ms. Nguyen (Doc. 286-12; see also Doc. 286-3). Ms. Brown said she had Plaintiff sign a

release so she could share his medical information with Ms. Nguyen (Doc. 286-12). Ms. Brown

also summarized Plaintiff’s medical issues and the healthcare he had been receiving (Doc. 286-

12). Dr. Meeks testified that based on Ms. Brown’s memo, he believed that “Plaintiff was receiving

letter, there is no date at the outset of it (see Doc. 1-1, pp. 71–74). However, a “certificate of service” following the

letter indicates that it was sent out on August 1, 2017 (Doc. 1-1, p. 82). Consequently, the document at Doc. 1-1, pp.

71–82 is viewed as a letter sent out on August 1, 2017. And because there is no other evidence regarding a January

23, 2017 letter (see Doc. 296), Plaintiff’s assertions to this effect are disregarded.

appropriate medical treatment and monitoring” (Doc. 286-3).

4. Jacqueline Lashbrook

Defendant Jacqueline Lashbrook was the Warden at Pinckneyville from July 2015 through

December 2016 (Doc. 286-4). Plaintiff’s only interaction with Warden Lashbrook was on October

31, 2016, when Plaintiff was taken to the healthcare unit after a fight with his cell mate (Doc. 265-

1, pp. 200–01; Doc. 296, p. 21). According to Plaintiff, he saw Lashbrook in the healthcare unit

and told her and a nurse that he needed his eye glasses from his cell. Lashbrook said that she would

“look into it.” There is no mention of Plaintiff’s glasses or interaction with Lashbrook in the

medical record from this day (Doc. 265-2, p. 26; Doc. 265-3, pp. 98–101). Lashbrook testified via

affidavit that, as warden, she would not have agreed to personally retrieve any items from a cell

(Doc. 286-4).

5. Karen Jaimet

Karen Jaimet replaced Jacqueline Lashbrook as the Warden at Pinckneyville in January

2017 (Doc. 286-5). She served as the Warden at Pinckneyville from January 2017 to June 2018.

Prior to becoming Warden, she served as the Assistant Warden of Programs from October 2016 to

January 2017.

On February 22, 2017, Warden Jaimet responded to a letter received from Plaintiff’s friend,

Megan Selby, regarding Plaintiff’s health concerns (Doc. 1-2, p. 30). The response indicated the

Warden was unable to communicate with Ms. Selby about Plaintiff’s medical concerns without a

signed release from Plaintiff, however, medical staff members were available and capable of

addressing his medical concerns.

On June 14, 2017, Plaintiff filed an emergency grievance, regarding the inappropriate

medical care he was receiving for his HCV and diabetes, his lost eyeglasses, and an incident where

Lieutenant Pierce refused to leave the examination room while Plaintiff attended a nurse sick call

(Doc. 265-1, p. 203; Doc. 286-5; Doc. 286-13; Doc. 286-14, pp. 112-117). Warden’s Jaimet’s

designee, Larue Love, deemed the grievance an emergency and it was processed on an expedited

basis (Doc. 286-13). The grievance officer, Derek Flatt, consulted with Healthcare Unit

Administrator Christine Brown, who reviewed and summarized the medical records, essentially

verifying that Plaintiff was receiving regular medical attention for his problems. Based on Brown’s

response, Flatt recommended denying the grievance, which Warden Jaimet concurred with.

The June 24, 2017 and August 1, 2017 letters discussed above were also addressed to

Warden Jaimet (Doc. 1-2, pp. 2–26; Doc. 1-1, pp. 71-82). Plaintiff admitted that he does not have

any documentation or evidence that Warden Jaimet received the June letter (Doc. 296, p. 21).

There is also no evidence that she ever received the August letter (see Doc. 286-5; Doc. 296).

Plaintiff also testified that “a few times while I was in seg” he requested to speak with

Warden Jaimet “on numerous occasions” as she “was making her rounds” but she “basically

brushed me off” (Doc. 265-1, pp. 202–03). He did not provide any further details about these

purported conversations (see id.). However, the cumulative counseling summary indicates that

Warden Jaimet saw Plaintiff in the segregation unit “during rounds” on August 21, 2017 (Doc.

286-15, p. 6). Plaintiff told her that “he has a virus and the HCU is not treating him” and she

advised him that she would “check with the HCU” (Id.). Warden Jaimet testified that she has no

independent recollection of Plaintiff or any specific conversations with him (Doc. 286-5).

6. Larue Love

Defendant Larue Love was Assistant Warden of Programs at Pinckneyville when Plaintiff

arrived there (Doc. 286-6). The following month (in October 2016), he became the Assistant

Warden of Operations and served in that position through January 2020. (Doc. 286-6).

The June 24, 2017 letter from Plaintiff that is discussed above was addressed to Assistant

Warden Love (Doc. 1-2, pp. 2–26; Doc. 265-1, p. 202). Plaintiff admitted that he does not have

any documentation or evidence that Love received this letter (Doc. 296, p. 24). The August 1, 2017

letter discussed above was also addressed to Assistant Warden Love (Doc. 1-1, pp. 71-82). There

is no evidence that he ever received it (see Doc. 296, Doc. 286-6). Aside from these letters, Plaintiff

testified that he also spoke to Assistant Warden Love about his missing glasses (Doc. 265-1, p.

107). Plaintiff claims that Love told him there was no optometrist available and walked away.

Defendant Love has admitted that he never recommended that Plaintiff see an optometrist outside

Pinckneyville (Doc. 222, pg. 4).

7. Christine Brown

Defendant Christine Brown has been Healthcare Unit Administrator at Pinckneyville

Correctional Center since 2014 (Doc. 286-7). Her job responsibilities are to direct, coordinate, and

review activities of healthcare operations in conjunction with the Medical Director and the Nursing

Director (Id.). She is a registered nurse, but she does not regularly treat patients in her current

administrative role (Id.). The June 24, 2017 letter from Plaintiff that is discussed above was

addressed to Ms. Brown (Doc. 1-2, pp. 2–26; Doc. 265-1, p. 202). Plaintiff admitted that he does

not have any documentation or evidence that Brown received this letter (Doc. 296, p. 25). The

August 19, 2018 letter discussed above was also addressed to Christine Brown (Doc. 286-12). As

recounted above, Ms. Brown received the letter and then wrote a memorandum to Dr. Meeks

indicating that Plaintiff was receiving appropriate medical treatment and monitoring. Ms. Brown

also responded to inquiries pertaining to grievances that Plaintiff filed in December 2016, May

2017, and July 2017 (Doc. 265-3, pp. 100, 102, 103).

8. Christopher Scott Thompson

Defendant Christopher Scott Thompson was the Clinical Services Supervisor at

Pinckneyville from January 2017 to April 2017 (Doc. 286-10). He was then promoted to Assistant

Warden of Programs after Karen Jaimet became Warden. He served in that position from April

2017 to June 2018. In June 2018, after Jaimet left her position as Warden, Thompson became the

Acting Warden at Pinckneyville. He served in that position from June 2018 until February 2020.

It is undisputed that in February 2017, while Thompson was the Clinical Services

Supervisor, he received a letter from Plaintiff’s fried, Megan Selby (Doc. 227; Doc. 286-10). It is

also undisputed that Thompson forwarded the letter to Plaintiff’s counselor and the healthcare unit

since it was “health related” (Doc. 227). He says he “expected the healthcare unit to appropriately

address the medi[c]al concerns expressed in the correspondence” (Id.). Plaintiff, however, claims

Thompson never followed-up with the healthcare unit to determine whether Plaintiff’s medical

concerns were addressed. (Doc. 296, pp. 11–12). However, it seems this is likely the same letter

that Warden Jaimet responded to on February 22, 2017 (Doc. 1-2, p. 30).

Additionally, the June 24, 2017 letter that is discussed above was addressed to Thompson

(Doc. 1-2, pp. 2–26; Doc. 265-1, pp. 199, 202, 204). Plaintiff, however, admitted he has no

evidence that Thompson received this letter (Doc. 292, p. 30).

9. Derek Flatt

Defendant Derek Flatt was a Grievance Officer at Pinckneyville from August 2014-

February 2018 (Doc. 286-8). Plaintiff indicates that on June 18, 2017, he sent written

correspondence to Defendant Flatt regarding missing grievances pertaining to his medical care—

specifically, a non-emergency grievance dated November 17, 2016 that disappeared after he sent

it to Flatt’s “office” and a grievance dated May 7, 2017 that was responded to by his counselor on

May 18, 2017 (Doc. 296, p. 28; Doc. 1-1, p. 60; see also id. at pp. 9–18, 51–56). Plaintiff testified

that Flatt never responded to his letter (Doc. 265-1, p. 208).

Plaintiff indicates that he sent another letter to Defendant Flatt on August 6, 2017,

regarding missing grievances (Doc. 296, p. 28; Doc. 1-1, p. 61). That letter once again mentions

the grievance dated May 7, 2017 regarding “medical treatment etc. etc.” and two other grievances

that were not related to medical care (Doc. 1-1, p. 61). Plaintiff testified that Flatt never responded

to his letter (Doc. 265-1, p. 208).

Finally, as recounted above, Defendant Flatt reviewed and denied Plaintiff’s June 14, 2017

emergency grievance. But Plaintiff argues that Flatt did not address the incident that occurred with

Lieutenant Pierce (Doc. 296, p. 7; see also Doc. 286-13; Doc. 286-14, pp. 112-117).

10. Rhonda McWilliams

Defendant Rhonda McWilliams worked as a Correctional Counselor at Pinckneyville from

April 2016 to February 2018 (Doc. 286-9). She was responsible for initial decisions on grievances

submitted through the normal (non-emergency) process. According to Plaintiff, he submitted a

grievance in November 2016 (Doc. 100-1, p. 1; Doc. 1-1, pp. 9–18). By mid-December, he had

not received any kind of response, so he sent an Inmate Request asking about the status of the

grievance (Doc. 100-1, p. 2; see also Doc. 109). Several days later, McWilliams made an

announcement on the P.A. system advising inmates that she had recently been out on vacation and

they should resubmit any grievances that were originally submitted while she was gone (Doc. 100-

1, p. 2; Doc. 100-3, p. 2; Doc. 268-9). Plaintiff later spoke with McWilliams and tried to hand her

a copy of the November grievance but she refused to take it and told him to put it in the grievance

box (Doc. 265-1, pp. 205–07; see also Doc. 1-1, p. 23). By January, Plaintiff still had not received

any kind of response to the grievance, so he once again inquired about it but McWilliams did not

respond to him (Doc. 100-1, p. 2; Doc. 100-3). McWilliams testified that she did not throw away

grievances (Doc. 286-9), which Plaintiff does not dispute (Doc. 265-1, p. 206). She further testified

that she did not ignore any of the grievances she received from Plaintiff (Doc. 286-9).

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is proper only if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

“Factual disputes are genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a

verdict in favor of the non-moving party on the evidence presented, and they are material only if

their resolution might change the suit’s outcome under the governing law.” Maniscalco v. Simon,

712 F.3d 1139, 1143 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding a

motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to,

and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears,

Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

The Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment imposes an

obligation on states “to provide adequate medical care to incarcerated individuals.” Holloway v.

Delaware Cty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1072 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

103 (1976)). “Prison officials violate this proscription when they act with deliberate indifference

to the serious medical needs of an inmate.” Holloway, 700 F.3d at 1072 (citations omitted). To

succeed on a claim for deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must demonstrate that they suffered from

an “objectively, sufficiently serious” medical condition and that the defendant acted with a

“sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id.

None of the Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s medical conditions were not objectively

serious (see Doc. 265, Doc. 286). Instead, they argue that they were not deliberately indifferent to

his medical conditions (see Doc. 265, Doc. 286). “A prison official is deliberately indifferent only

if he ‘knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.’” Whiting v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 837 (1994)). In other words, “[t]he defendant must know of facts from which he could infer

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must actually draw the inference.” Whiting,

839 F.3d at 662 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). This subjective standard “requires more than

negligence or even gross negligence; a plaintiff must show that the defendant was essentially

criminally reckless, that is, ignored a known risk.” Huber v. Anderson, 909 F.3d 201, 208 (7th Cir.

2018) (quoting Figgs v. Dawson, 829 F.3d 895, 902 (7th Cir. 2016)).

A. TREATMENT PROVIDERS

For medical professionals, the deliberate indifference standard has been described as the

“professional judgment” standard. Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894 (7th Cir. 2008). Treatment

decisions are “presumptively valid” and entitled to deference so long as they are based on

professional judgment—meaning they are fact-based with respect to the particular inmate, the

severity and stage of his condition, the likelihood and imminence of further harm, and the efficacy

of available treatments—and do not go against accepted professional standards. Johnson v.

Rimmer, 936 F.3d 695, 707 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted); Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 476

(7th Cir. 2017); Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 859 (7th Cir. 2011). A medical professional may be

held to have displayed deliberate indifference if the treatment decision was “blatantly

inappropriate” even to a layperson, Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014); see also

Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 729 (7th Cir. 2016) (a jury can infer deliberate indifference when

“a risk from a particular course of medical treatment (or lack thereof) is obvious.”), or there is

evidence that the treatment decision was “such a substantial departure from accepted professional

judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not

base the decision on such a judgment.” Petties, 836 F.3d at 729; see also Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409

(“A medical professional is entitled to deference in treatment decisions unless ‘no minimally

competent professional would have so responded under those circumstances’”) (citation omitted).

1. Nurse Practitioner Angel Rector

Plaintiff alleges that NP Rector was deliberately indifferent to his serious health needs

when she ignored his requests for HCV treatment and vaccinations for Hepatitis A and B (see Doc.

183, p. 9; Doc. 282, pp. 4–8). However, the Court is convinced that no reasonable jury could find

in Plaintiff’s favor.

NP Rector saw Plaintiff on only one occasion on September 21, 2016. His APRI score was

0.71 and NP Rector did not take any further action or order any additional work-up. Plaintiff is

adamant that NP Rector (as well as Dr. Scott and Dr. Butalid, who are both discussed in subsequent

sections of this Order) failed to treat his HCV in accordance with the IDOC Guidelines (Doc. 282).

He apparently believes that at the time he saw NP Rector, the 2014 Guidelines were still governing

HCV treatment for IDOC inmates (see Doc. 282, p. 5). Under the 2014 Guidelines, if an inmate

had an APRI score over 0.5, an additional work-up was supposed to be completed that included

FibroSpect/Sure testing, vaccinations for Hepatitis A and B if the inmate was not already immune,

HCV education and counseling, and a possible referral to UIC for evaluation for treatment (Doc.

282-3, p. 16). However, the evidence in the record plainly contradicts Plaintiff’s assertion that the

2014 Guidelines were still in effect at the time he saw NP Rector.

Dr. Paul testified that the Guidelines were amended in June 2015 before Plaintiff was even

incarcerated in the IDOC. Specifically, the IDOC had stopped using FibroSpect/Sure testing and

the IDOC was instead conducting a liver-spleen ultrasound, but only if the patient’s APRI was 1.0

or higher. In other words, by the time Plaintiff saw NP Rector, the threshold for ordering any

additional work-up was an APRI score of 1.0. Plaintiff did not set forth any evidence that

contradicted Dr. Paul’s testimony (see Doc. 282). Furthermore, all of the practitioners who saw

Plaintiff in 2016 and 2017, including NP Rector, Dr. Butalid, and Dr. Scott, were no longer

following the May 2014 Guidelines; rather, they were all operating on the understanding that the

threshold APRI score was above 1.0 (Docs. 265-8; Doc. 265-14; Doc. 282-4, pp. 71–72). Because

Plaintiff’s APRI score was under 1.0, the Guidelines did not require any additional work-up.

But even if the Court assumes Plaintiff is correct and the APRI cutoff for additional work-

up was still 0.5 at the time he saw NP Rector, a purported failure to follow the IDOC’s Guidelines

does not automatically create liability for deliberate indifference. “[P]ublished requirements for

healthcare do not create constitutional rights[.]” Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 729 (7th Cir.

2016). Such protocols can, however, “provide circumstantial evidence that a prison healthcare

gatekeeper knew of a substantial risk of serious harm,” particularly when the protocol is well-

established and widely known.19

Here, the protocol as to when to refer an HCV-positive inmate for additional work-up was

ever-changing, as opposed to a well-established and widely recognized standard of care (e.g., Doc.

282-3, pp. 2, 3, 15; Doc. 282-1, pp. 35, 92; Doc. 286-2, p. 1). Additionally, there is no evidence

that an APRI score of 0.7 posed a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff. There is also no evidence that

19 Petties, 836 F.3d at 729, 731–32 (finding it reasonable to infer treating physician knew that declining to immobilize

Achilles tendon rupture would impede inmate’s recovery where physician testified that immobilization was essential,

as did two specialists, and Wexford’s own protocol required it); Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 758 (10th Cir. 2005)

(finding it reasonable to infer nurse knew severe chest pain posed a serious risk of harm when DOC protocols state

that chest pains are a symptom of acute cardiac disease and two experts testified “it was an extremely well-known

standard of care” that chest pain should be treated as an emergency until cardiac involvement is ruled out by a doctor).

See also Steele v. Choi, 82 F.3d 175, 179 (7th Cir.1996) (“If the symptoms plainly called for a particular medical

treatment—the leg is broken, so it must be set; the person is not breathing, so CPR must be administered—a doctor's

deliberate decision not to furnish the treatment might be actionable under § 1983.”).

the decision not to initiate further testing and possible treatment for an inmate with an APRI score

over 0.5 but below 1.0 substantially deviated from accepted medical practices. Rather NP Rector,

Dr. Butalid, and Dr. Scott all testified that when a patient’s APRI score is below 1.5, monitoring

the condition is an appropriate treatment plan (see Doc. 282-4, pp. 71–72; Doc. 265-8; Doc. 265-

14). And expert witness Dr. Dina Paul also testified that the decision to monitor Plaintiff’s HCV

rather than refer him for additional work-up was in accordance with the IDOC’s Guidelines and

community standards of care (see Doc. 282-1, pp. 23, 26, 96). Plaintiff did not put forth any of his

own expert evidence to the contrary (see Doc. 282). Consequently, there is nothing from which a

reasonable jury could conclude that NP Rector acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s

HCV, and she is entitled to summary judgment.

2. Dr. Michael Scott

Dr. Michael Scott was the Medical Director at Pinckneyville for approximately the first six

months that Plaintiff was incarcerated there. Plaintiff contends that Dr. Scott failed and/or refused

to properly treat his HCV, diabetes, and the pain near his left kidney (Doc. 183, pp. 7; Doc. 282,

pp. 6, 8–9, 10–11). However, the Court is convinced that no reasonable jury could find in

Plaintiff’s favor on his claims.

The evidence shows that Dr. Scott saw Plaintiff on three occasions between November

2016 and the end of January 2017. None of these appointments were scheduled for the purpose of

addressing Plaintiff’s HCV. Plaintiff contends that he nevertheless brought up his HCV and

requested HCV treatment and vaccinations for Hepatitis A and B. But, according to Plaintiff, Dr.

Scott refused to provide any treatment or order the “initial work up” outlined in the Guidelines.

Even if what Plaintiff says is true, there is no basis for finding Dr. Scott liable for deliberate

indifference. As discussed above, the evidence demonstrates that during the time Plaintiff was

under Dr. Scott’s care, the threshold for initiating further testing and possible treatment for HCV

under the IDOC’s Guidelines was an APRI score of 1.0. There is no evidence Plaintiff’s APRI

score ever reached or exceeded 1.0. And as mentioned above, expert witness Dr. Dina Paul testified

that the decision not to order any further work-up was in accordance with the IDOC’s Guidelines

and accepted medical practices, and Plaintiff did not put forth any evidence to the contrary.

Consequently, Dr. Scott is entitled to summary judgment with regard to Plaintiff’s HCV.

As for Plaintiff’s diabetes, he argues Dr. Scott was deliberately indifferent because he

ignored Plaintiff’s request for a therapeutic diet, and without a therapeutic diet Plaintiff’s diabetes

remained uncontrolled (Doc. 282, pp. 8–10). This argument fails for a number of reasons. First,

there is no definitive evidence that a therapeutic diet for diabetics was available at Pinckneyville.

For his part, Plaintiff submitted a document titled “Illinois Department of Corrections Therapeutic

Diet Manual,” which he claims allowed Dr. Scott to order a diet geared specifically toward

managing diabetes (Doc. 282, pp. 8–9). However, there is no evidence as to when, if ever, this

Manual actually went into effect (see id.). According to Dr. Scott, there was no such thing as a

special diet for diabetic inmates while he was the Medical Director at Pinckneyville. Rather, Dr.

Scott testified that the regular meals were approved by a dietician and were appropriate for diabetic

inmates. Dr. Butalid said the same, as did Healthcare Administrator Christine Brown. Plaintiff did

not argue, let alone submit any evidence, that the regular meals offered at Pinckneyville were

inappropriate for diabetic patients (see Doc. 282).

At any rate, even if the Court assumes that a therapeutic diet was available, Plaintiff is not

entitled to dictate the treatment he is prescribed, nor is he entitled to receive every possible

treatment available. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 754 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[A]n inmate is not

entitled to demand specific care and is not entitled to the best care possible . . . .”); Walker v.

Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 965 (7th Cir. 2019) (“]M]edical professionals may

choose from a range of acceptable courses based on prevailing standards in the field.”) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). Courts “defer to medical professionals’ treatment decisions

unless there is evidence that no minimally competent professional would have so responded under

those circumstances.” Walker, 940 F.3d at 965 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the medical records demonstrate that once Dr. Scott was made aware that Plaintiff’s diabetes

was not well-controlled, he prescribed medication, enrolled Plaintiff in the diabetes chronic clinic,

educated Plaintiff on managing his diabetes, and continued to closely monitor Plaintiff, adjusting

his medications as necessary. While Plaintiff claims that Dr. Scott should have also ordered a

therapeutic diet, he has not put forth any evidence that it was essentially mandated by accepted

professional standards. Nor was the decision not to order a therapeutic diet obviously wrong even

to a layperson, particularly given the unchallenged evidence that the regular meals offered at

Pinckneyville were appropriate for diabetic inmates. At most, Plaintiff’s evidence shows that a

therapeutic diet was another potential treatment option and perhaps it would have been beneficial.

But Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the prescribed course of treatment is insufficient to create a

genuine question of material fact as to whether Dr. Scott was deliberately indifferent. Pyles, 771

F.3d at 409; Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006)

Finally, Plaintiff’s argument that Dr. Scott’s failure to prescribe a therapeutic diet is the

reason that his diabetes remained uncontrolled strains credulity. The records demonstrate that at

the same time Dr. Scott was repeatedly counseling Plaintiff on the importance of eating a well-

balanced diet, Plaintiff was spending hundreds of dollars per month at the commissary on foods

that diabetics are counseled to avoid, such as refined, highly processed carbohydrates and those

with added sugar (like soda, juice, rice, noodles, chips, sugary cereal, cakes, cookies, and candy),

and saturated fats (like cheese, sausage, and other processed meats). For these reasons, no

reasonable jury could find that Dr. Scott was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s diabetes and he

is entitled to summary judgment in this regard.

That leaves Plaintiff’s left flank pain. Plaintiff contends that Dr. Scott was deliberately

indifferent because he did not order any additional testing or complete an additional examination

to determine what was causing the pain (Doc. 282, p. 11). But the decision to forgo additional

diagnostic tests is a “classic example of a matter for medical judgment.” Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d

403, 411 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). Here, Plaintiff

complained at his first appointment with Dr. Scott about pain near his left kidney that had been

ongoing for several months. But he indicated that he was not in pain during the appointment and

he had previously reported a pain level of only two out of ten. Dr. Scott examined Plaintiff and ran

some tests, which ruled out any infection or problem with Plaintiff’s kidneys. There is no

indication that Plaintiff ever complained about the pain again during his three subsequent

appointments with Dr. Scott. Given the circumstances—the unremarkable results from the

diagnostic testing and Dr. Scott’s own physical examination, the reportedly mild and intermittent

nature of Plaintiff’s pain, the lack of any other symptoms, and the absence of any further

complaints of continuing or worsening pain—it can hardly be said that Dr. Scott’s decision not to

pursue additional diagnostic testing was blatantly inappropriate. Nor did Plaintiff put forth any

evidence showing that it was a significant departure from accepted medical standards (see Doc.

282). Accordingly, no reasonable jury could find that Dr. Scott was deliberately indifferent to

Plaintiff’s left side pain and he is entitled to summary judgment in this regard.

3. Dr. Alberto Butalid

Plaintiff claims that Dr. Butalid failed and/or refused to properly treat his diabetes and

HCV (Doc. 183, pp. 9, 10; see also Doc. 282). However, the Court is convinced that no reasonable

jury could find in Plaintiff’s favor on his claims.

Plaintiff saw Dr. Butalid only once at an HCV chronic clinic visit in April 2017. His APRI

score was 0.8, but as discussed above with respect to NP Rector, during the time Plaintiff was

under Dr. Butalid’s care, the threshold for initiating further testing and possible treatment for HCV

under the IDOC’s Guidelines was an APRI score of 1.0. Additionally, Plaintiff did not report any

symptoms or complications with his HCV and none were apparent on examination. Dr. Butalid

testified that based on his decades of experience as a medical doctor, he was of the opinion that he

provided Plaintiff with appropriate care for his HCV (Doc. 265-14). Expert witness Dr. Dina Paul

agreed (Doc. 282-1, pp. 23, 26, 96). Plaintiff did not put forth any of his own expert evidence to

the contrary (see Doc. 282). Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to establish a material issue of fact

with regard to Dr. Butalid’s treatment of his HCV, and Dr. Butalid is entitled to summary judgment

in that regard.

As for Plaintiff’s diabetes, Plaintiff contends that he asked Dr. Butalid to order a

therapeutic diet for him but Dr. Butalid ignored his request (Doc. 282, pp. 9–10). However, as

explained above with respect to Dr. Scott, the failure to order a therapeutic diet was not obviously

wrong or blatantly inappropriate even to a layperson, nor did Plaintiff put forth any evidence that

it was a substantial deviation from accepted professional practices. Consequently, no reasonable

jury could find that Dr. Butalid was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s diabetes, and Dr. Butalid

is entitled to summary judgment in that regard.

4. Dr. Nageswararao Vallabhaneni

Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Vallabhaneni was deliberately indifferent to his serious health

needs when the doctor discontinued his anti-psychotic medication, Risperdal, in September 2016

(Doc. 183, p. 7; Doc. 282, pp 11–14). However, the Court is once again convinced that no

reasonable jury could find in Plaintiff’s favor.

Dr. Vallabhaneni testified via affidavit that based on his evaluation of Plaintiff and his

“decades of experience as a psychiatrist,” he was of the opinion that the anti-psychotic medication

was not medically necessary for Plaintiff (Doc. 261-11). Plaintiff was “on board with” and

consented to the discontinuation of his medication (Doc. 265-1, p. 160; Doc. 283-1, pp. 39, 42).

Plaintiff did not set forth any expert testimony that Dr. Vallabhaneni’s chosen course of treatment

was a substantial departure from accepted medical judgment (see Doc. 282), and the decision was

not so obviously wrong that a layperson could draw the required inference about the doctor’s state

of mind without expert testimony. Consequently, there is nothing from which a reasonable jury

could find that Dr. Vallabhaneni was deliberately indifferent and his motion for summary

judgment is granted.

5. Rose Loos

Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Loos was deliberately indifferent with respect to his mental health

and HCV (Doc. 183, p. 7; Doc. 282, pp. 6–7, 12–14). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that he told

Ms. Loos that he was receiving inappropriate care for his HCV and she assured him that she would

look into the issue but she never referred him to the healthcare unit for an evaluation (Doc. 282,

pp. 6–7; Doc. 265-1, pp. 164-65). The evidence shows that Plaintiff complained to Ms. Loos on

January 10, 2017 that he was not feeling well and thought it was related to his diabetes or HCV.

Ms. Loos was not a medical provider and could not diagnose or prescribe any treatments for HCV.

Nor did she have any control over the medical providers and their treatment decisions. The most

she could do was refer Plaintiff’s complaint to the healthcare unit. But Plaintiff was already

scheduled to see Dr. Scott the very next day and at that appointment, he was enrolled in the diabetes

chronic care clinic. And he was already enrolled in the HCV chronic care clinic and was being

evaluated and monitored every six months. In other words, Ms. Loos knew that Plaintiff was

actively seeing medical professionals for his medical conditions and she was entitled to rely on

them to provide proper treatment. Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1050 (7th Cir. 2019), cert.

denied, 140 S. Ct. 50 (2019). (“If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts . . . a non-medical

prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.”); Burks

v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009) (“A layperson’s failure to tell the medical staff

how to do its job cannot be called deliberate indifference; it is just a form of failing to supply a

gratuitous rescue service.”) Furthermore, the Court has already concluded that Plaintiff failed to

show any of the medical providers were deliberately indifferent in treating his diabetes or HCV,

and therefore he cannot show that Ms. Loos violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to

intervene in their care. Thomas v. Wahl, 590 Fed. Appx. 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding because

plaintiff failed to show any medical personnel were deliberately indifferent, prison administrators

could not be held liable for failing to investigate his complaints of inadequate medical care); Reed

v. Indiana Dep't of Corr., 30 Fed. Appx. 616, 619 (7th Cir. 2002) (same).

As for Plaintiff’s mental health, he claims that Ms. Loos “carelessly mismanaged [his]

psychiatric care” (Doc. 282, p. 14). Specifically, Plaintiff told Ms. Loos at an appointment on

December 8, 2016, that he wanted to restart his medications, and it is undisputed that she referred

him to the psychiatrist (Doc. 282, pp. 12–14). However, Plaintiff still had not seen the psychiatrist

by the time he saw Ms. Loos again in January 2017, or even by the time he saw her in April, May,

and June 2017. He finally saw the psychiatrist on July 13, 2017. Plaintiff claims Ms. Loos was

deliberately indifferent when she failed to follow-up on her referral or to make additional referrals

to the psychiatrist (Doc. 282, pp. 12–14). He argues that “[a]s a result of Loos’ complete disregard

for [his] psychiatric conditions, [he] went approximately seven months without seeing the

psychiatrist while experiencing irritability and aggression.” (Id. at p. 14).

This argument is unpersuasive. There is no evidence that duplicate referrals to the

psychiatrist would have hastened an appointment. In fact, other mental health providers did make

additional referrals in May and June 2017, all to no effect. There is also no evidence, or even a

suggestion, that Ms. Loos could have taken some other action aside from re-referring Plaintiff.

Simply put, the Court acknowledges that there was a long delay in getting Plaintiff in to see a

psychiatrist, but there is a complete dearth of evidence that Ms. Loos had the power or the ability

to do anything about it.20 Consequently, no reasonable jury could find that she was deliberately

indifferent to Plaintiff’s mental health and she is entitled to summary judgment.

6. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.

A private corporation acting under the color of state law, like Wexford, can be held liable

under § 1983 for constitutional violations based on the Monell theory of municipal liability.

Glisson v. Indiana Dep't of Corr., 849 F.3d 372, 378–79 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Under Monell,

a plaintiff must show that his constitutional injury was caused by the corporation’s own actions.

Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409–10 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824,

832 (7th Cir.2010)). A corporate action can take the form of an express policy adopted and

promulgated by the corporation, an informal but widespread and well-settled practice or custom,

or a decision by an official of the corporation with final policymaking authority. Glisson, 849 F.3d

at 379.

Here, the nature of Plaintiff’s argument against Wexford is not entirely clear to the Court.

He states:

20 There is no suggestion that Wexford should be held responsible for this delay (see Doc. 292).

It is widely known and accepted that Wexford has failed to provide the IDOC and

inmates within the IDOC quality medical care. The evidence uncovered in this

matter establishes that Wexford and its employees have a policy, custom and

practice of disregarding IDOC policies and guidelines. As discussed extensively

above, Wexford and its employees failed to provide Plaintiff with medical care that

meets the standard of practice and complies with IDOC Guidelines. There is more

than sufficient evidence to establish a series of constitutional violations committed

by Wexford.

(Doc. 282, p. 15). He further asserts that Wexford was aware of the deficiencies in the care he was

receiving because he sent them letters about it (Id. at pp. 15, 16).

On the one hand, it seems like Plaintiff is arguing that Wexford is vicariously liable for the

misdeeds of its employees. To the extent that is true, this argument is dead on arrival. Under

controlling precedent, a private corporation, like Wexford, cannot be held vicariously liable in

litigation under § 1983. E.g., Gaston v. Ghosh, 920 F.3d 493, 494 (7th Cir. 2019).

On the other hand, it seems like Plaintiff is arguing that the purportedly inadequate medical

care he received was in accordance with Wexford’s widespread practice or custom of providing

constitutionally subpar medical care or its practice and custom of condoning or turning a blind eye

to deficient medical care. However, the Court has already concluded that Plaintiff failed to show

an issue of fact as to whether any of the Defendant medical providers were individually liable for

deliberate indifference or provided him with constitutionally inadequate care. Therefore, he did

not suffer an actionable injury from the widespread practice he attributes to Wexford. See, e.g.,

Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 412 (7th Cir. 2014); Ray v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 706 F.3d

864, 866 (7th Cir. 2013).

Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to marshal sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury

could conclude that the medical providers’ treatment decisions were made pursuant to the alleged

widespread practice. His only admissible evidence pertains to the purported deficiencies specific

to his own experience. He did not, for example, provide any admissible evidence of other inmates

who were harmed by the alleged systemic failings or testimony from prison officials regarding the

existence of the alleged systemic failings (see Doc. 282; see also Doc. 306). Cf. Davis v. Carter,

452 F.3d 686, 695 (7th Cir. 2006). Consequently, no reasonable juror could conclude that there

was a true corporate policy at issue, as opposed to a random event. Grieveson v. Anderson, 538

F.3d 763, 774 (7th Cir. 2008).

For these reasons, Wexford is entitled to summary judgment.

B. GRIEVANCE OFFICIALS

For the following Defendants, Plaintiff claims that he complained to them in some form or

fashion (e.g., written correspondence, grievance, face-to-face) regarding the purportedly

inadequate medical care that he was receiving, but the Defendants ignored his complaints and

failed to take any corrective action (Doc. 183; Doc. 282; Doc. 296).

When it comes to non-medical officials, the Seventh Circuit has “long recognized that the

division of labor within a prison necessitates that non-medical officials may reasonably defer to

the judgment of medical professionals regarding inmate treatment.” Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d

1040, 1050 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 50 (2019). “If a prisoner is under the care of

medical experts . . . a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the

prisoner is in capable hands.” Id. (quoting Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2005)).

However, non-medical officials can be held liable for deliberate indifference if they have “a reason

to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not

treating) a prisoner.” Giles, 914 F.3d at 1050 (quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir.

2004)). An inmate's correspondence to a prison official may thus establish a basis for personal

liability under § 1983 where that correspondence, “in its content and manner of transmission” gave

the official sufficient notice that the prisoner’s serious medical condition was not being treated by

prison medical providers, yet the official took no action to assist in obtaining care for the prisoner.

Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 755 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); accord Perez v. Fenoglio,

792 F.3d 768, 782 (7th Cir. 2015).

As for medical administrators like Defendants Dr. Shicker, Dr. Meeks, and Healthcare Unit

Administrator Christine Brown, who are not directly responsible for providing medical care, they

can be held liable as supervisors if they know of and facilitate, approve, condone, or turn a blind

eye to medical personnel providing inadequate treatment. Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335,

344 (7th Cir. 2017).

1. John Baldwin

Plaintiff claims, his friend, Tanya Nguyen, sent Director Baldwin a letter on January 20,

2017 and he sent Director Baldwin a second letter on August 1, 2017, regarding the inadequate

treatment he was receiving for his HCV, diabetes, vision issues, and the pain he had in his left side

near his kidney. There is no evidence, however, that Director Baldwin ever received either letter

or otherwise knew about Plaintiff’s issues with his healthcare. There is also no evidence Baldwin

was in any way involved in decisions made regarding Plaintiff’s healthcare. And Baldwin cannot

be held liable solely because he was in charge. E.g., Lennon v. City of Carmel, Indiana, 865 F.3d

503, 507–08 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[T]here is no vicarious liability in a suit under section 1983.”).

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Court has already concluded that Plaintiff failed to show

any of the medical providers were deliberately indifferent in treating his diabetes, HCV, or side

pain, and consequently, there was no impermissible conduct for Director Baldwin to turn a blind

eye to and he cannot be held liable for deliberate indifference for failing to intervene in Plaintiff’s

care. Thomas v. Wahl, 590 Fed. Appx. 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2014); Reed v. Indiana Dep't of Corr.,

30 Fed. Appx. 616, 619 (7th Cir. 2002). For these reasons, there is no basis for holding Director

Baldwin liable, and he is entitled to summary judgment.

2. Dr. Louis Shicker

Plaintiff claims he wrote Dr. Shicker a letter in August 2016 and another in 2017

complaining about his medical care, but Dr. Shicker ignored the letters (Doc. 183; Doc. 265-1, p.

199; Doc. 296, pp. 3–4). Plaintiff admitted, however, that he has no proof that Dr. Shicker received

the August 2016 letter, and there is no competent evidence that Dr. Shicker received the 2017 letter

(see Doc. 306). More importantly, however, Dr. Shicker was no longer the IDOC medical director

by the time either letter was sent. So even if he happened to receive them, he did not have the

authority to take any action or direct any treatment be provided to Plaintiff. Consequently, there is

no basis for holding Dr. Shicker liable, and he is entitled to summary judgment.

3. Dr. Steve Meeks

Plaintiff claims his friend sent Dr. Meeks a letter in January 2017, he wrote Dr. Meeks a

letter in June 2017, and his friend wrote a second letter to Dr. Meeks in August 2018. All the letters

pertained to the purportedly inadequate medical care he was receiving for his diabetes, HCV,

vision issues, and pain in his left side near his left kidney. But Dr. Meeks ignored the letters (Doc.

183; Doc. 296, pp. 4–5). The Court has already concluded that Plaintiff failed to show any of the

medical providers were deliberately indifferent in treating his diabetes, HCV, or side pain, and

consequently, there was no impermissible conduct for Dr. Meeks to approve of, facilitate, or

condone with respect to these conditions. Dr. Meeks therefore cannot be held liable for deliberate

indifference for not intervening in Plaintiff’s care.

Plaintiff’s vision issues were mentioned in the January 2017 letter and the June 2017 letter

(Doc. 1-2, pg. 29; Doc. 1-2, pp. 2–26). However, Dr. Meeks testified that he has no recollection

or record of receiving these letters (Doc. 286-3), and Plaintiff did not offer any evidence to the

contrary (see Doc. 296). While it is undisputed that Dr. Meeks received notice of the third letter

sent in August 2018, it does not appear that Plaintiff’s vision issues were mentioned in this letter

(see Doc. 286-12).21 Consequently, there is no evidence that Dr. Meeks was ever made aware of

any issues regarding Plaintiff’s vision. Furthermore, Plaintiff did not point to any evidence

regarding the extent of his visual impairment without glasses or make any argument that his need

for glasses constituted a serious medical need (see Doc. 296, pp. 5–6, 20–21).22 No reasonable

jury could therefore conclude that Dr. Meeks “kn[e]w of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir.

2016) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). Dr. Meeks is entitled to summary

judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s vision issues.

4. Jacqueline Lashbrook

Plaintiff alleges that Warden Lashbrook was deliberately indifferent to his missing glasses

(Doc. 296, pp. 5–6). He claims he saw Lashbrook in the healthcare unit on October 31, 2016 and

told her that he needed his glasses and she said she would “look into it.” Even if things went exactly

as Plaintiff claims, it is not enough to hold Lashbrook liable for deliberate indifference. Plaintiff

did not point to any evidence regarding the extent of his visual impairment without glasses or make

any argument that his need for glasses constituted a serious medical need, nor did he present any

21 The letter itself does not appear to be part of the record. The parties cited only to the memo Christine Brown sent

to Dr. Meeks after she received the letter (see, e.g., Doc. 296, pp. 17, 19).

22 Hundreds and hundreds of pages of records regarding Plaintiff’s medical treatment and his

grievances/correspondence to prison officials have been submitted to the Court (Docs. 1-1, 1-2, 94-1, 94-2, 94-3, 265-

2, 265-3, 265-6, 265-7, 286-14). The Court thus suspects there is information in the record about the severity of

Plaintiff’s visual impairment without glasses, but Plaintiff did not point it out. And the Court will not sift through the

voluminous records for the relevant information and make Plaintiff’s argument for him. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3)

(“The court need consider only the cited materials . . . .”); Sommerfield v. City of Chicago, 863 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir.

2017) (approving of district judge’s refusal “to wade through the voluminous record to find evidence on a counseled

plaintiff’s behalf.”)

evidence or argument that Lashbrook was aware of the severity of his vision problems (see Doc.

296, pp. 5–6, 20–21). Consequently, no reasonable jury could conclude that Lashbrook “kn[e]w

of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Whiting, 839 F.3d at 662

(citation omitted). Warden Lashbrook is thus entitled to summary judgment.

5. Karen Jaimet

Plaintiff alleges that Warden Jaimet was deliberately indifferent to his missing glasses and

the medical care he was receiving for his HCV, diabetes, and pain in his left side (Doc. 296, pp.

6–7). However, the Court has already concluded that Plaintiff failed to show any of the medical

providers were deliberately indifferent in treating his diabetes, HCV, or side pain, and

consequently, there was no impermissible conduct for Warden Jaimet to turn a blind eye to. She

therefore cannot be held liable for deliberate indifference for failing to intervene in Plaintiff’s care.

Jaimet also cannot be found deliberately indifferent with respect to Plaintiff’s eyeglasses because,

as already explained, there is no evidence regarding the extent of his visual impairment without

glasses or that Jaimet was aware of the severity of his vision problems (see Doc. 296).

6. Larue Love

Plaintiff alleges that Assistant Warden Love was deliberately indifferent to his missing

glasses because after he told Love about his missing glasses, Love simply said there was no

optometrist available and walked away (Doc. 296, p. 8). Even if that is true, Assistant Warden

Love cannot be held liable because, as previously mentioned, there is no evidence regarding the

extent of Plaintiff’s visual impairment without glasses or that Love was aware of the severity of

his vision problems (see Doc. 296).

Plaintiff also alleges that Assistant Warden Love was deliberately indifferent regarding his

inability to obtain medical care for his HCV, diabetes, and pain in the left kidney area (Doc. 296,

p. 8). Specifically, Plaintiff claims he sent letters to Love in June 2017 and August 2017. However,

there is no evidence that Love received either letter or knew about Plaintiff’s issues with his

healthcare. Additionally, the Court has already concluded that Plaintiff failed to establish an issue

of fact that any of the medical providers were deliberately indifferent in treating his diabetes, HCV,

or side pain, and therefore Plaintiff cannot show that Love violated his Eighth Amendment rights

by failing to address his complaints about their care. For these reasons, Defendant Love is entitled

to summary judgment.

7. Christine Brown

Plaintiff contends that Healthcare Unit Administrator Christine Brown was deliberately

indifferent to his missing glasses and the medical care he was receiving for his HCV, diabetes, and

pain in his left side (Doc. 296, pp. 8–9). Specifically, he claims Ms. Brown gave false and

misleading information about his medical care when she responded to inquiries pertaining to his

grievances. He also claims that she failed to respond to the letter he sent her in June 2017. The

Court has already concluded that Plaintiff failed to show any of the medical providers were

deliberately indifferent in treating his medical conditions, and therefore he cannot show that Ms.

Brown violated his Eighth Amendment rights by approving of or failing to intervene in their care.

Ms. Brown is entitled to summary judgment.

8. Christopher Scott Thompson

Plaintiff claims that Thompson “was aware of [his] medical complaints and took no action

to address them” (Doc. 296, pp. 10–11). It is undisputed that when Defendant Thompson was the

Clinical Services Supervisor, he received a February 2017 letter from Plaintiff’s friend, Megan

Selby, and forwarded the letter to the healthcare unit. Plaintiff argues that Thompson is

nevertheless liable for deliberate indifference because he never followed-up with the healthcare

unit to determine whether his medical concerns had been addressed (Doc. 296, p. 10).23 Plaintiff

further claims that he sent Defendant Thompson a letter about his medical issues in June 2017

when Thompson was the Assistant Warden of Programs. Plaintiff, however, admits that he has no

proof Thompson received the letter. The Court has already concluded that Plaintiff failed to show

any of the medical providers were deliberately indifferent in treating his diabetes, HCV, or side

pain, and consequently, there was no impermissible conduct for Thompson to turn a blind eye to

and he cannot be held liable for deliberate indifference for failing to intervene in Plaintiff’s care.

Thompson also cannot be found deliberately indifferent with respect to Plaintiff’s eyeglasses

because, as already explained, there is no evidence regarding the extent of his visual impairment

without glasses or that Thompson was aware of the severity of his vision problems (see Doc. 296).

9. Derek Flatt

Plaintiff claims that grievance officer Flatt “was aware of [his] medical complaints and

took no action to address them” (Doc. 296, pp. 9–10). Specifically, Plaintiff says he sent letters to

Flatt in June 2017 and August 2017 regarding missing grievances pertaining to medical care but

Flatt never responded. However, neither of these letters contain any information about his

purported medical issues (see Doc. 1-1, pp. 60, 61). There is also no evidence that Flatt ever

received these letters or that he saw the purportedly missing grievances or was responsible for

processing them. Flatt did, however, review and recommend denying Plaintiff’s June 14, 2017

emergency grievance. In doing so, he consulted with Healthcare Unit Administrator Christine

Brown to ensure that Plaintiff’s complaints did not require further action. Flatt did not have to do

23 Plaintiff also states that Thompson never informed him that he had received the letter from Ms. Selby (Doc. 296,

10). Plaintiff does not, however, explain or cite to any authority as to how this purported failure could have possibly

violated his constitutional rights (see id.). As far as the Court knows, this purported failure is of no constitutional

significance whatsoever.

anything more and he was entitled to rely on Ms. Brown’s professional judgment regarding

Plaintiff’s medical care because there was nothing in her report that made it obvious Plaintiff might

not be receiving adequate care. Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1050 (7th Cir. 2019); Hayes v.

Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 527 (7th Cir. 2008). Furthermore, as with the other grievance officials, Flatt

cannot be held liable for failing to intervene in Plaintiff’s medical care because the Court has

already concluded that Plaintiff failed to establish any of the medical providers were deliberately

indifferent in treating him. For these reasons, Defendant Flatt is entitled to summary judgment.

10. Rhonda McWilliams

Plaintiff claims that counselor McWilliams “was aware of [his] medical complaints and

took no action to address them” (Doc. 296, p. 10). Specifically, he claims McWilliams refused to

accept a grievance and failed to respond to his inquiries about the grievance (Id.). To the extent

Plaintiff is claiming that Ms. McWilliams is liable because she mishandled his grievances, this

claim must fail. Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he alleged mishandling

of . . . grievances by persons who otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying conduct

states no claim.”). To the extent Plaintiff is claiming that Ms. McWilliams was aware of his

medical complaints but took no action to address them (Doc. 296, p. 10), this claim must also fail.

There is no evidence that Ms. McWilliams ever received or reviewed the November 2017

grievance that purportedly went missing. There is also no evidence that Ms. McWilliams received

Plaintiff’s follow-up inquiries, but additionally, neither of those inquiries contain any information

about his purported medical issues (see Doc. 100-2; Doc. 100-3). Consequently, no reasonable

jury could conclude that she had sufficient notice of a constitutional deprivation but declined to

take any action to rectify it. Furthermore, as with the other grievance officials, McWilliams cannot

be held liable for failing to intervene in Plaintiff’s medical care because the Court has already

concluded that Plaintiff failed to establish any of the medical providers were deliberately

indifferent in treating him. For these reasons, Defendant McWilliams is entitled to summary

judgment.

CONCLUSION

The motions for summary judgment filed by the Wexford Defendants (Doc. 264) and the

IDOC Defendants (Doc. 285) are GRANTED. Summary judgment is GRANTED as to Dr.

Alberto Butalid, Rose Loos, Angel Rector, Dr. Michael Scott, Dr. Nageswararao Vallabhaneni,

Wexford Health Sources, Inc., John Baldwin, Christine Brown, Derek Flatt, Karen Jaimet,

Jacqueline Lashbrook, Larue Love, Rhonda McWilliams, Dr. Steve Meeks, Dr. Louis Shicker, and

Christopher Scott Thompson. Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants are DISMISSED with

prejudice and the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in their favor and close this

case on the Court’s docket.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 30, 2020

s/ Mark A. Beatty

MARK A. BEATTY

United States Magistrate Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.