Smith v. Stover

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

MARK D. SMITH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 18-cv-1023-DWD

)

SARAH BROWN-FOILES, )

ROB JEFFREYS, )

HEATHER WRIGHT, and )

DANIEL Q. SULLIVAN, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Mark D. Smith is a civil detainee housed at Big Muddy Correctional

Center (“Big Muddy”) as a result of a civil commitment proceeding pursuant to the

Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, 725 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq. (“SDPA”). Under the

SDPA, “[p]ersons charged with sex offenses in Illinois may be diverted before trial to civil

confinement, if a mental illness of at least one year’s duration led to the criminal conduct.

Those who complete treatment successfully are released and the criminal charges

dismissed.” Allison v. Snyder, 332 F.3d 1076, 1078 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Hughes v. Dimas,

837 F.3d 807, 808 (7th Cir. 2016).

Plaintiff brought his Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that

Defendants1 violated his rights to receive treatment as a sexually dangerous person

1 Plaintiff’s claims are against the Defendants in their official capacities. Since the filing of his

Complaint, the names of these officials have changed. Accordingly, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk

(“SDP”). This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Doc. 51). Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition to the motion (Doc. 55). For the

reasons set forth below, the Motion is GRANTED.

Background

Following initial screening under 28 U.S.C. §1915A, Plaintiff proceeded on the

following counts:

Count 1: All defendants violated Plaintiff’s right to receive

treatment as a civilly committed SDP;

Count 2: All defendants violated Plaintiff’s right to receive

treatment for his mental illnesses and disorders under

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments;

Count 3: Defendants Brown-Foiles, Jeffreys, and Sullivan

violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments by failing to adequately train

or supervise their employees regarding the proper care

and treatment for an SDP; and

Count 4: All defendants have violated Plaintiff’s liberty

interests under the Fourteenth Amendment by

subjecting him to a severely punitive environment.

(Doc. 10, p. 4). The claims against the Defendants are in their official capacity and

Smith seeks both declaratory and injunctive relief (Id. at p. 3).

Material Facts

The SDP Program

to SUBSTITUTE Rob Jeffreys in place of John Baldwin, Sarah Brown-Foiles in place of C. Thomas

Holt, and Heather Wright in place of Jessica D. Stover.

Defendant Wright is a Sex Offender Therapist I at Big Muddy and Plaintiff’s

current primary therapist (Doc. 51-1, pp. 1 and 5). As such, she is familiar with Plaintiff’s

treatment at Big Muddy and is also familiar with the general treatment program at the

facility. All SDPs at Big Muddy are given an opportunity to participate in SDP treatment

groups. (Id. at p. 2). They can choose whether or not to participate in the program and

can sign in and out of treatment groups at any time. (Id.). When an SDP chooses to

participate, they are assigned one core therapy group and the facilitator of that group is

considered the SDP’s primary therapist. (Id.). In the SDP Program (“SDPP”) there are

currently eleven core therapy groups and seven elective groups. Prior to November 2019,

core groups met for one hour each week but as of November 2019 the groups meet for

two hours each week. Elective groups meet for one hour each week. (Id.). There are no

more than ten SDPs in a core treatment group. (Id.).

Goals of the core treatment groups include developing insight into/resolving

motivational and development issues, processing interpersonal relationship dynamics,

identifying and learning to control deviant arousal and fantasies, and identifying and

learning to challenge offending lifestyle behaviors (Doc. 51-1, pp. 3-4). The SDPP also

offers sexual offense specific groups when deemed clinically appropriate. (Id. at p. 4).

Those groups teach specific topics and strategies related to the sexual offending treatment

process and encourages participants to practice those behaviors in their core treatment

group. (Id.). Sexual offense specific groups include cycle of sexual offending and relapse

prevention. (Id.). The SDPP also offers four categories of didactic groups, which are

offered on a rotating basis and teach specific topics and strategies related to the treatment

process. (Id. at p. 4). Those groups include anger management, social skills, rational

emotive behavioral therapy, and substance abuse. (Id.).

SDPs participating in treatment can request to be placed in either sexual offense

specific or didactic groups (Doc. 51-1, p. 4). If an SDP requests placement in a group, the

treatment staff determine whether the group is clinically appropriate for the SDP. (Id.).

In addition to requesting to be placed in a group, treatment staff may also place an SDP

in either group when it is deemed clinically appropriate. (Id.).

SDPs also have access to non-sex offense specific activities. They have access to

mental health treatment, medical treatment, correctional counselors, library services,

recreation, and religious services. (Doc. 51-1, p. 4). Big Muddy staff attempt to keep SDPs

separate from the general population. As of November 2019, SDPs reside in Housing

Unit 1 on B and C wings. (Id. at p. 3).2 Only SDPs are housed in these wings. Although

general population offenders are housed on A and D wings of the same housing unit, the

doors to each wing are secured and correctional staff observe each wing. (Id.). SDPs do

attend some services with general population inmates, but security staff are present and

make efforts to keep the SDPs separate. (Id. at p. 5). SDPs are allowed to leave their cells

and access the dayroom on their wing during treatment hours which are from 8:30 to

2:30, Monday through Friday. They also have dayroom access during the evening and

weekend hours. (Id.).

2 Defendants’ brief mentions both Housing Units 4 and 1 interchangeably. It appears SDPs were

housed in one housing unit prior to November 2019 and another housing unit after November

2019. Regardless of the housing unit, SDPs are housed on the B and C wings and separated

from the general population.

SDPs are required to follow Illinois Department of Correction (“IDOC”) rules and

regulations that apply to all individuals housed at Big Muddy, as well as SDPP-specific

rules. (Doc. 51-1, p. 3). SDPP staff monitor the behavior of the individuals in the

treatment program and they exercise their authority based on the established rules of

both IDOC and the SDPP. (Id.). SDPs can receive disciplinary reports and be subject to

institutional discipline if they violate institutional rules. (Id.). The consequences for those

violations are set forth in the IDOC protocols. Once the infraction is recorded, the SDPP

staff are not involved in the disciplinary process. (Id.). If an SDP violates a SDPP rule, he

receives notification of the infraction but does not receive any discipline (Id.). The policies

and rules are designed to facilitate optimal treatment and provide for care and safety of

the participants. (Id.). Any infractions are recorded for non-compliance, but do not result

in any loss of privileges or property. (Id.).

Plaintiff’s Experience

On October 9, 2013, Plaintiff was civilly committed as an SDP (Doc. 51-2, p. 15).

He has been housed at Big Muddy since December 20, 2013 (Id. at p. 17). Plaintiff

participates in one of Wright’s core treatment groups, as well as three didactic groups:

anger management, rational emotive behavioral therapy, and substance abuse. (Doc. 51-

1, p. 5). He receives five hours of treatment each week. (Id.). According to Wright, the

treatment Plaintiff receives is “designed to effectuate his recovery and eventual release

from the SDPP[.]” (Id.). Plaintiff is eligible for treatment and has access to programs so

long as he participates in treatment. (Id.). Plaintiff testified that the treatment he receives

in Wright’s core group is helping him and is designed to help his recovery (Doc. 51-2, pp.

24-26).

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that he was placed in segregation as discipline, and

that he was made to wear a jumpsuit that singled him out. (Doc. 1). In his deposition,

Plaintiff testified that he was placed in segregation on at least five occasions for flashing

his therapist. (Doc. 51-2, pp. 34-36, 47-48, 59, 70-71, 76). He also received a charge for

sexual misconduct for writing in his homework assignment about sexual thoughts and

feelings related to the same therapist. (Id. at pp. 36-39). Plaintiff received a hearing on

the incidents before the Adjustment Committee. (Id. at p. 35).

After his release from segregation, Plaintiff was placed in intensive therapy where

he could only come out of his cell for group and homework. (Doc. 51-2, pp. 44-45). In

intensive therapy he was provided with a jumpsuit that was sewn from the bottom up in

order to prevent him from flashing his therapist. (Id. at pp. 72-73, 84-89).

Discussion

Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment where the

non-moving party “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her

case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. When

deciding a summary judgment motion, the Court views the facts in the light most

favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex

Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

However, if the evidence is merely colorable, or is not sufficiently probative, summary

judgment may be granted. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986). A

genuine issue of material fact remains “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248.

Count 1

As civil detainees, SDPs constitutional protections regarding the conditions of

their confinement arise from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Sain

v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 893 (7th Cir. 2008). Due process requires that their conditions and

the duration of their confinement “bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which

persons are committed.” Allison, 332 F.3d at 1079. Although committed individuals are

entitled to “more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement” than traditional

prisoners, the state is entitled to exercise professional judgment as to the needs of the

confined individuals. Id. (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-2 (1982)). See also

Lane v. Williams, 689 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he constitutional requirement is that

professional judgment be exercised.”). Confined individuals are entitled to “some

treatment” and “what that treatment entails must be decided by mental-health

professionals.” Id. at 1081; Lane, 689 F.3d at 882. Treatment decisions made with

professional judgment are presumptively valid unless the decision is such a “substantial

departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards” that the decision

is found not to be based on professional judgment. Lane, 689 F.3d at 882 (quoting

Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323).

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he received less than one hour per week of

treatment, less than forty hours of treatment total in four and half years, and was never

provided treatment designed to help his recovery (Doc. 10, p. 3). Here, however, Plaintiff

does not deny that he is receiving more extensive treatment at Big Muddy. He

participates in a core treatment group as well as three didactic groups. He receives

approximately five hours of treatment each week. He also had access to treatment and

homework assignments while housed in segregation (Doc. 51-2, pp. 37-38, 40). Plaintiff’s

primary therapist testified that based on her knowledge, practice, and experience

working with sex offenders, the treatment that Plaintiff is receiving is designed to

effectuate his recovery and eventual release (Doc. 51-1, p. 5).

Plaintiff fails to point to any aspect of the SDPP that departs from professionally

accepted standards or is somehow insufficient, such that a reasonable finder of fact could

find the program would be unconstitutional.3 He testified that both his current core

therapy group with Wright and his didactic groups are beneficial and designed to

effectuate his treatment. (Doc. 51-2, pp. 22-26). In his deposition, Plaintiff asserts that the

program itself was ineffective because he believes it lacks a format and guidance on

homework assignments. (Id. at pp. 99-102). However, he offers no evidence beyond his

own lay opinion from which a jury could find that the program is not based on

professional judgment. He is clearly receiving care that was deemed necessary under the

3 Plaintiff’s response (Doc. 55) does not focus on the merits of his claims, but instead focuses on

his ability to exhaust his administrative remedies. He fails to address any of the arguments

raised in Defendants’ motion.

professional judgment of Wright and the other staff. Because Plaintiff fails to identify

any part of the program that departs from professional judgment, the Defendants are

entitled to summary judgment on Count 1.

Count Two

A pretrial detainee’s claim for improper medical treatment is also considered

under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A standard of objective

reasonableness (rather than deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment)

governs medical claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

McCann v. Ogle Cty., Illinois, 909 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Miranda v. County of

Lake, 900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018)).4

The controlling standard has two steps. The first step focuses on the intentionality

of the defendant’s conduct and “asks whether the medical defendants acted

purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly when they considered the

consequences of their handling of [plaintiff’s] case.” Id. (quoting Miranda, 900 F.3d at

353). Negligence – even gross negligence — is not enough. Id. (citing Miranda, 900 F.3d

at 353). See also Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 35–36 (2d Cir. 2017) (concluding that “[a]ny

§ 1983 claim for a violation of due process requires proof of a mens rea greater than mere

negligence”)). The second step looks at whether the challenged conduct was objectively

reasonable. See Miranda, 900 F.3d at 354. Looking at all of the facts and circumstances

4 There is currently some question as to whether the standard also includes a requirement of an

objectively serious medical condition, in common with the Eighth Amendment standard. Here,

Defendants do not challenge the seriousness of Plaintiff’s condition.

before the defendant, a court must determine whether the response was reasonable,

without taking into account “any subjective belief held by the individual.” McCann, 909

F.3d at 886.

Again, Plaintiff does not deny that he receives treatment at Big Muddy. He

participates in several groups designed to address his sex offense specific mental health.

He also has access to non-sex offense specific mental health treatment as well as medical

treatment. (Doc. 51-1, p. 4). He testified that he meets with a mental health professional

once a month and was prescribed an anti-depressant. (Doc. 51-2, pp. 28-29). While in

segregation, he also had access to a mental health professional once a week (Id. at pp. 64-

65, 98). Plaintiff fails to identify any denial of mental health treatment or any way in

which mental health treatment that he received does not meet the objective

reasonableness standard. He testified that he wanted an immediate fix for his mental

health issues, but now realizes that it is a gradual process. (Doc. 51-2, pp. 29-30). He

acknowledged that the treatment and medications helped his mental illness. (Id.).

Because Plaintiff fails to offer evidence that he was denied adequate mental health

treatment, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count 2.

Count Three

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Jeffreys, Sullivan, and Brown-Foiles (or their

predecessors, as this is an official capacity claim) failed to train or supervise employees

regarding the proper care and treatment of SDPs. (Doc. 10, p. 3). There is no respondeat

superior liability under Section 1983. A supervisor can only be held liable if they are

personally involved, if they knew about the conduct and approved it, condoned it, or

turned a blind eye. Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing

Lanigan v. Vill of E. Hazel Crest, Ill., 110 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 1997)). Further, a failure to

train may give rise to liability where the inadequacy of the training amounts to deliberate

indifference to the rights of persons who come into contact with the inadequately trained

personnel. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (in the context of

municipal liability).

Plaintiff fails to offer any evidence that any of the defendants were aware of

improper care and treatment at Big Muddy or that they condoned or turned a blind eye

to that care. Nor has Plaintiff produced any evidence that personnel at Big Muddy were

inadequately trained. Thus, Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on Count

3.

Count Four

Plaintiff’s alleges that he has been subjected to a severely punitive environment

(Doc. 10, p. 5). A pretrial detainee states a conditions-of-confinement claim under the

Fourteenth Amendment if he was subjected to conditions that were “objectively

unreasonable” and “excessive in relation to any legitimate non-punitive purpose.”

Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 824 (7th Cir. 2019).5 Like a pretrial detainee, an SDP

can be punished for conduct while in custody, but the “punishment can be imposed only

after affording the [committed person] some sort of procedural protection.” Rapier v.

5 The concurrence in Hardeman suggests that the same requirement that “defendants acted

purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly when they considered the consequences of

their handling of [plaintiff’s] case” used in detainee use-of-force and medical treatment claims

should be extended to conditions-of-confinement claims. 933 F.3d at 827.

Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1005 (7th Cir. 1999). A civil detainee may be put in isolation, as

“preserving the safety of the staff and other detainees takes precedence over medical

goals.” West v. Schwebke, 333 F.3d 745, 748 (7th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff argues in his response that he has been placed in segregation for extensive

periods of time, as recently as 2020, and he believes that the segregation is being used as

a punitive measure. (Doc. 55, p. 4). But a committed individual like Plaintiff may be

placed in segregation so long as he receives notice of the charges against him and an

opportunity to be heard. West, 33 F. 3d at 748; Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir.

2002). Plaintiff testified that he was placed in segregation on at least five occasions for

flashing his therapist and for a charge of sexual misconduct for writing in his homework

assignment about sexual thoughts and feelings related to the same therapist. He

acknowledged that he went before the Adjustment Committee for a hearing on the

incidents. Wright also testified that SDPs receive disciplinary reports and those reports

are processed in accordance with IDOC protocols which require notice and a hearing. 20

Ill. Admin. Code 504.80. Plaintiff fails to offer any evidence that he was denied due

process prior to being placed in segregation. Similarly, there is no indication that his time

in segregation was excessive in relation to the legitimate non-punitive purpose of

deterring him from sexually assaulting his therapist.

Plaintiff also takes issue with the fact that he was issued a jumpsuit after his release

from segregation. While in intensive therapy he was provided with a jumpsuit that was

sewn from the bottom up in order to prevent him from flashing his therapist, which made

him he feel singled-out because he was the only one wearing a jumpsuit. (Id. at pp. 72

and 90). Wright testified that wearing the jumpsuit was an intervention tool designed to

address Plaintiff's repeated flashing incidents, and that such actions are common in the

SDPP. (Doc. 51-1, pp. 5-6). Once the SDPP staff determined that Plaintiff would follow

the rules, he was no longer required to wear the jumpsuit. Again, Plaintiff presents no

evidence from which a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that this was excessive in

relation to the legitimate non-punitive purpose of the action. As such, Defendants are

entitled to summary judgment on Count 4.

Disposition

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 51). Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. The Court

DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close this case and enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 24, 2020 ‘| Lb 9 Ls ae

DAVIDW.DUGAN

United States District Judge

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