Hoskins v. Eovaldi

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JOSHUA LEE HOSKINS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 17-cv-1122-RJD

)

FRANK EOVALDI, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

DALY, Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Joshua Lee Hoskins, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of

Corrections (“IDOC”) brings this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging his constitutional

rights were violated while he was incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”).

Plaintiff alleges he was confined in the segregation unit at Menard from November 30, 2016

through January 4, 2017 and, during that time, was held in a cell under inhumane conditions.

Plaintiff alleges security staff also denied him basic hygiene products and refused to process or

allow Plaintiff to file grievances. Plaintiff’s complaint was screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915A, and he was allowed to proceed on the following claims:

Count One: Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Eovaldi for

twisting and bending Plaintiff’s hand and fingers on November 30,

2016.

Count Two: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against all

Defendants for placing and/or holding Plaintiff in an unsanitary cell

contaminated with human waste, and/or refusing to relocate him or

remedy the unhealthy conditions between November 30, 2016 and

January 4, 2017.

Count Three: First Amendment claim against Eovaldi, Sanders, Young, Lt.

Engelage, Officer Engelage, Hudson, Jetton, Carter, Witthoft,

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Officer Spiller, Swisher, Hof, Laminack, Bump, Mercer, Snell,

Mennerich, Marshall, Reva Engelage, Hartman, Roth, Lang,

Gardiner, Myers, Brookman, Held, Slavens, McCarthy, Wooley,

Sanders, William Spiller, Gee, Phelps, Gutreuter, and Allen for

placing and/or holding Plaintiff in an unsanitary cell to retaliate

against Plaintiff for his litigation and/or grievance activity against

Menard officers.

Count Four: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against health care

providers Marshall, Reva Engelage, and Lang for refusing to

provide Plaintiff with medical attention for the skin irritation,

nausea, and other conditions he developed while housed in the

unsanitary and contaminated cell.

This matter is now before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

152). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is DENIED.

Factual Background

The incidents giving rise to the claims in this lawsuit occurred at Menard from November

30, 2016 to January 4, 2017. Upon Plaintiff’s arrival to Menard from Stateville on November 30,

2016, he was taken to the chapel and strip searched (Deposition of Joshua Lee Hoskins, Doc.

153-1 at 374-75; Complaint, Doc. 1 at 281). Defendant Frank Eovaldi, the shift commander at

Menard when Plaintiff arrived, saw Plaintiff while he was in the chapel and, while Plaintiff’s

hands were behind his back, Eovaldi twisted and bent Plaintiff’s fingers and hands (Doc. 153-1 at

410; Doc. 1 at 28). Eovaldi told Plaintiff that he “had a cell that was in a fucked up condition” and

told Plaintiff that Eovaldi, along with Defendants Sergeant Hudson, Major Carter, and Officer

Spiller, had told the North Two staff not to better his living conditions (Doc. 153-1 at 411; Doc. 1

at 28). Eovaldi also told Plaintiff he was retaliating against him because Plaintiff had brought a

lawsuit against him and sought preliminary injunctive relief that was granted in September 2016

1 In his response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff included an affidavit attesting to the

accuracy of the allegations in the complaint (Doc. 155 at 11). Indeed, Plaintiff asserts he has reviewed the complaint

and finds no errors in the same. Accordingly, the Court cites to the complaint as evidence in the record.

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(Doc. 153-1 at 414).

Plaintiff was placed in cell 4-43 in the North 2 cell house segregation gallery (Doc. 1 at 28;

see Doc. 153-1 at 507). Plaintiff testified that this cell had a clogged toilet and sink, and no light

switch (Doc. 153-1 at 378; Doc. 1 at 28). According to Plaintiff, there was blood on the sink and

the bed, and feces on the floor (Doc. 153-1 at 378). Also, when toilets were flushed in cells that

were above Plaintiff’s, urine and feces would come down the walls (Id.). Plaintiff’s cell was also

infested with various insects that caused him to itch and develop pus-filled blisters, which resulted

in sores and skin infections (Doc. 1 at 28).

Defendants dispute Plaintiff’s contentions regarding the cleanliness of cell 4-43. In

support of their contention, Defendants point to a Shakedown Record completed on November 30,

2016 in which it was noted the cell was “clean” at 8:15 a.m.2 (see Doc. 153-1 at 499).

On November 30, 2016, while Plaintiff was standing by the IDOC transportation bus, Lt.

Mennerich saw Plaintiff’s IDOC photograph and remarked that they had been “waiting” for

Plaintiff (Doc. 1 at 34). Mennerich said that Eovaldi and Spiller told everyone Plaintiff would be

coming and told Plaintiff he would be placed in a contaminated cell (Id.).

On December 1 and December 2, 2016, Defendant Sergeant Lindenberg came to Plaintiff’s

cell, and Plaintiff made Lindenberg aware of the conditions in his cell (Doc. 1 at 29). Lindenberg

indicated Plaintiff should know he would be mistreated by staff due to Plaintiff having a staff

2 Defendants failed to provide an affidavit attesting to the accuracy of the records submitted. Accordingly, although

the Court references these records in this Order, it does not ultimately rely on the records because they have not been

properly introduced with a sufficient “indicia of trustworthiness to be considered reliable.” See Woods v. City of

Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 988 (7th Cir. 2000) (To be admissible as a business record, a document must have sufficient

indicia of trustworthiness to be considered reliable. Normally, to demonstrate such trustworthiness and reliability at

the summary judgment stage, the party seeking to offer the business record must attach an affidavit sworn to by a

person who would be qualified to introduce the record as evidence as trial, for example, a custodian or anyone

qualified to speak from personal knowledge that the documents were admissible business records.”) (internal citations

omitted).

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assault in his disciplinary history (Id.). Lindenberg indicated he knew of Plaintiff’s cell

conditions and he was not going to take any action to address the same (Id.). At his deposition,

Plaintiff testified that Lindenberg toured his gallery on many occasions, and Plaintiff would

explain his cell conditions and request showers, cleaning supplies, and hygiene items, but his

requests were denied (Doc. 153-1 at 442). Defendant Officer Sanders was assigned to Plaintiff’s

gallery on December 1 and 2, 2016, and told Plaintiff he was not going to have Plaintiff’s cell

cleaned or his toilet or sink unclogged because Sanders had been informed that Plaintiff had filed

“court complaints” against Menard staff (Doc. 1 at 29). Sanders told Plaintiff he had to be seen by

Ms. Franklin, a mental health professional, but that Sanders would be present to ensure Plaintiff

did not tell Ms. Franklin about his cell conditions or about his mistreatment by staff at Menard

(Id.). Both Sanders and Defendant Sgt. Young were present while Plaintiff saw Ms. Franklin

(Id.). Plaintiff told Sgt. Young he needed to speak with him, to which Young replied, “Hoskins

we don’t have shit to talk about. How you like the cell we have you in?” (Id.). Young also made

comments indicating Plaintiff would not be receiving any cleaning supplies and the conditions of

his cell would not be addressed (Id.; Doc. 153-1). Sometime from December 1 to December 3,

2016, Defendant Lt. Engelage walked past Plaintiff’s cell and told Plaintiff that if he did not file

complaints against staff he would not have been placed in “that nasty ass” cell (Doc. 1 at 29). On

December 3, 2016 and December 6, 2016, Defendant Officer Engelage looked up at Plaintiff’s cell

and told Plaintiff he was getting what he deserved, indicating that Plaintiff was being held in that

“contagious ass cell” because he snitched on staff (Id. at 30).

Sometime between November 30 and December 3, 2016, Defendants Hof and Sgt.

Laminack walked past Plaintiff’s cell and he called out to tell them about the unsanitary cell

conditions (Doc. 1 at 31-32). Hof told Plaintiff they know about the conditions and that he was

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placed in that cell because he had brought court complaints against Menard staff (Id. at 32; Doc.

153-1 at 433).

Subsequently, on December 5, 2016, Defendant Sergeant Hudson walked past Plaintiff’s

cell during the morning shift and observed the conditions in the cell and told Plaintiff that each

time he complained against staff the conditions would worsen (Doc. 1 at 30). Hudson was also

made aware that Plaintiff did not have a light switch, and when inmates above Plaintiff flushed

their toilets feces and urine would leak to Plaintiff’s cell (Doc. 153-1 at 434). Hudson told

Plaintiff they were housing him in that cell because Plaintiff had filed court complaints (Doc. 1 at

30). Also on this date during the morning shift, while Defendant Officer Spiller was going in and

out of the door directly in front of Plaintiff’s cell, he observed Plaintiff and told Plaintiff that is

“how we treat dogs like you” (Doc. 1 at 30). The next day, Spiller told Plaintiff that if he

complained to any staff about his cell conditions it would be a waste of time because “they already

know” (Id. at 31). On December 8, 2016, Spiller told Plaintiff not to waste his time filing

grievances because he was on mail watch and any grievances about his cell conditions would be

destroyed (Id.). Spiller told Plaintiff he would stay in his cell with the toilet, sink, and ceiling

issues (Id.).

On December 5, 2016, Lt. Bump walked through Plaintiff’s gallery and, when he walked

past Plaintiff’s cell, asked Plaintiff how he liked his cell with the “toilet full of shit and piss” (Id. at

32). Bump told Plaintiff the Menard staff was advised to not put in any work orders (Id.). Bump

also indicated that they don’t “give a fuck” about any lawsuits and they will not be affected by any

further lawsuits (Id.). Around this time Sgt. Laminack also walked past Plaintiff’s cell again and

told Plaintiff not to call out for him because Plaintiff would be staying in that “filthy ass” cell (Id.).

On two occasions between November 30 and December 5, 2016, while Sgt. Mercer walked past

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Plaintiff’s cell, Plaintiff told Mercer about the unsanitary conditions in his cell, and Mercer told

Plaintiff he knew about the conditions and that Eovaldi, Spiller, and others told Mercer they were

ensuring Plaintiff was housed in that cell (Id.). Mercer told Plaintiff he could submit work orders,

which he was supposed to handle, but he was told by two officers that Plaintiff appeared in front of

a federal judge in late September 2016 and told the judge that he was being mistreated by Menard

staff, and for that reason, Mercer was going to leave Plaintiff housed in the unsanitary cell (Id. at

33).

At some point between November 30, 2016 and December 5, 2016, medical technician

Marshall told Plaintiff she had to dispense his psychotropic medication, but she would not provide

any care for his other complaints (Id. at 37). At his deposition, Plaintiff testified Marshall told

him he would not receive medical treatment because he had filed lawsuits and grievances (Doc.

153-1 at 443). Marshall told Plaintiff any sick call requests were being thrown away and staff was

told not to forward any request slips (Doc. 1 at 37).

On December 5, 2016, Officer Myers, a shower officer, walked past Plaintiff’s cell and

told Plaintiff he had heard that Plaintiff was complaining about his cell conditions to staff at

Menard (Id. at 38). Myers told Plaintiff he was not going to be allowed to shower or go to yard, or

receive any cleaning products (Id.). Myers mentioned that he had seen Plaintiff had a staff assault

in his disciplinary history and this was his way of helping that officer “get back at” Plaintiff (Id.).

Plaintiff also testified that Myers told him he would not be providing Plaintiff any hygiene items or

cleaning supplies because he had filed lawsuits against Spiller and told the “federal court” about

his mistreatment at Menard (Doc. 153-1 at 450).

On December 6, 2016, Defendant Officer Swisher saw Plaintiff and told him they had his

cell waiting for him and that Plaintiff “got what was coming to him” (Doc. 1 at 31). On December

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9, 2016, while Plaintiff was in the holding cage area to be seen by mental health staff, Swisher told

Plaintiff he would not be seen because he did not want Plaintiff telling the mental health staff that

he was placed in a cell with blood everywhere (Id.). Swisher told Plaintiff he would tell mental

health that Plaintiff refused to be seen and that Officer Hoffman would sign Plaintiff’s refusal form

(Id.). Swisher told Plaintiff that Swisher and Eovaldi placed Plaintiff in cell 4-43 purposely and

partly because Plaintiff sent a grievance to the ARB in early 2016 naming Swisher and Spiller

(Id.). At his deposition, Plaintiff testified that Swisher told Plaintiff he would not provide

Plaintiff with showers, hygiene items, sheets, blankets, better living conditions, or medical

treatment due to Plaintiff complaining about Menard staff to the federal judge (Doc. 153-1 at 463).

On December 6, 2016, Plaintiff called out to Sgt. Snell during the morning shift and

identified the unsanitary conditions of his toilet, sink, ceiling, floor, and mattress (Doc. 1 at 33).

Snell responded that there was no way he was going to assist Plaintiff and told Plaintiff he was

aware of issues Plaintiff brought to the court about Sgt. Hudson, Spiller, and Engelage, and knew

about the officer assault in Plaintiff’s history (Id.). Plaintiff also testified that Snell indicated he

knew about Plaintiff’s court complaints (Doc. 153-1 at 459). During the evening shift on

December 5 and December 6, 2016, Plaintiff made Officer Morris aware of his unsanitary cell

conditions, to which Morris indicated that Wooley, Spiller, Gee, Eovaldi, Hudson, and Carter had

asked all staff to keep Plaintiff in cell 4-43 (Doc. 1 at 33). Morris also told Plaintiff that he was

aware of a staff assault in Plaintiff’s history, and would not do anything to better his cell conditions

for that reason as well (Id.). On December 6, 2016, Ms. Myers, a mental health professional,

toured Plaintiff’s gallery and Plaintiff told her about the unsanitary conditions in his cell (Id. at 35).

Plaintiff asked Myers to make note of his complaints and forward the complaints to the Menard

Warden (Id.). Myers told Plaintiff she was not going to make note of his complaints because it

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was not a “mental health function” (Id.).

On December 7, 2016, Mennerich came on Plaintiff’s gallery and stood in front of cell 4-44

(Doc. 1 at 34). Plaintiff described the unsanitary conditions of his cell (Id.). Mennerich told

Plaintiff he could and should have Plaintiff placed in a better cell, but he would not because he

knew all about Plaintiff (Id.). On December 9, 2016, Plaintiff again saw Mennerich, who advised

Plaintiff that Mennerich had spoken with maintenance and engineering to falsify documents to

demonstrate there was nothing wrong with Plaintiff’s cell prior to his placement (Id.). Mennerich

again told Plaintiff he told staff to leave him in that cell and not provide Plaintiff with any cleaning

supplies or hygiene necessities (Id.). Mennerich explained that Ms. Myers, a mental health

professional, told Mennerich that Plaintiff complained about his cell conditions to her on

December 6, 2016, but she did not document those complaints in her notes (Id.).

On December 8, 2016, Officer Engelage told Plaintiff that Engelage and other staff

members would ensure Plaintiff stayed in cell 4-43 because Plaintiff had submitted complaints

against Engelage’s “loved ones” and because Plaintiff had a staff assault in his history (Doc. 1 at

30).

On December 10, 2016, shortly after 2:30 a.m., Sgt. Mercer was on Plaintiff’s gallery with

a nurse and observed Plaintiff awake in his cell (Doc. 1 at 35). Mercer told Plaintiff he would be

staying in that cell and the conditions in the cell would not change (Id.). Later that morning, Sgt.

Hudson stopped near Plaintiff’s cell and told Plaintiff he would not be moving from that cell and

no work orders would be put in to address the issues in the cell (Id.). At some point Ms. R.

Engelage, the medical technician, and Officer Engelage toured the gallery and R. Engelage told

Plaintiff he knew “they” did not “give a fuck about his cell conditions” or his health issues (Id.).

R. Engelage told Plaintiff that she, Lang, and Marshall “posted” for all healthcare unit medical

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staff to not provide Plaintiff with medical treatment and to destroy any and all sick call slips

submitted to the healthcare unit (Id.). Plaintiff testified at his deposition that R. Engelage saw his

health conditions, including his pus-filled blisters and skin redness, and she told him all sick call

slips would be destroyed (Doc. 153-1 at 418). Later, during the 3 to 11 shift, Lt. Bump did a walk

through in Plaintiff’s gallery and saw Plaintiff sitting on his bed (Doc. 1 at 36). Bump told

Plaintiff the staff was told not to move Plaintiff from that cell, and not to fix the toilet, sink, or

ceiling (Id.). Bump told Plaintiff he did not care what Plaintiff told “that judge in East St. Louis,

Illinois” about Menard staff in early September 2016 (Id.).

On an unknown date, presumably in early December 2016, Defendants Lt. Witthoft, Jetton,

Sgt. Young, and Major Carter toured Plaintiff’s gallery and stopped at his cell (Doc. 1 at 30).

Carter stated that “they” had been waiting for Plaintiff to return to Menard on a court writ, and

Witthoft added that they knew Plaintiff went to federal court in late September 2016 and told a

federal judge how Plaintiff was mistreated by Menard staff (Id.). Whitthoft told Plaintiff that

because of that action he would make sure Plaintiff was not moved out of cell 4-43 (Doc. 1 at 30).

Witthoft also told Plaintiff neither he nor other staff would provide Plaintiff with cleaning

materials, bedding, sheets, blankets, or clothing (Doc. 153-1 at 464). Carter stated that he would

make sure no work orders were put in to have Plaintiff’s sink or toilet fixed and unclogged (Doc. 1

at 30). Jetton stated she would tell the cellhouse workers not to provide Plaintiff with any

cleaning supplies and she would make Plaintiff suffer while he was in his unsanitary cell because

Plaintiff told a federal judge about Menard staff “months ago” (Id.). Young added that Eovaldi

and Spiller would be glad to see that Plaintiff was housed as they had requested (Id.). At his

deposition, Plaintiff did not attribute any work order comments to Defendant Carter, rather, he

testified Carter saw the conditions in Plaintiff’s cell and told Plaintiff that his requests for a

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shower, hygiene necessities, and better living conditions would be denied due to Plaintiff bringing

forth federal complaints (Doc. 153-1 at 406).

On December 11, 2016, Officer Hartman walked past Plaintiff’s cell door, and Plaintiff

yelled to him about the unsanitary conditions of his cell (Doc. 1 at 36). Hartman told Plaintiff

they knew about the conditions of his cell and placed him in that cell purposefully because Plaintiff

told “federal judges about” Menard staff (Id.). Officer Roth looked up at Plaintiff’s cell from the

lower gallery and Plaintiff identified himself and explained the conditions in his cell (Id.). Roth

responded that staff placed Plaintiff in that cell because Plaintiff filed complaints to the courts

against Menard staff (Id.). At some point, medical technician Lang walked down Plaintiff’s

gallery and, before Plaintiff could set forth his health issues, Lang told Plaintiff he should not

bother sending medical request slips (Id.). Plaintiff testified Lang was aware of his cell

conditions and saw Plaintiff’s health issues, but refused to provide medical treatment on Plaintiff’s

request (Doc. 153-1 at 440). Plaintiff also testified she told healthcare staff not to provide

Plaintiff any medical treatment, and explained to Plaintiff it was because he filed grievances and a

lawsuit against her (Id.). As Lang was talking to Plaintiff, Officer Gardiner observed Plaintiff and

told him not to send another kite to internal affairs about his cell conditions or his health issues

(Doc. 1 at 37). Gardiner told Plaintiff they were not going to help him and indicated Plaintiff was

placed in that cell because he submitted complaints against staff and against intelligence staff (Id.).

Gardiner also indicated he knew what Plaintiff told the judge about Sgt. Hudson, Sgt. Spiller, and

medical technician Engelage (Id.).

During the morning shift on December 12, 2016, Sergeant Hudson observed Plaintiff

standing in his cell and told Plaintiff he would not be going to yard, and that he would not ever go

to yard (Doc. 1 at 38). Hudson also told Plaintiff that his sink, toilet, ceiling, mattress, and floor

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would stay in the condition they were in and all staff members had been told not to move Plaintiff

from that cell (Id.). During the 3 to 11 shift, Officer Myers stopped at Plaintiff’s cell and told

Plaintiff he would not be moved from that cell and his toilet, ceiling, and sink would not be fixed

(Id.).

On December 13, 2016, while Plaintiff was being escorted through the visiting room, he

walked past Lt. Brookman, who immediately told Plaintiff he needed to quit sending kites to the

lieutenants because they “don’t give a fuck” (Doc. 1 at 39). Brookman explained he was

disappointed to hear Plaintiff went to an East St. Louis courthouse and told a federal judge how

Menard staff had mistreated him (Id.). Brookman told Plaintiff he would be kept in cell 4-43 until

he was transferred out of Menard (Id.). Plaintiff also testified that Brookman admitted telling

Menard staff not to let him shower or receive hygiene items or medical treatment because he told a

federal judge about the staff at Menard (Doc. 153-1 at 398-99). Later, Officer Gardiner came to

Plaintiff’s cell and told Plaintiff he was on “mail watch” and his outgoing mail would be opened

and any complaints about his cell conditions would be destroyed (Doc. 1 at 39). Gardiner

explained he had the authority to house Plaintiff in a better cell, but would not move him because

Plaintiff filed court complaints against Menard staff (Id.). Plaintiff also saw Lt. Held and yelled

to him (Id.). Held told Plaintiff not to call his name because Held was not Plaintiff’s friend (Id.).

Held told Plaintiff he knew about the issues in Plaintiff’s cell and that just like Brookman said,

they were not going to do anything about Plaintiff’s cell (Doc. 1 at 40). Plaintiff testified that

Held told him he was not allowing him to shower or receive hygiene necessities because Plaintiff

had filed lawsuits and grievances against Menard staff (Doc. 153-1 at 431-32).

During the 3 to 11 shift on December 14, 2016, Lt. J. Engelage observed Plaintiff standing

at his cell bars and, before Plaintiff could address the unsanitary conditions, Engelage told Plaintiff

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that they were not going to move him to another cell so Plaintiff can stop sending kites to all

majors, lieutenants, counselors, and internal affairs staff (Doc. 1 at 40). Engelage reiterated that

Plaintiff would not be receiving any medical treatment and any sick call slips would be destroyed

(Id. at 41). Engelage said he was doing this because Plaintiff submitted complaints about Menard

staff and had a staff assault in his disciplinary history (Id.).

On December 15, 2016, Sgt. Lindenberg came to Plaintiff’s cell and told Plaintiff to stop

sending kites because “ain’t nobody gonna do shit for you” (Doc. 1 at 41-42). Later, during the

morning shift, Major Carter, Lt. Mennerich, Sgt. Snell, and other staff members walked past

Plaitniff’s cell (Id. at 41). Major Carter told Plaintiff not to send any more kites complaining

about his cell conditions and hygiene needs because they “don’t give a fuck” (Id.). Lt. Mennerich

indicated Plaintiff already knew that, and Sgt. Snell told Plaintiff he would freeze to death in that

smelly cell because he was not going to get any sheets or blankets (Id.). On the same day during

the 3 to 11 shift, Lt. Engelage and Officer Slavens came to Plaintiff’s gallery and Engelage told

Plaintiff he was going to make sure Plaintiff remained housed in cell 4-43 with no hygiene items,

sheets, or blankets (Id. at 42). Engelage told Plaintiff he would make sure Plaintiff became “real

sick” due to the excessive cold and unsanitary conditions in his cell, and that maintenance staff had

been told not to address any of Plaintiff’s requests (Id.). Slavens stated that he and Officer

Wooley had discussed Plaintiff’s kites about the conditions of his cell and that he disliked Plaintiff

due to Plaintiff complaining to the courts about Menard staff (Id.).

On December 16, 2016, Officers Wooley, Gardiner, and McCarthy from the internal

affairs and intelligence units came to Plaintiff’s cell (Doc. 1 at 42). Gardiner looked up at

Plaintiff’s cell and told Plaintiff it was planned to have him housed in an unsanitary “nasty ass

cell” so he could get sick and die (Id.). Wooley yelled up to Plaintiff and told him not to send any

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more kites because it would be a waste of time (Id. at 43). Gardiner also told Plaintiff to stop

sending kites, and told Plaintiff he would not be moved to a better cell (Id.). Later, Lt. Hof and

Officer Myers walked by Plaintiff’s cell, and Myers also told Plaintiff not to bother to send any

more kites (Id.). Myers told Plaintiff they know about the conditions in his cell and that is why he

was placed there (Id.).

On December 17, 2016, Officer Sanders, #103623, came to Plaintiff’s cell and, before

Plaintiff could complain about his cell conditions, Sanders told Plaintiff he knew about the

unsanitary conditions and he was not going to provide Plaintiff with cleaning supplies, a plunger, a

new mattress, or anything else because he knew Plaintiff had filed court complaints against

Menard staff and had a staff assault in his disciplinary history (Doc. 1 at 44).

On December 20, 2016, Gardiner and McCarthy came to Plaintiff’s cell and reiterated their

knowledge of Plaintiff’s cell conditions and indicated Plaintiff would not be moved and would not

receive showers or hygiene supplies (Doc. 1 at 44). Later, on December 22, 2016, Major Carter,

Lt. Mennerich, and Sgt. Lindenberg came on Plaintiff’s gallery and stopped at his cell (Id.).

Carter remarked that Plaintiff did not like being in his cell, but told Plaintiff to stop sending sick

call requests because he would not receive any medical treatment (Id. at 45). Mennerich told

Plaintiff that the medical staff does not care about his medical conditions caused by his unsanitary

cell (Id.). Lindenberg indicated that he told the cellhouse staff to not allow Plaintiff to complain

to counselors, grievance officers, or the warden about his cell (Id.). Also on this day, Wooley

escorted an inmate in Plaintiff’s cellhouse and, while in front of his cell, told Plaintiff no one cares

about his complaints or threats of filing another complaint (Id.). Officer Gee and McCarthy also

3 Plaintiff identifies two different defendants as Officer Sanders. The first is identified as “Officer Sanders” and the

second is identified as “Officer Sanders, #10362.”

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escorted another inmate through the cellhouse and, while in front of Plaintiff’s cell, McCarthy

yelled at Plaintiff that he does not care if Plaintiff keeps taking him to court, and he was glad his

house was not like Plaintiff’s cell (Doc. 1 at 46). Gee told Plaintiff he loves his co-workers and

they had been planning to house Plaintiff in an unsanitary cell for weeks (Id. at 45). Gee indicated

they told all Menard staff to make sure Plaintiff was placed in an unsanitary cell and that they

received his kites detailing the conditions, but Plaintiff’s efforts to be moved were in vain (Id.).

Spiller and Phelps also walked through and Plaintiff yelled to Spiller that Plaintiff had been

informed that he was one of the staff members that had him housed in the unsanitary cell (Id.).

Phelps said “they” were all involved in Plaintiff’s cell placement, and told Plaintiff they “don’t

give a fuck” about Plaintiff suing them (Id.). Phelps said he was not going to help Plaintiff

because he knew Plaintiff pushed an officer back in 2013 (Id.). Plaintiff also testified that Phelps

acknowledged Plaintiff’s cell conditions and his health issues, but told Plaintiff he would not assist

Plaintiff in getting treatment due to the lawsuit Plaintiff filed against Spiller and the “court

complaint” Plaintiff had filed (Doc. 153-1 at 453).

On December 23, 2016, Sgt. Spiller, Officer Wooley, and Officer McCarthy came through

Plaintiff’s cellhouse (Doc. 1 at 46). Spiller told Plaintiff that he knew the conditions of the cell

and he was going to make sure Plaintiff was not moved out of his cell because he was getting

revenge for Plaintiff filing court complaints against Menard staff (Id.). Wooley yelled to Plaintiff

that staff from her unit have told the medical staff not to provide Plaintiff any medical treatment

(Id.). McCarthy told Plaintiff that he had spoken to the medical technicians and told them not to

provide Plaintiff with medical treatment or document his medical conditions, and that he had told

the cellhouse inmate workers that they should not provide Plaintiff with mops, plungers, blankets,

or other supplies (Id. at 47). At his deposition, Plaintiff testified that McCarthy told him he was

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not going to provide him with any necessities because he had filed a lawsuit against Spiller and

discussed issues at Menard during an evidentiary hearing in 2016 (Doc. 153-1 at 445). During a

later shift that day, Sgt. Laminack walked down Plaintiff’s gallery and told Plaintiff he needed to

stop sending kites to the lieutenants, majors, and health care unit staff because he had ensured that

Plaintiff would not receive medical treatment and would not be moved from his cell (Doc. 1 at 47).

Laminack also told Plaintiff he and Myers had agreed to falsify the cellhouse shower logs to show

Plaintiff either received or refused showers (Id.).

On December 24, 2016, Nicole Marshall, a medical technician, came to Plaintiff’s cell and

told Plaintiff the medical staff had received his sick call slips detailing Plaintiff’s health conditions

caused by his unsanitary cell (Doc. 1 at 47). Marshall told Plaintiff she did not care about his

chapped lips, dry throat, and issues with vomiting, shaking, and itching (Id.). Marshall again saw

Plaintiff on December 25, 2016, and reiterated he would not receive any medical treatment and

that based on her knowledge of Plaintiff’s cell conditions and his medical complaints, he already

had Hepatitis C (Id. at 48). Later that day, Laminack was again at Plaintiff’s cell and told Plaintiff

he made sure he was placed in the unsanitary cell and that Plaintiff would stay in that cell because

he assaulted an IDOC officer (Id. at 47). Plaintiff testified at his deposition that Laminack told

him he was not going to better the conditions of Plaintiff’s cell because Plaintiff had filed a lawsuit

against Officer Spiller and went before a judge in September 2016 to complain about Menard staff

(Doc. 153-1 at 439).

On December 26, 2016, Officer Gee came to Plaintiff’s gallery and told Plaintiff to stop

sending sick call request slips (Doc. 1 at 47). Gee also told Plaintiff his mail was being monitored

so he should not send out any complaints regarding his conditions of confinement (Id. at 47-48).

Plaintiff also testified that Gee saw the conditions of his cell and told Plaintiff he would not receive

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any showers, cleaning supplies, or medical treatment because he had filed a lawsuit against Officer

Spiller (Doc. 153-1 at 426). Later that day, Officer Myers came to Plaintiff’s cell and told

Plaintiff he was going to get his toilet fixed, but he needed Plaintiff to flush it first (Doc. 1 at 49).

Plaintiff flushed the toilet and water with urine and feces spilled on the floor (Id.). Myers then

refused to have the toilet fixed, or provide Plaintiff with any cleaning supplies (Id.).

On January 3, 2017, Plaintiff saw Major Allen who told Plaintiff he was one of the staff

members who placed Plaintiff in the unsanitary cell (Doc. 1 at 49). Allen told Plaintiff he placed

Plaintiff in that cell because of the staff assault in Plaintiff’s disciplinary history (Id.). At his

deposition, Plaintiff testified Allen told him he had received Plaintiff’s kites about his cell and

refused to address Plaintiff’s complaints because he knew Plaintiff had told a federal judge in

September 2016 about mistreatment by Menard staff (Doc. 153-1 at 396). Plaintiff later walked

past Lt. Jetton and Lt. Scott and Scott told Plaintiff to stop sending kites about his clogged sink and

toilet, and indicated he made sure Plaintiff was not provided with cleaning supplies, hygiene items,

or sheets (Doc. 1 at 49). Plaintiff testified Scott told the North Two cellhouse staff not to better

Plaintiff’s living conditions because he told the federal judge about being mistreated at Menard

(Doc. 153-1 at 458).

On January 4, 2017, while Plaintiff was waiting to be cleared for his court writ transfer, Lt.

Gutreuter told Plaintiff he knew Plaintiff did not like his placement in the north two cellhouse

because he had reviewed all of his kites directed to the lieutenants and majors detailing the

unsanitary conditions (Doc. 1 at 50). Gutreuter told Plaintiff he made sure Plaintiff was not

provided with medical treatment, cleaning supplies, showers, or anything else (Id.). Plaintiff

testified that Gutreuter told him he instructed officers not to provide Plaintiff with necessities

because he filed a lawsuit against them and went to federal court (Doc. 153-1 at 428).

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As a result of the conditions in his cell, Plaintiff’s skin itched, and he suffered from

bleeding scabs and pus-filled blisters and bumps (Doc. 1 at 50). Plaintiff also had a dry mouth,

throat, and lips (Id.). Because Plaintiff had no light switch in his cell, he suffered from blurry

vision, dizziness, and headaches (Id.). Plaintiff also could not sleep, or focus, and was angry and

depressed with violent fantasies of hurting himself (Id. at 51).

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986); see also

Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of any genuine issue of

material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary

judgment is made, the adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue

for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of

material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). In assessing a summary judgment motion, the district court views the

facts in the light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving

party. Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation

omitted).

Discussion

Count One: Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Eovaldi

Plaintiff asserts Eovaldi used excessive force against him on November 30, 2016 by

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twisting and bending Plaintiff’s hand and fingers. Defendant Eovaldi seeks summary judgment

on this claim arguing the force claimed by Plaintiff was de minimis.

The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause prohibits the

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” on prisoners. Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 837

(7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)). “In cases involving the

claimed use of excessive force, ‘the core judicial inquiry’ is ‘whether force was applied in a

good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm’.”

Outlaw, 259 F.3d at 837 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). “In conducting this inquiry, a court

must examine a variety of factors, including ‘the need for an application of force, the relationship

between that need and the force applied, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible

officers, the efforts made to temper the severity of the force employed, and the extent of the injury

suffered by the prisoner.’” Id. With regard to the last factor, a plaintiff need not demonstrate a

significant injury to state a claim for excessive force; however, “a claim ordinarily cannot be

predicated on a de minimis use of physical force.” DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 620 (7th Cir.

2000) (emphasis added) (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5).

Here, the evidence indicates that Plaintiff’s fingers and hands were bent and twisted;

however, there is no evidence that Plaintiff suffered any injury due to Eovaldi’s actions, or that the

occurrence lasted longer than a brief period of time. Despite finding Plaintiff did not sustain any

significant physical injury due to Eovaldi’s actions, the Court recognizes that infliction of pain that

is “totally without penological justification” is per se malicious. Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496,

504 (7th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Eovaldi has failed to set forth any explanation for the

force he allegedly took and, as such, the Court finds Eovaldi’s twisting and bending of Plaintiff’s

hands and fingers was excessive force. Defendant Eovaldi is not entitled to summary judgment as

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to Count One.

Count Two: Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim

Prison officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment to provide humane conditions of

confinement, including the provision of adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994). Courts evaluating claims of unconstitutional

conditions of confinement must consider: (1) whether the defendant prison officials acted with the

requisite state of mind (the subjective component) and (2) whether the alleged deprivations were

sufficiently serious to rise to the level of a constitutional violation (the objective component).

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). In other words, to establish his Eighth Amendment

claim, Plaintiff must show that he was subjected to conditions that denied him “the minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities” and that Defendants acted with a culpable state of mind in

denying him the same. Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 491 (7th Cir. 2006).

Further, the Seventh Circuit requires that a plaintiff “do more than demonstrate a triable

issue of fact with respect to the conditions he faces; he must also show that he suffered some

cognizable harm from the overall lack of a sanitary environment.” Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000,

1006 (7th Cir. 2016).

In seeking summary judgment on Count Two, Defendants set forth two arguments: first,

that Plaintiff failed to show he suffered a cognizable harm due to the conditions in his cell; and

second, that they should not be held liable for any injury preventable by the use of proper hygiene

products. With regard to their argument concerning a cognizable harm, Defendants assert there

are no records and no evidence that any medical treatment was requested or received for Plaintiff’s

complaints of vomiting, itching, scratching, skin redness, swelling, blisters, sores, and muscle

issues. Defendants argue medical records from Stateville (where he was transferred to from

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Menard) evidence that Plaintiff went to the health care unit multiple times, but never complained

of any issue resulting from his conditions of confinement at Menard. Defendants assert Plaintiff

first made a complaint about eye problems including redness, swelling, and itching more than five

months after his transfer from Menard.

Despite the lack of medical records evidencing a cognizable physical harm, such

evidentiary “proof” is not required for Plaintiff to survive summary judgment. Plaintiff has

submitted evidence, and the Court at this juncture is required to view the evidence in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff, that he suffered from multiple health conditions, including blisters, sores,

and vomiting, while housed in cell 4-43 at Menard. The record also indicates Plaintiff sought

medical treatment for his conditions, but was denied. While the Court notes that the conditions do

not appear particularly severe or emergent, in Gray, the Seventh Circuit found the plaintiff

demonstrated a sufficient, cognizable harm by introducing evidence that the conditions in his cell

had likely exacerbated his asthma and caused him to develop skin rashes. Gray, 826 F.3d at

1004-06. Also in Gray, the Seventh Circuit set forth the standard for assessing an Eighth

Amendment claim, noting that courts look for physical injury “that a reasonable doctor or patient

would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition

that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial

pain,” but noted that Gray was a prison-conditions case, not a case about inadequate medical

treatment, and the plaintiff had set forth enough evidence to show “some physical injury.” Id. at

1006 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court finds the evidence here similar to that

in Gray and finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated he suffered “some physical injury” while housed

at Menard during the relevant time. While Defendants clearly disagree, this is a material fact that

precludes summary judgment.

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Next, the Court considers Defendants’ argument that they should not be held liable for any

injury that is preventable by the use of proper hygiene products. In support of this argument,

Defendants rely on the declaration of Justin Snell, in which he asserts inmates in segregation

receive toilet paper, soap, toothbrush, toothpaste, and deodorant (Doc. 153-1 at 519). Snell also

asserts that when an inmate transfers to segregation he receives two sheets, a washcloth, a towel,

and a blanket (Doc. 153-1 at 519). Defendants further assert Plaintiff could have requested an

indigent hygiene bag. Accordingly, Defendants argue that to the extent any of Plaintiff’s alleged

injuries were caused by lack of hygiene products, he should not hold Defendants liable for those

injuries.

Defendants’ argument is inapposite and ignores much of the evidence in the record.

Plaintiff has attested that he frequently requested hygiene items, but his requests were ignored and

refused by Defendants. Although Defendants may dispute this, it is certainly a material question

of fact. Further, Defendants do not set forth, and the Court declines to consider, what injuries

may have been caused by lack of hygiene supplies and what injuries may have been caused by the

conditions of Plaintiff’s cell.

For these reasons, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment as to Count Two.

Count Three: First Amendment claim

A prison official who takes action in retaliation for a prisoner’s exercise of a constitutional

right violates the Constitution. DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 2000). The

Seventh Circuit has articulated that for a plaintiff to prevail on a First Amendment retaliation

claim, he must show that: (1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he

suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the

First Amendment activity was “at least a motivating factor” in the defendant’s decision to take the

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retaliatory action. Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Woodruff v.

Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008)) (other citations omitted).

At the summary judgment stage, the Seventh Circuit has held that the burden of proving

causation is split between the parties. Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 965 (7th Cir. 2012).

Initially, in order to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must produce evidence that his

speech was at least a “motivating” factor in the defendant’s decision to take retaliatory action. Id.

Then, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the causal inference raised by the plaintiff’s

evidence and show that the harm would have occurred anyway, despite the protected activity. Id.

If the defendant fails to counter the plaintiff’s evidence, then the defendant’s retaliatory actions are

considered a “necessary condition” of the plaintiff’s harm, and the plaintiff has established the

“but-for” causation needed to succeed on his claim. Id.

Plaintiff claims Defendants placed him in an unsanitary cell and refused to provide him

with hygiene items, medical treatment, showers, and other necessities because he filed grievances

and lawsuits against officials at Menard. Defendants assert they are entitled to summary

judgment on this claim, arguing Plaintiff did not suffer a deprivation likely to deter First

Amendment activity and that Plaintiff’s First Amendment activity was not a motivating factor in

Defendants’ actions.

First, the Court considers whether Plaintiff suffered a deprivation likely to deter First

Amendment activity. Defendants argue part of the deprivation Plaintiff alleges he suffered was a

prohibition on filing grievances and assert this is belied by the record because Plaintiff was able to

file grievances while at Menard during the relevant time. Defendants misconstrue Plaintiff’s

claim. Plaintiff’s complaint and the screening order in this case clearly contemplate and focus

this claim on Plaintiff’s placement in an unsanitary cell. Defendants do not address this point in

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their motion for summary judgment. It is clear that placement in a cell such as that attested to by

Plaintiff is a deprivation likely to deter First Amendment activity.

Next, the Court considers Defendants’ argument that there is no evidence that placement in

his unsanitary cell was motivated by Plaintiff’s First Amendment activity. More specifically,

Defendants Carter, Reva Engelage, Eovaldi, Gardiner, Gee, Gutreuter, and Hartman assert there is

no indication in the complaint that they ever stated they were motivated due to Plaintiff’s practice

of filing grievances or lawsuits. Defendants explain Plaintiff only alleged these Defendants

admitted their retaliatory intent at his deposition. Defendants further remark that Plaintiff only

generally alleges all Defendants said they were retaliating against him without any details, which

is insufficient for a reasonable jury to find in Plaintiff’s favor.

Although the Court agrees that the evidence and details supporting a finding of retaliatory

motive are sparse, the Court cannot award summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff

has attested to the accuracy of his complaint, and Plaintiff did in fact either attest or testify at his

deposition that all Defendants, including Carter, Engelage, Eovaldi, Gardiner, Gee, Gutreuter, and

Hartman, referenced either Plaintiff’s filing of grievances or court complaints as motivation for

their refusal to move Plaintiff to another cell, provide hygiene or cleaning supplies, or provide

medical treatment. The Court must consider this evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff

at this time. Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment as to Count Three.

Count Four: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Marshall, R. Engelage,

and Lang

The Supreme Court has recognized that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs

of prisoners” may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). In order to prevail on such a claim, Plaintiff must show first

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that his condition was “objectively, sufficiently serious” and second, that the “prison officials

acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 652-53 (7th Cir.

2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

With regard to the first showing, the following circumstances could constitute a serious

medical need: “[t]he existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important

and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects

an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” Hayes v. Snyder,

546 F.3d 516, 522-23 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir.

1997)); see also Foelker v. Outagamie Cnty., 394 F.3d 510, 512-13 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A serious

medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so

obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”).

A prisoner must also show that prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of

mind, namely, deliberate indifference. “Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of

prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104

(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). “The infliction of suffering on prisoners

can be found to violate the Eighth Amendment only if that infliction is either deliberate, or reckless

in the criminal law sense.” Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652-53 (7th Cir. 1985).

Negligence, gross negligence, or even recklessness as that term is used in tort cases, is not enough.

Id. at 653; Shockley v. Jones, 823, F.2d 1068, 1072 (7th Cir. 1987). Put another way, the plaintiff

must demonstrate that the officials were “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists” and that the officials actually drew that inference.

Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653. A plaintiff does not have to prove that his complaints were “literally

ignored,” but only that “the defendants’ responses were so plainly inappropriate as to permit the

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inference that the defendants intentionally or recklessly disregarded his needs.” Hayes, 546 F.3d

at 524 (quoting Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2000)).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s numerous subjective complaints do not rise to the level of

a sufficiently serious medical condition as a matter of law. Defendants assert there is no objective

evidence to support Plaintiff’s allegation that he suffered pain, and argue Plaintiff’s medical

records show no objective medical issues were witnessed by any medical professional or brought

to any medical professional’s attention. Again, Defendants’ argument that there is no objective

evidence of Plaintiff’s medical issues is misplaced. At this juncture, the Court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and Plaintiff has submitted evidence that he

attempted to obtain medical treatment, but was denied. Moreover, the Court finds that although

any one of Plaintiff’s purported medical conditions may not meet the standard for a serious

medical need under the Eighth Amendment, a reasonable jury could find that the combination of

conditions and the duration during which he suffered from them (more than 30 days) presented a

serious medical need. Although the Court recognizes Plaintiff’s conditions ultimately resolved

on their own within a few weeks, this does not discount the fact that at the time he was in his

segregation cell at Menard he suffered from medical conditions that could be found to be a serious

medical need.

Defendants Marshall, Engelage, and Lang also argue they were not deliberately indifferent

to Plaintiff’s medical conditions. Defendants assert there are no documented complaints from

Plaintiff about his conditions while Plaintiff was at Menard. Defendants also reference Plaintiff’s

Health Status Transfer Summary that was completed on December 28, 2016, in which Nurse

Crane (who is not a defendant), made no reference to any obvious medical injury or condition (see

Doc. 153-1 at 589). The Court cannot accept Defendants’ argument because Plaintiff has

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presented evidence that he complained to Defendants Marshall, Engelage, and Lang about his

medical conditions, and they ignored his requests for medical treatment. Again, although

Plaintiff’s complaints are not documented in his medical records, this is not fatal to Plaintiff’s case

and the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff at this stage in the

proceedings. Because there is some evidence Defendants Marshall, Engelage, and Lang were

aware of Plaintiff’s medical conditions and failed to take action to address his complaints, a

reasonable jury could find they acted with deliberate indifference. Defendants Marshall,

Engelage, and Lang are not entitled to summary judgment as to Count Four.

Qualified Immunity

Generally, government officials are protected from civil liability when performing

discretionary functions under the doctrine of qualified immunity so long as “their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Alvarado v. Litscher, 267

F.3d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus, in order to evaluate a claim of qualified immunity, the Court

engages in a two-part inquiry. The first question is whether the defendants’ conduct violated a

constitutional right. Volkman v. Ryker, 736 F.3d 1084, 1090 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194, 201 (2001) (overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)). The second

question is whether that particular constitutional right was “clearly established” at the time of the

alleged violation. Id. The two questions may be considered in either order. Volkman, 736 F.3d

at 1090 (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236-42).

For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours “must be sufficiently clear

that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Estate of

Escobedo v. Bender, 600 F.3d 770, 779 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739

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(2002)). The unlawfulness of a particular official’s action must be apparent “in light of the

pre-existing law.” Id. A party may demonstrate that a right was clearly established by

presenting a closely analogous case establishing the defendant’s conduct was unconstitutional or

by presenting evidence the defendant’s conduct was so patently violative of the constitutional right

that reasonable officials would know without guidance from a court. See Hope, 536 U.S. at

739-40.

Defendants make only a general qualified immunity argument, asserting that: (1)

Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s rights; and (2) they are entitled to qualified immunity. The

Court disagrees. It was clearly established at the time of the events in question that placing

Plaintiff in a cell with the conditions testified to by Plaintiff, and doing so for the purpose of

retaliation without providing medical treatment implicates an inmate’s constitutional rights.

Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 152) is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 22, 2020

s/ Reona J. Daly

Hon. Reona J. Daly

United States Magistrate Judge

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