The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MATTHIAS SCOTT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Cause No. 3:19-cv-00528-GCS
)
JOHN BALDWIN, )
JACQUELINE LASHBROOK, )
FRANK LAWRENCE, )
WILLIAM QUALLS, )
MARC WILDBAHER, )
DAVID EVELSIZER, )
DENNIS YOUNG, )
RICHARD AKINS, )
JOHN KOCK, )
TYLER RICHERSON, and )
SHAUN GEE,1 )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
SISON, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Matthias Scott, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”), alleges that the housing situation at Menard Correctional Center
has resulted in unconstitutional conditions of confinement, including severe
overcrowding and a breakdown in the inmate classification system that causes inmates,
including Scott, to be celled with inmates who are severely mentally ill and dangerous.
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion filed by
Defendants John Baldwin, John Kock, Jacqueline Lashbrook, Frank Lawrence, William
1 The Clerk of Court shall correct the name of Defendant Major Evelsizer to David Evelsizer and of
Marc Wildbaher to Marc Wildhaber.
Qualls, Tyler Richerson, and Marc Wildhaber. Plaintiff responded to Defendants’ motion,
and the Court held an evidentiary hearing on August 24, 2020. For the reasons delineated
below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At all times relevant to his complaint, Plaintiff Matthias Scott was incarcerated at
Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”). Defendant John Baldwin was the acting
director of IDOC. Defendant Jacqueline Lashbrook was the warden at Menard before
Defendant Frank Lawrence became the acting warden at some point in early 2019. Scott
alleges that Baldwin, Lashbrook, and Lawrence were responsible for the administration
of Menard and were aware of the dangerous conditions of confinement inmates faced,
including severe overcrowding (Count 1). Defendants William Qualls, Marc Wildhaber,
David Evelsizer, Dennis Young, Richard Akins, John Kock, Tyler Richerson, and Shaun
Gee were correctional employees who, along with Baldwin, Lashbrook, and Lawrence,
allegedly failed to protect Scott from a physical attack by his cellmate on March 30, 2019
(Count 2), and intentionally inflicted emotional distress by ignoring his requests for a
new cellmate before the assault (Count 3).
Plaintiff attached three emergency grievances to his complaint that he claims he
submitted but that went unanswered by prison officials. In a December 21, 2018
grievance, Scott complained that he was housed in a cell meant for one inmate with
another inmate due to overcrowding and that he believed his cellmate was severely
mentally ill. (Doc. 1, p. 35-36). He explained that he and his cellmate were having
increasingly intense arguments and that he wanted to be moved to a different cell before
their arguments turned physical. Scott wrote that he had complained to the gallery
officers, the sergeant, and the lieutenants, but he was told that he would not be moved
unless they had a physical altercation. The grievance was not reviewed as an emergency
by the Chief Administrative Officer (“CAO”), nor was it submitted as a non-emergency
for review by a counselor, grievance officer, and the CAO.
Scott’s complaint includes two letters to Defendant Lashbrook dated December 27,
2018, and January 8, 2019. (Doc. 1, p. 37-38). The letters request a status update on the
December 21, 2018 emergency grievance. On January 3, 2019, Scott wrote to the west
house major and the “7 to 3” sergeant. (Doc. 1-1, p. 1-2). These letters do not reference his
December 2018 emergency grievance or the letter to Defendant Lashbrook. The letters to
the major and sergeant dated January 3, 2019 are also not mentioned in Scott’s January 8,
2019 letter to Lashbrook or in his later grievances.
Scott also attached an emergency grievance dated January 8, 2019, to his
complaint. (Doc. 1, p. 39-40). It referenced the December 2018 grievance and the two
letters to Lashbrook. Like the December grievance, the January 8, 2019 grievance also
explains that Scott spoke with his gallery officers, the sergeant, the lieutenant, and the
major about his desire to be moved to a new cell. There is no evidence of a response to
this grievance by a grievance officer or of emergency review by the CAO.
In a February 6, 2019 grievance, Scott claimed that he was told by “the West House
Officers” that he would not be safe if he did not fight his cellmate. He explained that his
cellmate had mental health issues and was threatening to fight him, so Scott asked to be
moved, explaining that he was forced into an unsafe cell assignment due to severe
overcrowding. (Doc. 1-1, p. 3). Scott marked the grievance as an emergency, but it was
not reviewed by the CAO to determine whether it raised an emergency. There is no
response from a counselor, a grievance officer, or the CAO.
In addition to the February 6, 2019 grievance, Scott attached several letters to his
complaint, which were purportedly written in February 2019 and concerned the risk he
faced from his cellmate. In a February 9, 2019 letter to John Baldwin, he mentions talking
to gallery officers, the sergeant, the lieutenants, the major, and the counselors about his
desire to move a different cell. (Doc. 1-1, p. 5-7). He also mentions the emergency
grievances and letters he sent to Defendant Lashbrook. Scott also attached three February
2019 letters to Defendant Lawrence. (Doc. 1-1, p. 8-10). The letters to Lawrence reference
his February 6, 2019 grievance and seek a response to the grievance. They do not mention
the December 2018 or January 2019 grievances.
The records of the Administrate Review Board (“ARB”) submitted by Defendants
(Doc. 39-1) contain two grievances filed by Scott. On October 18, 2018, Scott filed a
grievance about personal property that was missing after he was transferred to Menard.
He filed a similar grievance on November 4, 2018, as well. A grievance counselor
responded to the October grievance, but there is no response from a counselor or from
the Chief Administrative Officer (“CAO”). The November grievance does not show a
response from a counselor, a grievance officer, or the CAO. The ARB responded to the
grievances on November 14, 2018, indicating that additional information was needed, to
wit: the responses from a counselor, the grievance officer, and the CAO. The ARB also
deemed the grievances misdirected because personal property issues were to be
reviewed at the inmate’s facility before being appealed to the ARB.
The Court held an evidentiary hearing on August 24, 2020. At the hearing, Scott
testified that he was familiar with the grievance process at Menard, though he later
testified that he was unaware of how to submit non-emergency grievances, despite
having done so with his missing property grievances. Grievances at Menard, including
emergency grievances, are supposed to be submitted using a box in each cell house,
rather than through institutional mail. When the cell house is on lockdown, correctional
officers bring the box around to the cells for inmates to submit their grievances. Scott
testified that he submitted the December 2018 grievance using the grievance box, but he
said that he submitted the other two emergency grievances using the mail.
Scott was asked whether he knew that there was a log of inmate letters or kites,
and he testified that he did not know that. He was asked if he knew why his letters did
not appear in the kite log, but he did not know. He also testified that he did everything
he could to be moved to a new cell, but he first said that he did not tell his counselor of
his concerns. He later said he did talk with his counselor but was told the counselor had
no control over cell assignments. He testified that if the reports of his conversations with
his counselor on January 3, January 9, and March 6 showed that he reported no issues,
then that information was incorrect.
The Court also heard testimony from Yvette Baker, a grievance officer. She
explained that when grievances are submitted using the grievance box as opposed to
through the mail, it allows for better tracking by the institution. As each grievance is
removed from the box, it is given a grievance number and is logged immediately. The
system of assigning a number and logging each grievance as it is removed from the box
is meant to ensure that grievances are not lost. If a grievance with an assigned number
does not show a response in the log, then officials can easily follow-up on the status of it
with the person who should be reviewing it. She testified that if the grievance office
received Scott’s three grievances, then he would have received responses to them.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary judgment is “proper if the pleadings, discovery materials, disclosures,
and affidavits demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact such that [Defendants are]
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Wragg v. Village of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 467
(7th Cir. 2010). Lawsuits filed by inmates are governed by the provisions of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Act states, in pertinent part,
that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”
Id. (emphasis added).
Generally, the Court’s role on summary judgment is not to evaluate the weight of
the evidence, to judge witness credibility or to determine the truth of the matter. Instead,
the Court is to determine whether a genuine issue of triable fact exists. See Nat’l Athletic
Sportwear Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 528 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 2008). In Pavey, however, the
Seventh Circuit held that “debatable factual issues relating to the defense of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies” are not required to be decided by a jury but are to be
determined by the judge. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740-741 (7th Cir. 2008).
The Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to the PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement. See, e.g., Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006)(noting that “[t]his
circuit has taken a strict compliance approach to exhaustion”). Exhaustion must occur
before the suit is filed. See Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff cannot
file suit and then exhaust his administrative remedies while the suit is pending. Id.
Moreover, “[t]o exhaust remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the
place, and at the time, the prison administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286
F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2005). Consequently, if a prisoner fails to use a prison’s grievance
process properly, “the prison administrative authority can refuse to hear the case, and
the prisoner’s claim can be indefinitely unexhausted.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809.
In Pavey, the Seventh Circuit set forth procedures for a court to follow in a situation
where failure to exhaust administrative remedies is raised as an affirmative defense. The
Seventh Circuit stated the following:
(1) The district judge conducts a hearing on exhaustion and permits
whatever discovery relating to exhaustion he deems appropriate. (2) If the
judge determines that the prisoner did not exhaust his administrative
remedies, the judge will then determine whether (a) the plaintiff has failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies, and so he must go back and
exhaust; (b) or, although he has no unexhausted administrative remedies,
the failure to exhaust was innocent (as where prison officials prevent a
prisoner from exhausting his remedies), and so he must be given another
chance to exhaust (provided that there exist remedies that he will be
permitted by the prison authorities to exhaust, so that he’s not just being
given a runaround); or (c) the failure to exhaust was the prisoner’s fault, in
which event the case is over. (3) If and when the judge determines that the
prisoner has properly exhausted his administrative remedies, the case will
proceed to pretrial discovery, and if necessary a trial, on the merits; and if
there is a jury trial, the jury will make all necessary findings of fact without
being bound by (or even informed of) any of the findings made by the
district judge in determining that the prisoner had exhausted his
administrative remedies.
Pavey, 544 F.3d at 742.
As an inmate confined within the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”),
Plaintiff was required to follow the regulations contained in the IDOC’s Grievance
Procedures for Offenders (“grievance procedures”) to exhaust his claims properly. See 20
ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. The grievance procedures first require inmates to file
their grievance with the counselor within 60 days of the discovery of an incident. See 20
ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a). The grievance form must:
contain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint,
including what happened, when, where, and the name of each person who
is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint. This
provision does not preclude an offender from filing a grievance when the
names of individuals are not known, but the offender must include as much
descriptive information about the individual as possible.
20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(c). Grievances that are unable to be resolved through
routine channels are then sent to the grievance officer. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE
§ 504.820(a). The grievance officer will review the grievance and provide a written
response to the inmate. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(a). “The Grievance Officer shall
consider the grievance and report his or her findings and recommendations in writing to
the Chief Administrative Officer within two months after receipt of the grievance, when
reasonably feasible under the circumstances.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(e). “The
Chief Administrative Officer shall review the findings and recommendation and advise
the offender of his or her decision in writing.” Id.
If the inmate is not satisfied with the CAO’s response, he or she can file an appeal
with the Director through the ARB. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(a). The grievance
procedures specifically state, “[i]f, after receiving the response of the Chief
Administrative Officer, the offender still believes that the problem, complaint or
grievance has not been resolved to his or her satisfaction, he or she may appeal in writing
to the Director. The appeal must be received by the Administrative Review Board within
30 days after the date of the decision.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(a). The inmate shall
attach copies of the Grievance Officer’s report and the CAO’s decision to his appeal. Id.
“The Administrative Review Board shall submit to the Director a written report of its
findings and recommendations.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(d). “The Director shall
review the findings and recommendations of the Board and make a final determination
of the grievance within six months after receipt of the appealed grievance, when
reasonably feasible under the circumstances. The offender shall be sent a copy of the
Director’s decision.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(e).
The grievance procedures also allow an inmate to file an emergency grievance. See
20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.840. In order to file an emergency grievance, the inmate must
forward the grievance directly to the CAO who may “[determine that] there is a
substantial risk of imminent personal injury or other serious or irreparable harm to the
offender [such that] the grievance [should] be handled on an emergency basis.” 20 ILL.
ADMIN. CODE § 504.840(a). If the CAO determines the grievance should be handled on an
emergency basis, then the CAO “shall expedite processing of the grievance and respond
to the offender indicating what action shall be or has been taken.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE
§ 504.840(b). If the CAO determines the grievances “should not be handled on an
emergency basis, the offender shall be notified in writing that he or she may resubmit the
grievance as non-emergent, in accordance with the standard grievance process.” 20 ILL.
ADMIN. CODE § 504.840(c). When an inmate appeals a grievance deemed by the CAO to
be an emergency, “the Administrative Review Board shall expedite processing of the
grievance.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(f).
ANALYSIS
Neither of the grievances in the Administrative Review Board’s files exhaust
Scott’s claims in this action. They involve unrelated complaints about property lost
during Scott’s transfer to Menard, and, while they show a response from his counselor,
they do not contain responses from the grievance officer or the CAO prior to their
submission to the ARB. Similarly, Plaintiff’s letters to various Menard and IDOC officials
do not exhaust his claims in this action. The grievance procedures are clear that inmates
must use the grievance forms provided by a correctional facility. See 20 ILL. ADMIN CODE
§ 504.810. A letter does not take the place of following an institution’s grievance
procedures, so the letters alone cannot exhaust Plaintiff’s claims.
Looking at the record as a whole, the Court finds that there are too many
inconsistences to conclude that Plaintiff submitted his three emergency grievances and
that prison officials failed to respond to them, rendering Plaintiff’s administrative
remedies unavailable. Yvette Baker’s credible testimony established that the likelihood
of losing three emergency grievances accidentally is low, and, not only is there no record
of Plaintiff submitting his emergency grievances, there also is no credible evidence
suggesting that he sent the letters attached to his complaint to their designated recipients.
When asked why his letters did not appear in the kite log, Scott did not have an
answer. He also did not answer the undersigned’s questions about why certain pertinent
information about his earlier letters and grievances and the very existence of such letters
and grievances were left out of some writings but not others. These inconsistencies lead
the Court to believe that Scott’s letters and grievances were not submitted through proper
channels. Nor were they submitted in a manner that allowed Defendants to respond
meaningfully to Scott’s complaints. Additionally, Scott testified that, of his emergency
grievances attached to his complaint, only the December 21, 2018 grievance was filed
using the designated grievance box in his cell house. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(c)
(requiring grievance forms to be submitted to the designated repositories).
Based on the record as it stands, the Court concludes that Scott did not exhaust his
emergency grievances fully. Scott was not prevented from doing so by actions taken by
Defendants, and the grievance process was available to Scott during the time period in
which he had issues with his cellmate. He did not avail himself of it in a manner that
comports with IDOC procedures.
The Court notes that Defendants Akins, Evelsizer, Gee, and Young had not been
identified at the time Defendants Baldwin, Lashbrook, Lawrence, Kock, Qualls,
Richerson, and Wildhaber filed their motion for summary judgment on the issue of
exhaustion in December 2019. Nonetheless, the reasoning in this Order extends to the
claims against the newly identified Defendants, as Scott’s claims against them are
identical to his claims against the moving Defendants. As Scott has not exhausted his
claims in this action, the Court finds that dismissal of all claims against all Defendants is
appropriate at this time.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the
issue of exhaustion (Doc. 38) is GRANTED. This action shall be DISMISSED without
prejudice in its entirety due to Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior
to filing suit. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment of dismissal and shall close this
case.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Digitally signed
Dated: September 11, 2020. Althet ©. Saga it seocot ;
13:07:48 -05'00'
GILBERTC.SISON
United States Magistrate Judge
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