Mauter v. Siddiqui

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PETER C. MAUTER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 18-cv-2100-RJD

)

MOHAMMED SIDDIQUI, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

DALY, Magistrate Judge:

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Objection to the Report and

Recommendation, construed by the Court as a Motion to Reconsider1 (Doc. 71). For the reasons

set forth below, the Motion is DENIED.

Background

Plaintiff Peter Mauter, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(“IDOC”), filed this lawsuit on November 20, 2018 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging his

constitutional rights were violated while he was incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center

(“Menard”). In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges he was provided inadequate medical treatment for

his medical conditions, including lower back pain. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on

March 8, 2019 that was screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff was allowed to

proceed on the following claims:

Count One: Eighth Amendment claim against Siddiqui, Trost, Ritz, and Wexford for

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs relating to

1 All parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned and this matter was referred for all proceedings on

November 22, 2019 (see Doc. 56). Accordingly, no report and recommendation was entered and the filing in which

Plaintiff takes issue was an order entered by the undersigned.

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degenerative spine disease.

Count Two: Eighth Amendment claim against Siddiqui, Trost, Ritz, and Wexford for

deliberate indifference to the risk of substantial harm caused by long-term

use of Naprosyn and in failing to monitor Plaintiff for the harm caused by

long-term use.

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion of

administrative remedies that was granted on February 12, 2020 (Doc. 69). This case was

dismissed without prejudice pursuant to that Order. In the Order, the undersigned found that the

grievance relied on by Plaintiff to demonstrate exhaustion of his administrative remedies was not

timely appealed to the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”). The relevant grievance, dated

November 28, 2017, was signed and dated by the Chief Administrative Officer (“CAO”) on

February 16, 2018. Pursuant to the Administrative Code, this grievance must have been received

by the ARB within 30 days (by March 18, 2020) to be considered timely. The ARB did not

receive this grievance until April 17, 2018, and as a result, it was returned to Plaintiff without a

decision on the merits due to being submitted beyond the allowable timeframe.

Legal Standard

Although Plaintiff captions his motion as an objection to a report and recommendation, the

Court construes it as a motion to reconsider under either Rule 59 or 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

Rule 59(e) provides a basis for relief where a party challenges the Court’s application of

the law to the facts of the case. See Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 174-76 (1989)

(concluding that Rule 59(e) was intended to apply to the reconsideration of matters encompassed

within the merits of a judgment). While Rule 59(e) permits a district court to exercise its

discretion to correct its own errors, sparing the time and expense of further proceedings at the

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appellate level, Divane v. Krull Elec. Co. Inc., 194 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 1999), “ill-founded

requests for reconsideration of issues previously decided … needlessly take the court’s attention

from current matters.” Berger v. Xerox Ret. Income Guar. Plan, 231 F.Supp.2d 804, 820 (S.D.

Ill. 2002). Typically, Rule 59(e) motions are granted upon a showing of either newly discovered

evidence not previously available or evidence in the record that clearly establishes a manifest error

of law or fact. Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, Ill., 487 F.3d 506, 511-12 (7th Cir. 2007); Romo v.

Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 250 F.3d 1119, 1121 n.3 (7th Cir. 2001). “[M]anifest error is not

demonstrated by the disappointment of the losing party. It is the wholesale disregard,

misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent.” Oto v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,

224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). A proper motion to reconsider does

more than take umbrage and restate the arguments that were initially rejected during the summary

judgment phase. County of McHenry v. Ins. Co. of the West, 438 F.3d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 2006);

Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 247, 249 (7th Cir. 2004); Oto, 224 F.3d at 606.

Rule 60(b) contains a more exacting standard than Rule 59(e), although it permits relief

from a judgment for a number of reasons including mistake, fraud, misrepresentation, or

misconduct by an opposing party, or “any other reason that justifies relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).

In contrast to Rule 59(e), however, legal error is not an appropriate ground for relief under Rule

60(b). Gleash v. Yuswak, 308 F.3d 758, 761 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A contention that the judge erred

with respect to the materials in the record is not within Rule 60(b)’s scope, else it would be

impossible to enforce time limits for appeal.”). Relief under Rule 60(b) is an extraordinary

remedy and is only granted in exceptional circumstances. United States v. 8136 S. Dobson St.,

Chicago Ill., 125 F.3d 1076, 1082 (7th Cir. 1997).

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Discussion

In the motion now before the Court, Plaintiff asks that its decision be reconsidered due to

the Court’s failure to consider certain evidence. First, Plaintiff asserts Defendants admitted the

ARB reviewed and responded to his November 28, 2017 grievance on February 16, 2018, citing

Defendants’ brief in support of their motion for summary judgment. The Court acknowledges

that Defendants indicated that the ARB responded to this grievance on February 16, 2018 in their

brief, but, at the hearing, counsel explained that this statement was made in error. More

importantly, it is belied by the evidentiary record. The documents obtained from the ARB clearly

indicate that the grievance was received on April 17, 2018 (see Doc. 46-1 at 16). Although the

Court recognizes that some confusion may stem from Defendants’ error in their briefing, this was

addressed at the hearing on their motion and is not cause for reconsideration or amendment of the

Court’s order pursuant to either Rule 59 or Rule 60.

Next, Plaintiff urges the Court to reconsider because there has not been any explanation

given by Defendants for the “received” stamp dated March 7, 2018 on this grievance. Plaintiff

asserts that this stamp was from the records office, but he fails to provide any evidence to support

this claim. The Court referenced this issue in its Order and it was addressed by Kelly Pierce at the

hearing. Ms. Pierce testified that if Plaintiff had resubmitted this grievance to the Grievance

Office in March 2018 it would have been stamped as received, but promptly returned because it

had already been addressed. The Court found this is likely what occurred. Plaintiff’s position

that the records office stamped this grievance as received on March 7, 2018 has no bearing on the

finding that the institution properly addressed this grievance, but Plaintiff was delayed in

appealing the institutional decision to the ARB. Plaintiff’s argument as to this point does not

present any cause for reconsideration under Rules 59 or 60.

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Finally, Plaintiff’s complaint that the counselor, grievance officer, CAO, or ARB are not

qualified to determine whether he received adequate medical care is not relevant to whether he

exhausted his administrative remedies and certainly not grounds for reconsideration.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Objection to the Report and Recommendation,

construed by the Court as a Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 71) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 11, 2020

s/ Reona J. Daly

Hon. Reona J. Daly

United States Magistrate Judge

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