Monroe v. Rauner

JANIAH MONROE,

MARILYN MELENDEZ,

LYDIA HELÉNA VISION,

SORA KUYKENDALL, and

SASHA REED,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 18-cv-00156-NJR

STEVE MEEKS,

MELVIN HINTON, and

ROB JEFFREYS,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:

On February 11, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a response to Defendants’ report on

compliance with the Court’s preliminary injunction order. (Doc. 207). Plaintiffs argue that

Defendants have not taken meaningful steps to comply with the order and the proposed

steps offered by Defendants are insufficient and vague. (Id. at p. 2). They also ask the

Court to order the parties to meet and confer on a list of potential experts, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Evidence 706, to oversee the changes being implemented and to ensure

that transgender prisoners are receiving adequate care for their gender dysphoria. (Id. at

p. 14). The Court ordered Defendants to file a reply, specifically directing them to address

Plaintiffs’ request for a court-appointed medical expert to oversee the implementation of

the preliminary injunction. (Doc. 209).

After reviewing Defendants’ report on compliance (Doc. 202) and the reply brief

(Doc. 210), the Court finds that Defendants are taking steps to comply with certain aspects

developing various policies and procedures regarding medical care provided to

transgender inmates and have contracted with a consultant, Dr. Anderson, who is on the

WPATH Board of Directors. (Doc. 210, pp. 5, 7). They also have advised the Court on the

training provided to correctional staff on transgender issues, which has been developed

with the input from Howard Brown Health Center and Planned Parenthood and been

reviewed and approved by Dr. Anderson. (Id. at p. 5). As the Court previously

acknowledged, “these changes will take time,” and the purpose of the injunction was to

require Defendants to provide assurances that progress is underway, which they have.

(Doc. 186, p. 38.).

The Court is not entirely convinced, however, that Defendants are complying with

the directive to “cease the policy and practice of allowing the Transgender Committee to

make the medical decisions regarding gender dysphoria.” (Doc. 212, p. 1). Defendants’

report states that the Transgender Care Review Committee (“TCRC”) is still being

consulted regarding “placement, security, and gender-related accommodation issues[,]”

(Doc. 202, p. 2), and their reply states that “the responsibility of decisions regarding

gender-affirming surgery are being modified and the responsibility will stand with the

IDOC Medical Department, not IDOC Mental Health.” (Doc. 210, p. 4) (emphasis added).

The Court recognizes that decisions of medical treatment within a prison environment

may have medical as well as security components (Doc. 210, p. 2), and the “need for

deference to experienced and expert prison administrators faced with the difficult and

dangerous task of housing large numbers of convicted criminals.” Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S.

1 The Court’s preliminary injunction order was issued on December 19, 2019 (Docs. 186, 187). Thereafter,

on March 4, 2020, the Court amended the preliminary injunction order. (See Docs. 211, 212).

related accommodation issues does not violate the order at this time. Nevertheless, the

Court emphasizes that Defendants were ordered to immediately cease the practice of

allowing the TCRC to make medical decisions and recommendations regarding gender

dysphoria, and this includes decisions regarding gender-affirming surgery and medically

necessary social transition.

Despite having some reservations about Defendants’ compliance with the above

directive, the Court finds that the appointment of an expert is not warranted at this time.

Federal Rule of Evidence 706(a) gives the Court discretion to appoint a neutral expert to

assist the Court in evaluating complex information. See Ledford v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 354,

357 (7th Cir. 1997) (whether to appoint such an expert is a discretionary decision); DeJesus

v. Godinez, 720 F. App’x 766, 772 (7th Cir. 2017) (purpose of such an appointment is to aid

the Court in evaluating complex matters); Elcock v. Davidson, 561 F. App’x 519, 524 (7th

Cir.) (a court may appoint an expert “if scientific or specialized knowledge will help the

court to understand the evidence or decide a disputed fact.”). After evaluating the

evidence presented during the two day preliminary injunction hearing, including

testimony from expert witnesses, the Court determined that Plaintiffs demonstrated a

likelihood of success on the merits regarding IDOC’s failure to provide constitutionally

adequate treatment and awarded the preliminary injunction. (Doc. 186). Thus, at this

stage, appointing a neutral expert would not add to “the understanding of the case” or

“help sort through conflicting evidence[.]” Turner v. Cox, 569 F. App’x 436, 468 (7th Cir.

2014). Furthermore, as previously discussed, the Court finds that Defendants have

properly reported to the Court actions taken to implement the directives in the Order.

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and confer on an acceptable list of experts to oversee compliance. To the extent the parties

have further issues regarding compliance with the preliminary injunction order, a proper

motion should be filed, and the issue will be referred to a magistrate judge for further

determination under 28 U.S.C. § 636. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(1) advisory committee’s note

to 2003 (“There is no apparent reason to appoint a magistrate judge to perform as master

duties that could be performed in the role of magistrate judge.”).

This order does not prohibit the parties from seeking a special master under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 in the future or as a part of settlement negotiations.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 20, 2020

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NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

Chief U.S. District Judge

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