an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”
How later courts described this case
- an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ASHTON DANIEL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 19-cv-550-NJR
)
)
DR. LIPCHITZ and CRISTINE BROWN, )
)
Defendants. )
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
PlaintiffAshton Daniel, an inmateofthe Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”)who
is currently incarceratedatShawneeCorrectional Center, brings this action for deprivations of his
constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.Daniel’s original Complaint (Doc. 2) alleged a
single count against Dr. Lipchitz and Jacqueline Lashbrook for discontinuing his insomnia
medication while at Pinckneyville Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”).The Court dismissed the
original Complaint for failure to state a claim, and Daniel was given leave to amend. (Doc. 8). In
the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 9),Danielalleges that Dr. Lipchitz and Cristine Brown failed
to ensure that medical staff followed proper medication distribution protocolat Pinckneyville.1He
asserts that the Defendants were negligent and committed medical malpractice. Daniel seeks
declaratory judgment and monetary damages.
1Jacqueline Lashbrook is not identified as a defendant in the First Amended Complaint.She is neither listed in the
caption nor is she included in the statement of the claim. As such, all potential claims against Lashbrook are
DISMISSED without prejudice.
This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to
28U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to
filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). Any portion of a complaint that is
legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for
money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief must be dismissed.
28U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
The First Amended Complaint
In his First Amended Complaint (Doc. 9), Daniel makes the following allegations: Dr.
Lipchitz, the tele-psychiatrist at Pinckneyville, and Cristine Brown, the head administrator of
medical services, were in charge of ensuring that healthcare staff followed proper medication
distribution. They both failed in that duty and, as a result, Daniel was allowed to collect several
pills and attempt suicide on two separate occasions.(Doc. 9, p. 6).Danielfirst collected thirty pills
and attempted suicide.He was taken to the infirmary and placed on suicide watch, but his stomach
was not pumped.(Id. at p. 7).He suffered from pain, nausea, dizziness, tremors, and chills, as well
as psychological symptoms, include hearing voices and having visions. (Id.). On a separate
occasion he collected three pills and again attempted suicide.(Id. at p. 6).
Discussion
Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro
se action intothe followingtwo counts:
Count 1: Dr. Lipchitz and Cristine Brown were deliberately indifferent
under the Eighth Amendment by failing to ensure that medical
staff properly distributed medications to Daniel.
Count 2: Dr. Lipchitz and Cristine Brown committed medical negligence
and/or malpractice by failing to ensure that medical staff
properly distributed medications to Daniel.
The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless
otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is mentioned in the
Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed without prejudice
as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading standard.2
Danielagain fails to state a claim in his First Amended Complaint.Healleges that Lipchitz
and Brown failed to ensure that their staff followed proper medication distribution protocol. But
Defendants cannot be liable for failing to properly supervise their staff, because respondeat
superior, or supervisor liability, is not recognized under Section 1983. Shields v. Illinois Dep’t of
Corr., 746 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Iskander v. Village of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128
(7th Cir. 1982)).In order to be held individually liable, a defendant must be “personally responsible
for the deprivation of a constitutional right.” Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir.
2001) (quoting Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)). “A defendant ’will
be deemed to have sufficient personal responsibility if he directed the conduct causing the
constitutional violation, or if it occurred with his knowledge or consent.’” Id. (citing Chavez, 251
F.3d at 652).There is no indication in the allegations that either defendant directed the distribution
protocol or that they knew the protocol was not being followed and that Daniel was hording
medications. Daniel also fails to allege that either defendant treated Daniel after his suicide
attempts.To the extent that Danielalleges that the defendants were negligent, negligence does not
amount to deliberate indifference. Accordingly, his claim in Count 1 is DISMISSED for failure
to state a claim.
2See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)(an action fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).
Because Daniel fails to state a claim that any defendant violated his constitutional rights,
the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Daniel’s medical negligence and/or
malpractice claim under state law. See also Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir.
1999); Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1354 (7th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, Count
2 is also DISMISSED.
This is Daniel’s second attempt to provide the Court with factual allegations that would
state a claim. He fails to offer any facts that would raise his claim to a viable constitutional
violation. The Court finds that any additional amendment would be futile. Accordingly, the First
Amended Complaint, along with this action, will be DISMISSED with prejudice. See Agnew v.
NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 347 (7th Cir. 2012); McCree v. Grissom, 657 F.3d 623, 624 (7th Cir. 2011);
Garcia v. City of Chicago, Ill., 24 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1994).
Disposition
Daniel’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. This shall count as a “strike” for purposes of 28 U.S.C.
1915(g).
If Danielwishes to appeal this Order, he mustfile a notice of appeal with this Court within
thirty days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). If Daniel does choose to appeal,
he will be liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the appeal.See
Fed. R. App. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th
Cir. 2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien, 133 F.3d at 467.He must
list each of the issues he intends to appeal in the notice of appealand his motion for leave to appeal
in forma pauperis. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C). A proper and timely motion filed pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal deadline.Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4).
A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no more than twenty-eight (28) days after the entry of judgment,
and this 28-day deadline cannot be extended.
The Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 11/7/2019 7 g
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge