The opinion
FIONR T THHEE U SNOIUTTEHDE SRTNA TDEISS TDRIISCTTR OICFT I LCLOIUNROTIS
CHARLES DENT,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 3:16-CV-442-NJR-GCS
NICK NALLEY, DENISE MINOR,
WINNIE BRADDOCK,
JASON GARNETT, TY WALLACE,
and BARRY LASATER,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
Plaintiff Charles Dent, an inmate in the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”), filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Defendants, in concert
with each other, engaged in a course of retaliatory conduct against him for exercising his
First Amendment right to file grievances and lawsuits against them. Before the Court are
two motions for summary judgment: one filed by Defendants Nick Nalley, Denise Minor,
Winnie Braddock, and Barry Lasater (Doc. 182) and one filed by Defendant Ty Wallace
(Doc. 186). For the reasons explained below, the Court denies Defendant Wallace’s
motion, and the motion filed by Defendants Nalley, Minor, Braddock, Lasater, and
Garnett is granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
At all times relevant to this action, Dent was incarcerated at Big Muddy River
Correctional Center (“Big Muddy”). On February 28, 2018, Dent, through appointed
counsel, filed an amended complaint raising the following claims:
Count 1: Fanirdst AJamsoenn dGmaernnte trte tafolira tieoxnp oasgianign stD Denefte nadsa nat Ncoinckfi dNeanltlieayl
informant.
Count 2: First Amendment retaliation against Defendants Denise
Minor, Nick Nalley, and Winnie Braddock for improperly
refusing to send Dent’s privileged mail.
Count 3: First Amendment retaliation against Defendant Denise Minor
for improperly conducting a Prison Rape Elimination Act
(PREA) investigation with a retaliatory motive.
Count 4: First Amendment retaliation against Defendant Denise Minor
for placing Dent with a violent, homophobic cellmate.
Count 5: First Amendment retaliation against Defendants Denise
Minor and Ty Wallace for illegally disclosing confidential
information about Dent with the intent to have him first from
his job in the law library.
Count 6: First Amendment retaliation against Defendants Denise
Minor and Barry Lasater for improperly taking Dent’s legal
papers.
Count 7: Violation of the Illinois Mental Health and Developmental
Disabilities Confidentiality Act against Defendant Ty
Wallace.
A. Counts 1, 3, and 4
At some point before Dent transferred to Big Muddy in July 2012, he was
incarcerated at Centralia Correctional Center, which is where he met Defendant Nick
Nalley. According to Dent, Nalley was a correctional officer at Centralia, and the two
men had a good, cordial relationship. (Doc. 182-1, p. 5-6). Nalley worked in Internal
Affairs at Big Muddy. He remembered that Dent worked in the law library at Centralia
and referred him to Jennifer Wilson, who was a supervisor in the library, for a job.
(Doc. 187-7, p. 6). Jennifer Wilson testified that the recommendation from Nalley was out
of the ordinary. (Doc. 192-3, p. 2). She suspected that Dent was assigned to the library to
keep an eye on the school building. (Doc. 192-3, p. 3).
Dent began working in the law library on or about February 26, 2016, and, on
February 28, 2016, he was moved from his cell in one-house to a cell in three-house. He
believes he was moved away from another inmate, Shane Marcentel, and that the move
was retaliatory because he tried to provide information about Marcentel to Defendant
Nalley. Dent testified there is a big difference between one-house and three-house, in that
one-house was quieter with more mature inmates while three-house is louder and run by
“gang bangers.” (Doc. 187-1, p. 8). Dent complained about his reassignment to the
warden, the placement office, internal affairs, and “everybody,” and he was told that all
of the library workers were being moved to three-house. (Doc. 187-1, p. 9). Nalley testified
there was a phase where Big Muddy moved all of the students and the school workers to
three-house. (Doc. 187-7, p. 14). According to Dent, however, no other library workers
moved with him. (Doc. 187-1, p. 9).
As a library worker, Dent helped other inmates file lawsuits, including lawsuits
against internal affairs officers at Big Muddy. He testified that Nalley and the internal
affairs team did not want him to help the inmates file lawsuits against them and that it
became a source of conflict. Dent felt like he was stuck in the middle and had to choose
between doing his job by helping inmates and helping Nalley by keeping other inmates
from complaining about him. (Doc. 182-1, p. 9). His experiences in dealing with Nalley
and internal affairs caused him great concern with how the unit operated, and Dent
wanted to do something about it. (Doc. 182-1, p. 10-11).
Jennifer Wilson submitted an incident report on March 3, 2016, about events that
occurred the day before. She reported that Dent asked about the whistleblower statute.
Dent allegedly told her, “I know that I.A. is dirty, but I’m afraid if I try to turn them in,
they’ll be notified (I.A. staff) and then I’m done, Ms. Wilson, then I’m done for sure.”
Wilson went on to note that the former internal affairs supervisor, Big Muddy “appeared
to be run by thugs in I.A. who are unscrupulous.” Dent also told her that the internal
affairs officers “are breaking the law and breaking the rules, covering for themselves, for
other security staff, and for some inmates even. I’m the only one who knows it all, and if
I tell they will know that it’s me who told on them. They will kill me for sure, Ms. Wilson.”
At the end of the conversation, she spoke to her supervisor, and he advised that she speak
to the warden, Defendant Jason Garnett. (Doc. 182-2).
Dent testified that the retaliation against him began in earnest on March 3, 2016.
(Doc. 187-1, p. 5). According to Dent, he had been working as a confidential informant
for internal affairs, primarily with Nalley. He alleges that one of his roles for internal
affairs was to control the number of lawsuits and grievances that inmates filed. On March
3, 2016, Nalley summoned Dent and asked him if he was okay, which Dent later tied to
an incident report Jennifer Wilson turned over to Garnett. Garnett, in turn, allegedly gave
the report to Nalley. During his conversation with Nalley, Dent provided information
about what he viewed as threats to Marcentel. He felt like Nalley wasn’t listening to him
and described the meeting as the last boiling point in feeling fed up with Nalley.
(Doc. 187-1, p. 5-6).
Defendant Nalley testified that Dent never worked as a confidential informant for
him. He claims Dent wanted to meet with him on March 3, 2016, to discuss Dent’s
reassignment to three-house. Nalley described the conversation as relaxed. He did not
remember their conversation involving information about other inmates, but he did
remember that Marcental told him that he and Dent had been in a relationship that ended.
(Doc. 187-7, p. 14-15). At some point during the conversation, Dent claims that Defendant
Jason Garnett, the warden, called Nalley to see if Dent was with him. Nalley allegedly
warned him to watch what he said to Garnett. Garnett came to the internal affairs office
and talked with Dent and Nalley about a meeting in the library that Dent missed because
he was talking with Nalley. (Doc. 182-1, p. 13).
According to Dent, Nalley—with a retaliatory motive— relayed everything he said
to Marcentel, who then told other inmates that Dent was working with internal affairs.
(Doc. 187-1, p. 5-6). On March 22, 2016, Dent filed a grievance because other inmates were
coming up to him in the library and telling him they heard he was working with internal
affairs. (Doc. 187-1, p. 6). He claims that the grievance never got to its intended recipient
because Defendant Nalley held it up.
In a March 29, 2016 grievance, Dent again complained about retaliation by Nalley.
He attached a copy of his March 22 grievance and indicated that he signed a declaration
against Nally on March 25, 2016, and that he was in the process of exposing corruption
in the internal affairs department. He complained that Nalley was known for retaliating
against inmates who filed grievances. (Doc. 182-4).
Dent testified that on April 7, 2016, Marcentel got together with Nalley and
Defendant Denise Minor and told them that Dent was running the lines in the library,
kicking off an investigation into whether he was abusing his position. Dent was not
punished after this alleged investigation. (Doc. 187-1). He claims the next retaliatory
incident came on April 14, 2016, when he was sent to segregation for approximately eight
days due to an investigation under the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA). (Doc. 187-1,
p. 7-8). According to an April 14, 2016 incident report, an inmate reported to a correctional
officer that he had been sexually harassed by Dent in the school building. Dent allegedly
told this inmate that he was going to get him moved and that he was going to have sex
with him. Dent was then moved to segregation on investigative status. (Doc. 182-9).
Defendant Denise Minor was a supervisor in internal affairs at Big Muddy in 2016.
Her supervisor was the warden. (Doc. 187-6, p. 3). She described Nalley as a good,
thorough officer. (Doc. 187-6, p. 5). She testified that internal affairs received a lot of false
PREA reports but that they have to investigate every report under the guidelines.
According to Minor, inmates sometimes submit false reports to get a different housing
assignment or cellmate. (Doc. 187-6, p. 6). Inmates against whom a claim has been filed
must be kept separate until the investigation is complete. The inmates are sent to
segregation on investigative status, but it is not meant to be punitive. (Doc. 187-6, p. 6).
Minor testified that she first met Dent during the PREA investigation in April 2016.
(Doc. 187-6, p. 8). She found it difficult to interview him because he would not stay
focused on her questions and wanted to talk about a grievance instead. (Doc. 187-6, p. 9).
Other than the grievances he brought up during their conversation, Minor testified that
she was unaware of any grievances Dent filed before their interview. (Doc. 187-6, p. 9-
10). She denies making any threats to Dent if he kept filing grievances. (Doc. 187-6, p. 10).
Dent, however, testified that Minor focused their conversation while he was held on
investigative status on whether he wanted to pursue his grievance against Nalley, and
Dent claims that Minor said that she and Garnett wanted to know what he planned to do
about the grievance. (Doc. 182-1, p. 21).
Dent was released from investigative status on April 22, 2016, but he claims that
he was released hours later than usual due to retaliation by Defendant Minor. He testified
that Minor also intentionally assigned him to cell with a very aggressive inmate who was
homophobic in retaliation for his complaints about Nalley. He claims that his cellmate
threatened him and would lock him out of the cell. (Doc. 187-1, p. 7-8). Dent drafted his
initial complaint in this action while he was in segregation and filed it the day that he was
released. (Doc. 187-1, p. 10).
B. Counts 5 and 7
Dent went back to work after his release from segregation. On April 26, 2016,
Defendant Minor allegedly pulled Dent from the library line and held him for three hours
to investigate his grievance against Nalley and internal affairs. (Doc. 187-1, p. 9).
According to Minor, their conversation focused on Marcentel, and Dent was upset about
him more than anything else. When she tried to steer the interview back to Nalley, Dent
would return to talking about Marcentel. (Doc. 187-6, p. 13). She found Dent hard to
follow during the interview. She was not aware that he had filed a lawsuit days before
their meeting. (Doc. 187-6, p. 14).
Minor decided to refer Dent for a mental health appointment because he was
crying and visibly shaken up during their conversation. (Doc. 187-6, p. 15). In the incident
report she drafted in relation to the referral, Minor wrote that she made it due to Dent’s
inability to focus during their interview and because he appeared to be overwhelmingly
obsessed with other inmates’ legal matters. (Doc. 187-8). Dent maintains that her claims
about his mental status during their meeting are untrue and that Minor made the referral
to induce him drop his grievances. (Doc. 187-1, p. 10).
Dent testified that he did not want to go to the appointment, but he met with
Defendant Ty Wallace, a mental health provider, on April 27, 2016. (Doc. 187-1, p. 10).
Dent said he felt comfortable talking to Wallace because he had seen him before and he
thought their conversations were confidential. Dent signed a confidentiality agreement
with Wallace. It contained a confidentiality disclosure statement:
I understand there are limits to confidentiality within a correctional setting.
I understand that the treating Mental Health Professional is required to
disclose any information regarding: Suicidal, Homicidal, and Self Injurious
Ideation; Unreported Child or Elder Abuse/Neglect; Safety and Security
Issues; and may disclose information for the purpose of Multidisciplinary
Team Consultation or Placement Issues.
(Doc. 187-5).
Following their meeting, Wallace disclosed in an incident report that Dent
“presented as having delusions of persecution based on legal work he has done for other
offenders, stating he has been retaliated against, siting [sic] a recent cell move in R-3 as
one action of retaliation.” He also wrote that Dent seemed preoccupied with his
conspiracy theory and that Dent told him that he planned to file a lawsuit over it.
(Doc. 187-4). According to Dent, he was fired because of the information in the incident
report in an act of retaliation by Wallace and Minor. (Doc. 187-1, p. 12). Wallace, however,
maintains that he made his recommendation out of concern for Dent.
Dent was removed from his job in the law library following Wallace’s
recommendation. Jennifer Wilson, a library supervisor, testified that she appreciated
having Dent as a library worker because he made the library a better place. (Doc. 192-3,
p. 3). She also testified that she overheard other prison employees, including Nalley,
make jokes or lewd and lascivious comments about inmates’ sexuality. She heard Nalley,
in particular, use offensive slurs like “faggot” and “queer” to describe inmates. (Doc. 192-
3, p. 4).
C. Count 6
Defendant Barry Lasater was a correctional officer working as the academic officer
at Big Muddy in May 2016. His job was to provide security at the school building where
the library was. He remembers Dent as a library worker. (Doc. 182-10, p. 3). At his
deposition, he testified that he did not observe anything that led him to believe Dent
needed a mental health evaluation. (Doc. 182-10, p. 7).
Lasater testified about a disciplinary ticket he wrote on May 6, 2016. He explained
that inmates visiting the library were not supposed to bring anything to the library with
them. According to the incident report, Dent was leaving the library that day with papers
that he did not have when he arrived, which also was not allowed. Dent allegedly told
Lasater they were his legal papers. (Doc. 182-11).
Lasater did not recall the incident but testified that in that situation he would have
confiscated the papers because Dent should not have had them. Lasater would have
given them to the shift commander to be turned over to the adjustment committee for
discipline. (Doc. 182-10, p. 9). Dent maintains the Lasater told him, “this is what happens
when you file grievances against Lieutenant Minor and Nalley,” but Lasater did not recall
saying that. He also testified that it did not sound like something he would say. (Doc. 182-
10, p. 10).
D. Count 2
According to a declaration submitted by Dent, Dawan Jones, an inmate, signed a
declaration about Nalley on April 8, 2016. (Docs. 192-1, p. 1, 3) He claims, and the
declaration states, that only five copies were made. He kept one and Jones kept one. The
other three were sent to various entities via legal mail. On April 11, 2016, he requested
his mail log, but the mail log does not show at least three outgoing legal letters that Dent
maintains he sent between January 1, 2016, and April 11, 2016. (Doc. 192-1, p. 1-2, 5). One
such letter was addressed to the John Howard Association of Illinois and was dated
March 17, 2016. (Doc. 192-1, p. 6-7). Two letters dated March 22 and April 5, 2016, that
Dent attempted to send to the Uptown People’s Law Center also do not appear on the
log. (Doc. 192-1, p. 8-11). He also sent a letter to his sister, Diane Dent, on April 17, 2016,
discussing his attempts to reach various attorneys by letter. The postmark shows it was
not mailed until April 26, 2016. (Doc. 192-1, p. 12-18).
Winnie Braddock responded to interrogatories about her involvement. She
indicated that she has no recollection of sending, or being directed to send, Dent’s mail
to Nalley, Minor, or Garnett. She also indicated that Dent was not, to her knowledge, on
a “mail watch” list by internal affairs. (Doc. 182-7). Minor testified that she never
instructed Defendant Winnie Braddock to hold Dent’s mail. (Doc. 187-6, p. 8). Jones
submitted a declaration in this action indicating that Minor somehow gained possession
of one of the copies of his earlier declaration and showed it to him. Dent maintains she
could not have had a copy unless she intercepted his legal mail.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Doe, 743 F.3d 1101, 1105 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a)); accord Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2012). A genuine issue of
material fact remains “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); accord
Bunn v. Khoury Enterpr., Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 681-682 (7th Cir. 2014).
In assessing a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the
light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving
party. See Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2012); Delapaz v. Richardson, 634
F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011). As the Seventh Circuit has explained, “we set forth the facts
by examining the evidence in the light reasonably most favorable to the non-moving
party, giving [him] the benefit of reasonable, favorable inferences and resolving conflicts
in the evidence in [his] favor.” Spaine v. Community Contacts, Inc., 756 F.3d 542, 544 (7th
Cir. 2014).
B. First Amendment Retaliation
To succeed on a claim of First Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff must show that
(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation
that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First
Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the defendant’s decision to take
the retaliatory action. See Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009). An inmate
has a constitutional right to file a grievance as part of his right of access to the courts
under the First Amendment. See DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 2000).
Retaliatory official action violates the Constitution, even if the officer would be otherwise
authorized to take that action in the absence of a retaliatory motive. See Zimmerman v.
Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir. 2000).
In a First Amendment retaliation claim, the burden of proof is split between the
parties. See Mays v. Springborn, 719 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Mt. Healthy Board
of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)). First, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s
conduct was sufficient to cause the injury, that is, that the protected First Amendment
conduct was a motivating factor for taking the retaliatory action. Id. at 634-635. The
burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut by showing that the action would have
occurred anyway, regardless of the improper motive. Id. at 635.
C. Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act
The Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act is carefully
drawn to maintain the confidentiality of mental health records. See Sassali v. Rockford
Memorial Hospital, 693 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (Ill. 1998). Absent an exception, the Act prohibits
the disclosure of confidential communications made to a mental health service provider
without consent of the patient. A confidential communication is defined as “any
communication made by a recipient or other person to a therapist or to or in the presence
of other persons during or in connection with providing mental health . . . services to a
recipient.” 740 ILCS § 110/2. Exceptions to the Act are narrowly drawn, and the
“legislature has been careful to restrict disclosure to that which is necessary to accomplish
a particular purpose.” Norskog v. Pfiel, 755 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ill. 2001).
DISCUSSION
A. Count 1: Exposure of Plaintiff Charles Dent as a confidential informant
by Defendant Nick Nalley and Defendant Jason Garnett
Only persons who cause or participate in an alleged constitutional deprivation are
responsible under Section 1983. See, e.g., Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656-57 (7th Cir.
2005). Defendants Nalley and Garnett argue that there is no evidence of their personal
involvement in exposing Dent as a confidential informant. But Dent claims that, after his
March 3, 2016 conversation with Defendant Nalley, Shane Marcentel repeated “word-for-
word” the content of the conversation, which Marcentel could not have done unless
Nalley relayed the information to him. Based on this alleged disclosure by Nalley, word
spread through Big Muddy that Dent was an informant. Nalley denies that Dent was an
informant and denies that he disclosed any of this information to Marcentel. Given the
differing version of events put forth by the parties, there is a dispute of material fact as to
Defendant Nalley’s involvement in the alleged release of Dent’s role as a confidential
informant.
Defendant Garnett’s involvement in identifying Dent as a confidential informant
is more tenuous. Dent alleges that Garnett gave Jennifer Wilson’s incident report, in
which she wrote about corruption in the internal affairs unit, to internal affairs and,
presumably, to Nalley. Dent seemingly argues that Garnett’s decision prompted Nalley
to disclose that Dent was an informant. There is insufficient evidence to support such a
contention, however, and the link between forwarding a report for investigation and
another official’s alleged decision to expose Dent is too speculative to survive summary
judgment.
B. Count 2: Confiscation of Legal Mail by Defendants Denise Minor,
Winnie Braddock, and Nick Nalley
Defendants Minor, Braddock, and Nalley argue that they are entitled to summary
judgment on Dent’s legal mail claim because they were not personally involved in
withholding or blocking Dent’s legal mail from being sent. Dent did not argue that Nalley
was personally involved in his response to Defendants’ motion (See Doc. 189, p. 10-11),
and there is insufficient evidence of his personal involvement. Accordingly, Defendant
Nalley is entitled to summary judgment on Count 2.
There is a question of fact as to whether Defendant Minor was involved in Dent’s
complaints about his mail. According to Dent, he had Dawan Jones, an inmate, prepare
an affidavit, and the men made five copies of it. Dent and Jones both maintain that Dent
kept a copy, Jones kept a copy, and the remaining three copies were sent in legal mail.
According to Jones, Minor showed him a copy of the declaration during an April 29, 2016
meeting in the internal affairs office. (Doc. 190-3). Dent argues that she could not have a
copy of the declaration without intercepting it from his legal mail. Minor denies any
involvement in intercepting or stopping Dent’s mail. A reasonable juror could conclude
that Minor was personally involved in the acts alleged by Dent depending upon how
these disputes of fact are resolved at trial.
Unlike the evidence supporting Dent’s claim against Minor, there is insufficient
evidence that could allow a reasonable juror to find that Defendant Braddock interfered
with Dent’s legal mail. Unlike the disputed testimony that Minor possessed copies of
documents sent in legal mail, there is no evidence that Braddock was in possession of
Dent’s legal mail in any improper manner. While she may have been a link in the chain
between Dent and a mailbox, that does not sufficiently tie her in a culpable way to
Minor’s alleged possession of Dent’s mail.
C. Count 4: Cell Reassignment after PREA Investigation by Defendant
Denise Minor
Defendant Minor maintains that she has no role in cell assignments and that she
did not play a role in selecting the cell that Dent was assigned to after his release from
investigative status. According to Dent, during the PREA investigation interview with
Minor, she began asking him if he intended to pursue his grievance against Defendant
Nalley. He claims that he asked to stay in segregation and to be sent to another institution.
Minor allegedly refused because she would not be able to watch him if he left. Dent
testified that Minor then began scanning the computer to look for a cellmate for him and
that she chose the most hated, homophobic inmate in the prison. There is a clear dispute
of material fact as to Minor’s personal involvement in the Dent’s cell reassignment that
must be resolved by a jury.
D. Count 5: Recommendation to Fire Plaintiff Charles Dent by Defendants
Denise Minor and Ty Wallace
Defendant Minor argues that she was not personally involved in having Dent fired
from his library job. Defendant Wallace made the recommendation to remove Dent from
his job, but Dent points to an email sent by Wallace attaching the incident report about
their mental health appointment. Minor is included on the email, and Wallace references
a conversation, though he was unsure if he spoke with Minor or Major Eric Plott, a
recipient on the email, before drafting the email. (Doc. 187-2, p. 24, Doc. 190-2). Wallace
testified that he had never made a recommendation to remove an inmate from a job
assignment, but he did not recall speaking with Minor about the decision.
Dent also denies Minor’s claims that she made the referral to Wallace because he
was emotional or had any difficulties during their meeting. He claims instead that she
made vague threats of retaliation if he continued to pursue his grievances during the
PREA investigation and during an April 26, 2016 conversation in the internal affairs
office. Minor made the referral on April 27, 2016, and Wallace met with Dent at 9:10 a.m.
that morning. Dent points to the short timeframe between the referral and the
appointment as evidence of Minor’s involvement. Given the differing versions of events
put forth by the parties, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to Defendant Minor’s
personal involvement in the decision to recommend that Dent be removed from his job
assignment.
Defendant Wallace argues he is entitled to summary judgment because the
removal of Dent from his job assignment did not actually deter Dent from exercising his
First Amendment rights. The inquiry in a First Amendment retaliation claim, however,
is whether the “retaliatory activities would ‘deter a person of ordinary firmness’ from
exercising First Amendment activity in the future.” Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 552
(7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982)). Knowing that
filing grievances and lawsuits complaining about internal affairs could lead to retaliation
in the form of the loss of desirable privilege (i.e., a good job assignment) could deter a
person of ordinary firmness from engaging in protected First Amendment activity in the
future, and a reasonable juror could so find. As such, Defendant Wallace is not entitled
to summary judgment on Count 5.
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Defendant Barry Lasater
Minor argues that the April 2016 PREA investigation had to happen regardless of
any retaliatory intent on her behalf, seemingly arguing that the defendant’s portion of the
split burden of proof, whether the harm would have occurred anyway, requires that
summary judgment be entered in her favor. Dent does not claim, however, that the
investigation was not required. Instead, his claim is that it was prolonged, along with his
time in investigative segregation, and evolved into a pretense to pressure him into
dropping his grievance against Defendant Nalley out of something akin to duress. As
such, there is a question of fact as to whether the investigation would have been
conducted in the same manner absent retaliation by Minor.
Likewise, in Count 6, Dent claims that Lasater told him that he was confiscating
his papers because of the grievances Dent filed. There is a question of fact as to whether
Lasater would have taken that action and the harm would have occurred anyway absent
a retaliatory motive that precludes the entry of summary judgment. As this is the only
argument raised by Defendants as to Count 6, summary judgment will not be granted as
to this claim.
F. Count 7: Violation of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities
Confidentiality Act by Defendant Ty Wallace
In favor of his motion for summary judgment on Count 7, Defendant Wallace
argues that Dent was a “committed person” and that as a committed person, “in the
course of providing services, a therapist … may disclose … communications without
consent to any department, agency, institution or facility which has custody of a recipient
pursuant to State statute or any court order of commitment. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 110/9.
Due to Dent’s status as a committed person, Wallace suggests that he was permitted to
disclose the content of his communications with Dent to other officials within Big Muddy.
This line of reasoning is undercut by the confidentiality waiver signed by Dent before his
appointment with Wallace on April 27, 2016, which enumerated specific circumstances
under which Dent should not expect confidentiality within IDOC.
Wallace also ignores the next sentence of the statute: “Information may be
disclosed under this Section only to the extent that knowledge of the record or
communications is essential to the purpose for which disclosure is made and only after
the recipient is informed that such disclosure may be made.” 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 110/9
(emphasis added). The incident report prepared by Wallace disclosed confidential
communications between Dent and Wallace. The parties dispute the purpose of the
disclosure, and there is a genuine question of material fact as to whether the information
was disclosed “in the course of providing treatment” or for another reason. There is also
a dispute of fact as to whether the disclosure was limited, as required, because Wallace
disclosed not only information about Dent’s mental health status but also his decision to
file a lawsuit. Given these disputes, Wallace is not entitled to summary judgment on
Count 7.
G. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity shields “government officials from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 231 (2009). The doctrine “balances two important interests – the need to hold public
officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield
officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties
reasonably.” Id. It protects an official from suit “when she makes a decision that, even if
constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the
circumstances she confronted.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).
The qualified immunity test has two prongs: (1) whether the facts shown, taken in
the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, demonstrate that the officer’s
conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right at issue was clearly
established at the time of the alleged misconduct. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232; see also
Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 197; Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). To be “’clearly
established’ a right must be defined so clearly that every reasonable official would have
understood that what he was doing violated that right.” Dibble v. Quinn, 793 F.3d 803, 808
(7th Cir. 2015) (citing Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). There need not be a case
directly on point, but “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional
question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). The right must be
established “not as a broad general proposition.” Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664. Instead, it must
be “particularized” such that the “contours” of it are clear to a reasonable official. Id. That
is, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate.” Carroll v. Carmen, 135 S.Ct. 348, 350 (2014).
As the Court found in favor of Defendant Jason Garnett (Count 1), Defendant Nick
Nalley (Count 2 only), and Defendant Winnie Braddock (Count 2), they are entitled to
qualified immunity on those counts because the facts, when taken in the light most
favorable to Dent, do not demonstrate that their conduct violated a constitutional right.
The remaining IDOC defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because a
prisoner’s right to file grievances and lawsuits without fear of retaliation was clearly
established at the time of the events alleged in Dent’s amended complaint. See DeWalt v.
Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 2000); Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009).
H. Damages
The IDOC Defendants argue that the Court should find that Dent cannot receive
compensatory damages because “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner
confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury
suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission
of a sexual act.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). This is not a blanket prohibition on compensatory
damages in the absence of a physical injury but rather prohibits compensatory damages
for mental or emotional injuries in the absence of a physical injury. Even if Dent does not
prove a physical injury at trial, he may still recover nominal damages, punitive damages,
or any kind of compensatory damages other than those for mental or emotional injury.
Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 940-41 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418,
421 (7th Cir. 2011).
The IDOC Defendants also ask the Court to find that Dent cannot seek punitive
damages at trial. Given the disputes between the parties, there are genuine questions of
material fact as to whether punitive damages are appropriate. At this time, a reasonable
juror could conclude that the conduct of one or more of the IDOC defendants
demonstrates a reckless or callous disregard as to Dent’s federally protected rights. See
Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Illinois, Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 930 (7th Cir. 2004). As such, the
Court declines to limit Dent’s ability to pursue punitive damages at this time.
I. Deprivation Likely to Deter Free Speech
The IDOC Defendants raise a brief argument that Dent did not suffer a deprivation
likely to deter free speech. They suggest that the actions allegedly taken against Dent
would not deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in First Amendment
Activity in the future, but this question is best left to a jury, particularly in light of the
cursory argument made to the contrary.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant Ty Wallace’s motion for
summary judgment (Doc. 186). The motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants
Nick Nalley, Denise Minor, Winnie Braddock, Jason Garnett, and Barry Lasater (Doc. 182)
is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. At the close of the case, the Clerk of Court
shall enter judgment:
e On Count 1, in favor of Defendant Jason Garnett and against Plaintiff
Charles Dent; and
e On Count 2, in favor of Defendant Nick Nalley and Defendant Winnie
Braddock and against Plaintiff Charles Dent.
The following claims remain pending:
e Count 1 against Defendant Nick Nalley;
e Count 2 against Defendant Denise Minor;
e Count 3 against Defendant Denise Minor;
e Count 4 against Defendant Denise Minor;
e Count 5 against Defendant Denise Minor and Defendant Ty Wallace;
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e Count 6 against Defendant Denise Minor and Defendant Barry Lasater;
and
e Count 7 against Defendant Ty Wallace.
Magistrate Judge Gilbert C. Sison is DIRECTED to set this case for a settlement
conference.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 23, 2019
Teed Moe tig?
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL |
Chief U.S. District Judge
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