Singleton v. Rains

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

AVERY SINGLETON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:17-CV-323-NJR-GCS

VIPIN SHAH,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:

Pending before the Court is Defendant Vipin Shah’s motion for summary

judgment (Doc. 75). Plaintiff Avery Singleton opposes the motion (Docs. 80, 81). For the

reasons set for the below, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

Singleton, a former inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) who

was incarcerated in Robinson Correctional Center, filed a pro se lawsuit pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of his constitutional rights (Doc. 1). Specifically,

Singleton complains about the medical care he received at Robinson from Defendant Dr.

Shah for his back, neck, and knees resulting from an accident while he was a passenger

on the Cook County Jail’s transportation bus.

Following threshold review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,

Singleton was permitted to proceed on one claim of Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference claim against Dr. Shah for refusing to examine his knees, back, or neck

despite his complaints of severe pain. (Doc. 7, ps. 5-7).

Dr. Shah now moves for summary judgment, arguing that he was not deliberately

indifferent to Singleton’s medical needs regarding his back, neck, or knees. Singleton

counters that Dr. Shah delayed an adequate examination and should have examined him

to find the “root” of his problem.

FACTS

The following facts are taken from the record and presented in the light most

favorable to Singleton, the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in

his favor. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009).

The events at issue in this lawsuit as it relates to Dr. Shah occurred at Robinson

from August 2016 to March 2017. According to Singleton’s medical records, he has been

diagnosed with lumbago (low back pain) with an onset date of May 31, 2012, and

osteoarthritis of the spine and knee with an onset date of June 16, 2015.1

On June 21, 2016, Singleton was involved in a bus accident. As a result of that

accident, Singleton alleged he experienced neck, knee, and back pain. On July 8, 2016,

Singleton was seen by Physician Assistant Carlos Altez; he complained of neck, knee, and

lower back pain as a result of the bus accident.

During the month of July, Singleton was transferred to Stateville Correctional

Center NRC (“Stateville”). On August 3, 2016, Singleton was transferred back to

1 Singleton contends that “[d]ue to the Dept. of Corrections and Cook County Jail’s effort to cut costs” he

ended up with these diagnoses and without “a second opinion from a qualified medical professional” he

cannot substantiate that he has these conditions. (Doc. 80, p. 2).

Robinson. Three days later, Singleton reported to a nurse sick call for pain in his neck,

knee, and back, as well as other issues.

Singleton saw Shah on August 16, 2016. Singleton claims Shah asked him

questions about his pains. Shah then looked at his medical records, re-prescribed the

ibuprofen that Stateville previously prescribed, and requested Singleton’s medical file

from Cook County. Shah’s notes from this visit indicate that Singleton’s vitals were

normal and he had no acute distress. Singleton was able to walk, sit, stand, and move

around with no signs of a medical issue. (Doc. 76-2 at p. 14). Singleton said Shah told him

he could not do anything until Shah got the medical records from Cook County Jail.

Shah next saw Singleton on August 25, 2016, for pain in his right hand and for an

ear infection. (Id. at p. 18). During this visit, Singleton asked about the medical records

from Cook County Jail. Singleton claimed Shah told Singleton, “The medical records say

there was no signs of trauma. So I am not going to see you about those problems.”

(Doc. 80, p. 7). Shah examined his hand and ear, prescribed him a low bunk permit as to

not put weight on his hand, and continued him on ibuprofen (Doc. 76-2 at p. 18). Shah

also told Singleton to lose weight to help alleviate any pressure he is placing on his hand.

(Id.).

On September 2, 2016, Singleton was transferred to Stateville for an upcoming

court date. Singleton returned to Robinson on September 28, 2016.

On October 7, 2016, Singleton filed a grievance complaining about medical

treatment against Shah regarding his neck, back, and knee pain (Doc. 1 at pp. 15-16). On

November 15, 2016, the grievance officer responded, recommending: “Based on a total

review of all available information, this Grievance Officer recommends that the grievance

be denied because offender’s medical needs are being addressed in follow up

appointments with the Medical Director. The Medical Director was not able to determine

from the Cook County Jail Medical Records that any injury’s [sic] were recorded in the

Medical file that resulted in the pain that offender is claiming in his neck, back, and knees.

The Medical Director has prescribed ibuprofen to offender to ease his pain. Follow up

appointments have been utilized to address ongoing issues.” (Doc. 1, p. 14).

Singleton next saw Shah on October 28, 2016. During that examination, Shah

prescribed Singleton with an increased dosage of ibuprofen from 400 mg to 600 mg.

(Doc. 76-2 at p. 28).

Singleton returned to healthcare for the pain in his back, neck, and knees on

January 28, 2017. (Id. at p. 31). Singleton requested an increase in the ibuprofen. The nurse

provided Singleton with Tylenol and continued him on the ibuprofen. (Id.).

Subsequently, Singleton came to healthcare through a nurse sick call on February 21,

2017, for complaints of back, neck, and knee pain. (Id. at p. 33). The next day, Singleton

saw Shah. Shah evaluated Singleton for low bunk permit and reassessment of his

ibuprofen prescription. (Id. at p. 34). Shah’s notes state that he would not increase his

medications because Singleton needs to lose weight to help relieve the arthritis; Shah

continued Singleton on his current ibuprofen regimen; and Shah renewed his low bunk

permit to assist with relieving pressure on his neck, back, and knee. (Id.).

On March 13, 2017, Singleton returned to the healthcare unit regarding knees and

back pain (Id. at p. 35). At this time, Singleton described the pain as throbbing with a level

of nine out of ten, but his neck pain had subsided. The nurse noted no obvious signs of

discomfort. (Id.).

On March 21, 2017, Singleton returned to the healthcare unit regarding dry skin.

During this visit, Singleton did not complain of back, neck, or knee pain. (Id. at p. 36).

Thereafter on March 23, 2017, Shah examined Singleton for complaints of dry skin and

itching. There are no notes of complaints of back, neck or knee pain. (Id. at p. 37).

Singleton was placed in segregation on April 4, 2017, until he was transferred to

Jacksonville Correctional Center on April 26, 2017. Singleton’s medical records while he

was in segregation contain no complaints of back, neck, or knee pain. (Id. at pp. 38-45).

Singleton testified that ibuprofen helped to relieve his pain. (Doc. 76-4 at p. 5).

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Ruffin-

Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). Any

doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of fact must be resolved against the moving

party. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970); Lawrence v. Kenosha Cty., 391

F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004).

A moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law where the non-moving

party “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of h[is] case with

respect to which []he has the burden of proof.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986). A party asserting that a fact is genuinely disputed must support that assertion by

citing to particular materials in the record or by showing that the materials in the record

do not establish the absence of a genuine dispute. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. If the non-moving

party does not show evidence exists that would reasonably allow a fact-finder to decide

in its favor on a material issue, the court must enter summary judgment against the non-

moving party. See Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994).

The Seventh Circuit has stated summary judgment is “the put up or shut up

moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince

a trier of fact to accept its version of the events.” Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th

Cir. 2007) (quoting Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005)).

The Supreme Court has recognized that deliberate indifference to the serious

medical needs of prisoners may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the

Eighth Amendment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To prevail on a claim for

deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, there are “two high hurdles, which

every inmate-plaintiff must clear.” Dunigan ex rel. Nyman v. Winnebago Cty., 165 F.3d 587,

590 (7th Cir. 1999). First, the plaintiff must demonstrate he suffered from an objectively

serious medical condition. Id. at 591-592. Second, the plaintiff must establish the

individual prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that condition. Id.

To show prison officials acted with deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must put

forth evidence that prison officials not only knew that the prisoner’s medical condition

posed a serious health risk, but they consciously disregarded that risk. See Holloway v.

Delaware Cty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 2012). “This subjective standard requires

more than negligence and it approaches intentional wrongdoing.” Id. Accord Berry v.

Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that “[d]eliberate indifference is

intentional or reckless conduct, not mere negligence.”); McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636,

640 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that “negligence, even gross negligence does not violate the

Constitution.”).

For a medical professional to be held liable under the deliberate indifference

standard, he or she must respond in a way that is “so plainly inappropriate” or make a

decision that is “such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,

practice, or standards,” that it gives rise to the inference that they intentionally or

recklessly disregarded the prisoner’s needs. Holloway, 700 F.3d at 1073; Hayes v. Snyder,

546 F.3d 516, 524 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir.

2000)). In other words, a prison medical professional is “entitled to deference in treatment

decisions unless no minimally competent professional would have so responded under

those circumstances.” Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 857 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

“But deference does not mean that a defendant automatically escapes liability any

time he invokes professional judgment as the basis for a treatment decision. When the

plaintiff provides evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the

defendant didn't honestly believe his proffered medical explanation, summary judgment

is unwarranted.” Zaya v. Sood, 836 F.3d 800, 805 (7th Cir. 2016). The Eighth Amendment

does not require that prisoners receive “unqualified access to health care[.]” Rather, they

are entitled only to “adequate medical care.” Johnson, 433 F.3d at 1013.

Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Singleton, the Court finds

that he has not established that Shah was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs

regarding his neck, back and knee pain.2 The record reveals that Shah from August 2016

to March 2017 did provide appropriate medical treatment to Singleton; the medical

treatment simply was not the treatment Singleton wanted/demanded. Over the various

visits, Shah did prescribe Singleton with 400 mg of ibuprofen and then increased the

dosage at a later visit to 600 mg, advised Singleton to lose weight, and prescribed a low

bunk permit on two separate occasions.

Shah also reviewed Singleton’s prior medical records before determining

Singleton’s medical complaints. Singleton’s prior medical records show that he was

diagnosed with lumbago with the onset date of May 31, 2012, and osteoarthritis of the

spine and knee with the onset date of June 16, 2015. For the osteoarthritis, Singleton was

provided ibuprofen to alleviate the pain, which is the same treatment Shah provided to

Singleton at the first visit in August 2016.

Clearly, the record does not contain evidence that Shah’s treatment of Singleton

for his back, neck, and knee pain was so inappropriate or that Shah’s treatment was a

substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards. Even

construing the facts in the light most favorable to Singleton, the medical records do not

support Singleton’s subjective complaints, and the record does not support Singleton’s

2 The Court notes that Singleton contradicts himself on the issue of the neck pain. In his deposition, it

appeared Singleton withdrew his claim against Shah for neck pain. Singleton testified that during his time

at Robinson, he did not have neck pain. He further testified that the only time he complained about neck

pain was at Cook County. (Doc. 76-4 at pp. 32, 61). In his declaration, however, Singleton, as to the issue of

neck pain, avers: “Between the date of March 2017 and the date of the deposition, Plaintiff has had no neck

pain. However, Plaintiff has been constantly having complications with his back and knee … Which has

caused a problem with Plaintiff’s hip (See Exhibit ‘C’). With this lapse of time, and the continuous problems

with Plaintiff’s knee and back … and now hip, Plaintiff forgot about the neck pain during his deposition.”

(Doc. 80, p. 13).

argument that he should have had an x-ray performed. There is no evidence that Shah

was deliberately indifferent to Singleton’s medical needs regarding his back, neck, and

knee pain.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment filed by

Defendant Dr. Vipin Shah (Doc. 75). The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter

judgment in favor of Dr. Shah and against Avery Singleton and to close the case. This

entire action is DISMISSED with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 23, 2019

el ort?

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

Chief U.S. District Judge

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