The opinion
FIONR T THHEE U SNOIUTTEHDE SRTNA TDEISS TDRIISCTTR OICFT I LCLOIUNROTIS
GREGORY SPENCE,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 3:16-CV-1221-NJR-GCS
DEE DEE BROOKHART,
STEVE DUNCAN, and
RUSSELL GOINS,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate
Judge Gilbert C. Sison (Doc. 72), which recommends the undersigned grant the Motion
for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Dee Dee Brookhart, Steve Duncan, and
Russell Goins (Doc. 46). For the reasons set forth below, the Court modifies in part the
findings of the Report and Recommendation and grants Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
Plaintiff Gregory Spence, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections
formerly housed at Lawrence Correctional Center, brought this action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of his constitutional rights. After preliminary review of
his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court permitted Spence to proceed on
the following claims:
Count 1: Duncan and Brookhart subjected Spence to unconstitutional
conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment
by failing to respond to his complaints regarding the water in his
ctheollu bgehi nhgi ss cheultl voeffn tfso ra nsdix pdraisyosn, nsotaxfifo fuasi lifnugm teos gbievien gh ipmu micep eodr
other relief when inmates’ cells were extremely hot; and
Count 2: Goins and Duncan failed to respond to Spence’s grievances
regarding being subjected to retaliatory searches by correctional
officers, in violation of the First Amendment.
On May 22, 2018, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the merits
of Spence’s claims (Doc. 46). Defendants argued that Spence failed to demonstrate that
Defendants Brookhart and Goins were personally responsible for any alleged
constitutional violations, that Defendant Duncan was deliberately indifferent to Spence’s
alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and that his grievance writing was a
motivating factor in Duncan and Goins’s alleged failure to respond to his grievances.
Defendants also argued they were shielded from liability by the doctrine of qualified
immunity. Spence filed a timely response in opposition (Doc. 51).
On August 2, 2019, Judge Sison entered the Report and Recommendation
currently before the Court (Doc. 72). With regard to Count 1, Judge Sison found there was
no evidence in the record that Brookhart had actual knowledge or turned a blind eye to
any alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement that took place from September
2015 to April 2016. Judge Sison also found that Duncan responded promptly to Spence’s
grievances regarding the conditions in his cell and, furthermore, Duncan was not
personally responsible for the alleged constitutional violations. Finally, Judge Sison
found that prison staff acted reasonably to rectify the alleged unconstitutional conditions
about which Spence complained. Accordingly, Judge Sison recommended the Court
grant summary judgment to Defendants Brookhart and Duncan on Count 1.
With regard to Count 2, Judge Sison found there was no evidence in the record
that Defendant Goins had actual knowledge of the retaliation or turned a blind eye to
Spence’s complaints of retaliation that allegedly took place from September 2015 to
October 2015. As to Defendant Duncan, Judge Sison found that, when viewing the facts
in the light most favorable to Spence, there is no evidence Duncan failed to respond to or
ignored Spence’s complaints in retaliation for the grievances he filed. Instead, the record
reveals that Duncan did respond to Spence’s grievances. Judge Sison then stated: “Thus,
the undersigned finds that Spence is entitled to summary judgment on Count 2.” (Doc. 72
at p. 20).
On August 8, 2019, Spence filed a letter—docketed as an “objection” to the Report
and Recommendation—stating that he had no objection to summary judgment being
awarded to Defendants Brookhart and Duncan on Count 1 and summary judgment being
awarded to him on Count 2 (Doc. 73). He further said he would like to enter this matter
into “arbitration” if the Defendants were willing to make him an offer (Id.).
In response to Spence’s letter, Defendants noted that although Judge Sison said
Spence is entitled to summary judgment on Count 2, his discussion on the matter
indicated there was no evidence to establish Spence’s retaliation claim against Duncan
(Doc. 74). Furthermore, Judge Sison concluded with the recommendation that the
undersigned grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants and against Spence (Id.).
Accordingly, Defendants asserted, Judge Sison’s statement that Spence was entitled to
summary judgment was merely a clerical error. Defendants asked the Court to correct
the record and accept Judge Sison’s recommendation to grant Defendants’ motion.
On September 5, 2019, Spence filed a reply in which he maintained his position
that Judge Sison “got it correct” when he recommended that summary judgment be
granted to Spence on Count 2. He made no other argument in response to Defendants’
assertion that Judge Sison simply made an error when he wrote that “Spence is entitled
to summary judgment on Count 2.”
Where timely objections are filed, this Court must undertake a de novo review of
the Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(B), (C); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b); SDIL-
LR 73.1(b); Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, 824 F. Supp. 786, 788 (N.D. Ill. 1993); see also
Govas v. Chalmers, 965 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1992). But, where neither timely nor specific
objections to the Report and Recommendation are made, this Court should only review
the Report and Recommendation for clear error. Johnson v. Zema Systems Corp., 170 F.3d
734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999). The Court may then “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part,
the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
In this case, no specific objections were made to Judge Sison’s Report and
Recommendation, and the only clear error found by the Court is the clerical error made
by Judge Sison in stating that “Spence is entitled to summary judgment on Count 2.”
Clearly, Judge Sison’s discussion regarding Count 2 indicated it was Defendant Duncan
who was entitled to summary judgment—not Spence. The Court agrees with the
remainder of Judge Sison’s findings, analysis, and conclusions.
For these reasons, the Court MODIFIES the findings of the Report and
Recommendation to state that Defendant Duncan is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law on Count 2. The Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 72) in all
other respects and GRANTS the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants
(Doc. 46). This action is DISMISSED with prejudice, and the Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 17, 2019
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge
Page 5 of 5