To defeat summary judgment, a nonmovant must produce more than a “mere scintilla of evidence” and come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
How later courts described this case
- To defeat summary judgment, a nonmovant must produce more than a “mere scintilla of evidence” and come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
- “[I]t was not the district court’s job to sift through the record and make [the plaintiff’s] case for him.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CHARLES WILSON,
Plaintiff, No. 20 C 4604
v. Judge Thomas M. Durkin
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF COMMUNITY
COLLEGE DISTRICT 508,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Charles Wilson alleged that his supervisor and employer, the City Colleges of
Chicago, discriminated and retaliated against him based on his race and age.1 The
Court previously granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss all of Wilson’s claims except
his retaliation claim under Title VII, which the City Colleges never moved to dismiss.
The City Colleges now seek summary judgment on that claim. That motion is granted.
Title VII prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for
opposing an unlawful employment practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). “To prevail
on a Title VII retaliation claim, the plaintiff must prove that (1) he engaged in an
activity protected by the statute; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and
(3) there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Lewis
v. Wilkie, 909 F.3d 858, 866 (7th Cir. 2018).
1 The City Colleges of Chicago is the more common name of defendant Board of
Trustees of Community College District 508.
Wilson began working as amaintenance engineer for the City Colleges in 2015.
He alleges he made many complaints about the circumstances of his employment to
his supervisors and the Human Resources Department at the City Colleges. But he
does not allege that any of those earlier complaints concerned discrimination
prohibited by Title VII. Rather, the complaints generally concerned his assignments
and work conditions. Because Title VII protects only complaints about
“discrimination based on a protected characteristic,” Wilson’s complaints about his
job conditions are not protected by Title VII. See Miller v. Chicago Transit Auth., 20
F.4th 1148, 1155 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Merely complaining in general terms of
discrimination or harassment, without indicating a connection to a protected class or
providing facts sufficient to create that inference, is insufficient.”).
Wilson alleges that he made what the Court assumes was a verbal complaint
to the City Colleges EEO Officer in May 2019. But it was not until November 19, 2019
that Wilson filed a grievance with the City Colleges alleging racial discrimination.
Four days later, he submitted a complaint to the EEO Office alleging discrimination.
The Court assumes that this grievance and complaint is activity protected by Title
VII.
Having produced evidence that he engaged in a protected activity, Wilson must
also demonstrate that he suffered an adverse action as a result of that protected
activity. For an adverse action to be actionable as retaliation under Title VII, it must
have occurred after the plaintiff engaged in protected activity, or else it is impossible
to demonstrate causation. In this case, that means that only actions taken against
Wilson after his May or November 2019 complaint can be actionable.
The primary problem with Wilson’s claims is that he does not explain when
many of the alleged adverse actions occurred. This is true for the following alleged
adverse actions:
“subjected him to intimidating, humiliating, and
derogatory statements,” see R. 76 at 2 (no date);
“performing dangerous activities without proper
equipment,” see R. 76 at 2 (no date);
“took away from [Wilson] the job that he was hired to
do, making [Wilson] no longer responsible solely for
Washburne but for all five . . . buildings,” see R. 76 at 5
(no date);
“giving [Wilson] additional work to do,” see R. 33 ¶ 19
(no date);
Wilson’s supervisor “threatened to terminate him,” see
R. 76 at 3 (no date);
Wilson’s “locker was broken into, and his items disposed
of,” R. 76 at 3 (no date), R. 76 at 5 (no date);
Wilson was disciplined “for not signing the diary or
logbook,” see R. 76 at 4 (no date), R. 76 at 7 (no date), R.
76 at 15 (no date); and,
Wilson’s supervisor disciplined him because Wilson
“observed and took pictures of [the supervisor] and an
unknown unauthorized person in the boiler room
making adjustments to the equipment which generated
a warning code on [Wilson’s] phone,” see R. 76 at 8 (no
date).
The dates of these alleged incidents are not included in Wilson’s complaint, R. 33;
brief, R. 76; or statements of material facts, R. 77, R. 78, R. 91. The Court is not
required to search the record further. See United States v. 5443 Suffield Terrace, 607
F.3d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[I]t was not the district court’s job to sift through the
record and make [the plaintiff’s] case for him.”). Without dates, a reasonable jury
could not find that these adverse actions were caused by Wilson’s complaint of racial
discrimination.
One of Wilson’s allegations of an adverse action occurred prior to his complaint
about discriminationin May or November 2019. He admits that he was denied access
to the Engineers’ jeep to get around campus prior to February 2019. See R. 77 ¶ 42.
Because this action occurred prior to Wilson’s EEO complaint, it cannot have been
caused by his EEO complaint, and therefore cannot have been retaliatory.
Wilson also identifies dates for the following incidents that occurred after his
complaint of racial discrimination, whether it occurred in May or November 2019.
They are the following:
“[B]etween 2019 and 2020,” Wilson’s supervisor told
him “he was suspended for one day and that he
shouldn’t come to work the following day,” but the
Human Resources Department told Wilson that the
supervisor “had no authority to issue a suspension, and
that Plaintiff should ignore the suspension and come to
work the following day,” see R. 76 at 14-15;
In December 2019, Wilson was required to relocate to a
different building on the campus where Wilson admits
“all of the other Engineers had workspace and lockers.”
See R. 77 ¶ 27. Wilson claims that this action “denied
him appropriate workspace,” see R. 76 at 2; and took
away Wilson’s “dedicated and assigned workspace” and
“dedicated computer, and . . . phone line,” see R. 76 at 4
(no date);
In December 2019, Wilson’s supervisor changed
Wilson’s shift. Wilson filed a grievance and was
awarded a more favorable shift the next month, see R.
76 at 8-9;
On January 10, 2020, [Wilson’s] supervisor “issued a
disciplinary write-up against [Wilson] for failing to
properly paint [a] wall. Wilson complained to [Human
Resources], who indicated the matter was not
appropriate for a write-up, rather the wall simply
needed to be repainted, see R. 76 at 9; and,
Wilson alleges that on February 25, 2021, his
supervisor disciplined him for: (i) supposedly making a
false statement; (ii) loafing or not performing work
during periods of time; (iii) failing to maintain
equipment properly, and (iv) breaching two specific
work rules, see R. 76 at 3-4, 13.
For these allegations, the problem is not timing, but the materiality of the
allegations. “For Title VII retaliation purposes, a materially adverse action need not
be one that affects the terms and conditions of employment, but it must be one that
a reasonable employee would find to be materially adverse such that the employee
would be dissuaded from engaging in the protected activity.” Lewis, 909 F.3d at 867-
68. “Material” means “significant” and not “trivial.” Id. In other words, the Supreme
Court has explained, Title VII “does not set forth a general civility code for the
American workplace.” Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68
(2006). It is insufficient to allege or demonstrate an unwanted or unexpected negative
experience at work. Rather, the retaliatory act must cause some “injury or harm.” See
Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 67; see also Poullard, 829 F.3d at 856–57 (an employer’s
unfulfilled “threats of unspecified disciplinary action” did not constitute adverse
actions).
Here, all but one of Wilson’s allegations concern either unfulfilled threats or
unspecified workplace disputes. Wilson alleges that his supervisor wished to suspend
him, yet admits that the City Colleges Human Resource Department prevented this
from happening. Wilson alleges that his supervisor gave him a less favorable shift,
yet that decision was soon reversed. Wilson claims that his supervisor wrote him up
for inadequately painting a wall, but Human Resources again stepped in to prevent
the discipline. And Wilson vaguely alleges that his supervisor disciplined him for: (i)
supposedly making a false statement; (ii) loafing or not performing work during
periods of time; (iii) failing to maintain equipment properly, and (iv) breaching two
specific work rules. Wilson’s vague allegation of “discipline” is insufficient evidence
for a reasonable jury to find that Wilson was subject to an adverse action. Moreover,
discipline for failing to meet reasonable job-related expectations is not actionable.
Wilson has not presented any evidence that he did not engage in these activities of
which he was accused. Indeed, he has presented no specific evidence about these
alleged incidents at all. Without such evidence, a reasonable jury could not find that
he was subject to retaliation in violation of Title VII. See Johnson v. Advocate Health
and Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 894, 896 (7th Cir. 2018) (To defeat summary
judgment, a nonmovant must produce more than a “mere scintilla of evidence” and
come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”).
Under certain circumstances, the decision to relocate an employee’s
workstation could arguably be material. But here Wilson admits that this action was
taken to make his working conditions equal to that of his fellow engineers. And
Wilson does not allege or present evidence that the relocation of his workstation had
a materially negative effect on his working conditions. Without such evidence, a
reasonable jury could not find that a reasonable employee would be dissuaded from
engaging in the protected activity, and thus the relocation of Wilson’s workstation
cannot be retaliatory.
Conclusion
Therefore, the City Colleges’ motion for summary judgment [70] is granted.
ENTERED:
Aontte MN Buchor
Honorable Thomas M. Durkin
United States District Judge
Dated: May 16, 2024