The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ANTWUAN ROBINSON,
Plaintiff
No. 23 CV 14805
v.
Judge Jeremy C. Daniel
KEITH CROT, EMMANUEL
VILLEGAS, and THE CITY OF
CHICAGO,
Defendants
ORDER
For the reasons stated in this order, the defendants’ motion to dismiss [8] is denied.
The defendants have until May 3, 2024 to answer the complaint. The April 16, 2024,
status is stricken.
STATEMENT
Plaintiff Antwuan Robinson filed this lawsuit against the City of Chicago and two of
its police officers, alleging that the defendants violated federal and state law when
they arrested him without probable cause. (See R. 1.)1 The defendants now move to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the arresting
officers’ body-worn-camera (“BWC”) footage establishes that there was probable
cause for Robinson’s arrest, negating the basis for many of his claims. (R. 8.) They
also argue that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, as well as
immunity under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act. (R. 11 at 10–13.) Because the BWC
footage may not be considered without converting the motion into one for summary
judgment, and because the defendants’ immunity arguments are premature, the
motion is denied.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content
1 Robinson asserts claims for false arrest, wrongful detention, unreasonable search, and malicious
prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts I–IV), retaliation
in violation of the First Amendment under § 1983 (Count V), and false imprisonment/arrest and
battery in violation of Illinois state law. (Counts VI and VII.) (See R. 1.)
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the
Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences in
the plaintiff's favor. Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar, Inc., 623 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir.
2010).
“Ordinarily, when adjudicating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a district
court is limited to the allegations of the complaint.” Fin. Fiduciaries, LLC v. Gannett
Co., 46 F.4th 654, 663 (7th Cir. 2022). If the Court considers “matters outside the
pleadings,” then the “motion must be treated as one for summary judgment.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(d); Tierney v. Vahle, 304 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2002). The doctrine of
incorporation by reference provides a limited exception to this rule whereby a court
may consider extraneous materials on a motion to dismiss “if they are referred to in
the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to [the] claim.” Brownmark Films, LLC v.
Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation and quotation marks
omitted); see also Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 608–09 (7th Cir. 2013). The
purpose of this doctrine is to “prevent[] a plaintiff from ‘evad[ing] dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6) simply by failing to attach to his complaint a document that prove[s] his
claim has no merit.’” Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 690 (quoting Tierney, 304 F.3d at 738).
The defendants argue that the BWC footage, which is extrinsic to the plaintiff’s
complaint, may be considered under the incorporation by reference doctrine. (R. 11 at
13–15.) But the doctrine does not apply because the footage is not mentioned in
Robinson’s complaint, even in passing. See Mong v. McKenzie, No. 21 C 2420, 2023
WL 7629667, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2023) (declining to consider BWC footage under
incorporation by reference doctrine where footage was not referenced in the plaintiff’s
complaint); Daoud v. City of Chi., No. 21 C 6663, 2023 WL 5389015, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 22, 2023) (same); Siguenza v. City of Chi., No. 23 C 33, 2023 WL 6198820, at *2
n.2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2023) (same). The defendants cite Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372
(2007), Harton v. Pobjecky, 883 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 2018), and Hyung Seok Koh v. Graf,
No. 11 C 2605, 2013 WL 5348326 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2013), to support incorporation
by reference. But Scott and Harton were decided at summary judgment. 550 U.S. at
372; 883 F.3d at 944. And in Koh, the video in question was considered because it was
referenced in the plaintiff’s complaint. 2013 WL 5348326, at *9.
Even if the BWC footage was referenced in the complaint, the footage is not central
to Robinson’s claims. In Brown v. City of Chicago, the district court declined to
consider BWC footage in ruling on motion to dismiss unreasonable search and seizure
claims under § 1983. 594 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1028–31 (N.D. Ill. 2022). The court
distinguished § 1983 claims from the copyright and breach of privacy claims at issue
in Brownmark and Bogie. See id. In those cases, resolution of the disputes “hinged
upon the videos themselves, which formed the very basis of the plaintiffs’ respective
claims.” Id. at 1030. The same was not true of the § 1983 claims. While the videos
“provide[d] key insights into the allegedly unreasonable events that took place[,]”
they were not themselves dispositive of the facts at issue.” Id. Importantly, the
plaintiffs “could have brought [their] § 1983 case if the BWC [footage] never existed.”
Id.
Here, similarly, the plaintiff’s claims for violations of the Constitution and state law
do not depend on the existence of the BWC footage. The videos merely provide insight
into the facts that give rise to these claims. Nor does the BWC footage provide a
comprehensive view of the facts. Unlike Koh, where the video captured the entire
interrogation from a fixed perspective, 2013 WL 5348326, at *10, here the BWC
footage captures only select portions of the events that transpired from the individual
officers’ perspectives. (R. 13.) Two of the officers were not present when Robinson was
handcuffed, and it is difficult to determine from the limited perspective of the cameras
whether defendant Crot “twisted, bent, and pressed his thumb onto Plaintiff’s wrists
and/or arms” as Robinson alleges in the complaint. (R. 1 ¶¶ 17, 29, 82.) These physical
limitations are an additional reason not to consider the footage at the pleading stage.
Brown, 594 F. Supp. 3d 1021 (quoting Flores Delgado v. City of Chi., 547 F. Supp. 3d
824, 831 (N.D. Ill. 2021)) (“[T]he fact that the video does not capture all of [the
defendant police officer’s] movement compels the Court to find that the claim against
[the defendant] must survive the motion to dismiss.”).
The Court therefore declines to consider the BWC footage in deciding the defendant’s
motion. In doing so, it takes no position as to whether the footage supports or
undermines the plaintiff’s theories. The desire to quickly resolve this lawsuit is
understandable, but it does not justify running roughshod over the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Court echoes other courts in this District that “if video footage
‘exists that clearly contradicts’ [a plaintiff’s] story,” the more appropriate response is
“an ‘early and cost-efficient motion for summary judgment. . .’” Brown, 594 F. Supp.
3d at 1031 (quoting Felton v. City of Chi, 827 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 2016)).
Putting aside the BWC footage, the defendants’ argument that the plaintiff’s claims
must be dismissed due to probable cause fails. An officer has probable cause to arrest
if “at the time of the arrest, the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge
. . . are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in
believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Neita v. City of Chi., 830 F.3d 494, 497
(7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). The complaint alleges that Robinson was not
violating any laws at the time that he was stopped and arrested, and that the
arresting officers lacked probable cause to detain him. (R. 1 ¶¶ 9, 39, 61.) The
defendants do not dispute the sufficiency of these allegations and rely exclusively on
the fact that they are contradicted by the BWC footage. (See generally R. 11.)
The Court concludes that Robinson has sufficiently alleged the absence of probable
cause. Whether probable cause existed for an arrest and subsequent detention is a
“mixed question[ ] of fact and law,” United States v. Carlisle, 614 F.3d 750, 754 (7th
Cir. 2010), that is generally inappropriate to resolve on a motion to dismiss. United
States v. Lewis, 411 F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005). Because the plaintiff’s allegations
regarding lack of probable cause are not clearly contradicted by the pleadings, the
defendants’ motion to dismiss on this basis is denied.2
Similarly, the defendants argue that Robinson’s Fourth Amendment malicious
prosecution claim must be dismissed because the BWC footage demonstrates that the
defendants’ “motive in instituting” the suit was not “malicious.” Thompson v. Clark,
142 S. Ct. 1332, 1337–38 (2022); see (R. 11 at 6–8.) But Robinson alleges that the
defendants’ actions “were intentional, malicious, and carried out with a reckless and
callous disregard for Plaintiff’s rights.” (R. 1 ¶ 34.) Again, the defendants rely
exclusively on the BWC footage to contradict these allegations and make no argument
as to their sufficiency.
Finally, the defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity and
immunity under § 2-202 of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, 45 ILCS 10/2-202. (R. 11
at 11–13.) The doctrine of qualified immunity shields public officials from civil
liability if their “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citation omitted). Section 2-202 of the Tort
Immunity Act provides that a public employee is not liable for his acts or omissions
in the execution or enforcement of any law unless such act or omission constitutes
willful and wanton conduct. 45 ILCS 10/2-202.
2 The defendants also argue that Robinson fails to allege a First Amendment retaliation claim because
his allegations regarding the lack of probable cause do not appear under the specific count for this
claim. (R. 11 at 9.) However, while complaints must plead claims, they need not plead counts. Alioto
v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2011). Robinson’s failure to include allegations
concerning probable cause under the count for First Amendment retaliation is therefore not fatal.
Both immunity arguments are premature. “[A] complaint is generally not dismissed
under Rule 12(b)(6) on qualified immunity grounds.” Hanson v. LeVan, 967 F.3d 584,
597 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)).
This is because an immunity defense “usually depends on the facts of the case,” and
a plaintiff “is not required initially to plead factual allegations that anticipate and
overcome a defense of qualified immunity.” Alvarado, 267 F.3d at 651 (citation
omitted). Similarly, § 2-202 is generally not an appropriate basis for dismissal at the
pleading stage, since “whether the conduct is sufficiently willful and wanton is
ordinarily a question of fact for the jury and rarely should be ruled upon as a matter
of law.” Stevenson v. City of Chi., No. 17 C 4839, 2018 WL 1784142, at *10 (N.D. □□□□
Apr. 13, 2018). Because the defendants’ immunity defenses rely on facts not contained
in the pleadings, the Court denies their motion to dismiss on immunity grounds.
Date: 4/12/2024
JEREMY C. DANIEL
United States District Judge