Johnson v. Edward

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

Oneal Johnson,

Plaintiff,

No. 21 CV 738

v.

Judge Lindsay C. Jenkins

Ryan Edwards, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Oneal Johnson was walking home late one night when he encountered

an active crime scene. Police told him that he could not cross the crime scene and

eventually said that if Johnson did not walk away, he would be arrested. The police

interpreted a comment Johnson made as a refusal to leave and arrested him.

Aggrieved, Johnson refused a seatbelt, despite having his hands cuffed behind his

back, and the police did not insist on using one. En route to the police station, the

driver braked abruptly, causing Johnson to hit his head and lose consciousness.

Johnson filed this lawsuit against four officers, Timothy Balasz, Ryan Edwards,

Monica Mata, and Dennis Hecker Jr. (“Defendants”). Defendants move for summary

judgment. [Dkt. 104.] For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted.

I. Background

The Court draws on the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 filings, noting where facts are

in dispute. Body-worn camera and in-car camera footage captures the events at issue,

so the Court relies on video evidence to the extent that it supplies a definitive record

of what occurred. Cf. Kailin v. Village of Gurnee, 77 F.4th 476, 480–81 (7th Cir. 2023)

(discussing when relying on video evidence at summary judgment is appropriate).

On April 19, 2021, at around 3:00 a.m., Johnson was at 75th Street and

Champlain Avenue in Chicago. [Dkt. 106 ¶¶ 1–2.] Defendants—Sergeant Balasz and

Officers Edwards, Mata, and Hecker—were in the same area with other Chicago

Police Department (“CPD”) personnel, investigating a shooting. [Id. ¶ 3.] The crime

scene was marked by police tape, and the investigation was active. [Id. ¶¶ 3, 7.]

Johnson encountered the police near the crime scene, and several officers’ body-worn

cameras captured the events that ensued. [Id. ¶¶ 4–5; Dkt. 123 ¶ 4.] Edwards and

Hecker’s patrol car was also equipped with a camera. [Dkt. 106 ¶ 6.]

The parties dispute whether Johnson breached the outer perimeter of the

crime scene tape [id. ¶ 8, Dkt. 123 ¶ 8], but this dispute is immaterial. The police said

Johnson could not cross the crime scene and Balasz ordered him to go another way.

[Dkt. 106 ¶¶ 9–14.] Things became heated, but a blow-by-blow of each remark is

unnecessary. Suffice it to say that Johnson yelled at the officers and used racial slurs;

some officers did their fair share of yelling too. [Id. ¶¶ 15–16; Dkt. 123 ¶¶ 15–16.]

The key events came next. The Court recounts them as depicted in Exhibit 3A,

footage from one of several body-worn cameras that recorded crisp video and audio.

[Dkt. 125 (fifth link) at 0:45–1:18.] Johnson walked backward while saying, “Get your

goofy ass out of here. You motherf*****.” In unison, officers told Johnson, “Start

walking, start walking.” When he was several paces away from the officers, he said,

“You don’t tell me shit.” An officer responded, “That’s why you’re walking backward.”

Pointing in the direction of the crime scene, Johnson said, “I work for waste

man[agement], and I’m trying to go that way.” An officer stepped toward Johnson and

was roughly eight feet way, while another officer said, “Go, go somewhere else.”

Johnson: “[inaudible] your white ass,” to which another officer said, “Get the f*** out

of here or you’re going to jail, period.” Johnson gestured behind himself, away from

the crime scene, saying, “I’m going the other way.” An officer says, “Walk, walk.”

Johnson said, “But I’m gonna check you bitches in the door before I go, so I ain’t trying

to go that way, brother.” While Johnson was making this statement, officers closed in

and arrested him for disorderly conduct.

Hecker, Mata, and another officer then placed Johnson into a patrol car. [Dkt.

106 ¶ 21.] The Court again relies on Exhibit 3A. [Dkt. 125 (fifth link) at 2:00–3:32.]

When Johnson realized he was going to be put into the patrol car, he said, “I’m not

going into there. Why I got to go into there now?” Johnson objected as officers

searched his pockets, then, as he was being led to the open car door, said, “Don’t

f****** put your hands on me. I’m going to get in, let me get in when this big, Black

mother****** can get in right! Don’t push me in there, boy!” The officers agreed, and

Johnson continued to complain about their behavior. Mata guided Johnson into the

car, saying, “Don’t hurt your head,” then after he was in the car: “I’m trying to help

you out here, put your leg up.” Johnson responded, “I’m going to help you out too,

sister.” Mata said, “Help me out,” but Johnson changed tack: “But I’m not ‘cause I

don’t like you, and I ain’t going to lie.” As Mata attempted to fasten Johnson’s

seatbelt, he said, “I don’t need that, get that shit off around me.” Mata asked if he

wanted a seatbelt; Johnson replied, “Hell no! Get that shit off . . . .” Mata then said,

“You are, you’re a big, ugly-ass motherf*****.” Johnson retorted, “You’re an ugly

bitch,” after which Mata and another officer closed the door. The parties dispute why

the officers did not make more of an effort to fasten Johnson’s seatbelt, but the video

makes clear that Mata made only one attempt to do so, and the others did not assist

with that attempt. [See also Dkt. 106 ¶¶ 22–25; Dkt. 123 ¶¶ 22–25; Dkt. 130 ¶¶ 57–

59.]

Edwards and Hecker then transported Johnson to the police station, with

Hecker driving. [Dkt. 106 ¶ 27.] The in-car camera was recording, but the quality of

the video is considerably worse than the officers’ body-worn cameras. The Court relies

on this recording, labeled Exhibit 3E [Dkt. 125 (seventh link) at 42:27–48:15], to the

extent possible, but it is far from definitive in many respects. Cf. Kailin, 77 F.4th at

480–81. Therefore, the Court describes the disputed facts in the light most favorable

to Johnson, the nonmovant. See Majors v. Gen. Elec. Co., 714 F.3d 527, 532 (7th Cir.

2013). Johnson disputes Defendants’ assertion that Hecker “drove in the same

manner he would have driven with an arrestee who was seat belted”; that he drove

“safely, obeying the speed limit, and assessing the environment around him”; and

that he “drove at a reasonable speed, navigated numerous red lights and stop signs,

and slowed and stopped when necessary.” [Dkt. 106 ¶¶ 28–30; Dkt. 123 ¶¶ 28–30.]

Instead, Johnson argues that Hecker’s driving was unsafe, noting that Hecker drove

through red lights and made rolling stops at or drove through stop signs, which

Defendants dispute. [Dkt. 130 ¶¶ 61–62, 64–72.] These disputes are not material.

The record indisputably shows that as Hecker drove to the police station,

Johnson spoke and complained from the back seat, sometimes apparently talking to

himself and at other times appearing to talk to the officers. [Dkt. 125 (seventh link)

at 42:27–45:00.] About two and a half minutes into the trip, he asked Hecker to slow

down, and made a remark about the tightness of his handcuffs. [Id. at 45:00–:10.]1

As Hecker neared a red light at the intersection at 75th Street and Vincennes, he

braked harder than he had at prior intersections, causing Johnson to hit his head on

the plexiglass divider in the patrol car. [Id. at 45:10–:11.]2 Johnson cried out, made a

few more noises, and then fell silent for the remainder of the ride; Hecker said, “I’m

sorry.” [Id. at 45:11–:20.] Hecker continued to drive for about two and a half minutes

until he reached the police station and parked the car. [Id. at 45:20–48:15.]

At the police station, officers soon realized that Johnson was nonresponsive, as

depicted in Exhibit 2C, a body-worn camera. [Dkt. 125 (third link) at 0:30–1:45.]

About 45 seconds after parking the car, Edwards and Hecker observed that Johnson

was nonresponsive and attempted to rouse him. [Id. at 0:30–:50; see Dkt. 125 (seventh

link) at 48:15–49:00 (in-car camera showing that 45 seconds elapse between Hecker

parking the car and the officers beginning to attempt to rouse Johnson).] Less than a

minute later, Hecker stated that Johnson might need to go to the hospital, and he

and Edwards summoned medical attention. [Dkt. 106 ¶ 34; Dkt. 123 ¶ 34; Dkt. 125

(third link) at 0:50–1:36.] They left Johnson in the car. [Dkt. 125 (third link) at 1:45.]

1 The parties dispute whether Johnson asked Hecker to slow down more than once and

why he asked Hecker to slow down. [Dkt. 130 ¶ 60.] This dispute is immaterial.

2 Defendants note that Hecker did not testify that Johnson hit his head, so the point is

not undisputed. [Dkt. 130 ¶¶ 74–75.] But a jury could certainly make this finding.

About four minutes later, Johnson seemed to regain consciousness, and he

began to demand to be let out of the car. [Dkt. 125 (seventh link) at 53:33.] Roughly

30 seconds later, officers opened the door. [Id. at 54:08.] As captured by Exhibit 4D,

a body-worn camera, Johnson indicated that he wanted to be seen by a doctor, and

officers informed him that medical personnel were on the way. [Dkt. 125 (ninth link)

at 0:30–1:00; see Dkt. 106 ¶ 38; Dkt. 123 ¶ 38.] First responders from the Chicago

Fire Department arrived minutes later. [Dkt. 125 (ninth link) at 5:45.] Johnson

refused treatment on site and insisted on going to the hospital; he was taken by

ambulance to St. Bernard Hospital, where he was diagnosed with a lip laceration.

[Dkt. 106 ¶¶ 44–47.] Johnson later testified that he received additional treatment for

injuries to his hands, lip, neck, and lower back, and that he suffered numbness in his

hands as a result of the events surrounding his arrest. [Dkt. 130 ¶¶ 78–80.]

The disorderly conduct charges against Johnson were dropped. [Dkt. 110 at 3.]

It is undisputed that no Defendant knew Johnson prior to their encounter with him

on April 21, 2019 or spoke with prosecutors about the criminal case. [Dkt. 106 ¶¶ 48,

50; Dkt. 123 ¶¶ 48, 50.]3 However, CPD disciplined Hecker and Edwards for actions

they took that night. CPD policy “requires that arrestees be seat belted, absent

exigent circumstances”; Hecker was disciplined “for failing to properly secure

3 Johnson responded to paragraph 50 of Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 statement, which

states that Defendants did not speak to prosecutors in connection with the criminal case,

with a single word: “Denied.” [Dkt. 106 ¶ 50; Dkt. 123 ¶ 50.] But to dispute an asserted fact

under Local Rule 56.1(e)(3), “a party must cite specific evidentiary material that controverts

the fact and must concisely explain how the cited material controverts the asserted fact.

Asserted facts may be deemed admitted if not controverted with specific citations to

evidentiary material.” Therefore, the facts asserted in paragraph 50 are deemed admitted.

arrestee in the squad car with safety belt.” [Dkt. 123 ¶¶ 56, 81 (cleaned up).] Edwards

was disciplined “for failing to keep arrestee under constant observation during

transport.” [Id. ¶ 82 (cleaned up).]

Johnson filed this lawsuit in February 2021 and filed the operative Amended

Complaint in March 2023. [Dkt. 91.] Johnson asserts four claims for violations of 42

U.S.C. § 1983: false arrest against all four Defendants, state-created danger against

Hecker and Mata, excessive force against Hecker, and failure to provide adequate

medical care against Edwards and Hecker. [Id.] He also brings a malicious

prosecution claim under Illinois law against all four Defendants. [Id.]4 Defendants

now move for summary judgment. [Dkt. 104.]

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323,

(1986). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Birch|Rea Partners, Inc. v. Regent

Bank, 27 F.4th 1245, 1249 (7th Cir. 2022). The Court “must construe all facts and

draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”

Majors, 714 F.3d at 532 (citation omitted).

4 The operative Amended Complaint asserts claims against “Other Unknown Police

Officers” [Dkt. 91 at 1], but Johnson did not identify those officers in discovery, so the Court

dismisses any claims against them for failure to prosecute. See Martin v. Noble Cnty. Sheriff’s

Dep’t, 2021 WL 5505407, at *1 (7th Cir. Nov. 24, 2021) (per curiam).

The existence of video evidence capturing the events at issue usually does not

change the applicable standard. An exception is when one party’s account “is

blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it,” in

which case “a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling

on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). But

the Seventh Circuit has emphasized that this “is a narrow pragmatic exception”—

video footage “can eviscerate a factual dispute only when the video is so definitive

that there could be no reasonable disagreement about what the video depicts.” Kailin,

77 F.4th at 481 (cleaned up).

III. Federal Claims

Johnson’s first four claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations

of his constitutional rights. Prevailing on these claims requires Johnson to overcome

qualified immunity, which shields government officials from liability for damages in

their personal capacity unless they violate clearly established law. Tousis v. Billiot,

84 F.4th 692, 697 (7th Cir. 2023). Qualified immunity requires the Court to ask two

questions: (1) “whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury show that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right,”

and (2) “whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the officer’s

alleged misconduct.” Id. (cleaned up). Qualified immunity is a question of law, Smith

v. Finkley, 10 F.4th 725, 734 (7th Cir. 2021), and the Court may consider these

questions in either order, Tousis, 84 F.4th at 697.

The first qualified immunity question goes to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.

The second question, whether the right is clearly established, requires it to be

“sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he

is doing violates that right.” Stockton v. Milwaukee County, 44 F.4th 605, 620 (7th

Cir. 2022) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). There are three

routes to showing that a right is clearly established:

First, by identifying a closely analogous case finding the alleged

violation unlawful. Second, by identifying in the relevant caselaw such

a clear trend ... that we can say with fair assurance that the recognition

of the right by a controlling precedent was merely a question of time. …

[T]hird …, reserved for rare cases, arguing that [the defendant’s]

conduct was so egregious and unreasonable that no reasonable official

could have thought he was acting lawfully.

Id. at 620–21 (cleaned up). “Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, but once

the defendant raises it, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to defeat it.” Taylor v. City

of Milford, 10 F.4th 800, 806 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).

As explained below, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on each of

Johnson’s claims, on the merits or because he has not overcome qualified immunity.

A. False Arrest

Count I alleges that all four Defendants arrested Johnson without probable

cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. [Dkt. 91 ¶¶ 11–22.] Defendants contend

that Count I fails because they had probable cause to believe that Johnson had

committed a crime or because qualified immunity shields them from liability. [Dkt.

110 at 4–5, 13–14.] The undisputed facts establish that Defendants had at least

arguable probable cause, so they are entitled to qualified immunity.

“To prevail on a Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim, a plaintiff must show

that there was no probable cause for his arrest. Put slightly differently, the existence

of probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to any § 1983 claim against a police

officer for false arrest.” Braun v. Village of Palatine, 56 F.4th 542, 548 (7th Cir. 2022)

(cleaned up). “Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances that

are known to the officer reasonably support a belief that the individual has

committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.” Doe v. Gray, 75 F.4th 710,

718 (7th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). Probable cause “is not a high bar and requires only

a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such

activity.” Id. at 718–19 (cleaned up). “The probable cause inquiry is purely objective,

and the officer’s subjective state of mind and beliefs are irrelevant.” Pierner-Lytge v.

Hobbs, 60 F.4th 1039, 1043 (7th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). A police officer enjoys

qualified immunity from a false arrest claim if he has “arguable probable cause—

meaning that a reasonable officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same

knowledge as the officer in question could have reasonably believed that probable

cause existed in light of well-established law.” Mwangangi v. Nielsen, 48 F.4th 816,

825 (7th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). If so, the Court “cannot say that the officer violated

the plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights.” Id. (citations omitted).

“The existence of probable cause depends, in the first instance, on the elements

of the predicate criminal offense(s) as defined by state law.” Doe, 75 F.4th at 719

(cleaned up). Here, the relevant offense is disorderly conduct in violation of Chicago

Municipal Code § 8-4-010, which provides:

A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly: …

(e) Fails to obey an order by a peace officer, traffic control aide, fire

department official, or other official, who has identified himself as such,

or is otherwise reasonably identifiable as such, issued under

circumstances where it is reasonable to believe that the order is

necessary to allow public safety officials to address a situation that

threatens the public health, safety, or welfare ….

Defendants argue that the body-worn camera footage “clearly shows at minimum,

that Defendants could reasonably believe that [Johnson] committed disorderly

conduct” by attempting to proceed through a crime scene. [Dkt. 110 at 5.] They

characterize the video as showing that Johnson “became angry, belligerent, yelled

profanities and racial slurs toward officers, and voiced his disagreement with officers’

orders,” and “[b]ased on [his] refusals, Defendants reasonably believed that [Johnson]

was going to further enter into the scene.” [Id.] Defendants cite Thayer v. Chiczewski

for the proposition that police have probable cause to arrest as soon as a suspect

“fail[s] to follow their orders”; they “did not have to wait for [Johnson] to actually

[cross] the police line.” 705 F.3d 237, 250 (7th Cir. 2012).

Johnson argues that a jury must decide this claim because there are material

disputes regarding his intention to enter the crime scene and the reasonableness of

the officers’ inferences. [Dkt. 122 at 6.]5 He argues that his statement that he was

“going the other way” in context could only have referred to the crime scene, meaning

that he did not intend to enter the crime scene. [Dkt. 122 at 6.] Johnson also argues

that Thayer is distinguishable because “[o]ne individual walking home, alone, on a

quiet residential street is not comparable to a disturbance of fifty protesters marching

on a crowded downtown intersection” and because “unlike the plaintiffs in Thayer,

5 Some of these disputes relate to later testimony Johnson argues is inconsistent. [Dkt.

122 at 6.] As the Court has explained, however, probable cause is an objective inquiry, so

even if later testimony is contradictory, it does not impact whether probable cause existed,

and the body-worn camera footage provides a clear record of the events at issue here, making

credibility determinations as to later testimony immaterial.

Johnson complied with Officer Balasz’s order not to cross the crime scene tape

immediately before his arrest.” [Id.]

The probable cause question a close one, and the Court is mindful that it must

not usurp the jury’s role as the factfinder. While Defendants’ interpretation of the

video may be persuasive, it is difficult to say that “the video is so definitive that there

could be no reasonable disagreement about what the video depicts.” Kailin, 77 F.4th

at 481 (citation omitted). Even if a jury could find that Defendants lacked probable

cause to arrest Johnson, however, the undisputed facts establish that Defendants had

arguable probable cause to believe that Johnson was committing disorderly conduct.

Thayer establishes that police need not wait for a suspect to “break through [a]

police line” to have probable cause to arrest for disorderly conduct, at least in some

circumstances. 705 F.3d at 250. Here, after Johnson was told in no uncertain terms

to walk a different way, he gave mixed signals about whether he would comply with

that order. He said that he was not going toward the crime scene, but then he said,

“I’m gonna check you bitches in the door before I go, so I ain’t trying to go that way,

brother.” [Dkt. 125 (fifth link) at 0:45–1:18.] A reasonable officer could have believed

that Johnson was refusing the order and that, in light of Thayer, there was probable

cause that he was violating Chicago Municipal Code § 8-4-010. Because “a reasonable

officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as

[Defendants] could have reasonably believed that probable cause existed in light of

well-established law,” the Court cannot say that officers violated a clearly established

constitutional right. Mwangangi, 48 F.4th at 825 (quotation omitted). Johnson cites

no case that could lead the Court to a different conclusion [cf. Dkt. 122 at 16 (arguing

only that “material factual disputes regarding … probable cause to arrest”)], so he

has not defeated qualified immunity, see Taylor, 10 F.4th at 806. Defendants are

therefore entitled to summary judgment on Johnson’s false arrest claim.

B. State-Created Danger

Count II alleges that Hecker and Mata violated § 1983 by exposing Johnson to

a state-created danger when they failed to apply Johnson’s seatbelt while knowing he

was handcuffed and had no way to brace himself against sudden movements of the

car. [Dkt. 91 ¶¶ 23–38.] Defendants argue that Hecker and Mata are entitled to

summary judgment [Dkt. 110 at 6], and the Court agrees.

The state-created danger doctrine is an exception to the general rule that the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “confers no affirmative right to

governmental aid.” Est. of Her v. Hoeppner, 939 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting

DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)). Under

this doctrine, a plaintiff can establish a due process violation by proving that “(1) the

government, by its affirmative acts, created or increased a danger to the plaintiff; (2)

the government’s failure to protect against the danger caused the plaintiff’s injury;

and (3) the conduct in question ‘shocks the conscience.’” Id. at 876 (quotation omitted).

“[C]onscience-shocking conduct … requires a culpable state of mind equivalent to

deliberate indifference” or “criminal recklessness”; “mere negligence is categorically

beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.” Id. at 876–77 (cleaned up).

Defendants argue that Johnson’s claim fails on the first and third elements

[Dkt. 110 at 6–8], but the Court addresses only whether a reasonable jury could find

that Hecker’s and Mata’s conduct shocks the conscience.6 It could not. The video

shows that Johnson told the police not to “put [their] hands on [him]” or “push [him

in there”; that he was “going to get in”; that they should “let [him] get in”; and that

he could “get in right.” [Dkt. 125 (fifth link) at 2:00–3:32.] When Mata attempted to

fasten his seatbelt, he said, “I don’t need it,” “hell no,” and “get that shit off.” [Id.; see

Dkt. 106 ¶ 22; Dkt. 123 ¶ 22 (disputing other facts but not Johnson’s refusal).] Even

setting aside the adamance of Johnson’s refusals, permitting an adult to ride in a car

without a seatbelt, even while handcuffed, is not the sort of “egregious conduct”

required to shock the conscience under Seventh Circuit precedent. See Est. of Her,

939 F.3d at 876 (cleaned up); cf. McDowell v. Village of Lansing, 763 F.3d 762, 765–

67 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that ordering a man to lie on the ground while three others

who had been chasing him remained unsecure and one kicked him in the face could

not be found to shock the conscience). A reasonable jury could find that Mata and

Hecker were negligent for not insisting that Johnson wear a seatbelt or not making

more of an effort to fasten his seatbelt, but negligence is insufficient for a § 1983 due

process claim. Est. of Her, 939 F.3d at 877.

6 Defendants argue that there was no affirmative act because Mata simply failed to

fasten Johnson’s seatbelt—an omission, not an affirmative act. [Dkt. 110 at 6–7.] See Doe v.

Village of Arlington Heights, 782 F.3d 911, 917–18 (7th Cir. 2015) (discussing when officers’

conduct may give rise to a state-created danger). Johnson responds that by placing him in

the car without a seatbelt, Defendants affirmatively exposed him to a danger he would not

otherwise have faced. [Dkt. 122 at 8–9.] This appears to be a delicate line-drawing exercise:

if Defendants’ relevant conduct was “placing Johnson in the car without a seatbelt,” there

may have been an affirmative act; if the conduct in question was “failing to fasten Johnson’s

seatbelt,” perhaps there was no affirmative act. The Court can resolve this claim on the

shocks-the-conscience element, however, so it declines to decide whether there was an

affirmative act here.

Johnson argues that a jury could find that Hecker’s and Mata’s conduct shocks

the conscience based on five facts: (1) they “were disciplined for their conduct”; (2)

that conduct violated CPD policy; (3) they “intentionally transported Johnson without

a seatbelt”; (4) Hecker drove through stop signs and failed to stop at red lights despite

knowing Johnson was unsecured; and (5) Hecker slammed on the brakes, causing

Johnson to hit his head. [Dkt. 122 at 10 (citations omitted).] The Court cannot agree.

Regarding points (1) and (2), Defendants note the well-established principle

that Ҥ 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state

laws or, in this case, departmental regulations and police practices.” Est. of Biegert

ex rel. Biegert v. Molitor, 968 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). They argue

that “[t]he introduction of evidence relating to any alleged violation of municipal

regulations is improper” [Dkt. 129 at 8], but the Court is not convinced that the

principle stretches that far. True, violations of policy often shed no light on whether

a use of force is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment’s objective standard. See,

e.g., Est. of Biegert, 968 F.3d at 699. But whether conduct shocks the conscience

implicates a defendant’s intent because the standard is deliberate indifference. Est.

of Her, 939 F.3d at 876. The fact that the deliberate indifference standard applies

suggests that policy violations could be relevant if they allowed a jury to infer that

the failure to abide by policy was intentional. Cf. United States v. Proano, 912 F.3d

431, 439 (7th Cir. 2019) (“We have before recognized that evidence of departmental

policies can be relevant to show intent in [18 U.S.C.] § 242 cases. … Those decisions,

expressly or impliedly, acknowledge that an officer’s training can help inform his

state of mind in certain circumstances.” (citations omitted)).7 Here, though, the

existence of policy violations does not preclude summary judgment because it is

undisputed that Johnson refused the seatbelt. Therefore, a reasonable jury could not

infer that Mata or Hecker intentionally or recklessly disregarded Johnson’s safety

based on their failure to follow CPD policy.

Points (4) and (5) are not relevant. The question for purposes of the failure to

protect claim is whether allowing Johnson to ride without a seatbelt shocked the

conscience, so the Court must analyze Hecker’s and Mata’s conduct at the time they

took that action. Deciding whether Hecker drove poorly—and whether he did so

intentionally, recklessly, or negligently—would not help a jury decide whether Mata’s

choice not to seatbelt Johnson or Hecker’s failure to step in was based on deliberate

indifference to a serious danger, see Est. of Her, 939 F.3d at 876, at least without

evidence that they planned to leave Johnson vulnerable to injury in the back seat.

Johnson cites no such evidence.8

That leaves point (3), that Mata and Hecker transported Johnson when he was

not secured with a seatbelt, which simply restates the factual predicate for his claim.

For the reasons stated above, it does not shock the conscience for police officers to

transport a handcuffed arrestee without a seatbelt, at least where the arrestee

7 Proano distinguished Fourth Amendment cases because, among other reasons,

“§ 1983, unlike § 242, is a civil statute that lacks a specific-intent requirement,” but the

discussion also makes clear that evidence may be relevant in some § 1983 cases. 912 F.3d at

439 (citation omitted); see Florek v. Village of Mundelein, 649 F.3d 594, 601–03 (7th Cir. 2011)

(addressing the admissibility of expert testimony regarding police policies).

8 But if Hecker drove with the intent to injure Johnson or with a reckless disregard for

Johnson’s safety, Hecker may be liable on Johnson’s excessive force claim, addressed below.

refuses a seatbelt. Accordingly, Mata and Hecker are entitled to summary judgment

on Johnson’s state-created danger claim.9

C. Excessive Force

In Count III, Johnson alleges that Hecker used excessive force in violation of

the Fourth Amendment while transporting him to the police station. [Dkt. 91 ¶¶ 39–

46.] Specifically, Johnson alleges that Hecker “intentionally came to a sudden stop,”

causing him “to lurch forward, bashing his head on the squad car’s interior metal and

plastic.” [Id. ¶ 42.] The use of excessive force by police is an unreasonable seizure

under the Fourth Amendment. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989).

Whether the amount of force an officer used is excessive or reasonable

turns on the “facts and circumstances of each particular case.” The

standard of reasonableness for a police officer in an excessive force case

is “an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are

objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting

them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”

Burton v. City of Zion, 901 F.3d 772, 777 (7th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up) (quoting

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97). Defendants argue that Hecker is entitled to summary

judgment because his driving was objectively reasonable or, in the alternative, his

conduct did not violate clearly established law. [Dkt. 110 at 9–10, 15–16.]

Defendants’ merits briefing is somewhat off topic. They cite the Fourth

Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard at a high level, then turn to the

9 Johnson also argues that two cases Defendants cite, Fluker v. County of Kankakee,

945 F. Supp. 2d 972 (C.D. Ill. 2013), and Young v. Department of Corrections, 2007 WL

2214520 (E.D. Mich. July 27, 2007), are distinguishable. [Dkt. 122 at 10.] Because the Court

has not relied on these cases, it does not address these arguments, except to note that a state-

created danger claim arises under the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment,

and it incorporates a standard similar to Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference. See Est.

of Her, 939 F.3d at 875–76. [Contra Dkt. 122 at 10.]

admittedly “higher standard” for deliberate indifference claims under the Eighth

Amendment. [Id. at 10.] While sometimes reasoning by analogy to another body of

law is helpful, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is a poor analytical fit for Fourth

Amendment claims. The former has both subjective and objective components, see

Balle v. Kennedy, 73 F.3d 545, 552–53 (7th Cir. 2023), and Eighth Amendment claims

are routinely rejected when a plaintiff lacks evidence that the defendant subjectively

knew about the danger to the plaintiff, even if an reasonable official in his position

would have known, e.g., Est. of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 747 (7th Cir. 2017)

(“The rule is that an official who should have, but failed, to perceive a significant risk

cannot be held liable.” (citation omitted)). But the Fourth Amendment’s excessive

force standard is objective, imposing liability when a reasonable official would have

known that the force in question was unreasonable, regardless of the defendant’s

subjective belief. Burton, 901 F.3d at 777. So Defendants are incorrect that “[a]bsent

evidence to support that Hecker Jr. intended to punish [Johnson], or that he

knowingly or purposefully took an action to harm [Johnson], the claim fails.” [Dkt.

110 at 9 (citation omitted).] The question is whether his actions were “objectively

reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard

to their underlying intent or motivation.” Burton, 901 F.3d at 777 (cleaned up).10

10 Defendants’ reliance on Scott v. City of Philadelphia, 2019 WL 3530909 (E.D. Pa. Aug.

1, 2019) [Dkt. 110 at 9], illustrates the twofold peril of citing out-of-circuit caselaw applying

to different factual circumstances. Scott involved an excessive force claim by a pretrial

detainee, which is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, not the

Fourth or Eighth Amendment. See Jump v. Village of Shorewood, 42 F.4th 782, 792–93 (7th

Cir. 2022) (explaining when each Amendment applies). That might not be a problem had

Scott arisen in the Seventh Circuit, which applies the objective reasonableness test to both

The Court is also skeptical of Defendants’ implicit argument that no reasonable

jury could conclude that Hecker’s driving was unreasonable considering the in-car

camera footage [Dkt. 110 at 9–10.] At minimum, the fuzzy video leaves much open to

interpretation, cf. Kailin, 77 F.4th at 480–81. Their arguments might convince a jury

that “slowing down and braking as [Hecker] approached the intersection of 75th Street

and Vincennes[ ] was objectively reasonable” [Dkt. 110 at 10], but the camera (of

course) does not capture Hecker’s thoughts when he braked. It is not “so definitive

that there could be no reasonable disagreement about [whether] the video depicts” a

reasonable decision to stop before a busy intersection or an attempt to jostle an

aggravating passenger. See Kailin, 77 F.4th at 481 (citation omitted). [Dkt. 122 at

11–12 (arguing that a jury could rely on Hecker’s earlier speeding and rolling through

stop signs and red lights to conclude that he “intentionally chose to brake with

force”).] If the outcome of Johnson’s excessive force claim hinged on whether Hecker’s

actions were reasonable, a jury would need to decide that question.

But uncertainty of the merits aside, Defendants prevail on qualified immunity.

Johnson cites the correct standard, noting the need for a factually analogous case or

obviously unconstitutional conduct [Dkt. 122 at 14–15], but he makes little attempt

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, see id. at 793, but the Third Circuit applies the

deliberate indifference standard to Fourteenth Amendment claims by pretrial detainees,

Scott, 2019 WL 3530909, at *2 (citing Edwards v. Northampton County, 663 F. App’x 132,

135 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam)). Scott dismissed the claims against the officers transporting

the plaintiff detainee because he had not alleged facts showing that the defendants were

subjectively aware of a danger to him, not because an objectively reasonable officer could

have driven as the defendants did. Cf. id. at *3 (“[W]here the plaintiff’s allegations of reckless

driving are coupled with allegations that the driver intended harm, refused to slow down

after being asked, or declined to fasten an inmate’s seatbelt despite the inmate’s

protestations, courts have found a basis for a constitutional claim.” (citations omitted)).

to meet his burden under that standard. See Taylor, 10 F.4th at 806. He asserts that

“the Northern District of Illinois has declared qualified immunity a poor defense for

§ 1983 actions at summary judgment where ‘the parties differ materially as to the

circumstances that confronted the official,’” and argues that his brief’s discussion of

the factual disputes as to the merits makes qualified immunity inappropriate at this

stage. [Id. at 15 (quoting Morgan v. Stringer, 945 F. Supp. 1129, 1133 (N.D. Ill.

1996)).] He adds that “[c]ourts have precluded [the] qualified immunity defense on …

excessive force claims at the summary judgment stage,” citing Levan v. George, 604

F.3d 366 (7th Cir. 2010), as an example. [Dkt. 122 at 15.] He submits that like in

Levan, “here there are material disputes regarding” Hecker’s “use of excessive force,”

so “the Court should reserve these disputes for the trier of fact[ ].” [Id. at 16.]

This approach to qualified immunity will not do. The Supreme Court has made

plain that “[s]pecificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context”

because “[u]se of excessive force is an area of the law in which the result depends very

much on the facts of each case, and thus police officers are entitled to qualified

immunity unless existing precedent squarely governs the specific facts at issue.”

Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152–53 (2018) (per curiam) (cleaned up).

Analyzing whether existing precedent puts the legality of an officer’s conduct beyond

debate “is a necessary part of the qualified-immunity standard.” Id. at 1153. True,

sometimes factual disputes will preclude granting qualified immunity on the

summary judgment record, cf., e.g., Smith, 10 F.4th at 746–49, but that does not

obviate the need for a plaintiff to furnish the legal basis upon which to deny qualified

immunity—caselaw on point or an obvious violation of the Constitution, see Stockton,

44 F.4th at 620–61. Johnson has not done so; therefore, he has not carried his burden

of defeating qualified immunity. See Taylor, 10 F.4th at 806. Hecker is entitled to

summary judgment on Johnson’s excessive force claim.

D. Failure to Provide Medical Care

Johnson’s last § 1983 claim, Count IV, alleges that Edwards and Hecker failed

to provide him adequate medical care despite an obvious need for medical treatment.

[Dkt. 91 ¶¶ 47–56.] Because the alleged failure to provide adequate medical care

occurred before a judicial probable cause determination, the Fourth Amendment

governs this claim. Braun, 56 F.4th at 551. The Court “ask[s] whether the officer’s

conduct was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances,” considering the

following factors: “(1) whether the officer had notice of the detainee’s medical needs;

(2) the seriousness of the medical need; (3) the scope of the requested treatment; and

(4) police interests, including administrative, penological, or investigative concerns.”

Id. (cleaned up). Additionally, the objectively unreasonable conduct must cause the

plaintiff’s injury. See Ortiz v. City of Chicago, 656 F.3d 523, 534 (7th Cir. 2011). The

Court disagrees with some of Defendants’ framing of this claim, but it agrees that

Edwards and Hecker are entitled to summary judgment. [See Dkt. 10–12.]11

11 Defendants argue that (1) a claim for “denial” of medical care necessarily fails when

the plaintiff receives medical care and (2) a plaintiff must have an “objectively serious”

medical need to maintain a Fourth Amendment claim failure to provide medical care. [Dkt.

110 at 10–12.] The former seems not to conform with Seventh Circuit precedent, which

frames the inquiry as “whether police violated [Johnson’s] constitutional rights by failing to

respond reasonably to [his] medical needs.” Florek v. Village of Mundelein, 649 F.3d 594, 599

(7th Cir. 2011). The latter is another inapt analogy to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,

In light of the video evidence, no reasonable jury could conclude that Johnson

suffered any harm because of an unreasonable failure to provide medical care. See

Kailin, 77 F.4th at 481. A jury could not find that much, if any, of Edwards’s or

Hecker’s conduct was objectively unreasonable. After Hecker braked suddenly,

Johnson cried out and soon fell silent. [Dkt. 125 (seventh link) at 45:13.] Hecker

continued driving and reached the police station two and a half minutes later; he

parked the car roughly 30 seconds after that. [Dkt. 106 ¶ 33; Dkt. 123 ¶ 33; Dkt. 125

(seventh link) at 47:37–48:15.] Less than a minute after parking, Hecker attempted

to remove Johnson from the car and noticed that he appeared to be unconscious. [Dkt.

125 (seventh link) at 49:00.] Under a minute later, someone indicated that Johnson

would need to be taken to the hospital. [Id. at 49:42; see Dkt. 106 ¶ 38; Dkt. 123 ¶ 38.]

In short, Edwards and Hecker acted approximately as quickly as the Seventh Circuit

held was a reasonable time to respond after discovering a detainee hanging in a cell.

See Pulera v. Sarzant, 966 F.3d 540, 555 (7th Cir. 2020) (noting that the defendants

“had the pressure off [the detainee’s] neck in less than two minutes, and summoned

an ambulance in less than five”). No reasonable factfinder could find Edwards’s or

Hecker’s similar conduct constitutionally infirm.

Johnson’s counterarguments are unconvincing. First, he suggests that

Edwards and Hecker needed to act “immediately” [Dkt. 122 at 12–13], but Seventh

which requires showing “an objectively serious medical condition,” Brown v. LaVoie, 90 F.4th

1206, 1212 (7th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted), whereas the Fourth Amendment standard

depends on the totality of the circumstances; while “the seriousness of the medical need” is

relevant, “[o]ne should not fixate on factors,” Florek, 649 F.3d at 600 (quotation omitted).

Circuit precedent squarely forecloses that argument. Pulera, 966 F.3d at 555 (“The

Fourth Amendment requires reasonableness, not immediacy.” (quotation omitted)).

Next, he argues that Edwards and Hecker acted unreasonably by “fail[ing] to

check on the unconscious [Johnson] until they arrived at the police station, minutes

after they heard him hit the plexiglass divider.” [Dkt. 122 at 13.] But the Constitution

does not demand an officer put himself at risk when there is a reasonable alternative.

Cf. Pulera, 966 F.3d at 555–56 (“Perhaps the officers could have acted faster, but the

Constitution does not demand perfection. Nor does it demand that a correctional

officer enter a potentially dangerous situation before back-up can arrive.” (citations

omitted)). It could have been dangerous to park on the side of the street in the early

hours of the morning, and Johnson does not suggest how stopping would have helped

matters; would medical help have been summoned and arrived faster? With the police

station so near, a reasonable officer could have concluded that the best course was to

check on Johnson once there. It is improper to rely on a “hindsight-laden assessment

of … officers’ actions” when assessing their constitutionality. Id. at 555. Even

assuming that Johnson’s proposal would have improved the quality of care he

received, the corresponding negative impact on the police’s interest in officer safety

would outweigh any benefit, meaning that a reasonable jury could not find Edwards’s

and Hecker’s conduct unreasonable. See Braun, 56 F.4th at 551; cf., e.g., United States

v. Salazar, 69 F.4th 474, 477 (7th Cir. 2023) (explaining, in another context, that the

Fourth Amendment recognizes an interest in officer safety).

Johnson also cites Kudla v. City of Hammond, 2022 WL 2171229, at *5 (N.D.

Ind. June 16, 2022), for the proposition that “[i]n the case where an arrestee loses

consciousness, a reasonable response includes observing them, checking their

breathing and pulse, calling an ambulance, rubbing their sternum, and removing

their handcuffs.” [Dkt. 122 at 12.] But Kudla does not support Johnson’s position.

There, the court held that taking those actions constituted reasonable medical care

under the circumstances, but it did not suggest that they were required by the

Constitution. 2022 WL 2171229, at *5. In fact, Kudla recognized that “[t]he Fourth

Amendment requires reasonableness, not immediacy,” id. (quoting Pulera, 966 F.3d

at 555), and that “[p]romptly calling an ambulance after being notified of an arrestee’s

medical need ‘will typically qualify as reasonable,’” id. (quoting Florek, 649 F.3d at

601)). That is, in effect, what happened here: first responders arrived to provide

medical care a mere six minutes after the medical need was identified and 13 minutes

after the initial injury. [See Dkt. 125 (third link, ninth link) (body-worn camera

footage time stamps 08:17:41, 08:24:57, 08:30:00).]

The Court has yet to discuss the most fundamental problem with Johnson’s

arguments about the reasonableness of Edwards’s and Heckers’s actions: Johnson

complains about a delay in medical treatment, not an outright denial, but he does not

explain how any delay harmed him. See Jackson v. Sheriff of Winnebago Cnty., 74

F.4th 496, 500 (7th Cir. 2023) (explaining that a claim based on delayed medical care

requires the plaintiff to “show the delay itself caused some degree of harm” (cleaned

up)). Johnson regained consciousness in the police car before first responders arrived,

and he received medical attention. Johnson cites evidence about injuries he sustained

as a result of hitting his head [Dkt. 122 at 3–4], but he cites no evidence and offers

no argument to show that these injuries were caused or exacerbated by any delay in

treatment, as opposed to the initial impact. Therefore, even if a jury could find that

Edwards or Hecker unreasonably delayed providing medical care, Johnson’s claim

would still fail on causation grounds. See Jackson, 74 F.4th at 500. Edwards and

Hecker are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

IV. State Law Malicious Prosecution

Finally, Count V is a claim for malicious prosecution under Illinois law. [Dkt.

91 ¶¶ 57–60.] Success on a malicious prosecution claim requires a plaintiff to prove:

“(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial

proceeding by the defendant; (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the

plaintiff; (3) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (4) the presence of

malice; and (5) damages resulting to the plaintiff.” Moran v. Calumet City, 54 F.4th

483, 499 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Swick v. Liautaud, 662 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (Ill.

1996)). Defendants raise several arguments; the Court focuses on malice.12

“Malice, as an element of malicious prosecution, has been defined as the

initiation of a prosecution for an improper motive,” meaning “any reason other than

12 Because the Court grants summary judgment on Johnson’s federal claims, it could

relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over this claim. See Donald v. Wexford Health Sources,

Inc., 982 F.3d 451, 461 (7th Cir. 2020) (noting that doing so is the typical practice). No party

asks the Court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction, however, and the Court exercises its

discretion to retain jurisdiction. The parties have devoted substantial resources to litigating

this claim before this Court, so judicial economy and efficiency counsel in favor of resolving

the state law claim now; additionally, the outcome on the state law claim is clear. See id.

to bring the responsible party to justice.” Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 183 N.E.3d 767, 792

(Ill. 2021) (citations omitted). Johnson accurately notes that under Illinois law, malice

can be inferred from an absence of probable cause; he argues that because a jury could

find that Defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him, the jury could also find that

Defendants acted with malice. [Dkt. 122 at 14.] See Beaman, 183 N.E.3d at 792.

Inferring malice from the absence of probable cause is not automatic, however. Such

an inference is proper “when the circumstances are inconsistent with [the defendants

acting in] good faith … and lack of probable cause has been clearly proved.” Beaman,

183 N.E.3d at 792 (citations omitted). [See Dkt. 129 at 13–14.] Whether to infer malice

from a lack of probable cause is a question of fact that will typically be for the jury,

but a plaintiff must still “come forward … with evidence that would … permit a

reasonable inference of malice.” Williams v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 749, 760 (7th

Cir. 2013) (emphasis omitted) (cited with approval by Beamon, 183 N.E.3d at 792).

Here, the Court’s conclusion that Defendants had arguable probable cause to

arrest Johnson combined with the lack of other evidence forecloses a finding of malice.

[Contra Dkt. 122 at 14 (arguing that the absence of probable cause alone permits that

finding).] At summary judgment, Johnson is “not required to ‘clearly prove’ the lack

of probable cause or to come forward with evidence that would require the court to

infer malice,” Williams, 733 F.3d at 760, but under Illinois law there must be evidence

that the defendant did not act in good faith in pursuing the prosecution, see, e.g.,

Mack v. First Sec. Bank of Chi., 511 N.E.2d 714, 718 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (“Unless the

circumstances of the prosecution are inconsistent with good faith on the part of the

prosecutor, malice may not be inferred.” (citations omitted)); 54 C.J.S. Malicious

Prosecution § 57 (Aug. 2023 update) (“A lack of probable cause in bringing the

underlying action is a factor that may be considered in determining if the claim was

prosecuted with malice, since the lack of probable cause tends to show that the

accuser did not believe in the guilt of the accused, but the lack of probable cause must

be supplemented by other, additional evidence.” (footnotes omitted) (treatise cited

with approval by Beamon, 183 N.E.3d at 793)).

Defendants had arguable probable cause, so almost by definition their actions

were consistent with good faith. See Mwangangi, 48 F.4th at 825 (defining the term

to mean “that a reasonable officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same

knowledge as the officer in question could have reasonably believed that probable

cause existed in light of well-established law” (cleaned up)); cf. Williams, 733 F.3d at

758 (concluding that disputes of fact precluded even a finding of arguable probable

cause).13 The presence of arguable probable cause does not mean that a jury would

necessarily find that Defendants acted in good faith; at summary judgment, Johnson

need only introduce evidence that would permit a jury to find in his favor. See

13 The district court cases Johnson cites are likewise consistent with the Court’s reading

of Illinois law. [Dkt. 122 at 14.] In Bolden v. Pesavento, the court denied a motion for judgment

as a matter of law following a jury verdict in the plaintiff’s favor where “[t]he jury heard

evidence that Defendants sought to bring someone other than the responsible party to justice.

A jury could construe the testimony about the lineup as evidence of malice, too. … Bolden

also offered evidence, including expert testimony, that Defendants repeatedly acted in ways

contrary to their training and inconsistent with generally applicable police standards.” 623

F. Supp. 3d 897, 925–26 (N.D. Ill. 2022). In Jones-Huff v. Hill, a summary judgment decision,

the defendant argued only that the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim failed because

probable cause existed; when the court found a triable issue on probable cause, the motion

for summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim necessarily failed. 208 F. Supp. 3d

912, 924 (N.D. Ill. 2016).

Williams, 733 F.3d at 760 (explaining that the district court erred by requiring the

plaintiff to “clearly prove” the absence of probable cause). But Johnson points to no

evidence besides the lack of probable cause. [Dkt. 122 at 14; cf Dkt. 106 44 48, 50;

Dkt. 123 44 48, 50 (undisputed that Defendants did not know Johnson before their

encounter on April 21, 2019 and deemed admitted that Defendants did not speak with

prosecutors about the criminal case).] Because police officers who arrest based on

arguable probable cause act consistently with good faith, cf. Mwangangi, 48 F.4th at

825, Johnson cannot rely on his arrest alone to prove malice, see Mack, 511 N.E.2d at

718; 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 57. Johnson has come forward with no other

evidence of malice, so Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on his malicious

prosecution claim.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Dkt.

104] is granted. Judgment shall enter in favor of Defendants and against Johnson.

Civil case terminated.

Enter: 21-cv-738 2 TOO

Date: March 14, 2024

Lindsay. Jenkins □□□

United States District Judge

28